FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Hedley Bull/Stanley Hoffmann *The Conduct of U.S. Foreign Policy*—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. *Human Rights and the American Tradition*—Daniel Yankelovich *Public Opinion*—Marina Whitman *The U.S. and the International Economy*—McGeorge Bundy *The Arms Race*—Adam Ulam *U.S.-Soviet Relations*—David Watt *The European Initiative*—John C. Campbell *The Burden of Empire in the Middle East*—Stanley Karnow *The Great Transformation in Asia*—Colin Legum *Crisis in Africa*—Richard Fagen *Latin America*—*Chronology 1978*

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AMERICA AND THE WORLD 1978

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AMERICA AND THE WORLD 1978

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EDITOR'S NOTE

This is the first "extra" issue in the 56-year history of *Foreign Affairs*. It is an attempt to catch the most important events of the year 1978 on the fly, so to speak, and to assess their wider meaning almost before the ink is dry on the news headlines of December.

Since those headlines were unusually full of surprise and change, many of our authors have had to rewrite their articles extensively or even from scratch. Their willingness to do just this, and their extraordinary diligence and punctuality generally, have earned the deep gratitude of the Editors, and we hope the appreciation of our readers.

To woo Clio ardently but in limited space inevitably involves choices. We have omitted a few important but isolated events and some areas of world affairs that seemed to us relatively quiescent in this particular year—for example, the multilateral negotiations of the so-called North-South dialogue. This is not truly comprehensive history, then, although almost every loose end will at least be found in the Chronology.

Rather, its stress is on interpretive essays that connect what happened in 1978 to the past and unfolding future, and include blunt critical comment. The reader will find many disagreements here—perhaps most strikingly between the themes of the two opening overall appraisals of American foreign policy. Though it was not a year of major war or catastrophe, many of our authors do join in seeing darker times and still tougher choices ahead in 1979.

On the basis of our experience with this issue, the Editors are for the moment reinforced in the belief that a review of this sort can be a valuable contribution to informing public opinion. More than ever, we need the frank reactions of our readers on matters of substance and editorial policy alike. Our Comment and Correspondence section will resume in the Spring issue with this hope very much in mind.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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Hedley Bull

A VIEW FROM ABROAD: CONSISTENCY UNDER PRESSURE

The main objectives of President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy in his second year in office were clear enough. Toward the East he sought to maintain the momentum of détente. Toward the West he sought to preserve the coalition of liberal democracies and—in line with the prescriptions of "trilateralism"—to engage them in more intimate forms of economic consultation. In the vast and amorphous areas of the so-called South, where the Soviet Union and the Western powers do not meet in direct confrontation, his impulse was to treat the forces of change as rooted in indigenous developments rather than in superpower rivalry and to work with rather than against them.

In the course of the year developments within the United States and in the external world threatened to knock President Carter off course, but by and large he remained faithful to the main lines of his policy. Despite the rise in America of a belligerent public attitude toward the Soviet Union and difficulties created for him by Soviet policies in Africa, Carter kept America committed to the pursuit of a second agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Despite the challenge of widening economic conflict within the Western world, the policy of close collaboration among the liberal democracies was maintained.

In southern Africa, the policy of working with the forces of change was complicated by Soviet intervention, and even more by the inescapable and diametric opposition that existed between these forces and established Western positions. In Latin America, the long passage through Congress of the Panama Canal treaties underlined the difficulties America was experiencing in adjusting to the post-colonial era. In Iran—where the United States was caught unawares by forces of change now arrayed against its influence—Western policy seemed about to suffer a disaster. In relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute President Carter registered his

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most spectacular diplomatic triumph of the year in the Camp David agreements, but these did not lead—at least by the end of this year—to the expected Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, and the tie-up complicated already ominous developments in America's relations with the oil-producing Middle East countries.

Only in East Asia, where the emergence of a post-Mao China bent on rapid modernization and close relations with the Western countries signaled a major shift in the world alignment of forces—recognized by the agreement on normalization of relations between Washington and Peking announced in December—did there appear to be, at least for the time being, a true harmony between American policy and the forces of change in developing countries. Yet despite the challenges encountered in all these areas, President Carter's policy of seeking to view Third World issues in regional and local terms and to maintain a balanced view of the Soviet factor (while not denying that it existed) remained intact.

II

The main thrust of President Carter's policy toward the East was to press forward with the policy of détente toward the Soviet Union. There was, of course, a departure from the precedent of the Kissinger era because of Carter's emphasis on relations with allies rather than enemies, and on relations with particular Soviet bloc countries rather than with the Soviet bloc as a whole, as well as his disavowal of some of the methods by which Kissinger had sought to pursue détente—the insistence upon explicit "linkage" between SALT and other issues, the "bargaining chip" approach to arms control negotiations, the reliance upon personal and secret diplomacy. It is also true that President Carter in his election campaign had had to take account of the tide of feeling against détente that had been rising in the United States since the Angola crisis of 1975 to the extent of dropping the term from his political vocabulary. Even he himself on first coming into office had seemed ready to jeopardize détente by championing the rights of dissenting Soviet citizens and by departing drastically from the 1974 Vladivostok arms control understandings in the abortive March 1977 SALT proposals with which Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was sent to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Carter Administration sought to build upon the work of the Nixon and Ford Administrations in preserving and deepening the structure of understanding between the superpowers.

During the year a whole series of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union were in progress—in fields that included nuclear

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nonproliferation, conventional arms transfers, chemical weapons, anti-satellite weapons and arms limitation in the Indian Ocean area. Although no significant agreements were concluded, new life was breathed into the long-dormant discussions of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the talks between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union; the deadlock in East-West negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions seemed as though it might ultimately be broken when the Soviet Union, in its June proposals, accepted the principle of equal ceilings on forces, which the West had been demanding since 1973; and, above all, the SALT discussions reached the stage where agreement had clearly been reached on the essentials of a SALT II treaty. The expectation, at the end of the year, was that President Carter and President Leonid Brezhnev would soon meet to sign the treaty and thus demonstrate the continuing vitality of the détente process, of which SALT was the centerpiece and chief symbol.

But in the course of the year the reactions evoked in the West, and especially in the United States, by Soviet conduct had again made the policy of détente deeply controversial, so much so that the forthcoming debate over U.S. ratification of a SALT II treaty, already being compared in its fatefulness to the debate on the Versailles Treaty, seemed to overshadow every other issue of world politics. Three elements in Soviet policy were the subject of concern. One was the continuation of "the Soviet military build-up" in the strategic nuclear area, in forces deployed facing NATO in Central Europe and in the Soviets' capacity for intervention in the Third World, all of which showed, according to groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger in the United States, that the Soviet Union was aiming not at military parity with the United States but at superiority.

A second element was the continued apparent disregard by the Soviet Union of the obligations it had assumed under the 1975 Helsinki Accords toward the human rights of its own citizens, highlighted during the course of the year by the intransigence of the Soviet Union at the conference that met in Belgrade from October 1977 until March 1978 to review the Helsinki agreements, and by the sentences passed on the Soviet dissidents Yuri Orlov, Aleksandr Ginzburg and Anatoly Shcharansky.

The third element was Soviet and Cuban military intervention in support of Ethiopia in its conflict with Somalia over the Ogaden region in January-March and in its long-standing conflict with the Eritrean secessionists, together with the alleged involvement of Cuba in the incursion of insurgent forces based in Angola into the

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Zaïrean province of Shaba in May. These events showed that Soviet military intervention in Africa was a continuing factor, the more alarming because of its bearing upon the conflicts under way in Namibia and Zimbabwe and expected ultimately to break out in the Republic of South Africa.

Responding to these developments and to the pressures they evoked within the United States, President Carter spoke in strong terms—as at Wake Forest University on March 9—about the determination of the United States not to allow any other nation to achieve military superiority with or without a SALT treaty, and a number of steps were taken to enhance U.S. military capability. The Shcharansky trial led to the cancellation of some planned official visits to the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Cuban interventions and alleged interventions in Africa were roundly denounced, and led the Administration—first in a statement by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski on March 1, later in a major speech by the President at Annapolis on June 7—to qualify its previously enunciated policy of not seeking to link the SALT issue to other areas of the Soviet-American relationship. While the Administration, the President said, had no desire to make such linkage, the public might do so: "To be stable, to be supported by the American people, and to be a basis for widening the scope of cooperation, détente must be broadly defined and truly reciprocal."

Nevertheless, the Carter Administration did not swerve from its basic course. Although reported to be divided on the question of linking SALT to other issues, it did not qualify its own commitment to the SALT process. While making clear to the Soviets that the United States, too, was prepared to act on the principle that détente does not imply the cessation of ideological struggle, it was careful not to antagonize the Soviet Union in ways that might have endangered the détente process itself. After the high point of the sentencing of the dissidents in July, there was a certain cooling of the "human rights offensive" against Moscow. There was not any disposition to embark upon the policy of "playing the China card," in the sense of seeking to align the United States militarily with China or supply it with defense equipment, and America's normalization of relations with China at the end of the year passed off without expressions of Soviet hostility or alarm and indeed even with ostensible Soviet blessing. The more orthodox line in pursuit of SALT II and the strengthening of détente, associated with Secretary of State Vance and Soviet affairs adviser Marshall Shulman, seemed to have prevailed over the more skeptical line attributed to Brzezinski. By November President Carter was speak-

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ing of an improvement that had taken place in America's relations with the Soviet Union, and anticipating a meeting with President Brezhnev early in the new year that would bring the second phase of SALT to a conclusion.

President Carter's steadfastness in pursuit of SALT II displayed a finer judgment of the position of the United States in the world than did that of his critics. Great powers, if they are to be recognized as such, have to act responsibly, and the responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union is to pursue together—indefinitely and with the utmost seriousness—ways of alleviating the menace which is presented by the weapons they possess to the rest of the world. The results of the SALT process—in terms of its impact upon the stability of the strategic balance and the reduction of superpower strategic arms levels and expenditures—may be small, the progress slow, the demands of nuclear "have-nots" for radical disarmament no nearer to being satisfied and the process itself surrounded with humbug. But if the United States were seen to slacken its commitment it would create widespread alarm and risk forfeiting its claims to leadership.

It does not follow from this that any SALT II agreement is better than none, or that debate about the details of the proposed agreement is not vitally necessary. It cannot be argued in relation to SALT II, as it could be with reference to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, that concluding the proposed agreement as it stands is essential to the process of détente itself: even without SALT II, much of the structure of Soviet-American understanding might remain. Yet one's impression of the SALT II debate in America is that it is only apparently about the details of the proposed agreement, and that the chief issue at stake is détente itself—whether the United States should still strive to relax tension and broaden the scope of cooperation with its adversary or should enter a new phase of combativeness. The latter prospect is viewed by America's European and Pacific allies, and by most of the international community apart from China, with fear and alarm.

It is difficult to feel any sympathy for the argument that SALT or the wider détente process was somehow invalidated by the Soviet military buildup. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said repeatedly during the year, this did not in fact represent an actual or likely upset of the military balance. One of the factors underlying the campaign against SALT II in the United States was clearly that old attachment to American strategic primacy that had prevented Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms control from getting under way before 1969. The old American strategic

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ascendancy—at the strategic nuclear level, and in naval and global interventionary power—was basically at odds with the requirements of international order. International order has to be founded upon a general balance of military power. It is the United States which throughout the post-1945 period has been the potentially dominant power, no less so because of its virtues. It is important that some state or group of states should undertake the task of balancing the power of the United States. For the present this can only be the Soviet Union.

Nor can one be impressed by the argument that Soviet disregard of human rights provides a reason for relaxing America's commitment to SALT or to détente. It is one thing to make known America's disapproval of the Soviet government's treatment of its citizens in the matter of human rights, but another to make changes in Soviet internal policy the condition of agreements entered into with the United States. In terms of traditional principles governing the relations of sovereign states, Soviet protests on this score have been justified. When the agreements at stake concern the control of nuclear arsenals and the responsibilities of the nuclear superpowers as trustees for the security of mankind, it would be particularly irresponsible to allow one's priorities to be distorted by the hope of reforming the Soviet political system.

III

In his policy toward the West, President Carter had committed himself to repairing his predecessors' neglect of America's allies, and was also encouraged by the successes of democracy in southern Europe and driven by his own belief in human rights toward a renewed sense of ideological communion with the liberal democracies. He sought in the strategic area to invigorate the Western alliance and in the economic area to move toward closer consultation and collaboration.

In the strategic area the Carter Administration's efforts had a smooth enough passage. Among the North Atlantic allies President Carter's handling of the "neutron bomb" affair in April—first trying to persuade the allies to endorse it, then deferring production on it—was a source of irritation; there was mounting evidence of concern about the exclusion from both the SALT and the regional force reductions (MBFR) discussions of the control of those Soviet strategic weapons that could not reach the United States but could reach Western Europe; and still troubling were the related issues of nuclear nonproliferation policy and the

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development of nuclear energy, which in 1977 had led to friction between the United States on the one hand and France and Germany on the other. But the overall sense of common purpose underlying the alliance was perhaps stronger than it had been for many years on both sides of the Atlantic.

The weakening of détente and the concern caused by the Soviet military buildup tended to diminish both neutralism in Europe and neo-isolationism in North America. President Carter in January was able to announce a strengthening of the U.S. forces in Western Europe together with an improvement in capacity for reinforcement, and the NATO Council meeting in Washington at the end of May announced a commitment to a three-percent increase in real (or inflation-discounted) defense spending and a new ten-year defense program. The threat thought to be presented to NATO by Eurocommunism, that had loomed so large in the last days of the Kissinger era, seemed to recede with the victory of the Center-Right coalition in the French elections in March, just as President Carter's own more relaxed attitude toward Eurocommunism removed the anxiety that had been felt in Europe that the United States might over-react to it.

President Carter's success in bringing the Senate in July and the House of Representatives in August to end the arms embargo against Turkey removed an obstacle to that country's reintegration into the alliance. The survival of democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece, and the steps being taken to incorporate those countries within the European Community, seemed to show that the Western coalition was based not merely on opposition to communism but on positive values of its own. In the Pacific also, the basis of American strategic cooperation with Japan and with Australia and New Zealand was securely founded upon heightened concern about the Soviet Union and continued improvement of relations with China.

In the economic area, however, ominous cracks within the Western coalition were appearing. Continued slow growth within the North American, West European and Japanese economies, increased competition from the new industrializing countries, concern over the availability of energy and other raw materials, and the continued inability of governments to hold down inflation and unemployment to acceptable levels were engendering a new spirit of conflict. In trade relations among the industrialized countries, protectionist pressures were becoming stronger, even though they were not yet out of control and governments were still committed to the liberal trading system. Uncertain of access to one

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another's markets, the advanced industrialized countries were involved in heightened rivalry for the markets of the Third World, on which they had become increasingly dependent. Japan was involved in acrimonious disputes with the United States and the European Community over its export surpluses. The United States was roundly condemned by both Japan and Western Europe for failing to curb its energy consumption.

The deepest crack was in the dollar-based international monetary system. The drastic depreciation of the dollar in relation to most other currencies, reflecting the failure of the United States either to curb its energy import bill or to develop its export trade sufficiently to compensate for it, proceeded throughout the year until it was stabilized by the November rescue package. It gave rise to increased instability in foreign exchange markets, widening payments imbalances and widespread loss of confidence in U.S. management both of its own economy and of the dollar-based exchange and payments system. The decision taken at the European Community summit in Bremen in July to endorse the Franco-German scheme for a European Monetary System was from one point of view an attempt to take the Community a further stage toward its goal of integration; but it was also a step taken by Community countries to decouple Community exchanges and payments from the dollar and from American management of the dollar system.

The Carter Administration sought to contain these fissures within the trilateral world in a variety of ways. In common with its allies it continued to uphold the goal of further trade liberalization being pursued at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations at Geneva during the year. By September the Carter Administration's energy legislation—the first of a series of measures aimed at reducing the oil import bill and developing alternative sources of fuel—had passed Congress, though in emasculated form, and an export drive, modelled upon the efforts of countries more dependent on foreign markets than the United States has traditionally been, had been launched: both of these measures were designed in part to help stabilize the dollar. At the OECD ministerial meeting in Paris in June, Secretary Vance outlined a program for a return to sustained growth in the advanced industrial countries, for expanded world trade and for national policies of adaption to structural change, rather than resorting to the protection of inefficient industries. At the seven-nation Bonn economic summit in July—the successor to the London economic summit of 1977 and the principal expression of the trilateral element in the Carter

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Administration's thinking—the United States committed itself to cut oil imports, Germany and Japan to stimulate growth, and all to combat inflation, resist protectionism and expand trade.

In a year that saw a certain decline in the salience of "North–South" economic tension in world politics, there was a good deal of prominence given to the new specter of "the disintegrating West." But those who claimed to see in these rivalries the "contradictions" that would lead capitalism to its doom overlooked the underlying vitality of the Western alliance at the political and strategic levels. There was also an unwarranted element of economic determinism in the official ideology itself, according to which a division of the West into separate trading blocs was bound to stimulate political rivalry and war, as it was said to have done in the 1930s. It is by no means clear that a system of economic blocs or quasi-blocs, such as may now be developing, is incompatible with the political and strategic unity of the West or with the preservation of a sense of common responsibility for management of the international economy.

IV

In East Asia the principal development in U.S. foreign policy was the agreement to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China, announced to a startled world in mid-December. The secrecy that surrounded the negotiation of this agreement was reminiscent of Henry Kissinger's diplomatic revolution of 1971, but the normalization agreement was in no way revolutionary but rather a natural completion of processes already in train. Normalization had been promised by President Carter in his election campaign and expected since President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972. There was no question in 1978, as there had been in 1971–72, of a price to be paid for a shock delivered to Japan: the formula of a diplomatic mission in Peking and a trade office in Taipei was the one the Japanese had already adopted for themselves, while Japan (actively encouraged by the United States) had herself just moved dramatically closer to China with the historic Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded with Peking in August.

America's West European allies had also been drawing closer to China in the course of the year, both for economic reasons and as a consequence of a deepening perception of shared strategic interests. The normalization agreement was no isolated act of U.S. policy but was part of a general process of rapprochement, sought on both sides between China and the Western powers acting in parallel. The agreement was, of course, denounced by the Taiwan

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government and the Taiwan lobby in America (the United States indicated that it would exercise its right to terminate the defense agreement with Taiwan, and did not succeed in wringing from Peking a commitment to abstain from the use of force in solving the Taiwan problem), but this could hardly have been otherwise.

During most of 1978 the Carter Administration's policy in East Asia had appeared to be mainly a passive one. Although National Security Adviser Brzezinski visited Peking in May, stimulating discussion of the common security interests of the two countries, progress toward normalization was not known to be taking place. Nor were there any striking U.S. initiatives taken in relation to Japan, apart from continued attempts to have that country reduce its export surplus. The withdrawal of American ground troops from Korea was still proceeding at only a snail's pace, and was counterbalanced by measures to strengthen U.S. tactical air power. And there was no disposition to accede to Vietnam's terms for normalization.

What had appeared to justify this relative inactivity was that events in East Asia were moving in directions highly favorable to the objectives of U.S. policy without any need for encouragement from Washington. The presence of communist governments in power in Indochina had not led to the emergence of any imminent threat to non-communist governments elsewhere: the only such threat that existed in the region was the perennial one of North Korea to South Korea. The resources that communist states in Asia might conceivably have devoted to expanding their influence elsewhere in the region were largely consumed by their conflicts with one another: the Soviet Union with China, Vietnam with Cambodia, Vietnam with China. The appeal of communist ideology cannot have been strengthened by reports of border fighting among communist states, the Cambodian government's repression of its population, the persecution of the Chinese minority in Vietnam and the massive exit of refugees. Among non-communist states in the area, by contrast, there existed comparative harmony, while the economic growth and impact on international trade of countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and the Southeast Asian countries in ASEAN riveted the world's attention.

The Soviet Union found itself increasingly isolated in the region. In China Mao's successors were not seeking to mend their fences with the Soviet leadership as some had believed that they would do. The new element they brought to China's foreign policy was a concern to speed the modernization of China's economy, and this caused them to look first to the major centers of advanced

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technology—the United States, Western Europe and Japan. Japan's decision in August to conclude the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China, despite Soviet objections to the "anti-hegemony" clause which it contained, was a major setback for Soviet policy in the area, although in the light of the failure of the Soviet leaders to display any flexibility toward Japan's demands, one that can hardly have been surprising to them. Neither in the ASEAN countries, toward which China was also drawing closer, nor in relation to North Korea did the Soviet Union have any success in combating Chinese influence. Only Vietnam, which joined the Soviet bloc economic group, COMECON, in June and concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union in November, seemed to provide a secure basis for Soviet influence in the region.

Whereas in Africa and Latin America Western powers are still vulnerable to the charge that they are dominant powers maintaining a historic position of privilege, in East Asia—where the Western powers, after much blood and tears, have largely liquidated their historic position—it is the Soviet Union that is vulnerable to this charge. The Soviet Union, its Asian nationalities now increasing demographically in relation to the rest of the population and unlikely to remain immune to the stirrings of separatist sentiment, can be viewed as the last colonial power. Further, the U.S.S.R. faces unsatisfied territorial demands from the two largest states indigenous to the region—Japan and China—which are now drawing together. China, in particular, seeks to mobilize against the Soviet Union the sentiment of Asian peoples against "unequal treaties" and outside interference.

V

In the Middle East President Carter had his most dramatic success of the year—the September Camp David agreements. These agreements helped establish the President's authority in the conduct of foreign policy, which earlier in the year had been much questioned, and immensely strengthened his position in Congress and the nation. Even if the Camp David agreements do not lead to an Arab-Israeli settlement or even to an enduring Egyptian-Israeli peace, their historic importance in opening up new diplomatic avenues is not in doubt. There is, however, some question whether in seeming to solve certain of the problems of Arab-Israeli relations they do not make more difficult the solution of others.

The policy consummated at Camp David was in important respects a reversal of that which the Carter Administration had

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developed in relation to the Middle East in 1977. At that time the emphasis had been upon the pursuit of a comprehensive—all parties, all questions—solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, by way of a reconvening of the Geneva Conference that met in the aftermath of the October 1973 war, and upon working toward such an objective in tandem with the Soviet Union, as proclaimed in the October 1977 Soviet-American Joint Statement. The attempt to reconvene the Geneva Conference had not got off the ground when in November 1977 President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, followed by Prime Minister Begin's return visit to Ismailia, created the possibility of advancing the cause of peace through the unprecedented route of direct, bilateral negotiations on the most fundamental issues between Egypt and Israel.

American policy then shifted toward seeking to bring these negotiations to a conclusion—through diplomatic intercession as at the December 1977 Cairo conference, the visits of Sadat and Begin to Washington, and the July 1978 Leeds Castle conference; through pressure brought to bear on Israel to make a more generous response, as in the May 1978 vote of Congress endorsing sales of military aircraft to Egypt and Saudi Arabia along with Israel; and, finally, when the Egyptian-Israeli talks seemed to have foundered, by President Carter's inviting Sadat and Begin to Camp David. The United States was in effect returning to Mr. Kissinger's policy of 1973–75, a "step by step" approach to an Arab-Israeli settlement, executed by the United States in relation to the two major parties and leaving the Soviet Union outside.

It may be too simple a view of the Camp David agreements that they are an outline of a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, thinly disguised as the prelude to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. The link between the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the agreement setting out the framework of a wider peace involving Israel's other Arab neighbors and dealing with the West Bank and Gaza is clearly important to President Sadat, so much so that by the end of the year Israeli-Arab negotiations on the Peace Treaty had for the time being broken down on this issue. The United States, given the importance it now attaches to its relations with the Arab states other than Egypt, and especially with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, can hardly cease to interest itself in the Palestinian issue or the issue of Israel's northern and eastern frontiers. Nevertheless, it is clear that the connection between the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the comprehensive settlement is at best a loose and uncertain one.

For Israel, the gains in being relieved of the threat from the

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strongest of its neighbors—if this is indeed the outcome of the separate peace—are obvious. Israel will acquire a new freedom of diplomatic maneuver, including a freedom to deal with its other neighbors in its own way. For Egypt, too, on some interpretations, a separate peace, suitably disguised, is a sufficient objective. Under Sadat's leadership, it may be argued, Egypt has been moving for some time toward perceiving itself as primarily an Egyptian state rather than as an Arab state, as it did in the days of President Nasser: there is already a precedent for a separate peace in the armistice agreement Egypt signed in 1973, while Syrian troops were still fighting. Might it not be content to concentrate on its urgent domestic problems, or to turn toward the neighbor that menaces it to the west? Moreover, it may be argued that while an Israeli-Egyptian peace still needs to be completed by a comprehensive settlement, it was only by first breaking the logjam and treating the issues one by one that the wider goal could be approached.

As against this, however, there are certain dangers in the Camp David approach. If Israel is made stronger by the retirement of its principal adversary from the struggle, by the same token Israel's northern and eastern neighbors are made more vulnerable. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was ignored in the Camp David agreements, even though the Palestinian issue was not. It may seem that, deprived of Egypt, Israel's Arab opponents are not likely to present it with any considerable threat. This, however, leaves out of account the uncertainty of Egypt's withdrawal from the struggle and the improvement of its strategic position that would accrue from the regaining of Sinai. It does not take account of the Soviet Union, which is left in a much stronger position to present itself as the champion of Arab radicalism, is resentful at having been excluded from the settlement, and has powerful reasons for undermining it. It also neglects the financial resources of the oil-producing Arab states, the allies of the Arab states in Africa and the Islamic world, and the possibilities of the radicalization of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf states, especially in the light of the likely impact on the region of the cataclysmic events of the last few months of the year in Iran.

The disturbances in Iran dealt a more powerful blow to the existing edifice of U.S. and Western policy than any other developments in 1978. Rioting directed against the Shah's rule grew throughout the year and by September had resulted in the imposition of martial law. By late December a mass movement, bringing together the politically oriented National Front and the religious

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opposition, and responding to the direction from France of the exiled Shi'ite Muslim Ayatollah Khomeini, who was calling for an Islamic republic and the rejection of Western ways—but composed of diverse elements and uncertain in its ultimate political direction—had shaken the Shah's government to its foundations. Iran was in a state of protracted near-anarchy, with continuous confrontations of demonstrators and troops; oil production had fallen so low that it was being imported; and a mass evacuation of foreigners (a phenomenon now so common as to serve as a symbol of the West's relations with the Third World in the 1970s) was under way. It was not possible to say whether what would eventually emerge from the crisis would be a civilian or a military government, whether or not the Shah would still play any role in it, or what elements of Islamic fundamentalism, Marxist radicalism, or both might lie behind it. It did, however, seem safe to assume that the old order in Iran had gone forever, and that whatever took its place would be very much less amenable to the policies of the West.

Iran under the rule of the Shah had been a keystone in the arch of Western policy. Not only was Iran a major source of oil for the United States, Western Europe and Japan (and the chief source for South Africa and Israel), an influence for moderation among the oil-producing countries and the object of a massive transfer of goods and technology purchased with petrodollars. It had also been built up by Presidents Nixon and Ford as a source of stability in the region, a regional hegemonic power on whom the local wardenship of Western interests could be devolved: not only in the Persian Gulf (where the mantle was passed to Iran after Britain's 1971 withdrawal) but in South Asia and (as demonstrated in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict earlier in 1978) in the Horn of Africa. Not only because of its own weight but also because of its pivotal position in the Islamic world, Iran was a major element in the world power balance, whose shift out of the Western orbit (even if this shift were to prove only partial and was not a shift into the orbit of the Soviet Union) was bound to have profound repercussions.

President Carter did not fashion the policy of building upon the Shah, but inherited it and applied it, and does not seem to have critically examined it. The arms transfers to Iran continued with only minor modifications, the human rights policy was not allowed to become an obstacle, and in January Tehran was favored with a presidential visit. When the crisis flared to major proportions the President himself and Secretary Vance (in common with British Prime Minister Callaghan) made strong statements in support of

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the Shah, which will now complicate the business of coming to terms with a successor government. There were complaints in Washington at the failure of the intelligence services to provide warning about the lack of stable foundations for the Shah's Iran, into which the Western countries had poured such a vast quantity of material resources and upon which it had built such extravagant hopes. But that the whole unwieldy structure was built on sand and not on rock should not have been difficult to see; it is not as if this were the first time stability had been wrongly imputed to a congenial government in the Third World.

The Soviet Union is now well placed to be a beneficiary of these developments. Even before the emergence of the crisis in Iran, it had been strengthening its position in the surrounding region. The April coup in Afganistan established a pro-Soviet government in that country, which at once led to fears that it would stimulate Pathan and Baluchi risings in Pakistan. The June coup in Aden established a pro-Soviet communist government in South Yemen. Turkey under Prime Minister Ecevit moved in a neutralist direction during the year, and in June concluded a non-aggression treaty with Moscow. The Ethiopian victories against the Somalis and Eritreans in the spring, brought about with Soviet and Cuban assistance, appeared to secure Soviet influence, at least for the time being, across the Red Sea. Syria and Iraq, in part reacting against the Camp David agreements, were drawing close to Moscow. The political earthquake in Iran, and the shocks emanating from it that will soon be felt in the Persian Gulf states and in Saudi Arabia, will provide new opportunities.

The Soviet Union, however, cannot be held responsible for having brought about the changes in Iran, and has no more reason than the West to look forward to an Iran committed to Islamic fundamentalism. The basic problem for Western policy is to understand the changes taking place in Iran and make appropriate adjustments to them, and this problem would have to be faced even if the Soviet Union did not exist. What is so arresting about the changes in Iran is that they represent not a bourgeois revolt against a traditionalist autocracy or a socialist revolt against capitalism or a nationalist revolt against colonialism but—at least on the face of it—a religious and traditionalist revolt against modernization. We do not yet know, however, whether this is a total or only a partial rejection of modernization, whether it represents simply a Luddite phase that will quickly pass or an enduring development, or whether it expresses mainly local factors or the wider contemporary revival of Islam.

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VI

President Carter's main thrust in relation to the South was to seek to make a new effort to come to terms with the revolt of the Third World countries against Western domination: harking back to Franklin D. Roosevelt's anti-imperialism and Good Neighbor policies and to John F. Kennedy's efforts to forge closer links with nonaligned governments, Carter sought to alter the perception of the United States as a power hostile to change, especially in Latin America and black Africa.

This policy was advanced—or, in any event, a crushing defeat of it was averted—when the Senate in March and April ratified the Panama Canal treaties, which had been signed by President Carter in September 1977, thus at last bringing to a conclusion the process of negotiation that President Lyndon B. Johnson had opened with Panama 14 years previously. For all the provisions in the treaties ensuring American management of the Canal Zone until the end of the century and rights to protect its neutrality in perpetuity, the assurances of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that America's strategic interests in the waterway would be enhanced, and the claim of President Carter that Theodore Roosevelt himself would have endorsed the treaties, they have not made America's position in the Canal secure, for this is beyond the power of any treaties to accomplish. While they provide the American public with the illusion that things will not basically be changed, they do not satisfy the demands of the Panamanians, who are now most likely to focus on the revision of the treaties and the reopening of the issue. But the American public would hardly have settled for less; while President Carter, whose investment of time and attention in the Panama treaties issue was much criticized at the time, at least prevented what would have been a catastrophe for his Latin American policy and brought America past one milestone on the long road to adjustment to the post-colonial era.

VII

The Carter Administration's new "affirmative" policy toward black Africa, in part the overflow into foreign affairs of America's own civil rights revolution, was pursued vigorously in a year that saw the first state visit to black Africa by an American President (when Carter visited Nigeria in April), Ambassador Andrew Young's daring speeches at the United Nations and elsewhere early in the year (he became progressively less vocal as time wore on), the resolute pressing of the Anglo-American proposals for a

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Rhodesian settlement, the policy of working with the U.N. majority toward elections in Namibia, and the implementation of the U.N. arms embargo against South Africa. Yet it was clear that the policy was running into heavy weather.

Part of the difficulty arose from Soviet and Cuban intervention in Africa. The Carter Administration had been insistent that African issues should be viewed on their own merits and not simply as part of the East-West conflict. But if the Soviet Union and Cuba introduced an East-West element into the African equation, could the United States afford to ignore it?

On the one hand, there were those who argued, as Kissinger had done in relation to the Angolan civil war in 1975, that Soviet intervention in Africa needed to be met by some form of counter-intervention, direct or indirect. But the Soviet Union and Cuba, in backing Ethiopia against the Somali incursion into the Ogaden and in supporting the Ethiopian government against the Eritrean separatists, were intervening at the request of an incumbent government and within the consensus of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in favor of the preservation of existing frontiers. Had Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia after the latter withdrew its forces from the Ogaden it seems possible that some action might have been taken: Iran and Saudi Arabia warned Ethiopia that they would not stand by if Somalia were attacked, but this did not transpire.

At the other extreme there were those who argued that no response to the Soviet Union and Cuba was called for, since the more they intervened in Africa, the more they would get bogged down in their own Vietnams and defeat their own objectives. This argument, however, assumed that the Soviet or Cuban intervention would take the crass and insensitive form it had taken in a number of interventions by Western powers. It was, of course, possible that the Soviet Union and Cuba would outstay their welcome in Africa, and come to be perceived as having stepped into the shoes of the colonialists and neocolonialists. This, after all, is how they were already perceived in Egypt and Somalia, which together with Zaïre and Cambodia attacked Soviet intervention in Africa at the Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in July. But this was not the predominant perception in black Africa.

The Carter Administration reacted strongly in verbal terms against Soviet and Cuban policy. As noted above, it drew attention to the link that American public opinion would make between events in Africa and the SALT issue. It supported materially the Franco-Belgian intervention in the Shaba province of Zaïre—

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which, however, can hardly be regarded as counterintervention inasmuch as Cuban involvement in the operation was doubtful. But it did not endorse any form of direct or indirect counterintervention, nor in the end endorse the proposal for a pan-African intervention force, outside the framework of the OAU, that was discussed by West European officials at a meeting in Paris in June.

The weakness of the Western powers in Africa is that, because of the historic position they have inherited as former colonial powers, as current "neocolonial" powers and as mainstays of the white supremacist governments, it is against them that African nationalist movements have been and still are principally directed. The strength of the Soviet Union is that (in contrast to its position in Asia) it has no historical entanglement in Africa, and is free to ally itself with the forces opposing colonialism, neocolonialism and white supremacy, which it correctly judges to be the winning side. In the view of most African states and movements it is the Western powers—through their de facto support of South Africa and Rhodesia, their predominant economic (and, in the case of some francophone territories, military) presence, their continued resort to military action in defense of citizens, as in the Franco-Belgian action—that even today are the prime intervenors in African affairs, and the Soviet Union and its Cuban ally that are the counterintervenors.

The primary objective of Western powers in Africa, as the Carter Administration has seen, should be to disengage themselves from their support of positions of dominance and to come to terms with African nationalism. Soviet intervention complicates the achievement of this objective, but does not make it any less primary. It is by pressing on toward the fashioning of a new relationship with black Africa—and not by counterinterventionary operations against the Soviets mounted in disregard of African opinion—that the Western powers can in the long run best protect those economic and strategic interests in Africa which Soviet bloc activities now threaten.

Coming to terms with black Africa, however, is a policy that is easier to recommend than to carry out. The Western societies, which have to be brought to accept this policy by such visionaries as President Carter and Ambassador Young, are societies in which there is a keen awareness of present strategic and economic interests well served by a southern Africa constituted as it is now, and in which there is as much or more willingness to empathize with white kith and kin in southern Africa as with black nationalism. The African nationalist movements with which these Western

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societies are asked to come to terms, moreover, are not the opposition parties hoping to come to power in Westminster systems that Harold Macmillan had in mind when (in the prototype statement of the policy of President Carter) he told the South African Parliament that it must face "the winds of change," but are Marxist guerrillas. The cost of coming to terms with African nationalism may have to be measured not only in strategic and economic terms but also in terms of an affront to Western values. It is one thing to demand an end to the white monopoly of power in the name of "No Independence before Majority Rule" in Rhodesia, U.N.-supervised elections in Namibia or full political rights for all South Africans, but another to do so simply on the grounds that a particular armed group or combination of such groups seems bound to win.

VIII

Toward the world as a whole President Carter continued to project the vision of a new world order: in place of Kissinger's starting-point of the national interest there was a return to ideological objectives; in place of the negative ideological objective of anti-communism there was the positive one of the promotion of American values; in place of the older values of American liberal internationalism—the rights of states and of nations—there was a new emphasis on the rights of individual human beings.

President Carter's human rights policy was said to have been relegated to a lower priority after the enthusiasm of his early months in office, but in 1978 it remained prominent in American foreign policy, helping to draw the United States closer to the West and further away from the East (as a consequence of the Belgrade conference reviewing the Helsinki Accords) and from certain states in the South (where Uganda, Cambodia, Chile and Nicaragua were special targets of American criticism).

It now appears that President Carter's human rights policy has in certain respects strengthened his position in foreign policy. It has helped to restore in the American public self-respect and a sense of purpose in the world. It has provided the United States with an effective ideological weapon with which to strike back against its critics in the Socialist countries and in the Third World. It has provided a rationale for distancing the United States from unsavory governments with which it had long been associated, or at least from those of them with which the association was judged to be sufficiently unimportant.

At a deeper level President Carter's human rights offensive is an

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attempt to take account of the fact that the world political system is no longer a mere system of states: America's foreign relations are relations not only with governments, but with non-state groups and individuals in all societies—societies, moreover, which are nowhere static but everywhere in flux and open to the influence of outside ideologies. It is difficult to quarrel with the view that the United States should not stand by while others promote their values but should seek to make its own imprint on the process.

President Carter's policy, however, proceeds from the premise that other societies are awakening to a desire for human rights as these are understood in the West. "The basic thrust of human affairs," Carter said in his address to the United Nations in March 1977, "points to a more universal demand for basic human rights." One of his constant themes is that by embracing the human rights policy the United States is swimming with the tide rather than against it. It is true that much of the emphasis of President Carter's policy is upon very elementary rights, belief in the validity of which is widely shared—such as the right not to be arbitrarily arrested, tortured or imprisoned without trial. It is also true that President Carter has sought to base his condemnation of the behavior of governments on legal instruments to which they are parties rather than on subjective moral judgments. Nevertheless, the policy clearly springs from a belief in the universal validity of human rights as they are understood in the United States, especially the civil and political rights of individuals. Less attention is paid to collective rights, and to economic and social rights, which outside the Western world have provided the primary focus of interest in this subject. It is notable that in 1978, when virtually no progress took place on North-South economic differences, the United States did relatively little in the field of development assistance to demonstrate a continuing commitment to human rights in the economic domain.

As to whether or not non-Western societies will in the long run turn toward human rights as we understand them, all that can be said now is that we do not know. What we do know is that in the short run there is much evidence—in the revival of Islam, in the resurgence of traditionalist forces that (perhaps more than faith in democracy) lay behind the victory of the Janata in India, in the ascendancy of ethnic loyalties in Africa—that the move is away from Western values rather than toward them. If this is so, the achievement of President Carter's goals of détente with the East and accommodation with the South will be greatly complicated by the continued prominence given in his foreign policy to the human

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rights theme. Of course, if we really think that the rights we cherish in the West are universally valid, and are the entitlement of every human being from China to Peru, we are bound to strive for this goal even though the tide at present may run against us. The hardest question to answer about human rights is whether we really hold it to be a truth that all men have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; it is certainly not self-evident.

IX

The most important development affecting American foreign policy in 1978 was not the Soviet military buildup, nor the economic troubles of the Western world, nor the new promise at least of distant peace between Israel and its neighbors, nor the apparently still inexorable movement toward racial war in southern Africa, nor even the problem posed to Western oil supplies by instability in Iran and its neighbors. It was instead, the emergence of Teng Hsiao-ping's China, committed not only to a continuation of the conflict with the Soviet Union but also to the consolidation of closer ties with America, Europe and Japan.

This development is, of course, highly favorable to the interests of the Western powers as these are now perceived. In America, as so many times before, the events in China have given rise to a certain euphoria—based not, like the post-Vietnam China euphoria, on the attraction exerted by a country that embodied the rejection of American society and all it stood for, but this time on the attraction of a country apparently wanting to move toward the American model. But while there is every reason to welcome the present developments in China and to respond to them as America and its allies have done, there are certain dangers in the present trend.

One is that the Soviet Union, thinking itself faced with a coalition against it of all the other major centers of power in the world, will feel driven into a corner and be tempted to turn to desperate remedies. It will soon experience a change of leadership and a reappraisal of its foreign policy, and there is no reason to doubt the seriousness or the sincerity of the fears it has expressed about Western alignment with China. The Soviet Union is still a superpower, and the maintenance of cooperation with the other superpower in guarding the nuclear peace is still the first priority for American foreign policy.

There is also a need to maintain some reserve about the role of China itself. Poor countries which set out to acquire the sinews of the West have often done so in order to confront it. Chinese

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society—and Chinese foreign policy—have undergone some dramatic changes in recent years, and may do so again. Rapprochement between China and Japan, widely and rightly welcomed in America and Europe, has often been something of a specter to the Western imagination, and taken in conjunction with the economic tensions between Japan and other Western countries, it is not fanciful to consider that the present rapprochement may prove an ultimate source of difficulty.

X

In the course of 1978 the overall balance of power between the Western powers and the Soviet Union appears to have become less stable, a radical shift in either direction more possible. Ironically, the conviction grew on each side that a shift was taking place in favor of the other. In the West the fears focused upon the growth of Soviet military power and upon the new opportunities opening up for the extension of Soviet influence in Western Asia and Africa. What concerns the Soviet Union was the evidence that a new grand alliance was in process of formation between Moscow's most powerful adversaries—the United States, Western Europe and Japan—and its most implacable enemy, China.

None of this means that an actual upset of the balance of power has become any less improbable. The developments that each side fears tend to compensate one another, and the factors working against the preponderance of any one power or group of powers in the present world are formidable. But sudden and drastic changes in the present distribution of power have become more likely, and fears of them on both sides are already a fact.

We know that it is in the atmosphere created by such fears that extreme views come to sound plausible, and standard rules of the game to be brushed aside. In 1978 both the American and Soviet leadership managed still to conduct their relations according to the admittedly still vague and uncertain rules of the adversary/partnership. In 1979 the pressures upon them to do otherwise are likely to be stronger.

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Stanley Hoffmann

A VIEW FROM AT HOME: THE PERILS OF INCOHERENCE

The year 1978 was one of solid accomplishments, multiple frustrations and varied crises for American diplomacy. It saw neither great debacles nor spectacular "breakthroughs." The only event that came close to deserving this qualification—the Chinese-American announcement of the normalization of diplomatic relations—was the logical consequence of the rapprochement begun by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The other major event, Camp David, was the necessary—though far from inevitable—product of President Sadat's 1977 visit to Israel.

To an American observer trying to evaluate American foreign policy with some detachment, the single most striking feature of America's conduct in the world in 1978 was fragmentation. Washington's diplomacy went off in a bewildering variety of directions, and policymaking was marked by a number of conflicting actors and centrifugal forces. It is true that policymakers have always been impatient with demands for coherence or absolute consistency—for the world, at any moment, is riddled with contradictions, ambiguous trends, divergent currents and actions. But there is an attainable degree of coherence which requires, not the elimination of contradictions, but at least their management, indeed their good use. In the absence of a strategy which tries to channel conflicting forces and to prevent the contradictions between policies that aim at equally valid goals from breeding chaos, the conduct of foreign policy risks becoming a succession of ad hoc moves, with frequent changes of course or warring implications.

If these comments seem particularly true of 1978, the roots of American diplomatic inconsistency and contradiction go deeper than the peculiar flaws or troubles of the Carter Administration. Some may be traced to constraints and concerns that have always characterized American foreign policy; others are the result of changes in the constellation of world power that America could only marginally have influenced. Last, there are the special traits of the current policymaking group and state of mind of the

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American public. Continuities, world realities, American realities—these are the areas we will explore.

II

Indeed, from the viewpoint of a historian looking at 1978 as the 34th postwar year (or the 37th year of the United States as a continuously active great power), it would not be fragmentation but continuity that would stand out as the most remarkable feature. It is as if the United States had become the captive of the role it partly chose to play, and partly was forced into, after the Second World War.

The story itself is familiar. After 20-odd years, both the containment strategy that had been worked out around 1946, and the consensus that supported it at home, broke down over the Vietnam stalemate. Nixon and Kissinger tried to change the course of American policy: they switched from vertical diplomacy, which emphasizes relations within one's camp, to horizontal diplomacy, which stresses relations with adversaries; with respect to the two leading communist powers, they shifted relations from confrontation to détente; they changed the style of American diplomacy from ideology to Realpolitik; and, in the making of foreign policy, they let openness and coalition-building give way to secrecy and spectacle.

Yet by the time of Mr. Kissinger's departure from office, he was again stressing above all the strength of America's alliances. There was Soviet-American confrontation in Africa, an American policy in the Middle East that reduced Russia's role to very little, and no SALT II agreement. At home, the public and the political elites were asking for a return to principles, and it was clear that no foreign policy could be conducted successfully abroad unless a major new effort was made to gain the support of Congress and public opinion.[1]

When Jimmy Carter was elected, a bold new departure was promised once more. While the United States would of course remain strong, it would shed its obsession with communism and turn from the politics of competition to the politics of building a moderate world order. The Soviet-American relationship would no longer be treated as the dominant issue of world politics, either for confrontation or for détente. Attention would be focused on the new global agenda, filled with issues that have little to do with

[1] This is further developed in Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978, Part I.

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East-West relations, involving primarily the capitalist-industrialist powers and the countries of the Third World, or else, as in the case of human rights, transcending ordinary distinctions between friends and foes, rich and poor. This shift, and especially the stress on human rights, marked both the return to an idealistic stance, and the desire to break away from the earlier one of the cold war crusade.

Two years after the new Administration's arrival, what do we observe? First, the central issue remains the Soviet-American relationship; we have witnessed the return of the repressed, or the revenge of the demoted, and the debate which is raging over the nature of this relationship covers not only American policy toward the Soviet Union, but affects also American policy in Western Europe (because of Eurocommunism), in the Middle East, in the Far East (because of the "China card"), in Africa, even in Latin America (because of Cuban and Marxist opposition forces).

Second, after the debauch of realism, we are again experiencing the frustrations of idealism. Some of the major innovations that the Carter team had promised to promote have been blunted or bloodied by events, and particularly by the need not to turn allies or friends into foes at a time when the contest with Moscow is so intense: arms sales cuts have been cosmetic, the campaign against nuclear proliferation has been muted, and a credibility as well as a policy gap has been widening between the President's ardent sermons for human rights and the place they occupy in American diplomacy.

Third, the professed return to principle abroad has not restored harmony at home nor brought domestic moods and policies in line with the requirements of foreign policy. This, to be true, shows continuity between the Carter years and the last years of the Kissinger era, rather than with the long years of the cold war consensus. But it may well be that the consensus was the exception—a kind of wartime phenomenon, the cold war having been experienced by the public and the elites as a global war with limited bloodshed.

What do these strands of continuity signify? They show that there is, for the United States, no escape from a double drama: the drama of power, and the moral drama. The United States is caught in its role as a superpower, and in the grip of its old faith in American exceptionalism.

After Vietnam, many hoped and many feared—here and abroad—that Washington would give up America's burden of being a superpower. The Carter campaign sounded a typically

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contradictory note: it called on America to strive for a new world order, yet also promised priority to domestic concerns. Now, after two years, the complaint is heard—once again—that the President is responding to the frustrations of domestic policy by focusing increasingly on foreign affairs.

Certainly there has been no significant disinvolvement abroad. Militarily the retreat from South Korea has been slowed down and reduced in scope, and even the removal of America's last forces from Taiwan can hardly be seen as a proof of disengagement from the complex political balance of East Asia! Only the instruments of American involvement may have changed. Less emphasis is put on military presence, but arms sales are still used as tools of influence, as in the case of the sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia last spring, and to the neighbors of Ethiopia other than Somalia; U.S. transport planes also brought French and Belgian troops to the rescue of Kolwezi in May.

And on the diplomatic front there has rarely been a time when the United States was more deeply involved in negotiations and initiatives of its own, as well as in mediating the efforts of others. Finally, even in the field of domestic economic policy, the impact of events and opinion abroad has come to play a crucial if not a decisive role. The new priority given to the fight against inflation in the fall of 1978 stemmed directly from the need to prevent further depreciation of the dollar and further deterioration of the balance of trade. Or, to put it another way, the United States had to meet its world responsibilities as the nation whose currency is the world's reserve, and whose international economic policy opposes protectionism as a solution to imbalances.

The reasons why there is no exit from the superpower role are clear. One is the lasting importance of the Soviet-American conflict. There is disagreement as to how to deal with it, but no longer any doubt that it remains the relationship of major tension, and that it dooms the United States to some form of containment policy. The other reason is the worldwide reach of the American "empire" which earlier phases of containment had created. This "empire" rests on four diverse pillars. There is the military, paramilitary and diplomatic presence established in many nations by American governmental agencies—public or secret—in pursuit of containment. There is the vast expansion of American trade and technology, which are agents not only of change but also of influence. There are the expectations of one's friends and clients; we have, more or less deliberately, provided patronage, played favorites, and we find that even when we would prefer to stay

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neutral, our dependents count on our support, scrutinize our intentions before making their own moves, and compete for our attention. Finally, the United States shows special concern for a moderate world order, and wants the international milieu in which it acts to reflect its preferences and principles.

The role of superpower has given the United States a number of strengths on which it is still drawing. Its basic alliances remain solid despite recurrent misgivings and fears on the part of allies as well as Washington. The "contracts" drafted in the late 1940s and early 1950s with Western Europe and Japan are still in force, because our allies' security with regard to the Soviet Union has not changed, nor has their own military might grown enough to make our protection any less essential to them. Moreover, their economic rise has occurred within the framework of the international economic order we created.

In the past two years, the West Europeans and the Japanese have been faced with American demands which they deemed unacceptable or extremely difficult—over the German-Brazilian nuclear deal and methods of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the "locomotive" strategy for economic growth, the neutron bomb, tariff reductions—and with American policies they deemed dangerous—with respect to cruise missile limitations, the fall of the dollar, the human rights policy as applied to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the State Department statement of last January on Eurocommunism, and various American measures that restrict or threaten to restrict imports. The United States in turn has resented the vast surpluses accumulated by West Germany and Japan, Tokyo's reluctance to dismantle its barriers against exports, Bonn's preference for export growth instead of domestic stimulation. Nevertheless, there have been no real alliance crises. Whatever its long-term effects, the Bonn summit meeting of last July produced an agreement on economic strategy, and consultations among NATO members with respect to the provisions of a SALT II agreement have been intense. In the Far East, Americans and Japanese have coordinated their China policies. The United States has encouraged Japan to conclude a peace treaty with China and has itself adopted something close to the "Japanese formula" for Taiwan.

Another American strength remains the continuing importance of the economy and of the dollar. No state wants to challenge the dollar's position as the world reserve unit, nor has the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) switched from it to a basket of currencies as some of its members had suggested.

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Easier access to American technology and credits was one of the reasons for China's change of policy over Taiwan—its willingness not to "contradict" our statement of preference for a peaceful outcome, and to accept in fact our continuing shipments of arms to the island. When the United States refuses to move, there can be no successful negotiations between "North" and "South."

A third asset of America's superpower role is the possibility, enhanced by America's resources and role in the world economy, of exploiting rifts and tensions within the Soviet Union's own alliance system—for instance, to foster (albeit tardily) and to vindicate Sadat's decision to achieve Egypt's goals through reliance on Washington, to encourage reconciliation between Iran and Iraq as the latter strikes out for a more autonomous role, to establish contacts with Neto's Angola, or to support Romania in its defiance of a Warsaw Pact decision to increase its members' military budgets. The rapprochement with China since 1971 is our most significant exploitation of Moscow's own most important case of alliance mismanagement.

But playing the role of a superpower also means permanent insecurity. Insecurity has always been the lot of great powers, especially in bipolar contests, for bipolarity breeds a constant fear of dominoes falling—of setbacks even in remote parts of the world undermining either one's positions or one's reputation. And empire makes one into a worldwide target, both as a force of social change that upsets traditionalists as well as progressives, and as a force of political conservatism that tries to preserve its clients against domestic upheavals. Insecurity seems particularly strong in America today, no doubt because of a new complexity in international politics and in the arms race. But insecurity is endemic in a nation that has traditionally sought simple grids and fast results.

Besides the power drama, we are witnessing the continuation of America's moral drama. Widespread support still seems to exist in this country for the United States to stand as a model, to be a force for some ideal. Much of the incoherence of American policy stems from the effects of this faith in American "exceptionalism," for our principles are subject to several contradictions.

First (and this is the open wound of liberalism), there is a conflict between a desire to play standard-bearer and a policy of nonintervention, a clash between a desire to promote institutions that reflect our principles and a detachment bred from a fear that intervention will lead to abuse.

Second, there is a domestic contradiction between the principles we preach and our practices as a nation. We have, in the 1960s and

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again in the recent past, run our economy in such a way as to seem deliberately to abuse the privileges of the dollar. Occasionally, we have given in to protectionist pressures.

Next, there is a frequent clash between our principles and those of others. We can dismiss—or celebrate—this as a classic case of good versus evil when our ideals of free government are opposed, say, by the communists—but we cannot feel quite so self-righteous about the refusal of many to endorse our enthusiasm for free enterprise, nor about their rejection of injustices caused by untrammeled economic liberalism in societies marked by deep class differences or among unevenly endowed nations.

Finally, and most important, there is a conflict that particularly affects the decision-makers, between the principles they proclaim and the need for "pragmatism," i.e., the need to take into account the competitive essence of world politics, which militates against any enforcement of one's principles likely to give comfort to enemies, alienate friends, irritate neutrals, or entail excessive risks for one's power position.

These contradictions explain a phenomenon that baffles many Americans: the unwillingness of others to take our principles, so to speak, at face value. Our power inevitably creates resentments—but so do our principles, because of the inconsistencies which at times make our ideals seem nothing but a hypocritical disguise of that power.

III

American foreign policy-making has other constraints that are external, the result of new world realities coming to bear. On the one hand, signaling a break with the past, we see the end of smooth designs; ten years have seen the demise of two such designs—a containment strategy that relied largely on military alliances, and Kissinger's détente policy, which lived out its hopes. On the other hand, and pointing into the future, we see a new relativity of power.

Today, American diplomacy has to perform in a kind of three-ring circus of Soviet confrontation, regional conflicts and global issues that include new economic forces and problems. The ring of direct Soviet-American confrontation is formed by the arms race, the "eyeball-to-eyeball" situation in the heart of Europe, and the four-power balance in East Asia. Those who thought that the arms race had created strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union now see serious threats arising both from the vulnerability of our land-based missiles, and from the growth of

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Soviet conventional forces and transport facilities in a world in which strategic nuclear parity throws doubt on our capacity to deter conventional thrusts by the threat of nuclear war.

Next, there is the circle of regional conflicts, which raises tricky problems because of the interplay of local circumstances with the Soviet-American contest or the Soviet-American-Chinese competition. These conflicts would exist even if America and Russia did not, but their presence, and the new ability of Moscow to project Soviet power abroad far from Russia's borders, change the nature and effects of the local disputes. If we stress only what is special to the region, we may allow developments that work to the benefit of our Soviet rival; but if we stress only the Soviet-American conflict and apply a "globalist" interpretation to complex regional events, we may—as in Angola in 1975—misread the local scene and promote the wrong policies. Sometimes neither the confrontational grid nor the "localist" approach can, in fact, provide a successful policy; in the Horn of Africa, it would have been virtually impossible for the United States, at the time of Soviet involvement in Somalia, to support a new radical Ethiopian regime that was overtly anti-American, and it would have been dangerous for the United States, after the Soviets had begun their shift, to encourage Somalia, a nation with ambitions that challenged the African principle of border stability.

Finally, there is the circle of global issues. The Carter Administration had wanted to give high priority to them, for two reasons: because of the preponderance of economic issues among them in which the Soviet Union is only minimally involved and the United States and its allies could exploit their technological and economic power; and, conversely, because some of these areas offered prospects of Soviet-American cooperation (such as nonproliferation, an issue which India's nuclear explosion in 1974 placed in the forefront of world politics once more). But even here there are many contradictions, for instance, between a human rights policy (a moral concern) and a nonproliferation policy (a power concern); or between a human rights policy and a policy of cooperation with the Third World. Also, the United States, Western Europe and Japan have had to give priority to their serious internal economic problems and to painful attempts at coordinating their responses to the double crisis of inflation and stagnation. Moreover, the emergence of new centers of economic power among the oil-producing countries (grouped in OPEC) has made it difficult for Washington to exert leadership in energy and other North-South matters.

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Finally, some economic issues can hardly be addressed any more without the intrusion of the superpowers' contest. We cannot deal with the world's oil problem without deciding whether we want to help or hinder the development of Russia's oil resources. The Chinese decision to modernize with the aid of the West and of Japan inevitably raises highly political issues. And while nonproliferation has allowed for Soviet-American cooperation, the regulation of arms sales and above all the stress on human rights have shown that there is no way of separating the Soviet-American conflict from the "global agenda."

In this somewhat bewildering situation, the United States faces three serious problems. They are not new, but they have become particularly acute in the Carter Administration: our inability to devise an appropriate strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union; our tendency to become caught between mutually hostile states; and the internal weaknesses of some of our allies. There *is* objective difficulty in devising an integrated strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, although we know now what we cannot expect: an ever-widening spillover of détente that would dampen our competition and help us resolve conflicts all over the world. The reasons are many: Congress, in passing the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, reduced the possibility of trade expansion by a clumsy attempt at "linkage"; we are anyhow too fearful of aiding our rival should the web of trade and credit relations grow; both sides are looking for opportunities to drive out the rival's influence; the hopes put in arms control both as a way of slowing down the arms race and of fostering common interests beyond the strategic realm have faded. But when it comes to finding an appropriate strategy, we are at a loss. Whereas the international system of 1947 seemed to dictate an American policy that happened to match our interests and resources, the system of 1978 does not suggest an easy answer to a problem that is simultaneously all-pervasive yet far from all-determining.

The public debate shows sharp disagreements about Soviet intentions and strategy: Are they putting into effect a grand design of their own and planning to be able to win a nuclear war, or are they merely seizing opportunities wherever they can, and accumulating weaponry to deter us from taking advantage of those that come our way? Nor is there agreement about the future of the Soviet Union, which some see as a rigid empire crippled by economic infirmities, ethnic tensions and an aging leadership, and as a threat only because of its concentration on the single asset of military force, but which others see as an expanding empire with a

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worldwide network of ideological and conspiratorial clienteles and a need to seek external successes in compensation for domestic failings.

Consequently, not only the Administration but the American public as a whole is caught between two views. One, adopted by the Committee on the Present Danger, is coherent, dangerous and (in my opinion) wrong. The other one is incoherent. The Committee has an undeniable appeal because it offers an integrated view, pulls events together (however arbitrarily), giving them a single meaning, and builds both on the foundations of America's world role and on our past image of the Soviets. The incoherent view attacks the oversimplification, perverse effects and costs of the coherent approach—but without providing an alternative prescription, whatever the sharpness or logic of its critique.

The second problem that results from America's world position is that of being frequently caught in the middle, between mutually hostile friends. When containment succeeds, or when (as in the Middle East) the Soviet Union has been partly "expelled" from an area, the United States must play middleman in frequently trying circumstances. Throughout 1978, America was caught between Egypt and Israel, and we played our role (partly because both these countries had chosen such a course) in such a way as to irritate other friends (Jordan and Saudi Arabia) without, in the process, fully pleasing either Egypt or Israel. By the end of 1978, we were again trying to bring the Greeks and the Turks together over Cyprus, with no more success than before. Indeed, in order to contain Soviet influence we must sometimes try to bring peace to those who might otherwise turn to our rival in the hope of securing their goals through force: hence our endless missions to southern Africa, and our efforts to preserve the chances for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East after an Egyptian-Israeli peace.

A third problem is the danger represented by weak links in our chain of friends and clients. Several on whom we count either as allies against Soviet influence, elements of stability in regional conflicts, or supporters of some of our positions on global issues, are plagued by domestic insecurity, political strife, economic inefficiency, corruption or oppression. Our concern for order, plus our fear of losing our allies' confidence should we fail to support a friend in trouble, have repeatedly led us to tie ourselves far too tightly to dubious regimes whose strength was only apparent. On the other hand, our desire to prevent them from providing openings to our foes—from going the way of South Vietnam, if

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you like—our fear of regional turbulence spreading from or into such places, our own concern for human rights as an essential ingredient of world order, oblige us to try "reform," to improve the appearance or performance of such countries, despite our reluctance to get dragged too deeply into internal turmoils that we have few means of mastering. And so we become domestic peacemakers as well. In 1978 alone, we were obliged to deal, in January, with the political situation in Italy, when it seemed (wrongly) that the Communist Party might make a bid for power in the cabinet; with political crises in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic; and with the threat of collapse of the Shah of Iran. Now Egypt even expects us to rescue its economy. In all these instances, we are in a most uncomfortable position: fumbling with levers we do not control.

These three problems—lack of a strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets, a tendency to get caught between states, and our weak allies or clients—provide us with a melancholy paradox. On the one hand, they push American diplomacy into ever more widespread and deeper involvement. The very absence and indeed the difficulty of developing an integrated strategy toward the Soviet Union, which could guide us about where we most urgently need to contain our rival, makes it seem hazardous to overlook too many trouble spots that could provide the Soviets with opportunities. But, on the other hand, the fact that local or functional circumstances must be given their full due complicates our own role enormously. And the power at our disposal is not what it used to be.

Many Americans have tended to confuse the limitations of power with a weakening of will. It is not enough to proclaim one's determination, to rattle one's might or one's virtue, to call for a stand to intimidate all enemies, and to state that our present troubles (for instance, in Africa) result from past failures to prevail. We must begin by understanding these failures—for instance, in Vietnam or Angola—and reject the temptation to explain them all by stabs in the back or collapses of will. The fact is that our power is greatly affected by two sets of factors.

Abroad, our power encounters the inevitable rise of the power of others. In recent years, not only has that of the Soviet Union continued to grow in the realm of armaments, but the economic power of two of our allies, Japan and West Germany, which had seemed dangerously hurt by OPEC's actions in 1973, has recovered remarkably well. We have had to continue to take into account the financial power accumulated by the members of OPEC, and we shall have to think about the implications of China's developing

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strength, even if it occurs with our help. The economic power and policies of others now affect our economic well-being and policies in ways that seemed remote as recently as a decade ago.

At home, the vagaries of American economic policy affect the economic and monetary strength of the United States in world affairs. And, of course, the limits imposed by Congress in its attempts to curb the "imperial presidency," or the legislative restraints imposed on economic and military assistance, may handicap the use of our power abroad.

In the face of such external and internal developments, it is more than ever essential to distinguish among available, usable and effective power. Our available power remains—on paper—enormous in all domains: military, economic, monetary, ideological. But usable power can be extremely limited, either because of internal handicaps or external obstacles. There were excellent reasons why force could not be used in 1973-4 against the oil-producing states that embargoed the export of oil. Today both our economic situation and congressional reluctance have ruled out or limited the kind of large and widespread foreign aid programs we once used to buttress policy. And for differing domestic reasons there is resistance to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, or to a blunt resort to pressure against Israel through the withholding of economic or military aid.

Finally, even the power we could theoretically use is not guaranteed to be effective. Would overt military intervention in Iran's present crisis be any more capable of "stabilizing" that country than our expedition to South Vietnam? In 1953, the CIA was able to work with coherent local forces to overthrow Mossadeq. Current circumstances in Iran make it unlikely that the CIA could manipulate a much more volatile country and a much more unified opposition to the Shah. Would the expansion of credits to and trade with Russia help "moderate" Soviet behavior, or build up Soviet might? We still have enough power as a provider of nuclear fuels and technology to be able to use a mix of carrots and sticks on behalf of our nonproliferation policy. But now that we have lost our monopoly as a nuclear supplier, will this mix be effective? Or won't it incite our partners to seek independence from us, to diversify their supplies or even to seek nuclear autarky?

The thornier the uses and the effects of power, the more necessary it is to tailor one's power to a well-considered and domestically supported policy. But when one examines how the Carter Administration has dealt both with the elements of continuity and with the new realities of the last decade, one returns to the problem of coherence and the related problem of consensus.

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IV

The absence of an integrated strategy toward the Soviet Union results not only from the nature of the present international system, as discussed above, but also from the chaos of the Administration's own views on the subject. As I have described those views elsewhere, they were, from the start, full of inconsistencies.[2] The relatively benign idea of an American policy that focused on domestic and regional realities abroad, and that emphasized global issues and the settlement of regional conflicts (with Soviet cooperation when necessary), tended to assume Soviet passivity while we reshaped the world, or Soviet assent to "our" solutions. But the very attempt at removing the Soviet-American conflict from the center of the stage was bound to affront a status-hungry rival.

More serious still, the new approach included a readiness by the Administration to pronounce on Russia's internal affairs—in the name of universal human rights—and to challenge, at least formally, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.[3] This appeared to Moscow a clear violation of the "rules of détente" as used by Kissinger. In practice, the new approach coexisted with a much more combative one, expressed in statements about the need for a tougher policy toward the Soviets. The arms control proposals sent to Moscow in March 1977 were an interesting blend of those aspects of both approaches that could not fail to provoke a sharp response. Clearly, one cannot both demote the Soviet-American relation and (while wishing for further cooperation) promise greater firmness: the latter will make that relation more tense, hence more central. One cannot both look at conflicts in southern Africa as if they involved only blacks and whites, and analyze them in anti-communist terms when we rediscover, or even merely suspect (on flimsy evidence), Cuban mischief.

The result was almost bound to be confusion. The Administration, in 1978, threatened to link trade, or even SALT, to Soviet behavior in Africa (or trade to Soviet performance on human rights) while reassuring the Soviets about the importance of arms control as a goal in itself. It made of one dissident's trial a presidential test case and signed a communiqué in Belgrade that did not refer to human rights despite the important provisions of the 1975 Helsinki agreements in this area. It hardened its line on Eurocommunism (thus continuing, in the case of Italy, to make the United States a force in domestic affairs), and let contacts with

[2] See "Carter's Soviet Problem," *The New Republic*, July 19, 1978.

[3] We did, of course, continue to look at Soviet intrusion in Africa as a violation, but our case was weaker, for we ourselves never gave up competition in regional conflicts—*vide* the deliberate exclusion of the U.S.S.R. from the Middle East after October 1973.

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Vietnam fade away—leaving Hanoi with Moscow as its only partner—out of fear of antagonizing Peking (or Congress). But the Administration was very quiet about pro-Soviet coups in South Yemen and Afghanistan (far quieter than Brezhnev about our role in Iran); and after the heated words of Brzezinski at the time of the Shaba affair, it reverted to a far more relaxed attitude toward Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. The reverse happened in the Middle East: having reintroduced the Soviets into the diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict in September 1977 when we thought that we were heading toward a Geneva conference, we carefully kept the Russians out of the new negotiations that followed Sadat's initiative and led to Camp David.

There was even tactical inconsistency within narrower areas of policy. During the angry days of Soviet trials of dissidents and attacks on U.S. journalists and businessmen, the Administration tightened controls over transfers of advanced technology to the Soviets; yet it ended up allowing the sales of oil drilling equipment. We have moved closer to a comprehensive test ban treaty, thanks to a major Soviet concession on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, but we have delayed its completion by raising new questions about verification. We initiated negotiations with Moscow over the possible limitation of arms sales by the two biggest suppliers, and had a favorable Soviet response, but on Mr. Brzezinski's instruction our negotiators were not allowed to discuss two of the most important cases of U.S. sales—to South Korea and Iran. We also initiated talks about limiting naval forces in the Indian Ocean but then shied away from substantive discussions.

In the second half of 1978, the Administration appeared to have dispelled its own confusion sufficiently to give a clear priority to SALT and to negotiate in a quieter atmosphere. Yet we recognized Peking in December just before the end of the SALT talks and thus took the risk of delaying an agreement that was already six years in the making, as well as the Brezhnev-Carter summit meeting. The President, suggesting in his speech on June 7 at Annapolis that the choice between cooperation and confrontation was up to the Soviet Union, neglected to mention that we had the same choice, and that Russia's policy, like ours, is affected by its rival's behavior.

Another form of incoherence could be called unilateralism versus internationalism. Are we trying to cooperate with others and willing to accept the need to compromise, or shall we try to impose our conceptions on others? Unilateralism has been sometimes initiated by the executive, sometimes imposed by Congress. This conflict has shown up in three realms—foreign economic

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policy, human rights and nonproliferation.

In economic affairs, unilateralism has not only taken the form of restrictive import measures, but also of a policy of "benign neglect" regarding the dollar, after the failure in 1977 of one "internationalist" attempt to obtain Japanese and German agreement on the "locomotive" strategy. (That strategy would have increased opportunities for American exports and reduced the balance-of-payments surpluses of Bonn and Tokyo; it also might have created inflationary pressures there.) In this case, unilateralism boomeranged, for the fall of the dollar not only failed to cut deeply into the surpluses of West Germany and Japan, but, by exacerbating American inflation to an unexpected degree, it obliged the Administration in October-November 1978 to reverse its economic policy and come closer to what its allies had seen as desirable all along; it may also have contributed to a new OPEC oil price increase which will complicate the Administration's new task.

Concerning human rights, we have occasionally tried to work with others, for instance in the United Nations and the Organization of American States. But we have often issued our own proclamations and thereby worried West European allies eager to preserve whatever human rapprochement or contacts they had achieved with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We have, following congressional instructions, voted against World Bank aid to various states and decreed an embargo on trade with Uganda.

It is in the matter of nonproliferation that the conflict is most acute. On the one hand, the Administration aims at international agreements to strengthen safeguards, curtail the export of dangerous technologies, slow the march toward a plutonium economy, and search for less "proliferation-prone" kinds of fuel cycles. On the other hand, the legislation passed by Congress in early 1978, which closely follows the President's own policy principles announced in April 1977, contains a formidable set of "restrictive, unilateralist export control provisions."[4] Not only does it, in effect, submit America's clients to a series of conditions that give the United States the right to intervene in their nuclear energy programs and to suspend deliveries unless strict criteria are met, but it also obliges them to renegotiate existing agreements. This law cannot fail to create difficulties between the United States, on the one hand, and EURATOM, Japan, and India on the other. Delicate negotiations and compromises have marked 1978, but they do little more than postpone head-on collisions until the end of the transition period arranged by the bill. We must start to

[4] Frederick Williams, "The United States Congress and Non-proliferation," *International Security*, Fall 1978, p. 45.

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consider what to do if the present multilateral technical evaluation yields few agreements, and if the countries that have decided to move toward a plutonium economy and to build fast breeders in order to resolve their energy problems are undeterred by our exhortations and controls. There seems to be no good alternative to compromises that will amount, in effect, to a partial retreat from the ambitious goals proclaimed in 1977. But such a retreat risks a collision with Congress.

Besides the incoherence of our Soviet strategy and our tendency to unilateralist policies, a third form of incoherence results from the conflict between the concern for order and principle and the requirements of the competition for power. This conflict (which has sharply curtailed the effectiveness of Carter's attempt at curbing the sale of arms abroad) has particularly troubled both our African and our human rights policies. Should we warn South Africa that we expect it to give up apartheid and accept black majority rule? Or do we want to delay any confrontation in order to avoid encouraging violence in a country of considerable economic importance to us and able to help us in settling the Namibian and Rhodesian issues? On all these points, one can detect some wavering within the Administration.

Can we simultaneously try to court the coming "middle powers," or regional leaders, while demanding that they accept our conception of human rights? It is a fact that we have muted our pressure on Brazil and Argentina, exerted none on Mexico, gave our full blessing to the Shah (until his throne began to shake), restored good relations with the military rulers of Nigeria—and diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Can we push the demand for human rights very far when we must also take into account considerations of regional security (as in South Korea, or in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt), or our interests in reconciliation with China or in lessening tension with the Soviet Union?

Our human rights policy has been neither ineffective nor messianic, as critics have argued.[5] But its application has been spotty, and its effectiveness has ranged from appreciable in a number of cases (such as the Dominican Republic) to negligible in all the instances of offensive-and-retreat (the Soviet bloc, Brazil and Argentina) and of glaring omission (Iran and China). It may even have been counterproductive in places (Ethiopia, to which we cut off arms sales just as Somalia was shifting from reliance on Moscow to the Saudi connection; perhaps even Uganda: would

[5] See Coral Bell, "Virtue Unrewarded: Carter's Foreign Policy at Mid-term," *International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 4, October 1978, pp. 559–572; and Ernst B. Haas, "Global Evangelism Rises Again," *Policy Papers in International Affairs*, No. 5, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1978.

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Amin have struck Tanzania if we had not cut off trade with him?). Now the United States finds itself in a self-made predicament. It cannot drop this line of policy, given the expectations of the public and of Congress for something beyond Realpolitik, nor reduce its effort to solemn exhortations divorced from policy instruments, or to public denunciations by U.S. officials or international agencies relying only on the effects of public disclosure. But a case-by-case approach tends to give precedence in almost every instance to a conflicting concern, a more urgent interest or a special circumstance.

The danger is not, as some have charged, that we shall hit only our "friends," but rather that we shall predominantly hit those expendable offenders who play no important role in the power contests. Human rights can actually become a selective weapon against cold war foes, or against American assistance to the Third World, and such a weapon can increase foreign resentment against American hypocrisy, hegemony or naïveté. *Ad hoc*-ism is particularly unbearable in a domain which seems to call for consistency, since moral principles are at stake. If it cannot be the consistency of universal application, then it must be of another sort. My own inclination is toward focusing our policy and applying it more rigorously in those countries for which the United States can be said to be largely responsible—where, indeed, violations of human rights in the long run risk undermining our own position.

Among the effects of incoherence, the most devastating may well be the risk of getting the worst of the two worlds one tries to straddle. Might not the Soviets conclude that we are both intent on hostility and encirclement *and* weak—for example, when we fail to respond to their own probes and advances, in Afghanistan or in the Horn, and appear unwilling to be more assertive in a place as vital to our interests as Iran? Haven't we, by stressing human rights, given hopes to dissidents in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, as well as to the Shah's enemies in Iran, while failing to affect the nature of the regimes in the former case (indeed perhaps encouraging the Soviets to dispose of the most notorious dissidents), while utterly failing to move the Shah in reforming his regime when he was still in a situation of strength, yet dependent on our services?

V

Incoherence, alas, seems to have its roots deep in the Carter Administration's style of policymaking. More than other administrations it has, so to speak, institutionalized pluralism. There has been little agreement on economic policy between the Secretary of the Treasury and the President's economic and political advisers,

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with resultant drift in the fight against inflation and the fall of the dollar. It is well known that the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State do not see eye to eye on the subject of the Soviet Union, and that the National Security Council (NSC) staff and the State Department trade accusations of confused activism and lethargic complacency. On technological sales to the Soviets, the NSC and the Energy Department, preferring a reserved policy, were allied against State and Commerce, which favored the sales, with an ambivalent Defense Department in between. There have been differences in the respective enthusiasms of the NSC and of the State Department with respect to the "China card," SALT, and support of the Shah. The National Security Adviser seemed inclined to try to "destabilize" Angola; the State Department, which prevailed, preferred a rapprochement with Neto's regime (and between Neto and Zaïre's Mobutu). The views of the departing head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Paul Warnke, and those of his military successor do not appear identical.

The President's move to curb the statements of both his National Security Adviser and his Ambassador to the United Nations, and to make his Secretary of State the only official spokesman beside himself, has reduced the level of public cacophony. But for every type of issue, there is a different constellation—sometimes under the direction of a shining star, like Robert Strauss on trade matters and (briefly) George Ball on Iran, sometimes not. Sometimes the regional bureaus of State play an important role, sometimes not. Often, and for good reasons, the constellation includes the President's domestic advisers.

Besides complexity, another trend in decision-making has been notable; it too does little to enhance coherence. It is the tendency toward centralization in performance, perhaps to compensate for fragmentation in preparation. The Secretary of State had announced his intention to travel less than Kissinger. And yet he has been constantly in the air—as the chief negotiator of SALT, in southern Africa, in the Middle East. Once again, the consequence has been sluggishness in matters that did not involve him fully (or that did not also receive top presidential attention, as China policy did). This has been true in the case of Nicaragua and, until the explosion, in that of Iran.[6]

Another consequence of the complexity of policymaking has been the accentuation of what might be called *ad hoc*-ism. This is also partly the result of the President's own personal involvement

[6] The celebrated failure of intelligence to predict the trouble in Iran has probably much more to do with the excessively close ties that had developed between our agencies and the Shah's police than with the so-called crippling of the CIA by Congress.

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in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. To be sure, that involvement was required by the parties' own mutual distrust and their desire to implicate the President on their side: Begin, in December 1977, had flown to Washington to present his plan for the West Bank to Jimmy Carter before sending it to Sadat. But a regrettable result is that the President's efforts are focused on intricate verbal compromises aimed at keeping the process going *now*, without sufficient concern for the obstacles that might develop later. The President is led to put all his prestige on the line for limited results: if he wins, he may "win big" at home, but not so much abroad; if he loses, he loses big both abroad and at home. Fragmentation in the process, as so often in the past, forces the top players to concentrate on the short term.

A second source of domestic incoherence is the role and behavior of Congress. If one looks at the results, 1978 was not a bad year in congressional-executive relations over foreign policy: the Panama treaties were ratified, the arms sales to the Middle East were approved, the embargo on arms for Turkey was lifted. But there is a darker side. The amount of capital the Administration has had to spend to avoid defeats has been high, and the costs in the case of the Panama Canal entailed the acceptance of language (e.g., the de Concini reservation) that considerably tarnished the significance of the treaties.[7] Similarly, in Rhodesia, the Administration succeeded in defeating a proposal to end the embargo pretty much on Ian Smith's terms, but only by accepting a substitute that was far from an endorsement of its own policy. Victory against the pro-Israel lobby in the intricate maneuvers over the Middle East arms package may have been pyrrhic, and made further pressures on Israel more difficult.

Furthermore, the "deterrent" power of Congress—or of influential members of Congress—has been high, inhibiting contacts with Cuba and Vietnam and affecting, if not the SALT negotiations themselves, at least the climate in which they are being held. Finally, Congress has at times insisted on writing its own foreign policy into bills, either by eliminating what the Administration had proposed, as in the foreign aid bill, or by imposing its own commands, as in the case of prohibitions on military or economic assistance to specific countries, or by refusing to renew the waiver on the imposition of compensatory taxes on subsidized imports, which has greatly complicated the end of the Tokyo round of trade talks.

The breakdown of the traditional preeminence of a small group of "influentials," the strengthening of congressional staffs and of

[7] See I. M. Destler, "Treaty Troubles: Versailles in Reverse," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1978–79, pp. 45–65.

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the budgetary process in Congress, the fragmentation of party discipline, the rise of single-issue pressure groups, and that of issue-specific voting patterns—all have their share in congressional resurgence.[8] One must also stress a less institutional reason: the absence of any "patriotic" rationale for yielding leadership to the Executive, as in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the absence of such a rationale, two major factors of conflict between the executive and Congress appear. First, secrecy remains essential for diplomacy, especially in dealing with regimes that insist on it and in the expeditious resolution of conflicts—but secrecy and congressional consultation are mutually exclusive; when a secret decision is highly controversial (as, unlike Camp David, the recognition of China was), there are risks for the Executive. Second, diplomatic agreements are usually deliberate exercises in ambiguity, each side agreeing to leave certain conflicts in the dark, with the intention of reaping immediate gains from what could be agreed upon, and the hope of later resolution to its own advantage: witness Camp David or the subtle formula adopted by Washington over Taiwan. But Congress prefers floodlights to the delicate flashlights of diplomats, and tends to insist on the immediate clarification of issues: hence, for instance, the reservations added to the Panama treaties, or the mandatory provisions of the nonproliferation bill, or the instructions Congress periodically wants to give American representatives in international lending agencies over matters involving human rights.

The Executive itself is not without responsibility here. Sometimes it has underestimated the strength of opposition in Congress, only to exaggerate its importance later—an error made evident in the Panama debate. Sometimes it sends to Congress signals that incite more active interference in the policy process: Carter's insistence on human rights and on a draconian new antiproliferation policy, and the Administration's own statements about Soviet activities in Africa, encouraged Congress to write the provisions I have mentioned and to envisage lifting the embargo on Rhodesia.

In the long run, there is no chance for an effective foreign policy unless relations with Congress are systematically improved. This is not a matter of creating new formal institutions, but of moving from occasional consultation and intense mixes of struggle and cooperation during the drafting of bills to increased and steady participation by relevant members of Congress in the formulation of policy itself, which could only result in greater

[8] See Lee H. Hamilton and Michael H. Van Dusen, "Making the Separation of Powers Work," and Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., "Congress in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It?" *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, pp. 17–50.

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discipline on the floor. Resistance may be expected both from the Executive, zealous of preserving its freedom of maneuver, and the legislators, eager to safeguard their independence. But the very magnitude of the problems the United States faces in every realm of policy suggests that the coordination of powers be given precedence over their separation.

It remains a fact that domestic politics, especially at midterm, rarely take foreign issues, or the external implications of domestic ones, into account. This is not a peculiarly American trait, but it has special consequences because of both our system of government and the importance of our foreign policy. Paradoxically, perhaps the only pattern that emerged from changes in the Senate after the midterm elections of November 1978 was the removal of advocates of a liberal foreign policy without any of the victims having lost because of his foreign policy views or record.

The President, in effect, has to conduct foreign policy with an anxious eye on the politics of timing. It was not insignificant that Carter staged Camp David a few weeks before the midterm elections, at a time when his competence and prestige were in doubt. Nor was it by accident that the announcement of the recognition of China was planned for the time of the expected Israeli-Egyptian peace, and before a SALT II agreement. Success in the Middle East might have weakened conservative opposition to the removal of formal American recognition and military alliance from Taiwan; the fact that many of the opponents of SALT are ardent believers in the "China card" might in turn have eased the ratification of a SALT accord. This need for calculation may well have been one of the lessons learned from the Panama episode. But a good domestic calculation may be an external miscalculation. And for the politics of timing to succeed, the President requires not only success abroad: he must also have, or foster, a consensus at home.

The problems of consensus can be seen, paradoxically, as both mild and ominous. They are mild insofar as, according to the findings reported by Daniel Yankelovich, the public is willing to combine principles and pragmatism, to live with contradictions, to have America play an active role without excessive costs, and to pursue arms control without illusions about détente.[9] This is indeed encouraging, as it provides the Administration with freedom of maneuver. But these findings describe, at best, a consensus on moderation, a hugging of the middle of the road, not a consensus on a direction for that road. What is ominous, even in

[9] See "Farewell to 'President Knows Best'," in this issue.

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these surveys, is the desire of the public to have a greater say in policy formation, and its unwillingness to give carte blanche to the President. This is disturbing, not because there is anything wrong in a demand for a larger role and in a grudge against past excesses of executive rhetoric and power, but because the "moderate" majority conceals an emerging fragmentation of the public, and especially of the foreign policy elites, into two blocs.

The first bloc is a "hard" coalition composed of two elements: traditional nationalists concerned above all, à la Reagan or Goldwater, with America's might in the world; and what I would call cold war exceptionalists, or cold war idealists, à la Senator Moynihan. The latter believe in America's special mission as the protector of the free world, and see themselves as the heirs of Harry Truman or John Foster Dulles. Their idealism makes them endorse heartily a crusade for human rights directed against the totalitarians and the tyrants who disparage America. But their priority is the cold war crusade, and their idealism slides easily into jingoism (which makes their alliance with the nationalists possible). They start by announcing their willingness to take on the evil ones, they end by stating that whoever is against us, or critical of us, is evil, whoever is with us is good.[10]

The Committee on the Present Danger, again, forms part of this bloc, which looks at agreements with the Soviets as useless or perilous, at the present military balance with alarm, and at SALT II as misleading or worthless. It demands a drastic change in strategic posture by recommending a civil defense effort and the building of an MX missile capable of threatening Soviet land-based missiles (the bulk of the Soviet nuclear arsenal), and advocates firm support for the enemies of forces aided by the Soviets and their allies. Such a policy offers a dangerous cure, for it imposes an artificially simple and mechanical grid on a complex international system. It would intensify Soviet hostility and fears. It would force us to support countries and factions whose very weaknesses or policies provide opportunities for Soviet meddling and which cannot prevail unless we both match Soviet (or Cuban) efforts and save them from their internal follies—the very thing we could not do in Vietnam. It would prevent or delay the rise of tensions among the members of the Soviet camp—as our containment policy did in Asia in the 1950s. Moreover, despite its apparent simplicity, this is a view full of its own contradictions. In the case of Africa, its supporters want us both to be more concerned about

[10] For example, see Daniel P. Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, Boston: Atlantic Little Brown and Co., 1978.

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Soviet penetration, and more relaxed about Pretoria's and Salisbury's own efforts at solutions—even though these efforts might only incite further Soviet penetration.

On the other side, there is a "soft" bloc of liberal exceptionalists, for whom the mission of the United States is to do global good. Rather than fighting the evil ones, they would contend, we must combat the evils that threaten us all: hunger, oppression, disease, war, injustice. This group is less manichaean in its interpretation of the scope of human rights policy, but would push it prudently just where the other group would push it vigorously—against the Soviets. This group also tends to oppose American involvement in Third World military conflict and increases in the military budget, whereas the other group shows great skepticism about our involvement in the North-South economic issues, or about non-military aid to nations other than close allies.

This split is potentially as serious as the old one between internationalists and isolationalists before World War II, which inhibited statesmen who wanted to move from insulation to involvement. The new division may appear less dangerous, for both sides accept or seek involvement, but the groups differ profoundly on the kind and quality of commitments they desire. Above all, neither group offers a realistic basis of support for the Administration, since the policy each advocates is quite different from Carter's mix.

That the Administration must seek support from each carries the risk of alienating both. Above all it reinforces the tendency to tilt sometimes in one direction and sometimes in the other, strongly enough to gain the backing of the group being courted for some particular measure, but not so much as to make the Administration the prisoner of any one faction. In other words, for the Administration as well as for the public, the best that seems obtainable is case-by-case majorities, sometimes around the "hard" core, sometimes around the "soft" one.

VI

The course of American diplomacy in 1978 yields several conclusions concerning future developments and trends. Despite multiple American initiatives and negotiations, there is a real danger of drift in four important areas: the international economy, Africa, the Middle East, and relations with Moscow.

On the economic front, there has been little movement over North-South issues, partly because of the difficulties experienced by the industrialized powers and the priority we have given to relations

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with them, partly because the fall of the dollar reduced the weight of the debts and the cost of oil for the oil-importing less-developed countries (LDCs), partly because many of the oil-producing ones have experienced troubles resulting from excessively ambitious development programs. But the developing countries have not given up their demands; the new increase in the price of oil will worsen the financial plight of some of them, and the risk of any of them defaulting and provoking a major crisis in the international financial system that has so far made the recycling of the petrodollars possible is far from negligible. The continuing uncertainty over long-range oil flows, the importance of the LDCs as suppliers of minerals and as markets for the advanced countries, the mediocrity of aid flows from the advanced countries, and the resistance of some of them to more imports of industrial goods from the Third World also suggest a need to resume negotiations over the issues which were left unsettled in 1977.

But the root of the matter in 1978, as in previous years, is the need for a responsible domestic economic policy. The policy of 1977—economic growth in the United States not duplicated by our chief allies nor combined with any major effort to reduce oil consumption, but accompanied by a high rate of inflation which corrodes the competitiveness of American exports—was bound to lead to a huge trade deficit and to international monetary instability. And the weakness of the dollar in turn was bound, through its effect on oil prices, to promote inflation around the world. The energy bill finally adopted by Congress in 1978 does very little to encourage conservation or the development of alternatives to imported oil. We have tended to criticize those of our allies who had mastered inflation and reduced their consumption of oil for failing to help us restore our trade balance or to stimulate their economies sufficiently. The new 14.5 percent rise in the price of oil, stimulated in considerable part by the fall of the dollar, now risks increasing inflation not only here, but also among our oil-importing allies who have been fighting it more vigorously than we have.

In southern Africa, our very determination to seek peaceful solutions through elections open to all parties—designed to avoid both race wars and further Soviet penetration—exposes us to the hazard that mediation efforts always entail: being put at the mercy of the intransigent. Carter's critics charge that his policy plays into the hands of such "radical" groups as the Namibian South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and Zimbabwe's Patriotic Front, and of their Soviet and Cuban supporters, instead of

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helping "moderates" and pushing the costs of conflict onto their foes.

But in reality it is not the black "radicals" or the front-line African states (whose economies and societies are being disrupted by the conflict) which form our main problem, but rather the governments of South Africa and Rhodesia. While we have refused to endorse the internal settlement of Ian Smith and the South Africa-sponsored elections in Namibia, we have refrained from pressuring them too vigorously in order to keep open the possibility of securing their agreement to the very policies they oppose. As a result, they may assume that they can pursue their own course with impunity, or that, should this pursuit lead to an escalation of guerrilla war with Soviet support, we might end up by coming to their rescue—thanks in part to domestic U.S. support for their cause. In recent months the black Africans who oppose Smith and Botha may also have come to doubt our determination.

Developments during the year have made clear that our policy does not have a great chance of success, for it carries an assumption that a peaceful outcome is still possible. Its remaining chances depend on our ability to prove to Pretoria and Salisbury that they cannot count on any change of heart in America—that we are willing to tighten the noose either by supporting those of Rhodesia's neighbors that suffer most from international sanctions and from Rhodesian raids, or by applying further sanctions against South Africa. Precisely because a failure of our policy would be a major blow, we must see to it that it works, and accept the apparent contradiction between the goal of peaceful settlement and the means that may be needed to bring the white regimes to accept painful but inescapable conclusions.

In the Middle East, we have embarked on a policy of gradual settlement with an Egyptian-Israeli peace as a first step. But here, too, there is a danger of drift. The acrimonious negotiations that passed the December 17 deadline have already shown that each side wants to take back at least some of its Camp David concessions. (Pressure-cooker diplomacy has risks.) Moreover, should that peace be signed with little subsequent progress in the negotiations over the transition to autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, not only would Egypt have to choose between isolation within the Arab world and backing away from peace with Israel, but the chances of Jordan or the PLO encouraging or allowing elections to take place in the West Bank, and of West Bank Palestinians running for office, would be very low. The United States would be faced with gradual estrangement from its two moderate allies, Jordan and

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Saudi Arabia, as well as with the prospect of a largely hostile Arab bloc from Syria and Iraq to the Indian Ocean presenting new opportunities for Soviet diplomatic influence.

The failure to consult Jordan at Camp David, to forge a clear link between the two agreements there, to provide in the "framework" agreement on the West Bank and Gaza for assurances of Israeli withdrawal, to obtain from Begin guarantees against new Israeli settlements, and the decision not to raise the issue of Jerusalem have already led to a cooling off in our relations with these allies. If we want to preserve our interests in that part of the world, we will have to deal at once with what we decided to postpone at Camp David, to prevent a wider breach between Egypt and the other Arab states, and to make sure that the autonomy offered the Palestinians is not a sham. In other words, we must see to it that the Egyptian-Israeli peace is only a beginning. As in Africa, this means deeper involvement and a willingness to use pressure on Israel, despite domestic resistance made even tougher by Saudi Arabia's own hardening (in the area and in OPEC) and by events in Iran.

The most obvious danger of drift, or setback, is in *Soviet-American relations*. In Africa and the Middle East, the peril of drift results from ambiguities in our chosen course. Here, it results from the absence of a clear course. As we slide into a kind of harder containment, each measure may be justified in itself, but we ought to think through the larger pattern these measures create. Our détente with Peking in 1971–72 was concomitant with détente in Soviet-American relations. The new Chinese-American rapprochement takes place in a very different context. Such a rapprochement had not been a high priority for the Carter Administration in its first year; it became one not only at China's request, but also because of the new tensions with the Soviet Union in the early part of 1978. Our new ties with China, which will promote the economic development and, indirectly, the military rise of Moscow's most bitter enemy, will force Moscow to pay more attention to its eastern front. Not only the timing of recognition, but the apparent ease with which the Administration accepted China's main conditions for it and declared itself satisfied with Peking's mere silence about a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue—even though Peking is obviously eager for American economic and political support—must feed Soviet distrust of our intentions. We do not hesitate to encourage defiance of Moscow's will in Eastern Europe nor do we plan to give up the cause of human rights in Russia. We are increasing our military budget and

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may use some of it for new programs that will increase the vulnerability of Soviet nuclear forces or military installations.

Our justifiable tendency is to see in all this the normal exercise of competition, or a response to Soviet military advances, or even part of what the Administration must do in order to obtain Senate consent to SALT. But this should not blind us to the fact that the Soviets have often shown a strong phobia about capitalist encirclement. We will have to make sure that our West European allies' sales of arms to China observe certain restraints—it is anyhow not in their interest to provoke Soviet ire. A mild amount of Western pressure (and "China-card" playing) may perhaps make the Russians more malleable—although the 1971–72 parallel is a risky one—but too strong a series of Western moves, especially if they entail threats to the shaky Russian empire in Eastern Europe and in parts of Asia, may well have adverse affects on a state whose only strong suit is the uniform.

To be sure, there remains a Soviet, indeed a joint, interest in arms control. But as an incentive to détente or a dampener of hostility, arms control is losing its potency. SALT II imposes new ceilings and some constraints, but it implies new expansions, as SALT I had done. Once more, technology is racing far ahead of diplomacy: many genies escape from the bottle before it is stoppered. The greatest virtue of SALT II is the promise of future restrictions, but this time that promise is mixed with misgivings, since it will be difficult to separate SALT III from the Western problems of European defense and from the Soviet preoccupation with China. While it is always risky to pretend to distinguish soft and hard factions in the Kremlin, a struggle for succession is likely soon, and we must be aware of the effects of our acts on that struggle.

VII

For drift to end, for a partnership with Congress to develop, a final condition is needed: not a grand design of dubious value, or a mere collection of lofty goals, but a strategic rationale that brings the fragments together. After two years, the Administration still has not produced such a rationale. In its absence, no "public philosophy" of deference to the executive will keep the Congress and the public satisfied; nor will the Administration be able to build a solid coalition made of elements from both parts of the public. *Ad hoc*-ism and fragmentation do not cope with the crucial issue of the place of Soviet-American relations in our diplomacy; they cannot monopolize it, nor can we act as if the superpower

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rivalry affected only a few sectors of policy, and could be handled in those sectors with a simple mix of strategic arms control and shows of strength.

We may be doomed to a large dose of containment. But the Administration must explain that it can take forms involving neither confrontation nor close ties but the development of regional strength. Moreover, there are still possible areas of expanding cooperation, beyond the strategic talks, both in the realm of arms (where several negotiations, ranging from MBFR to anti-satellite weapons, and including conventional arms sales, are in process) and in that of economics.

Even in what I have called the ring of direct confrontation, there is a choice between a drift toward further escalation of the arms race—either in the nuclear competition (especially after the protocol that will be part of SALT II expires) or in the competition between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces—and gradual measures of arms reduction and qualitative restraints. If we want to pursue the latter course, we must of course adapt our China policy to it. If we choose what could be called indirect containment—through the resolution of conflicts in which the Soviets may find openings—and wish to preserve possibilities of cooperation, we must be careful to avoid humiliating Moscow diplomatically as well as remain on guard against either providing the Soviets with occasions for military intervention, or giving Russia a right of veto over our diplomacy. What is required, above all, is subtlety, a sure sense of direction, and the absence of the kind of defensiveness that has often marked the Administration—as if Jimmy Carter had to prove that he will not be pushed around by the Soviets, even at the cost of becoming the hostage of the "hard" coalition. It would be foolish to try to appease the tough new Right since, whatever its moves, the Carter team will never be sufficiently "credible" to those who suspect it is part of the "defeatist consensus" or the "culture of appeasement."[11]

The prospects for American diplomacy on the eve of 1979 are not brilliant. We can foresee great difficulties in Africa, in the Middle East and around the Persian Gulf, in the world economy, in collision between the President and Congress over Taiwan, SALT, Israel and southern Africa. And yet the world as seen from Moscow hardly looks promising. Western Europe's large communist parties are adrift, Eastern Europe is not tamed, and instability in Iran, with the opportunities it creates for Muslim fundamental-

[11] See the dialogue between Moynihan and Kissinger in *Public Opinion*, May-June 1978, or Norman Podhoretz, "The Culture of Appeasement," *Harper's*, October 1977, pp. 25-32.

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ism, is far from being obviously in Russia's interest. Some of its recent allies are basket cases, and there is increasing convergence between the United States, Japan, China and Western Europe.

We do not need to give up our goals, or to reverse any of the policies we have pursued. But we need to revise them, to make them mutually compatible, to replace both the contradictions and the drift of our Soviet policy with a coherent and flexible strategy. The Administration must explain clearly and steadily to the American people and Congress how the pieces fit, what kind of a world we seek, and the means we want to use to get there. It must be able to show how both the deep involvement that will continue to be required of us, and the retreats we may have to accept in certain realms, will contribute to the emergence of a world in which our main interests and our security will be assured.

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McGeorge Bundy

HIGH HOPES AND HARD REALITY: ARMS CONTROL IN 1978

As 1978 ended, the United States and the Soviet Union were still short of a final agreement on their new strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II). Yet the negotiation of this agreement, and Western discussion of its meaning, certainly dominated the year's events in the field of arms control. President Carter never wavered in his conviction that the achievement of a good agreement was an objective of top priority, and his optimism on the prospect of relatively early agreement seemed unshakable.

It did appear as the year ended that agreement, as a matter of substance, was very close indeed. Agreement as a matter of a shared will to agree *now* was something else—a matter not so much of arms control as of the tactical process of Soviet-American relations. When final progress was delayed by distinctly minor Soviet objections in December, one had to believe that the Russians were showing us and themselves that their cooperation could not be taken for granted as the United States and China joined once again in publicly opposing "hegemony" (a word that translates into Russian as "us").

While this tactical delay is not trivial, it still seems best for present purposes to assume that 1978 was indeed the year of decisive progress toward an agreement that will come before the Senate in 1979. Certainly the acts and statements of the Administration, including its bargaining tactics on matters that were substantively small compared to what had been settled in earlier years of this six-year story, were heavily affected by its concern for what could eventually pass the Senate. The SALT negotiations of the year, important as they were in their own right, are best understood in the context of a sharpening debate on the future adequacy of the American strategic deterrent.

Already in 1977 the broad outline of SALT II became clear. It would be an extended version of the Vladivostok Accords reached by President Ford and President Brezhnev in November 1974. The

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most important changes are those that lower ceilings on launchers and constrain warhead numbers (a goal of the United States) and those that limit the deployment of cruise missiles except as part of a heavy bomber force and so part of what is counted under the ceilings (a goal of the Soviet Union). While the joint draft text of SALT II may well be the most complex international document ever developed, it is essentially an agreement to keep what each side values most in its current and prospective systems while temporarily constraining sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles and setting limits—albeit very high ones—on the number of launchers and warheads the two sides can have.[1] Seen as one essential element in a policy of strategic stability, the emerging agreement is impressive.

SALT II does not end the arms race, or even put a solid lid over it. One of the most troubling and destabilizing technological forces of all—the drive to constantly greater accuracy—is wholly unconstrained. The achievement of "deep cuts," a passionately proclaimed initial purpose of the Carter Administration, is deferred to SALT III, and it is not yet clear how far the Soviet Union will agree to specific targets for this effort in the Statement of Principles that is to be part of SALT II.

II

The emerging agreement will be a disappointment to many who have hoped for more. If the Carter Administration is not itself in this group, it is mainly because it has had to learn by hard experience that it is one thing to believe in deep cuts and quite another to get the Soviet Union to agree to them on terms all Americans will like. The drastic American proposals of March 1977, flatly rejected by the Soviet Union and quickly and wisely abandoned, should stand as a reminder to all of the distance between hope and reality.

Yet on the plane of the achievable, the adjustments negotiated in 1978 reflect well on the judgment and skill of the Administration. On at least five significant elements of the agreement there was real progress in 1978, and in most respects that progress was advantageous from the American standpoint.

1. There was agreement on a relatively narrow statement of the rule against circumvention of the treaty by action through "other

[1] Two helpful essays on the content and meaning of SALT II have been Richard Burt, "The Scope and Limits of SALT," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978, and Jan M. Lodal, "SALT II and American Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/79. Mr. Lodal likes the agreement more than Mr. Burt does, but both writers are fair to positions they do not share. In this respect, unfortunately, they were not wholly typical of the public arguments of 1978.

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parties." This achievement has sharply reduced criticism of the agreement on the ground that it might interfere with our relations with our allies. The warm endorsements at Guadeloupe in the new year—by the heads of the British, French and West German governments—were well earned. There remain serious problems of policy on transfers of technology to Western Europe, but they are not problems created by SALT II.

2. There was agreement that each side would be free to deploy one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) over the life of the treaty. While constraining the indefinite expansion of new systems, this agreement has preserved the American option to develop and deploy a new land-based missile system to replace or supplement the increasingly vulnerable Minuteman.

3. there was agreement on limits to the numbers of warheads in missiles equipped with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVed missiles). These limits are more important to us than to the Soviet Union because of the potential for warhead multiplication on very large Soviet missiles, to which we have—and plan to have—no direct counterpart. The matching restraint on our side is a limit on the numbers of cruise missiles carried by each aircraft.

4. There was apparently a clarification, in December, of the obligation on both sides not to impede verification through the encryption of signals from missiles being tested. This highly technical—and possibly marginal—matter is much more important to us than to the Soviet Union for the oddly simple reason that in our society the open press is an ample guide to most of our capabilities.

5. We have apparently accepted the Soviet view that all aircraft carrying long-range cruise missiles, conventional as well as nuclear, should be counted under the treaty ceilings. In effect this gives up the option of deploying conventionally armed long-range airborne cruise missiles, at least for the life of the treaty. To some in the Pentagon this was a painful concession, but when examined as a matter of our general long-run interest, it takes on a different color. The existence of airborne cruise missiles will be verifiable, but to know their armament will be another matter altogether. It is greatly to our interest to discourage the Soviet Union from deploying assertedly "conventional" airborne cruise missiles—conceivably on MiG-23s, conceivably in Cuba. The "concession" here is a concession to a common interest in avoiding destabilizing uncertainties.

But while the negotiating record of the year shows serious

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progress, the Administration and SALT II did not fare so well in the swelling domestic and Western debate. This debate centers increasingly on the question of whether the United States is doing what it should to maintain the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear deterrent, and the real issues here are independent of SALT II. Probably the most extreme shopping list of proposed improvements in the American deterrent was an eight-point program (wholly unpriced) offered by the Committee on the Present Danger in October; it proposed urgent action on all three legs of the strategic force (the so-called triad of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and strategic aircraft), on air and civil defense and on command and control. As Jan Lodal promptly observed in this journal, not one of the eight recommendations conflicts with SALT II.[2] Yet the result in the Senate on SALT will almost surely be determined by the judgment of Senators on such wider issues.

The adequacy of the American strategic deterrent has been debated before—in 1950–52 over hydrogen bombs, and in 1958–61 over the missile gap. But for more than a decade after that the issue was dormant. In particular the shift from an emphasis on strategic superiority to the acceptance of sufficiency or parity was executed relatively nimbly by Richard Nixon—probably it would have been harder if the Republicans had been in opposition. But from 1972 onward there has been growing concern in important groups lest the Soviets achieve a usable strategic superiority. Few have argued that such a superiority would lead to deliberate nuclear war-making. The contention is rather that our deterrent will be deterred, and that other forms of pressure will become harder to resist, and so more attractive to the intrinsically expansionist Soviet leadership.

In 1978 this concern increased, and the Administration did not offer a clear-cut defense of its quite different assessment. It was hampered by two difficulties, one of them unavoidable. In the nature of things the SALT II agreement could not be fully explained and defended until it existed. Repeatedly and in many voices Administration spokemen said firmly that they would make no SALT agreement that did not serve American security. But they were estopped from authoritative exposition of the value of a document still both incomplete and highly classified.

A parallel and somewhat more avoidable difficulty was that the Carter Administration was still not able to present a clear and compelling picture of its own strategic doctrine and its plans for

[2] Lodal, *ibid.*, pp. 258–59, containing also a summary of the eight-point list.

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modernizing strategic forces. It said it would take whatever action was necessary, and in Secretary of Defense Harold Brown it had an unusually experienced and articulate master of the principles it strove to meet. But what was it really going to do, primarily about Minuteman vulnerability, but also about civil defense, survivable command and control, sustained deterrence, and its nuclear umbrella over Europe? As the year ended, no authoritative answers to these questions had been made public.

Part of the difficulty here lay in the peculiar technical problem posed by "Minuteman vulnerability." There seemed to be no doubt that by the early 1980s the Soviet Union would have weapons of a power and accuracy such that if everything went according to plan it could indeed wipe out the Minuteman force in a preemptive strike. There were intrinsic and serious imponderables in any such scenario, but no one could deny that Minuteman was about to be subject to the very weakness it had been designed to avoid. Like its predecessors in the first generation of ICBMs, it was destined to become vulnerable and thus somewhat destabilizing, where it had been designed as a secure and stabilizing second-strike force. The "quick fix" of a doctrine of "launch-on-warning" (under which the Minuteman force would be launched against Soviet targets—which ones?—just before the arrival of the mass of attacking missiles) was not attractive to anyone who believed in avoiding hasty and conceivably accidental holocaust. The Administration, at least in public, referred to launch-on-warning only as a possibility that any adversary would have to take into account.

Alternative and more stable answers were not easy to find. Not for 20 years had there been a problem of strategic choice as demanding. To this observer, if he had only himself to please, the problem was not so hard—the threat seemed partial, improbable and easy to resist at least for the coming decade. The strength of our alert bombers and our submarine forces seem such that the Soviet government would be quite simply mad to make a massive first strike on the American mainland on any scenario whatever.[3] But the worriers had a long head start, and they had done a perversely effective job of turning their improbable dreams into other men's real perceptions. By the end of 1978 there was a major need for the Administration to come forward with a reasoned and concrete combination of doctrine, modernization, and insistence that enough is enough.

The Administration was crowded with careful students of these

[3] My reasons for regarding Minuteman vulnerability as a matter that is important but not critically urgent are spelled out in a paper for *International Security*, Winter 1979, now in press.

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issues, and led by a former naval person whose personal understanding was as great as that of any of his predecessors, at least since Kennedy. But not all these thoughtful people thought alike, and visible command decisions had not yet been made. The SALT debate is unlikely to go well for the Administration if there is no solid strategic policy to go with the agreement.

Yet it would be churlish to end here. Events are likely to require the needed decisions, and there is no reason to assume, from the record, that Mr. Carter's decisions will be bad. If it should be one value of the SALT process that it forced the pace of analysis and choice, it would not be the first time. In this paradoxical sense the hard work done at the bargaining table in 1978 seems likely to lead on to equally needed decisions on the nature of our strategic policy, and the shape of our strategic forces. The SALT negotiators, led by the President, have kept open our government's right to choose, but as they come near to success they are also requiring the exercise of that right. The President is forcing the hand of the Commander in Chief.

But the Commander in Chief is also beginning to force the hand of the President. Mr. Carter had wanted deep cuts in 1977 and still wanted them in 1978. He has repeatedly expressed the hope that SALT III will meet this standard. Unless he is to abandon this deeply held purpose, it appears that at least part of any new weapons development he may support will need to be negotiable—something to be given up in SALT III in return for appropriate Soviet reductions. This situation has arisen only once before, in the case of the antiballistic missile (ABM), defended by Mr. Nixon in Congress and then traded off in SALT I. But the ABM had the asset, for these purposes, that it was not technically attractive. New offensive weapons have proven both easier to design and more appealing to men in uniform. The year 1978 probably set the stage for the most complex test of political command, control, communications, and intelligence yet put before a President in the field of strategic policy.

The President does not have much time left. Given the probable Soviet desire to have a good look at the planned visit by Teng Hsiao-ping to Washington in late January 1979 before taking final SALT decisions, a Carter-Brezhnev summit and a final agreement on SALT can hardly occur before March, and that will put Senate hearings over to April or May at the earliest. No one can predict how long the Senate will take, or how many of its own views it will attach in some fashion to any instrument of consent, but the Senators chiefly concerned are not famous for docility or despatch.

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Yet the presidential election of 1980 is already close—politically closer, because of new rules, ever-growing media interest, and candidate Carter's successful example in 1974–76, than such elections used to be at the half-way mark of a presidential term. Last time the looming election led Mr. Ford to hold back on SALT II. It is said that he now regrets this decision, both on the substance and on the politics, but no friend of SALT II who remembers the Republican primaries of 1976 will suppose it a good thing to let this issue stay unresolved beyond 1979. Mr. Carter's admirable persistence and optimism will have to be matched in the coming year by a new firmness in making large and complex decisions.

III

The same confrontation between high hopes and hard reality that marked the course of SALT II in the Carter Administration was visible in other fields of arms control. The most important was the effort to reinforce constraints against nuclear proliferation. Indeed one ritual argument for SALT itself was that it could help to encourage restraint among the states not having nuclear weapons. (In my view this claim is not wholly persuasive as long as the number of strategic nuclear warheads allowed in each superpower's arsenal remains well over 10,000.)

The current effort to avoid further proliferation goes back to the last months of the Ford Administration, and its most striking single element is an effort to put off the "plutonium economy." Accepting and indeed encouraging the use of the single-cycle nuclear power plants of the current generation, the U.S. government has come to believe strongly that the dangers of reprocessing and recycling outweigh their uncertain economic advantages. Since this view has been resisted and indeed rejected by major friends and allies, the Carter Administration has been proceeding cautiously, but its purpose has not changed. Along the road: (1) it has tried to set a good example, as by its own deferral of reprocessing; (2) it has tried to persuade other governments to follow this good example; and (3) it has tried to enlarge the common ground of international understanding on these issues, notably by proposing and earnestly supporting the two-year International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), now in process. It has had more luck with (1) and (3) than with (2). In 1977 the new team found itself coolly received in Brazil as it tried to reverse the German-Brazilian reprocessing deal that had been allowed to pass unchallenged in 1975 when the Ford Administration still had its priorities confused. And in 1978, though much more tactfully, the

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British and French governments reaffirmed their commitment to the construction of reprocessing plants.

These disappointments should not obscure the real achievement since 1976: the elevation of the dangers in the nuclear fuel cycle to the front row of international concern. At least one agreement—between France and Pakistan for a sale of reprocessing facilities—appears to be moribund, and initial annoyance over the American "switch" (which was indeed both late and sudden) has been transmuted into a process of review and analysis, through INFCE, which may well lead to policies and procedures less dangerous than those in prospect before the American change. The new American posture is surely better than the one it replaced, and for the executive branch 1978 was a better and more rewarding year than 1977.

Yet the new course has its built-in difficulties, and they are well exemplified by the language of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, passed overwhelmingly in both houses and signed by the President on March 10. That act embodies the essentials of the new policy, and its strongest provision requires that within two years, in most cases, all existing agreements for nuclear exports must be amended to meet its new standards. These new standards require safeguards even on facilities that have no American connection, a notion that is still rejected by the Indian government. They also require U.S. permission for reprocessing and transfer of nuclear materials, a restraint that Europeans may find hard to accept. The law allows presidential waivers, but in some cases only if majorities of both houses concur year by year. In 1978 the congressional sponsors of the bill and the Carter Administration appeared to be happy with all this and with one another. But they have set a course that is likely to test their respective skills and sensitivities as the grace periods wind down. The basic shift in American policy was overdue and profoundly right, but the value of legislative pressure to force the rewriting of existing agreements is not yet clear.

For there remains a danger that if the United States should become rigid in its righteousness, a new coalition may be formed uniting suppliers and recipients with looser standards than ours and a different estimate of dangers and rewards. Certainly there are many in other nuclear nations who hope for just such a result. It is an urgent interest of both the Administration and the Congress that the new law not be so applied as to reinforce such hopes.

For conventional arms transfers, another of Mr. Carter's campaign causes, 1978 was a year of very modest progress. The most

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controversial arms sale of the year, that of F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, was of course regarded by the Administration as absolutely essential to its effort for peace in the Middle East.

The Administration tended to measure itself in this field by its success in remaining under Mr. Carter's proclaimed ceiling of $8.5 billion in fiscal '78. (The ceiling did not apply to NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the countries included were so varied that the process was like counting applies and oranges, and even grapefruit and watermelons, all together.) Moreover, the Administration had properly accepted the view of its European allies that no real progress could be made on their arms transfers unless the Soviet Union would join in the effort, and, as far as an outsider could tell, by the end of 1978 four meetings with the Soviet Union had led to nothing but an unedifying public squabble between Mr. Brzezinski of the White House and Mr. Leslie Gelb of the State Department, over whether it was right to hear what the Soviet representatives had to say about U.S. sales to the Soviet Union's neighbors (Mr. Gelb apparently pro, and Mr. Brzezinski con). As Mr. Gelb had wisely observed just before he joined the Administration, "the prospects for multilateral restraint are not good."[4]

Yet even in the face of these difficulties it is right to respect the distinct change in posture effected by the Carter Administration in 1977 and 1978. Agreed restraint was hard to come by, but it was already a great gain to have abandoned the unilateral extravagance exhibited under Secretary Kissinger. Indeed, the unhappy events in Iran force the question whether we would not have done much better, in 1972 and after, not to cater to the Shah's insatiable appetite for the latest and best and most in military hardware.

In other arenas of arms control there was only marginal progress. The negotiations for balanced force reductions in Europe remained stalled at the starting gate because of East-West disagreement on the present size of Warsaw Pact forces. In June the Soviets did at last accept the principle of reductions to equal and lower limits, but since they denied any present superiority, they rejected the Western view that common limits would require larger reductions for the Warsaw Pact than for NATO.

The Tenth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, in the spring of 1978, produced an agreed document. It will be read by few and is binding on none, but along with much empty rhetoric it did include the first broadly international endorsement of the

[4] Leslie H.Gelb, "Arms Sales," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1976–77, p. 22.

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concept of restraint on transfers of conventional weapons. The Special Session also evoked a small but useful change in the U.S. position on the use of nuclear weapons. In effect the United States has now bound itself not to be the first user of nuclear weapons against any formally declared non-nuclear weapons state unless such a state attacks the United States or its allies in company with a nuclear weapons state. More simply, on the current scene only Soviet-backed aggression against us or our allies could trigger a U.S. first use; it is sensible to have said so publicly.

On one major issue the Administration appeared to have worked itself into a cul-de-sac. To serious believers in arms control and in nonproliferation, one of the most important of all objectives, for many years, has been the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), being negotiated by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. In early 1978 there was such progress in the negotiation for such a treaty—conspicuously including a new Soviet readiness to accept monitoring on its own territory—that by the summer the Carter Administration had to decide whether it really meant what Mr. Carter himself had repeatedly and forcefully said, that a permanent and verifiable comprehenisve test ban was desirable.

It turned out that it did not. Neither the Pentagon nor the Department of Energy was in favor of a permanent end to all testing. Although experts on nuclear weapons were divided, those holding office, both in Washington and in the weapons laboratories, appeared to believe that a prolonged ban on testing would bring with it an unacceptable risk of deterioration in the warheads of the deterrent. So Mr. Carter, trying to hold things together, ruled that the United States would propose no more than a three-year ban.

It is too soon to say whether or not such a limited arrangement will prove negotiable. But what seems clearly predictable is that if such a truncated treaty is negotiated it is likely to find as few friends as the unlamented Threshold Test Ban produced by Mr. Kissinger. It may be tactically prudent to put CTBT below the SALT, and Mr. Carter may have another view at another time. But on the record of 1978, one has to say that when he seemed to have a chance to get what he said he wanted, he looked around his own government and pulled back.

IV

All in all, there was more good than bad, for arms control, in 1978. Even where the results were meager, the effort remained

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considerably stronger, broader and more sustained than it had been at any time since SALT I. The goodwill and seriousness of the President himself were clear, and on the largest of all issues, the stabilization of the strategic nuclear balance, the Administration's position, even if incompletely formed and insufficiently explained, was enormously better than that of distinguished critics like Mr. Paul Nitze.

The most important negotiation by far was SALT, and the record showed slow but steady progress that owed a great deal to the skill and tenacity of Secretary of State Vance, Mr. Paul Warnke (now retired) and their senior deputies. If the SALT agreement now so nearly settled can be signed early in 1979, the President and his colleagues will be fairly placed to persuade the American people that what they have done is good and deserves approval. And if SALT II is ratified, it will be the greatest achievement in the history of arms control.

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Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION

Nothing the Carter Administration has done has excited more hope, puzzlement and confusion than the effort to make human rights a primary theme in the international relations of the United States. Observers, watching the human rights initiative stumble from one contradiction to another, have announced its demise at regular intervals. Yet the campaign has plainly touched exposed nerves around the planet; it reverberates from Moscow, Santiago and Kampala to Peking; and, after two uncertain years, it remains a vital if problematic strain in American foreign policy. It therefore seems appropriate to attempt an interim assessment of the human rights initiative: its origins, its ambiguities, its achievements, its perils, its prospects.

II

Human rights—roughly the idea that all individuals everywhere are entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness on this earth—is a relatively modern proposition. Political orators like to trace this idea to religious sources, especially to the so-called Judeo-Christian tradition. In fact the great religious ages were notable for their indifference to human rights in the contemporary sense—not only for their acquiescence in poverty, inequality and oppression, but for their addiction to slavery, torture, wartime atrocities and genocide.

Christianity, for example, assigned to earthly misery an honored and indispensable role in the drama of salvation. The trials visited on mankind in this world were conceived as ordained by the Almighty in order to test and train sinful mortals. From the religious perspective, nothing that might take place on earth mattered in comparison to what must take place hereafter. The world was but an inn at which humans spent a night on their

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voyage to eternity, so what difference could it make if the food was poor or the bed uncomfortable?

No doubt the idea of natural rights has classical antecedents, among, for example, the Stoics. But humanitarianism—the notion that natural rights have immediate, concrete and universal application—is a product of the last four centuries. Tocqueville persuasively attributed the humanitarian ethic to the rise of the idea of equality. In aristocratic societies, he wrote, those in the upper caste hardly believed that their inferiors "belong to the same race." When medieval chroniclers "relate the tragic end of a noble, their grief flows apace; whereas they tell you at a breath and without wincing of massacres and tortures inflicted on the common sort of people." Tocqueville recalled the "cruel jocularity" with which the intelligent and delightful Madame de Sévigné, one of the most civilized women of the seventeenth century, described the breaking on a wheel of an itinerant fiddler "for getting up a dance and stealing some stamped paper." It would be wrong, Tocqueville observed, to suppose that Madame de Sévigné was selfish or sadistic. Rather, she "had no clear notion of suffering in anyone who was not a person of quality."

But the age of equality, Tocqueville suggested, vastly increased the number of people who saw each other as equals. That equality was the source of the new mood of "general compassion" was proved by the contrast between the way white Americans treated themselves and the way they treated their slaves. "The same man who is full of humanity toward his fellow creatures when they are at the same time his equals becomes insensible to their afflictions as soon as the equality ceases. His mildness should therefore be attributed to the equality of conditions rather than to civilization and education."[1]

The ethic of humanitarianism came into its own in the eighteenth century. Since religion had traditionally rejected the notion that people had a right to earthly happiness, early human rights formulations, as with Voltaire and later in the French Revolution, had a markedly anti-religious cast. Only later, as religion itself succumbed to the new ethic and began to see the Kingdom of God as attainable within history, could the claim be made that the Judeo-Christian tradition commanded the pursuit of happiness in this world. The basic human rights documents—the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man—were written by political, not by religious, leaders.

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. II, book 3, chapter 1.

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III

The United States was founded on the proclamation of "unalienable" rights, and human rights ever since have had a peculiar resonance in the American tradition. Nor was the application of this idea to foreign policy an innovation of the Carter Administration. Americans have agreed since 1776 that the United States must be the beacon of human rights to an unregenerate world. The question has always been how America is to execute this mission.

John Quincy Adams discussed the American choice in his famous Fourth of July address in 1821. "Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled," Adams said,

> there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in seach of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from *liberty* to *force*. . . . She might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.[2]

In 1847 Albert Gallatin, the last survivor among the great statesmen of the early republic, made the same point. "Your mission," he told his countrymen, "was to be a model for all other governments and for all other less-favored nations, to adhere to the most elevated principles of political morality, to apply all your faculties to the gradual improvement of your own institutions and social state, and *by your example* to exert a moral influence most beneficial to mankind."[3]

Then in December 1849, Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, who had been Jackson's Secretary of War and in 1848 the Democratic presidential candidate and who later became Buchanan's Secretary of State, introduced a resolution instructing the Foreign Relations Committee to inquire into the "expediency" of suspending diplomatic relations with Austria. Cass intended this as the national

[2] Walter LaFeber, ed., *John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire: Letters, Speeches and Papers*, Chicago: Times Books, 1965, p. 45.

[3] Albert Gallatin, *Peace With Mexico*, New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1847, Section vii. Emphasis added.

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response to the bloody suppression by Austrian and Russian troops of the Hungarian revolution of 1848—"atrocious acts of despotism," Cass said, "by which human liberty and life have been sacrificed." Louis Kossuth, the President of the short-lived Hungarian republic, soon visited the United States, pointing out in powerful speeches the anomaly that, while Americans talked endlessly about their mission of liberty, they declined "to take any active part in the regulation of the condition of the outward world." Yet, if the American destiny was what "you all believe it to be, then, indeed, that destiny can never be fulfilled by acting the part of passive spectators and by this very passivity granting a charter to ambitious czars to dispose of the condition of the world." Americans, Kossuth said, trusted so much "to the operative power of your institutions and of your example that they really believe they will make their way throughout the world by their moral influence. . . . I have never yet heard of a despot who had yielded to the moral influence of liberty."[4]

Cass's resolution and Kossuth's challenge confronted Americans with the question of how they were to fulfill the mission of human rights. John Parker Hale, a Free Soil Democrat from New Hampshire, opened the debate. "Aching and throbbing hearts," he said ironically, "[had] been waiting, and watching, and agonizing for just such a day as that when the Government shall . . . express its sympathies for the millions who are under the heel of power." But, if the Hungarian repression were indeed a moral question, Hale thought, the resolution should speak, not of the "expediency" of suspending relations with Austria but the "duty." Cass, however, had assured the Senate that American trade with Austria was negligible, thus making it "quite clear to the country that they can let off a good deal of indignation, and that it will cost them but very little." Was this the way to treat a moral question? Imagine the American minister in Turkey, where Kossuth had now fled, trying to cheer the Hungarian refugees by telling them "that the Senate of the great American Republic are inquiring, this very day, how much it will cost to utter a little indignation in their behalf?"

The future historian, Hale said, might start off his chapter about these times:

> At the commencement of this year, the American Senate, the highest legislative body of the world, the wisest, greatest, and most magnanimous people that ever lived or ever will live, forgetting and neglecting the trifling local affairs which

[4] Kossuth's speech at Concord, May 11, 1852, *Old South Leaflets*, No. 111, p. 15.

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concerned their own limits, constituted themselves into a high court, and proceeded to try the nations of the earth for "atrocious acts of despotism."

Hale hoped that the historian could go on to say that the United States proceeded "to try, not some few second-rate Powers with but little commerce, and whom it would cost but little to deal with, but that they took the empire of Russia first, and tried her." After all, Russian arms had overcome Kossuth. "I will not consent to sit in judgment upon Austria, until we have passed judgment upon some of these larger criminals. I am not willing that our action should be like that of small nets which catch the small fishes but let the great ones go."

What Cass proposed, Hale continued, was "that we erect ourselves into a high court of indignation! We are to arraign at our bar the nations of the earth, and they are to pass in trial before us, and we are to pass judgment upon them." An excellent principle—but why stop with Austria? I want to try the czar of Russia, Hale said, not just for what he did in Hungary but "for what he had done long ago in sending those unfortunate exiles to Siberian snows. . . . I want them to know that the American Senate have sympathies also for them. . . . I want to try him for his agency in the partition of Poland. . . . When we have done this, we shall show that we are governed by no pusillanimous motives in expressing our indignation against a weaker Power." And, "when we have tried Russia, let us not stop there. I think we ought to arraign . . . England for the manner in which she tried Smith O'Brien and the Irish patriots. . . . I want to go to India, and to try England for the oppressions, the cruelties, and the wars that she waged there."

If the principle was good, Hale said, it should be applied impartially. "After we have got through with Russia and England, I want . . . France to be placed at the bar . . . I want to go to Algiers and to inquire what France has done there. . . . Then, sir, while the court is in session . . . I want to try Spain. . . . Let us show that we are in earnest, and not merely showing off our indignation where there is no power of resentment, and where it will not be likely to cost us anything."

And, after we have passed judgment on the nations of Christendom and "they lie writhing in an agony of mortification at our feet," then let us "go from these high places down before the bar, and plead ourselves." For in "the capital of the Model Republic . . . within sight of the flag of freedom that floats over our heads . . . men are to be bought, and women are to be bought, and kept at twenty-five cents per day, until ready to be transported

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to some other market." The principle of the Cass resolution—"that liberty is [man's] God-given right, and the oppression that takes it from him by man is a wrong"—ought to begin at home.

Henry Clay, then in the twilight of his career, joined the debate. He was struck by the "incongruity" between Cass's premises and his remedy. Cass had discoursed about the "enormities of Austrian despotism," but his conclusion was only to recall "a little chargé d'affaires that we happen to have at Vienna. Why, the natural conclusion would be to declare war immediately against Austria." But was it really sensible to close the door of intercourse with Austria? Why not send a distinguished American to Vienna to plead quietly on behalf of the Hungarians? And why not "bring forward some original plan for affording succor and relief to the exiles of Hungary?"

In any event, Clay said, the Cass resolution asks us to judge foreign nations "as their conduct may be found to correspond with our notion and judgment of what is right and proper in the administration of human affairs." It assumes "the right of interference in the internal affairs of foreign nations. . . . But where is to be the limit?" You may say to Spain that unless it abolishes the inquisition, to Turkey that unless it abolishes polygamy, the United States will cease all intercourse with you. "Where, again I ask, are we to stop? Why should we not interfere in behalf of suffering Ireland? Why not interfere in behalf of suffering humanity wherever we may find it?" Let the Senate reflect, Clay warned, that in going down this road, we may "open a new field of collision, terminating perhaps in war, and exposing ourselves to the reaction of foreign Powers, who, when they see us assuming to judge of their conduct, will undertake in their turn to judge of our conduct."[5]

IV

This ancient debate serves as a reminder of what small progress America has made since the 31st Congress in resolving the question of the national mission. Cass's resolution showed the profound and admirably uncontrollable American impulse to demonstrate sympathy for suffering people in other lands. The response by Hale and Clay expressed doubts that still persist: Is the point of foreign policy to discharge moral indignation or to produce real changes in a real world? May quiet diplomacy not be more effective in international persuasion than public denunciation? Must not the United States, when it invokes human rights, apply the principle

[5] *Congressional Globe*, 31st Cong., 2nd Sess., January 7, 1850, pp. 113–116. For this and other references to Senate debates, I am indebted to Richard Baker and the Senate Historical Office.

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across the board and not just to small and weak countries? May not intervention on behalf of human rights jeopardize other national interests and increase the danger of war? In any event, by what authority do we interfere in the internal affairs of foreign countries? Should all nations be expected to embrace the American conception of human rights? Does not the habit of passing judgment on foreign states nourish national self-righteousness? Should not a human rights crusade perhaps begin at home?

Cass's resolution failed. Yet the questions raised by his appeal nagged the national conscience. After the Civil War President Grant observed in his first annual message that while Americans sympathized "with all people struggling for liberty . . . it is due to our honor that we should abstain from enforcing our views upon unwilling nations and from taking an interested part, without *invitation*, in the quarrels . . . between governments and their subjects."[6] Nonetheless, both Congress and the executive thereafter condemned assaults on human rights abroad—the persecution of Jews in Russia, Eastern Europe and the Levant; the massacre of Armenians in Turkey; the oppression of the Irish; "the cruel treatment of State prisoners in Siberia."[7] Justification presumably lay in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.[8] "Although we . . . as a rule scrupulously abstain from interfering, directly or indirectly, in the public affairs" of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish informed the American minister in Vienna in 1872, the persecution of Jews in Moldavia and Wallachia was so "inhuman" as to impart to the situation "a cosmopolitan character, in the redress of which all countries, governments, and creeds are alike interested."[9] Twenty years later Secretary of State James G. Blaine told the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs that, while the American government "does not assume to dictate the internal policy of other nations . . . nevertheless, the mutual duties

[6] Ulysses S. Grant, first annual message, December 6, 1869.

[7] The quoted phrase is from a resolution referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1891. See *Congressional Record*, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., February 14, 1891, p. 141.

[8] Grotius and many subsequent authorities defended the legality of such intervention, even in the form of invasion and war. E. M. Borchard thus defined the doctrine in 1915: "When. . .'human' rights are habitually violated, one or more states may intervene in the name of the society of nations and may take measures to substitute at least temporarily, if not permanently, its own sovereignty for that of the state thus controlled" (E. M. Borchard, *The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad*, New York, 1915, p. 14). Senator McGovern's recent proposal for U.N. intervention in Cambodia was in this tradition. Other authorities have been skeptical of the doctrine. A. Rougier concluded after systematic inquiry into "*la théorie de l'intervention d'humanité*" that it was "neither possible to separate the humanitarian from the political grounds of intervention nor to assure the complete disinterestedness of the intervening States. . .Barbarous acts are committed by the thousands every day in some corner of the globe which no State dreams of stopping because no State has an interest in stopping them." See the discussion in L. B. Sohn and Thomas Buergenthal, *International Protection of Human Rights*, Charlottesville (Virginia): Michie Co., 1973, chapter 3.

[9] John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, Washington, 1906, VI, pp. 360–61.

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of nations require that each should use its power with a due regard for the result which its exercise produces on the rest of the world."[10]

The pressures of conscience, reinforced by ethnic lobbies fearful for relatives in the homeland, injected human rights into foreign affairs so regularly in these years that Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 felt impelled to issue a warning. No shrinking violet when it came to the assertion of American power in the world, TR nonetheless cautioned Congress:

> Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our own moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations. We have plenty of sins of our own to war against, and under ordinary circumstances we can do more for the general uplifting of humanity by striving with heart and soul to put a stop to civic corruption, to brutal lawlessness and violent race prejudices here at home than by passing resolutions about wrong-doing elsewhere.[11]

Despite TR's effort to recall his countrymen to the older tradition of doing good by example rather than by interference, the conviction grew in the bloody twentieth century that crimes against humanity indeed had "a cosmopolitan character" and were humanity's business. Wilsonianism gave this view general blessing, though Wilson cast the issue in terms of national self-determination. But the conception of an international interest in *individual* rights was evolving. The eighth Conference of American States (1938) produced resolutions in "defense of human rights." Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms (1941) applied specifically to people, not to nations. Roosevelt also extended the conception to cover not only freedom of speech and worship, but freedom from want ("economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants") and freedom from fear (that is, of military aggression). FDR's third freedom, supplemented by his Economic Bill of Rights (1944), soon flowered into the idea of social and economic rights to be sought along with traditional "Bill-of-Rights" rights.

The "Declaration by United Nations" (1942) called for "complete victory" in order, among other things, "to preserve human rights";

[10] Moore, *ibid.*, pp. 354–56. The "result" that disturbed Blaine was the discharge into the United States of large numbers of destitute Jews from Russia.

[11] Theodore Roosevelt, fourth annual message, December 6, 1904. Roosevelt went on to acknowledge it as "inevitable" that the nation "should desire eagerly to give expression to its horror on an occasion like the massacre of the Jews in Kishenef" and conceded that "in extreme cases action may be justifiable." The form of action, however, must depend "upon the degree of the atrocity and upon our power to remedy it."

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and the U.N. Charter (1945) pledged member nations to joint and separate action to promote "human rights." Three years later the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This lengthy document included both "civil and political rights" and "economic, social and cultural rights," the second category designed to please states that denied their subjects the first. The Declaration was followed by a series of subsidiary conventions and covenants. As David Owen, the present British Foreign Secretary, has accurately noted, these documents, "though usually passed by large majorities, normally had no perceptible impact on the protection of human rights in any part of the world."[12] Yet standards solemnly declared, even if unobserved, live on to supply ammunition to those who thereafter demand observance.

The idea of human rights, like nearly everything else, was caught up in the cold war. The democratic states assailed the communist world for its abuse of civil and political rights; the communist world assailed the democratic states for their neglect of social and economic rights. Human rights began to emerge as a theme in American foreign policy in this context; thus Kennedy in his inaugural address spoke of a new generation of Americans "unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this nation has always been committed." But human rights were also seen as an object of détente; thus Kennedy asked at American University in 1963: "Is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?" "Since human rights are indivisible," Kennedy told the United Nations two months before Dallas, "this body cannot stand aside when those rights are abused and neglected by any member state."

Vietnam interrupted Washington's movement toward human rights as a major theme of foreign policy. The case for American intervention spoke of national self-determination rather than individual rights; it would not, in any case, have been easy for a state engaged in mass destruction to allege a consuming interest in human rights. The issue lay dormant in Washington even after American forces left Vietnam in 1973. Henry Kissinger's diplomacy made a virtue of the de-ideologization of foreign relations. A policy aiming at the manipulation of the balance of power doubtless contained an inner bias in favor of governments that could deliver their nations without having to worry about political opposition or a free press. In any event, the United States in these years embraced without visible disgust governments both of the

[12] David Owen, *Human Rights*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978, p. 107.

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authoritarian Right (Greece, Portugal, Brazil, Chile) and of the totalitarian Left (Russia, China, Romania, Yugoslavia).

What forced the human rights issue on the world was the courage of the dissenters in the Soviet Union. Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, the Medvedevs, and the rest of those intrepid men embodied the challenge to the democratic conscience that Kossuth and the heroes of 1848 had embodied a century earlier. The initial response to this challenge came not at all from Washington but from the governments of Western Europe, especially Britain and France, and resulted in the celebrated Basket Three of the Helsinki Final Act, with its manifold human rights provisions. In 1975 and 1976 many Americans denounced Helsinki—among them, Jimmy Carter.

But the dominance of Realpolitik in the Kissinger years frustrated those in the Wilsonian tradition who felt that American foreign policy should be founded on ideals. It frustrated equally those in the school of FDR who did not doubt that foreign policy must be founded on national interest but considered ideals an indispensable constituent of American power. Official indifference to the Soviet dissidents, symbolized by President Ford's refusal in mid-1975 to receive Solzhenitsyn, seemed to reveal a moral vacuum at the center of American foreign policy.

Congress meanwhile undertook to force the human rights issue on the executive. It used its legislative power to forbid or restrict economic or military aid to countries that engaged "in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." It denied aid to a long list of erring countries by name. In the case of the Soviet Union, it demanded change in Soviet emigration practices as a condition for export credits and for the extension of most-favored-nation trade status. It required the State Department to submit annual reports on the state of human rights in more than a hundred countries.

Congressional pressure soon affected Foggy Bottom. "If the Department did not place itself ahead of the curve on this issue," Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll warned Secretary Kissinger in 1974, "Congress would take the matter out of the Department's hands." In 1975 the Department established an Office of Humanitarian Affairs. But the Secretary doubted that human rights had a serious place in foreign policy. Informed that the American Ambassador to Chile had raised human rights issues with the military dictatorship, he said, "Tell Popper to cut out the political science lectures."[13] And, if human rights were in any sense

[13] See the well-informed article by Patrick Breslin, "Human Rights: Rhetoric or Action?," *The Washington Post*, February 17, 1977.

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an object of policy, the Secretary was sure that quiet diplomacy, not public exhortation and punitive action, was the way to promote them—a view that received a measure of vindication when Jewish migration from the Soviet Union sharply declined after the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Congressional pressure continued to rise nevertheless. Eventually it affected the Secretary himself. In 1976 Kissinger pronounced human rights "centrally important . . . one of the most compelling issues of our time."[14]

V

By 1977 the world was well prepared for new human rights initiatives. Up to this point Washington had lagged badly behind. But the new President, in a remarkable display of leadership, seized the standard of human rights and succeeded in presenting it to the world as if it had been American property all along. He was able to do this because the time was ripe and because the cause fulfilled the old American conviction of having a mission to the world.

It is not altogether clear how Carter personally came to human rights. The phrase does not appear in the chapter on foreign policy in his memoir *Why Not the Best?* (1975). Nor was the issue prominent in his presidential campaign. On occasion, indeed, he seemed to be moving in the opposite direction. He criticized not only the Helsinki Agreement but the whole philosophy of intervention. "Our people have now learned," he told the Foreign Policy Association in June 1976, "the folly of our trying to inject our power into the internal affairs of other nations." At the same time, he had a general feeling, as he wrote in *Why Not the Best?*, that "our government's foreign policy has not exemplified any commitment to moral principles," that foreign policy must rest on the same moral standards "which are characteristic of the individual citizens"[15]—and that "there is only one nation in the world which is capable of true leadership among the community of nations, and that is the United States."[16] "We cannot look away," he added in Washington on September 8, 1976, "when a government tortures people, or jails them for their beliefs, or denies minorities fair treatment or the right to emigrate."

[14] E. P. Spiro, "A Paradigm Shift in American Foreign Policy," *Worldview*, January-February 1977.

[15] This was an odd proposition to come from a man who had announced himself a disciple of Reinhold Niebuhr. In the first sentence of *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, Niebuhr wrote: "The thesis to be elaborated in these pages is that a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing." Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1932, p. 11.

[16] Jimmy Carter, *Why Not the Best?*, New York: Bantam Books, 1976, pp. 140–41.

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The future historian will have to trace the internal discussions during the interregnum that culminated in the striking words of the inaugural address: "Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. . . . Our commitment to human rights must be absolute." (Carter also said that the United States had a special obligation "to take on those moral duties which, when assumed, seem invariably to be in our own best interests." The irony appears to have been unconscious.)

One can surmise that the President-elect, seeking to give American foreign policy a moral force and content it had lacked in the Nixon years, arrived at human rights as the perfect unifying principle. This principle tapped the most acute contemporary concerns as well as the finest American traditions. It promised to restore America's international moral position, so sadly eroded by Vietnam, Watergate, support of dictatorships, CIA assassination plots, etc. It promised also to restore a domestic consensus behind foreign policy. The doctrine gratified both cold warriors, who wanted to indict the communist world, and idealists, who saw human rights as the only basis for lasting peace.

So the campaign was launched with appropriate pyrotechnics—a presidential letter to Sakharov; a White House meeting with Vladimir Bukovsky; brave declarations of human rights principle. But it soon ran into trouble. The idea, critics were quick to point out, had not been "thought through." Perhaps this was just as well. Had the new President confided the idea to the State Department for analysis, there very likely would have been no human rights campaign at all. Confronted by new departures, bureaucracies customarily feel that risks outweigh opportunities. Sometimes changes can be wrought in government only when a President, by publicly committing the government to a new course, forces the bureaucracy to devise new policies. Truman's Point Four and Kennedy's Alliance for Progress are other examples.

Yet the failure to think the initiative through led Carter, then and later, to make the promotion of human rights sound a little too easy. He would have been wiser to admit the difficulties of converting principle into policy. "When I began to speak out for human rights," David Owen recently remarked, ". . . I warned that there was a price to pay, and that the price was a little inconsistency from time to time. If I had to make that comment again, I would no longer say a *little* inconsistency, I would say a *very great deal* of inconsistency."[17] The questions that John P. Hale and Henry Clay had raised long before against Lewis Cass returned to bedevil the

[17] Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

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Carter Administration. "Administration Still Groping to Define 'Human Rights'" read the headline in *The Washington Post* three months after the inauguration.[18]

Two weeks later Secretary of State Vance made a valiant and judicious essay at definition. Speaking at the University of Georgia Law School, he distinguished three categories of human rights: the right to be free from government violation of the integrity of the person (an adaptation of FDR's freedom from fear); the right to the fulfillment of vital needs as for food, shelter, health care and education (freedom from want); and the right to civil and political liberties (FDR's other two freedoms). In pursuing these rights, Vance warned, we must recognize "the limits of our power and of our wisdom," avoid "a rigid, hubristic attempt to impose our values on others" and reject the illusion that "a call to the banner of human rights will bring sudden transformations in authoritarian societies. We have embarked on a long journey." But Vance did not really try to deduce a policy from the principle, saying enigmatically that "there may be disagreement on the priorities these rights deserve."

Disagreement on the priorities was indeed unceasing. Diplomats objected when the human rights campaign threatened arms control negotiations or political relationships. Admirals and generals objected when it imperiled cherished military bases and alliances. Treasury officials estimated that foreign policy restrictions cost the economy up to ten billion dollars a year, thereby increasing the trade deficit.[19] Businessmen objected when the campaign hurt exports. Carter himself, the presumed number-one human rights crusader, was soon to be found visiting authoritarian nations, selling them arms and saluting their leaders. His human rights policy, it appeared, was entirely compatible with effusive support for the Shah of Iran, with an egregious letter of commendation to Somoza in Nicaragua, with the possible recognition of Vietnam and Cuba. Washington was fearless in denouncing human rights abuses in countries like Cambodia, Paraguay and Uganda, where the United States had negligible strategic and economic interests; a good deal less fearless toward South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia and most of black Africa; increasingly circumspect about the Soviet Union; totally silent about China.

By mid-1978 Solzhenitsyn could speak sarcastically of bureaucrats who exploded in "anger and inflexibility . . . when dealing with weak government and weak countries" but became "tongue-

[18] *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1977.
[19] "Trying to Right the Balance," *Time*, October 9, 1978.

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tied and paralyzed when they deal with powerful governments."[20] "Unless standards of human rights are seen to be applied uniformly and neutrally to all nations regardless of the nature of their regimes or the size of their armaments," Senator Moynihan of New York sternly said, "unless this is done it will quickly be seen that it is not human rights at all which are invoked . . . but simply arbitrary political standards dressed up in the guise of human rights."[21]

VI

The campaign—it could not be termed a policy—raised other problems. There was the question of its impact on the Soviet Union. "What we are now facing," Georgi Arbatov, the Kremlin's house Americanologist, told an English interviewer in November 1978, "is a consistent effort of interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and an attempt to inflict harm on some of our institutions. It is waged in a way that would have produced a serious uproar in the United States if we'd done what you've done toward us."[22] This was, of course, a ridiculous complaint from the representative of a country that for more than half a century had consistently tried to interfere in American internal affairs and to inflict harm on American institutions (and especially ridiculous in view of the fact, well known to Arbatov, that such interference had long since produced "a serious uproar" in the United States). Still, if Americans would recall how they felt about Soviet subversion, they might understand that this was precisely the way the Soviet government felt about the human rights campaign. Nor could anyone doubt that the campaign, pursued *à outrance*, would strike at the very foundation of the Soviet order.

The deterioration of Soviet-American relations during 1977 alarmed those who believed that the ultimate human right was the right to be alive and, therefore, that the prevention of nuclear war was the overriding issue for mankind and the condition for the promotion of all other human rights. Carter's campaign, French President Giscard d'Estaing observed in the summer of 1977, "has compromised the process of détente."[23] The Soviet resentment, for some utterly mysterious reason, astonished Carter himself; he spoke in June 1977 of the "surprising adverse reaction in the Soviet Union to our stand on human rights."[24] But he accepted it as a fact

[20] In his Harvard Commencement speech, *Harvard Gazette*, June 8, 1978.
[21] D. P. Moynihan, "The Politics of Human Rights," *Commentary*, August 1977.
[22] Interview with Arbatov by Jonathan Power, *The Observer* (London), November 12, 1978.
[23] Interview with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing by Arnaud de Borchgrave, *Newsweek*, July 25, 1977.
[24] *The New York Times*, June 26, 1977.

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of life and moderated his campaign accordingly, thereby raising the virtuous wrath of those who had seen the campaign primarily as a means of reviving the cold war.

There was the question, too, of the impact on the United States. America was once again erecting itself into a "high court of indignation." But what was America to sit in judgment upon the world? A born-again President might have remembered Matthew 7: 2–3: "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" As John P. Hale had reminded the Senate in 1850 of the slave markets in the District of Columbia, so latter-day critics asked whether the United States ought not, before setting forth to reform the world, secure human rights for black, red and brown citizens, for the targets of the FBI and the CIA, for the victims of muggers in the streets. How could the government invoke Helsinki's Basket Three while it denied visas to Soviet trade unionists and diplomats—and granted one to Ian Smith? How dared it lecture Fidel Castro about human rights after having spent a number of years trying to murder him?

An even more difficult question was involved—the question urged by Henry Clay when he wondered about American presumption in supposing that all nations were morally bound to accept our own conception of what was "right and proper" in human affairs. Was it reasonable, asked the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations, "to expect from developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America to apply overnight your high standards when most of them are still grappling with problems of food, education, health, employment, etc.?"[25] Was not the whole concept of political and civil rights ethnocentric and culture-bound and therefore the American determination to cram it down the throats of the world an adventure in cultural imperialism? "Those Americans who profess to know with such certainty what other people want and what is good for them in the way of political institutions," wrote George Kennan, "would do well to ask themselves whether they are not actually attempting to impose their own values, traditions, and habits of thought on peoples for whom these things have no validity and no usefulness."[26]

Observers commented on the "holier-than-thou" attitude discernible in the Washington human rights bureaucracy—a conde-

[25] Fereydoun Hoveyda, "Not All Clocks for Human Rights Are the Same," *The New York Times*, May 18, 1977.

[26] George F. Kennan, *The Cloud of Danger: Current Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977, p. 43.

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scension toward lesser breeds summed up in the odious remark an unnamed official made to Elizabeth Drew of *The New Yorker*: "I think that the mulish world has noticed the two-by-four."[27] And, as the British historian Sir Herbert Butterfield reminds us, "Moral indignation corrupts the agent who possesses it and is not calculated to reform the man who is the object of it."[28] Little has done more harm to human affairs than illusions on the part of leaders and of nations of their infallibility. Reinhold Niebuhr has warned of "a deep layer of Messianic consciousness in the mind of America" and of "the depth of evil to which individuals and communities may sink particularly when they try to play the role of God in history."[29] The human rights campaign led even pro-American Europeans to worry about rekindled messianism across the Atlantic and to recall, as Countess Marion Dönhoff put it, that "foreign policy based on moral values, as espoused by Wilson and Dulles, did not make the world noticeably more moral. On the contrary it led to dead ends and catastrophes."[30]

VII

In short order the human rights campaign was hailed before a high court of indignation of its own, and readily convicted of hypocrisy, double standards, undermining détente, undermining stalwart anti-communist allies, of cultural imperialism, racism, messianism and so on. It is little wonder that the initiative, buffeted by intractable circumstance, by plausible criticism and by quarrels among its original supporters over its emphases, came to seem so selective, intermittent and riddled with contradiction that it chronically threatened to disappear altogether. One writer entitled an article on the subject in mid-1978 "A Crusade Quickly Cancelled."[31]

Yet the criticism, however plausible, may also have been exaggerated. To all-or-nothing demands of the Solzhenitsyn-Moynihan sort, Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, made persuasive response:

> We candidly recognize that diversity of cultures and interests and different stages of economic and political maturity make it essential to treat each country on the merits of its own situation. It would be impossible to pursue our human rights objectives in precisely the same way for all countries, and silly to try.[32]

[27] Elizabeth Drew, "Human Rights," *The New Yorker*, July 18, 1977.

[28] Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations*, London: Collins, 1951, p. 110.

[29] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1952, pp. 69, 173.

[30] Marion Dönhoff, "Weltpolitik mit Fanfarenstössen," *Die Zeit*, March 4, 1977.

[31] Tracy Early, "A Crusade Quickly Cancelled," *Worldview*, July-August 1978.

[32] Patricia Derian, "A Commitment Sustained," *Worldview*, July-August 1978. One is constrained to ask Senator Moynihan, the upper chamber's neoconservative philosopher, which statement he thinks would have commended itself more to Edmund Burke—his own or Assistant Secretary Derian's.

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Of course the double standard was inherent in the situation. Not only were other nations in varying stages of maturity, but the promotion of human rights could not in any case be the supreme goal of foreign policy, the object to which all else was to be subordinated. A nation's fundamental interest must be self-preservation; and, when national security and the promotion of human rights came into genuine conflict, national security had to prevail—though this was not at all to say that the national security bureaucracy was anywhere near to being the infallible expositor of national security. Human rights, in the nature of foreign policy, could only be one of several contending national interests.

As for the impact on the Soviet Union, this was perhaps exaggerated. It was often said that the 1977 crackdown on dissidents was a response to the human rights campaign. Prominent dissidents themselves disagreed.[33] Viewed in retrospect, the crackdown was more probably a response to the effect that dissidence was having within the Soviet Union and would have taken place whether or not Washington had let loose on human rights.

The campaign unquestionably infuriated the Russians. But the Soviet response was tactical rather than strategic, and even the tactics were confused. Part of the time Soviet representatives responded with bluster. They claimed before the U.N. Human Rights Commission that the communist system protected individual freedoms to a "qualitatively unprecedented level," that any Soviet citizens may express opinions that "may not coincide with the Soviet outlook" and that there has "never been any case in which a healthy person has been interned in a psychiatric asylum: this is absolutely impossible."[34] At the same time, they have compromised their old line that the discussion of individual cases represents an intervention in internal affairs by themselves raising American human rights cases in international forums. "The more the Russians take up western cases," as the London *Times* recently noted, "the less they can legitimately complain when the west does the same."[35]

The future of détente would depend on other factors than human rights—unless cold warriors in the Senate succeeded in using human rights to block a new SALT agreement. (And, if they

[33] "Absolutely untrue," wrote Andrei Amalrik, the historian. " . . . These arrests were planned and set in motion earlier." See "Dissidents' Fate Turns on Kremlin Struggle," *The Washington Post,* June 5, 1977. Though Amalrik and Roy Medvedev, another dissident historian, agreed on little, they agreed on this; see Medvedev's statement in *Newsweek,* June 20, 1977. So did Ludmila Alexeyeva, authorized representative in the United States of the Moscow Group to Monitor the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in the U.S.S.R. in a letter to *The Washington Post,* published June 18, 1977.

[34] "UN Jurists Question Russians on Rights," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), October 27, 1978; Murray Kempton, "The UN Spins Its Wheels," *The New York Post*, October 29, 1978.

[35] "Calling the Kettle Black," *The Times* (London), November 14, 1978.

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attempted this, they would be rejecting the counsel of leading Soviet dissenters. "I emphasize the priority of the disarmament issue within the overall complex of détente aims," Sakharov said in his statement of July 15, 1978. "I emphasize the practical necessity for an independent decision of current problems in the disarmament area and international security."[36]) Arbatov, crabbing about human rights in November 1978, did *not* say, as he carefully said when considering the possibility of a Chinese-American axis, "Then the whole situation would look different to us. . . . Then there is no place for détente."[37] Plainly, the Russians prefer the discomfiture of living with the human rights campaign to the danger of a break with the United States and a Chinese-American alliance.

The impact on the United States was exaggerated also. In practice, the human rights campaign turned out to be notably less than a crusade. Moreover, intercession into the affairs of countries that mistreat their own citizens now had a more solid foundation in international law than simply the old doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The U.N. Charter and succeeding international documents ended finally the idea that human rights were solely a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

Nor was it by any means certain that concern for human rights was a form of cultural imperialism. If the assertion that such rights were universal, and not merely the local prejudice of Caucasian societies bordering the North Atlantic, might imply racial arrogance, the limitation of these rights to a few white nations might imply racial arrogance as well. Did the relativists mean that nonwhite peoples were incapable of appreciating due process, personal liberty and self-government? History certainly suggested that democracy has worked best in the North Atlantic orbit, but democratic aspiration could not be so easily localized. "Human rights," a distinguished former Philippine senator told Americans with understandable irritation, "are not a western discovery."[38] India, for all its religious and linguistic divisions, its poverty and its illiteracy, had voted emphatically in early 1977 for a return to democracy.

[36] Sakharov's statement condemning the trials of Ginzburg, Shcharansky, and Petkus, reprinted in the *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., September 13, 1978, p. H9744. Senator Kennedy reported after a meeting with dissenters in Moscow, "Almost all of the dissidents agreed with Dr. Sakharov that our two nations have an obligation to make progress on arms control. They urged us to conclude the SALT II agreement as soon as possible, on its own merits. They felt strongly . . . it would create a more favorable environment to pursue our concern about human rights." *Congressional Record*, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., September 13, 1978, p. S15044.

[37] *The Observer* (London), November 12, 1978.

[38] Raul S. Manglapus, "Human Rights Are Not a Western Discovery," *Worldview*, October 1978.

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The case of China was to the point. So far as one could tell, there was probably more intellectual freedom in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev than in China under Mao. The American government, however, was far more zealous in preaching human rights to Moscow than to Peking. Why? American officials used to explain that, since there was "no visible constituency for it within the country," the regime was not at a stage where anything could be done about it.[39] Perhaps they supposed there was no constituency for abstruse historical reasons—the Confucian tradition, the concern with the collective rather than with the individual good, and so on. But by 1978 Amnesty International had issued a telling report portraying the sweep of political repression in China[40]; and Peking wall posters proclaimed, "We cannot tolerate that human rights and democracy are only slogans of the western bourgeoisie, and [that] the eastern proletariat only needs dictatorship."[41] Another poster: "As Chinese citizens, we think that truth is universal and that the soul of mankind, human rights, is not limited by national boundaries or geography." The poster was signed "The Human Rights Group."[42]

Perhaps human rights were less culture-bound than some Americans, in an excess either of humility or vanity, liked to believe. In the end, the answer to the question whether political and civil rights are local or universal depends on one's view of man. Over the long run, this historian finds it hard to believe that the instinct for political and civil freedom is confined to the happy few in the North Atlantic littoral.

VIII

By the end of 1978 it appeared that, even if the crusade was dead, the campaign was here to stay, at least for the life of the Carter Administration. Human rights was now institutionalized as a claimant agency in American foreign policy decisions. Foreign assistance took account of the condition of human rights in cases where strategic considerations were not deemed overriding. (The Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Economic Assistance ought, however, to extend its purview to military assistance as well.) A long list of countries was denied aid or permitted it under severe restrictions: Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Argentina, Uganda, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Paraguay, and

[39] Elizabeth Drew, *supra*, footnote 27.
[40] Report of November 27, 1978.
[41] Fox Butterfield, "Peking's Poster Warriors Are Not Just Paper Tigers," *The New York Times*, November 26, 1978.
[42] "Peking Wall Poster Plea to Carter," *The New York Post*, December 13, 1978.

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others. The American government opposed loans by international financial institutions to countries flagrantly violating human rights. American embassies became human rights watch offices around the world. The repeated resurrections of the campaign in the face of premature obituaries demonstrated both the genuine continuity of the Administration's concern and, even more, the issue's underlying vitality.

For all its vulnerabilities, the campaign had significantly altered the international atmosphere. It had placed human rights on the world's agenda—and on the world's conscience. It had given heart to brave men and women fighting for their rights around the planet. It had encouraged the release of political prisoners in Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Brazil, Cuba and other countries, amnesty in Poland, a peaceful change of administration in the Dominican Republic.[43] It had placed the burden of proof within the American government on those who wanted to embrace despots. And, by exerting pressure, however unevenly, for human rights, the American government had also significantly altered the world's theory of the United States as a rampant capitalist power bent on global economic hegemony.

But where does the campaign go from here? The Senate, if it cares so deeply about human rights, might now ratify the U.N. human rights covenants still pending—on Civil and Political Rights, on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights and on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, not to mention the Genocide Convention, which Truman submitted a generation ago. Recalling Clay's recommendation that the United States, instead of merely proclaiming its virtue, bring forward plans affording succor and relief to political exiles, Congress might also take action to provide, for example, refuge asylum for the "boat people" fleeing Vietnam. We cannot always expect to be virtuous without cost to ourselves.

Can the United States do more than it has done to induce other governments to stop abusing their people? If a strong prima facie case can be made against military assistance to countries that trample on political and civil rights, the case for the termination of economic assistance is sometimes less clear.[44] Why should people already poor and oppressed be punished further because of the iniquity of

[43] Reinol Gonzalez, recently released after 16 years in Castro's prisons, told *The New York Times* that he was "convinced that the Cuban President was releasing the prisoners because he felt politically secure, and, especially, because of President Carter's human-rights initiatives. 'Even a single prisoner stains the record,' Mr. Gonzalez said." Howell Raines, "Castro Prisoners Arrive As a Split in Exiles Rises," *The New York Times*, December 13, 1978.

[44] See the able discussion by Edwin M. Martin, "Should Observance of Basic Human Rights Be a Prerequisite for Aid?," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1978.

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their governments? In most cases the denial of American assistance would not cause a government whose survival depends on repression to change its policies of control. Moreover, once inserted into bilateral relations, human rights invites unseemly bargaining—the release of political prisoners, for example, in exchange for a credit from the Export-Import Bank.

The more the United States presses human rights as a unilateral initiative, the more it risks becoming a high court of indignation. One hopes that the Administration will ponder the point made by American statesmen from John Quincy Adams to Theodore Roosevelt that, save in extreme cases, we can probably do more for human rights by example at home than by intervention abroad. One would wish, too, for more systematic self-scrutiny of our own motives. Not every American who invokes human rights these days really cares all that much about human rights per se. Cold warriors, who showed no interest in the fate of human rights under Greek colonels or Chilean generals, hope to use the issue in order to block a SALT II agreement. Protectionists seize the issue in order to stop the import into the United States of competitive Latin American products such as sugar and cotton. Nor has the United States been willing to join any international authority that would engage in external scrutiny of our practices. This fear lies behind the continued resistance to those toothless wonders, the U.N. conventions and covenants. While it may be arresting to hear our President proclaim that "no force on earth" can separate us from the commitment "to enhance human rights,"[45] we would be wise to rid ourselves of the messianic illusion that the United States is the only nation "capable of true leadership among the community of nations."

IX

The limits of a unilateral American role in reforming the world are plain—and raise the question of the multilateralization of the human rights campaign. But the U.N. General Assembly's concern for human rights is evidently exhausted by contemplation of South Africa, Israel and Chile. Even Cambodia and Uganda have thus far escaped rebuke. And the U.N. Human Rights Commission is an imposture, its members nurtured, in the words of Murray Kempton, "in the libertarian atmosphere of countries like Bulgaria, Iran, . . . and the Soviet Union."[46] Even Uganda is a member.

[45] In his speech of December 6, 1978, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

[46] Murray Kempton, "The UN Spins Its Wheels," *The New York Post*, October 29, 1978.

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Minor mechanical improvements have been suggested in the U.N. process. Some years ago Costa Rica revived a proposal, originally made by India, for the appointment of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. The United States advocates the return of the U.N. Division on Human Rights from Geneva, where it is buried in obscurity, to the bright lights of New York. Ambassador Richard Gardner has proposed transforming the Trusteeship Council, which has little left to do, into a Human Rights Council and thereby raising human rights to "new authority and visibility" in the U.N. process.[47] Such institutional changes would be of no more than marginal benefit, for law is the expression of community, and enforcement machinery requires a consensus. The Council of Europe can establish a High Court for Human Rights—but one cannot expect serious human rights action from the United Nations so long as nearly two-thirds of the member states abuse human rights in their own countries.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, established under the Helsinki Agreement, provides another forum for the promotion of human rights. The first follow-up meeting (held, ironically, in Yugoslavia, a nation celebrated for the high quality of its political prisoners) gave the democracies an opportunity to challenge the communist states on their failure to give effect to Basket Three. By responding with specific allegations of Western violations, the communist states themselves legitimized the issue for international debate. Though the meeting adjourned without agreement, it conducted an effective review of the post-Helsinki record. The communists neither walked out nor declined the next meeting to be held in Madrid in 1980.

It would be a mistake, however, to expect drastic transformations to come out of Madrid. It may well be that, given the existing balance of values as well as power in world affairs, human rights cannot be pushed much further in the sphere of government-to-government relations. The next phase of the campaign is likely to gather its force outside government. One side effect of the Carter Administration's campaign has been to leave the impression that human rights is essentially a matter among states. Yet, when states push human rights, their motives are always, and rightly, suspect. The "moral duties" assumed by governments, in Carter's unfortunate but accurate phrase in his inaugural address, seem "invariably" to be in their own "best interests." Politicization is not necessarily the best destiny for human rights.

[47] Richard Gardner, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy," address before American Chamber of Commerce in Italy, May 17, 1977.

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X

The moral duties of human rights rest just as strongly on nongovernmental as on governmental bodies. Amnesty International, the International League for the Rights of Man and the International Commission of Jurists have of course performed notable work. A special obligation rests, I would think, on professional associations. Many political prisoners are professionals themselves. When they are arrested, sent to labor camps or insane asylums, tortured, murdered, their professional colleagues around the world have the obligation to rally to their defense. So the National Academy of Sciences spoke out for Sakharov, Shcharansky and other Soviet scientists; so the American Psychiatric Association protested the arrest of Alexander Podrabinek after the publication of his book on the confinement of Soviet dissenters to insane asylums; so the World Psychiatric Association condemned the political misuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union and elsewhere; so PEN, the Authors League and the Association of American Publishers have protested the suppression of cultural freedom.

It is singular that American scientists and psychiatrists have been far more sensitive to human rights issues than American political scientists and historians. The American Political Science Association, after righteously declining to meet in Chicago because Illinois had not ratified the Equal Rights Amendment, could find no human rights obstacle to participating in the 1979 meeting of the International Political Science Association in Moscow. The American Historical Association watched the persecution of Soviet historians—Amalrik, Medvedev, Solzhenitsyn (whose *Gulag Archipelago* is an historical work), Valentyn Moroz—without a word of objection or regret.

The conventional argument against protests is that they antagonize orthodox Soviet political scientists and historians without helping the dissenters. Yet experience has shown that it is precisely the spotlight of international concern that exerts restraining effect on arbitrary government. "The most frightening thing that can happen to a person," Mihajlo Mihajlov, the dissident Yugoslav writer, has noted, "is to be forgotten in prison."[48] Amalrik has testified that it plays "a very important part in terms of moral support, to know that one is known and well-known. . . . The Soviet authorities do react quite sensitively to western public opinion."[49] "It must be understood," Solzhenitsyn himself has said,

[48] Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Notes of a Survivor," *New Leader*, July 31, 1978.
[49] "Dissent in Exile—Andrei Amalrik Talks to Michael Charlton," *Listener*, October 14, 1976.

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"that the East is not at all indifferent to protests from Western society. On the contrary it mortally fears them—and only them."[50] E. P. Thompson, the historian of the English working class, commented: "Solzhenitsyn has asked us to shout once more. And we must, urgently, meet his request. . . . We must make it clear again, without equivocation, that we uphold the right of Soviet citizens to think, communicate, and act as free, self-activating people; and that we utterly despise the clumsy police patrols of Soviet intellectual and social life."[51]

The American Historical Association did not shout, or even whisper. Instead, it took part in the Third U.S.–U.S.S.R. Historians' Colloquium in Moscow in November 1978 and secured a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities for two U.S.–U.S.S.R. conferences on quantitative history in 1979 and 1980, thereby expressing its solidarity with the historians the regime approves rather than with those the regime persecutes. I write all this with intense shame for my profession.

To regard human rights as simply an issue among states is a form of cop-out. Nor, I would emphasize, should professional concern be confined to the abuse of human rights in the communist world. Since professional associations need not balance competing national interests, they can speak without constraint about the persecution of their colleagues in all countries. The promotion of human rights depends in the end on the individual commitment of men and women in free societies. "Nothing is more disgusting," said Emerson, "than the crowing about liberty by slaves, as most men are, and the flippant mistaking for freedom of some paper preamble like a Declaration of Independence or the statute right to vote, by those who have never dared to think or to act."[52] In the end, it is on the strength of this spirit, applied primarily at home and secondarily and carefully abroad, that the success of the American mission depends.

[50] Interview in *Le Monde*, reprinted in *The New York Review of Books*, October 4, 1973.
[51] Letter in *The Times* (London), September 13, 1973.
[52] Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Fate" in the volume of essays, *The Conduct of Life*.

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Marina v. N. Whitman

A YEAR OF TRAVAIL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

While the stridency that has increasingly characterized North-South economic relations was somewhat muted in 1978, the tensions that have troubled economic relations between the industrialized nations in recent years were sharpened. This increase in tensions was largely a spillover into the international arena of unresolved problems of domestic economic management. Slow growth, sluggish investment and persistently high rates of unemployment and excess productive capacity continued in most major industrialized countries; only the United States sustained its recovery pace of growth from the sharp recession of 1974–75. As regards inflation, the shoe was on the other foot; in most of the advanced economies the rate was declining or relatively stable, while in the United States it accelerated significantly during the course of the year.

The international reflections of these domestic difficulties included reduced world trade growth, an escalating threat of protectionist attitudes and policies, widening payments imbalances, and increasing instability in foreign exchange markets. These last two developments were attributable in large measure to divergent rates of inflation and real growth between the United States on the one hand and other leading industrialized nations—particularly Germany and Japan—on the other.

Two sets of issues were acute during the year. One set involves such "macroeconomic" questions as the coordination of domestic stabilization policies and the operation of the international monetary system, including the exchange-rate regime. In the other or "microeconomic" sphere, especially in trade and commercial policies, measures to restrict or cartelize world trade proliferated even as the year-end deadline facing the multilateral trade negotiations

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in Geneva drew closer. In both spheres, the rapid increase in economic interdependence of recent years was straining political and institutional structures, both domestic and international, as nations tried to minimize the threat such interdependence posed to national economic autonomy.

For the United States, whose dominance of the international economic system during the quarter century following World War II has declined significantly in recent years, questions relating to its changing role became especially acute. A common theme pervades all of them: the trade-off between policies that would promote the achievement of specific national economic or political goals, on the one hand, and those likely to promote the viability of a coherent international economic system in the long run on the other. This question is not a new one for the United States, but it was thrust into sharp relief by the events of 1978.

II

1978 is likely to be remembered above all as the year of the declining dollar. The U.S. payments deficit associated with this development is often attributed to the "oil problem"—the fact that the United States continues to import increasing percentages of its petroleum. However, in terms of the global payments situation, the evolution in recent years has actually been somewhat more complex. Immediately after the "oil shock" of 1973–74, the payments deficit which mirrored the massive surplus of the OPEC nations was shared among virtually all petroleum-importing nations, both industrialized and developing. By 1975, widespread recession among the industrialized countries had reduced their external deficits and increased the pressure on the payments positions of oil-importing developing countries. With the uneven economic recovery of 1976–78, however, the payments position of the oil-importing developing nations improved and the largest payments imbalances were concentrated among the industrialized group of nations.

Differences in adjustment policies and in the pace of economic recovery then created a situation in which, by 1978, the major imbalance was the huge current account deficit of the United States—roughly equal in magnitude to the entire OPEC surplus, which had declined to about $15 billion from its 1974 level of $70 billion—as against the very large surpluses of Germany, Japan and Switzerland.

Although the rates of exchange between the currencies of major industrialized countries have, since the end of the Bretton Woods

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system of pegged rates in 1971, been intermittently managed rather than freely floating, changes in countries' external positions, or in the market's evaluation of those positions, are nonetheless mirrored in exchange-rate movements. And the image reflected in that mirror during 1978 was one of pervasive uncertainty and short-term volatility, dominated by a cumulative weakening of the dollar against virtually all major currencies, and a particularly sharp appreciation of the currencies of countries with strong current account positions, good inflation records, and relatively slow real growth rates.

Heavy selling pressure on the U.S. dollar began in September 1977, and continued more or less unremittingly for more than a year. Expressions of concern about the situation by President Carter in January 1978 and again in March and mid-August, accompanied by announcements of various measures aimed at shoring up the dollar's position, brought only brief respites. During a little more than a year, the dollar declined by nearly 40 percent against the Swiss franc, by nearly 35 percent against the Japanese yen, by more than 25 percent against the German mark, and by 12 percent on an effective basis (that is, against a trade-weighted average of 15 major currencies). The decline accelerated during October 1978, despite signs of improvement in the U.S. trade deficit, the passage of long-awaited energy legislation, and the President's announcement of an anti-inflation program involving both a tightening of the Administration's fiscal stance and a program of voluntary wage-price guidelines.

On November 1, confronted with increasing disorder and signs of generalized panic in the foreign exchange markets, the Administration decided to take really firm action. Forsaking the monetary gradualism and the hands-off attitude toward direct intervention in exchange markets that had characterized U.S. government behavior for some time, the Administration announced a dramatic package of measures designed to rescue the dollar. One part consisted of traditional measures to tighten bank credit—a full percentage point increase in the discount rate, and establishment of a supplementary reserve requirement on large time deposits. These had the aim not only of increasing the demand for dollars by attracting foreign funds into the U.S. financial market, but also of enhancing the credibility of the President's anti-inflation program, by rectifying the omission of monetary policy from the October 24 statement addressed to that issue. The second part consisted of moves to make some $30 billion in foreign currencies available to the United States for buying up dollars in the foreign

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exchange markets.[1] These actions were coordinated with the central banks of the three major surplus countries, which had been pressuring the United States to take such steps.

The exchange markets responded promptly to these actions. During November, the dollar rose by from eight to 15 percent against the three major currencies and by almost six percent on an effective basis, wiping out nearly one-half of its effective decline over the preceding 12 months. This rise was bolstered by an estimated six to ten billion dollars of central bank intervention in support of the dollar—partly by the Federal Reserve and partly by foreign central banks—but it was clear that the attitudes and behavior of private participants in foreign exchange markets had been significantly affected by the events of November 1. Apparently, the rescue package had bought essential time to allow improvements in underlying conditions to effect a more durable stabilization of the dollar's position.

There can be little doubt that the more active exchange market stance adopted by the U.S. government was justified in the short run—indeed required—to counter disorderly conditions in exchange markets. Whether these moves also signaled a more durable shift in the U.S. position is not yet clear.[2] But to the extent that they heralded a commitment by our government to more active management of the dollar exchange rate, we may be witnessing a significant shift in the rules of the game as regards the international monetary system, and one that raises some important questions. Such active participation by the United States could raise anew the possibility of inconsistency among the exchange-rate goals of the major countries and thus of exchange-rate policies operating at cross-purposes to one another. Perhaps more important, there is a longer term danger that the dollar could once again become overvalued—that effective appreciation of the dollar could erode the gains in our competitive position before the imbalance

[1] The $30-billion package included enlargement of reciprocal currency ("swap") arrangements between the Federal Reserve System and the foreign central banks of Germany, Japan and Switzerland; sale of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) from U.S. reserves; drawings on our line of credit at the International Monetary Fund; and sales to foreigners of U.S. Treasury obligations denominated in foreign currencies. The first such issue, of $1.6 billion of three- and four-year bonds denominated in deutschemarks, was successfully marketed in December. An increase in sales of gold from U.S. reserves was also announced, to begin in December.

[2] In December 14 testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal stressed that recent actions were not attempts "to peg exchange rates or establish targets or push the dollar beyond levels which reflect the fundamental economic and financial realities." In contrast, Chairman William Miller of the Federal Reserve Board recently stated that the dollar "is in a zone now that is acceptable," and Charles Schultze, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, stated that the United States is "still committed to avoiding disorderly *and unwarranted* changes in exchange rates" (emphasis added).

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in our external position is eliminated.[3]

The immediate danger faced by the United States, however, lay in the opposite direction. If the anticipated improvement in the fundamentals did not soon become clear to all, the dollar might resume its slide and the $30-billion "war chest" could be rapidly exhausted.

One important element of such an improvement appeared to be already underway, however, in the form of a shrinking U.S. trade deficit. Clearly, the shift of the U.S. trade and current account positions from substantial surplus in 1975 to unprecedentedly large deficit in 1977 was a major factor in the weakening of the dollar. Initially, it was thought that the increasing dependence of the United States on imported petroleum was the major cause of this deficit, and that the enactment of an effective U.S. energy policy, leading to a reduction in petroleum imports, was the essential corrective action. Later, however, as American oil imports actually declined, non-petroleum imports soared, and non-agricultural exports rose very modestly indeed, it became clear that broader problems of trade patterns and competitiveness were involved.

At least two forces were at work here. In the period from 1975 to mid-1977, appreciation of the dollar against other major currencies (at least to mid-1976), plus the continuing higher relative pace of inflation in the United States, created a real (inflation-adjusted) effective increase in dollar prices that has continued, during much of 1978, to affect the pattern of trade flows.

Second, and probably more important, the real growth of the American economy since the 1974-75 recession has been faster than that of most other industrialized nations, averaging nearly five percent annually over the past three years, as contrasted with an average annual rate of only 3.5 percent for its major trading partners. This development reversed the pattern of the 1960s, when U.S. real growth averaged only about four percent annually, compared with a 6.5 percent average for the rest of the industrialized world. This economic expansion has tended to suck imports into the United States, while the persistent stagnation experienced by some of our major industrialized trading partners has restrained their imports and, therefore, our exports. Ironically, then, the weakness of their domestic recoveries has strengthened

[3] These concerns may appear farfetched at the moment, but it is worth remembering the experience of recent years, which is replete with reminders of the need to avoid "policies or practices which are designed to limit exchange rate movements but may eventually lead to an undesirable degree of exchange rate instability." See Jacques de Larosière, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, in a speech entitled "The Fund and Surveillance," to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 14, 1978.

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the external positions of such countries as Germany and Japan.

Whether the deterioration of the U.S. trade position also involved a longer term "structural" or non-price weakening of U.S. competitiveness is a matter of continuing discussion and controversy. But, while the U.S. trade and current account deficits for 1978 as a whole exceeded those of 1977, by the end of the year there were clear signs of improvement. The trade deficit for the third quarter of the year was substantially smaller than that for the first quarter and slightly less, at an annual rate, than that of 1977.[4] A pickup in manufacturing as well as agricultural exports and a slowdown in the rate of increase in imports, including a significant drop in petroleum imports, all contributed to this favorable development. Presumably the improvement in the American competitive position arising from the substantial real depreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis the currencies of other major industrialized nations since September 1977 had begun to have the desired effect.

Whether the improvement in our trade position continues and, more broadly, whether the stabilization of the dollar is more than a nine-day wonder, turns primarily on what happens to these rates. One obvious factor in the decline of the dollar was, of course, differences in national rates of inflation: during 1978, prices (as measured by the Consumer Price Index) rose by some nine percent in the United States, as compared with four percent in Japan, just over two percent in Germany, and one percent in Switzerland.[5]

This is hardly the whole story, however, since the changes in exchange rates that actually occurred far exceeded what would have been required to compensate for these inflation differentials, and the dollar depreciated also vis-à-vis the currencies of several countries whose inflation rates equalled or exceeded that of the United States. The fact is that exchange markets, like stock markets, appear to take account not only of the past and present but of the future as well, or at least of expectations regarding it. It became increasingly apparent during 1977 and early 1978 that inflation was accelerating in the United States, while it was relatively stable or declining in the strong currency countries. Undoubtedly, exchange-rate movements during the year incorporated expectations of a continued widening of the inflation gap—plus concern that the United States might be caught in the kind of

[4] A rise in the monthly merchandise trade deficit to $2.1 billion in October, due primarily to a drop in exports of non-manufactured goods, particularly gold, did not alter the general consensus that our trade position is continuing to improve.

[5] The comparisons are roughly similar if Wholesale Price Indices are used, except for Japan, where the level of wholesale prices actually declined during 1978.

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vicious circle we shall examine in the next section, in which external currency depreciation and domestic inflation may feed on each other.

The long-standing international role of the dollar makes it particularly vulnerable. To the extent that foreigners lack confidence in the ability of the United States to manage its economy wisely and restore the position of the dollar as a store of value, they will attempt to reduce their holdings of dollars and increase their holdings of alternative reserve assets. A certain amount of such diversification was to be expected as a rational response to the move from pegged to floating exchange rates in 1971–73, quite apart from changes in the desirability of the dollar relative to other currencies.[6] However, there can be little doubt that the future position of the dollar in foreign exchange markets will depend to a significant extent on the elusive but critical factor of confidence: confidence that U.S. economic policy will be conducted in a manner that will make the dollar an attractive asset for both official and private holders.

III

Although movements in real exchange rates during 1978 were in the right direction for bringing about adjustment of unsustainably large payments imbalances, the events of the year make clear why exchange rates cannot be counted on as the alpha and omega of the payments adjustment process. This is partly because they are far from completely free: in 1977–78, in particular, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom poured enormous sums into exchange market intervention aimed in part at curbing or preventing appreciation of their currencies.

Furthermore, even if they were entirely unmanaged, flexible exchange rates could not alone fulfill two of the functions expected of them by some of their proponents in the late 1960s and early 1970s. That is, exchange-rate movements cannot, in a world of high international mobility of capital, insulate a country fully against economic disturbances originating abroad, or, conversely, confer autonomy on national stabilization policies in an interdependent world. Nor do they provide an automatic and painless mechanism of balance-of-payments adjustment, although they play a critically important role in both the buffering and the

[6] What is surprising, in fact, is that the share of dollars in global foreign exchange reserves held steady at roughly 80 percent between 1970 and 1977. Presumably the reason is that acquisitions of other currencies for diversification purposes were in the aggregate offset by dollar acquisitions arising from exchange market intervention for the purpose of restraining the appreciation of particular currencies vis-à-vis the dollar.

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payments equilibration functions.

One of the problems is that, while changes in exchange rates do appear to have an equilibrating effect, they do so only with substantial lags; expenditure patterns and therefore trade flows respond only sluggishly to changes in relative prices, and the effects are likely to be spread out over two years or more. In the interim, the impact of these changes on the balance of payments may actually be perverse, as well as uncomfortable for the domestic economy.[7]

In countries like Germany and Japan, where the manufacturing sectors are heavily dependent on exports, the short-run effects of an appreciating exchange rate include severe pressure on profits in the export and import-competing sectors. This further weakens already lagging business investment and makes it more difficult for these countries to escape the slow growth and high unemployment that currently plague them. Ultimately, as patterns of demand and supply adjust, the effect of an exchange-rate appreciation should be not only to reduce the current account surpluses of these countries, but also to make it possible for them to reduce high unemployment and excess capacity with less of the inflationary pressures they fear.

Such adjustments do not come quickly or easily, however, and a situation of continued volatility in exchange rates may lead surplus countries to try to buffer the impact on their domestic economies through increased protectionism: limiting imports or subsidizing exports in an effort to cushion—or subvert—the adjustment process. The specter of such a no-win situation is a major stimulus to the search for effective means of restoring greater foreign exchange stability.

Volatile exchange rates also complicate the task of domestic economic management for depreciating countries. As production and expenditure patterns shift in response to changing price relationships, the effect is not only to improve the trade balance of the depreciating country but to stimulate domestic output and employment. But again, these shifts take time, and the most immediate impact of depreciation on the domestic economy is likely to be inflationary. These pressures are likely to be greater in

[7] This so-called J-curve effect occurs because depreciation's most immediate effect is to raise the domestic-currency cost of imports for the depreciating country and thus temporarily to worsen its balance of payments. It is only as the country's volume of now-cheaper exports increases and its volume of imports declines that its balance of payments improves. The opposite of this perverse effect applies to appreciating countries, where the balance of payments temporarily improves because of the higher foreign-currency prices of its exports, and then worsens as its trading partners shift from its exports to lower priced competitors, and domestic consumers buy larger quantities of cheapened imports.

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countries where foreign trade is large in relation to the total economy. But even for a relatively self-sufficient country like the United States, the effect of depreciation on the domestic rate of inflation appears to be considerably greater than was generally thought a few year ago. Recent estimates suggest that a ten percent depreciation of the dollar can be expected to raise domestic prices by about 1.5 percent for any given level of unemployment.

As an example of these various effects, notice what appears to be happening to the automobile market as a result of the sharp depreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis the German mark and the Japanese yen. The number of imported VWs and Toyotas has dropped sharply and the number of American automobiles sold abroad has increased, an essential step toward reducing the U.S. trade deficit and the German and Japanese surpluses. At the same time, the average price of an automobile sold in the United States has been pushed upward, not only because imported automobiles now cost more, but because domestic automakers are enjoying a relaxation of the price competition formerly exerted by German and Japanese rivals, and can raise prices more than they would otherwise. This impact on domestic prices occurred before our trade balance had begun to turn around. In a country where inflation is currently the leading economic problem, such an exacerbation of domestic inflationary pressures is, to say the least, unwelcome.

What recent events have forcefully demonstrated is that changes in exchange-rate relationships can alter international competitive positions and reduce trade and payments imbalances only to the extent that *nominal* changes result in *real* changes, that is, to the extent they are not offset by changes in a country's rate of inflation relative to that of its trading partners. If the domestic price of American autos, or steel, or whatever, goes up by ten percent in a given period, these products will not attract foreign customers in countries with level prices, whose currencies have risen, say, eight percent against the dollar in the same period.

This truism, combined with the fact that exchange-rate movements inevitably tend to exacerbate inflationary pressures in depreciating countries and mitigate them in appreciating ones, has produced a new concern. May not high-inflation countries with persistent current account deficits and chronically weakening currencies find themselves trapped in a self-reinforcing process of depreciation and inflation, while low-inflation countries with strong external positions may, in contrast, enjoy the additional anti-inflationary assist of a chronic upward tendency in their currencies?

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Although the development of such "vicious" and "virtuous" circles is by no means logically inevitable, the fear is that, once they get started, they will drive countries with initially different inflation rates along ever diverging paths and thus create cumulative instability in exchange rates and in the world economy. Certainly, it is increasingly apparent that changes in exchange rates can equilibrate payments imbalances only if they are reinforced by appropriate domestic monetary and fiscal policies in *both* surplus and deficit countries. As we shall see in the next section in more detail, during 1977 and 1978 neither set of countries performed as it should have done—Germany and Japan, for domestic political as well as economic reasons, resisted raising their growth rates, while the United States, for similar reasons, resisted at least until November a really clear anti-inflation policy.

In addition to posing economic management problems for both appreciating and depreciating countries, excessive reliance on exchange-rate movements to equilibrate payments imbalances might, if it perpetuated large fluctuations or rapid movements in exchange rates, pose difficulties for the international system as a whole. In June of 1978, most of the OECD countries renewed a 1974 pledge to eschew the unilateral introduction or intensification of trade restrictions to improve their balance-of-payments positions. But, as we shall see, a variety of measures have in fact had a protectionist flavor, and the pressure for increased protection continues strong. More broadly, there is a widespread feeling that the general climate of economic uncertainty may be contributing to the sluggishness of investment that currently plagues most industrialized countries.

Because the United States is the world's largest economy and trading partner, such fears are particularly intense where the dollar is concerned. The unique role of the dollar as an international currency also poses some special problems. In particular, there is widespread concern that chronic dollar weakness may propel worldwide inflation. One channel through which this might occur is oil prices: because these prices are denominated in dollars throughout the world, the fear is that continuing dollar depreciation, by reducing the purchasing power of OPEC oil revenues, may lead these countries to raise dollar-denominated prices more rapidly, affecting not only the United States but all other oil-consuming countries whose currencies are *not* appreciating vis-à-vis the dollar. At the end of 1978, the OPEC countries did in fact announce that they would raise oil prices in 1979 by progressive steps cumulating to 14.5 percent, considerably more than expected. The extent of the planned increase reflected the late-1978

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political difficulties that had cut Iranian output and created a prospective market squeeze, however temporary. But the decline of the dollar during the year was undoubtedly also a factor.

Second, insofar as strong-currency countries try to prevent or limit the appreciation of their currencies by buying up dollars, they create an inflationary increase in their own domestic liquidity. That they are free to abstain from this sort of behavior (at the cost of seeing their currencies rise freely) does not necessarily alleviate their resentment of what they see as an American-caused dilemma.

Whatever the intellectual merits of the concerns described in the preceding paragraphs, the fact that they are widely held implies that an unstable or chronically weakening dollar is likely to complicate the United States' relations with other industrialized nations. We shall examine in a later section the measures taken during 1978 by the European Economic Community (EEC), and the U.S. response.

IV

Let us turn now more specifically to developments during the year in the area of coordination of macroeconomic policies among the industrialized countries. Since 1975, such coordination has been attempted primarily through a series of annual "summit" meetings among the political leaders of the seven largest non-communist industrialized countries. The general rationale underlying the coordination strategy of the past few years has been that the countries with relatively low inflation rates and strong external positions should take a lead in stimulating and maintaining world economic recovery, while those with poorer inflation records and weaker external positions should concentrate on improving them, even at the cost of somewhat slower growth of the domestic component of total demand.

At the 1978 summit meeting, held at Bonn in July, the strong surplus countries, Germany and Japan, as well as France, Italy and the United Kingdom, whose inflation rates and balance-of-payments positions have recently shown substantial improvement, promised to try to achieve somewhat higher rates of domestic real growth, while Japan pledged in addition to try to restrain the growth of its exports temporarily in order to reduce its large trade surplus. Meanwhile, the major deficit country, the United States, pledged that reduction of inflation would be its major priority, and that it would also take other steps—such as passage of energy legislation and more vigorous promotion of exports—to improve

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its negative trade balance position.

Annual economic summitry has made clear both the widespread perception that coordination of macroeconomic policies is essential in an interdependent world, and the difficulties that confront efforts to implement the concept. Both Germany and Japan fell far short of the real growth targets agreed to at the London summit in 1977. Although participants in the 1978 summit eschewed quantitative targets, recognizing their potential for embarrassment and ill feeling, it is now clear that the 1978 growth rate of the major surplus country, Japan, will again fall substantially short of what had been hoped, although the rate of economic activity does appear to be picking up in a number of West European nations. On the other side, it became increasingly apparent as 1978 wore on that the United States would not make significant headway against inflation before the end of the year.

There is debate whether the inability of the leading countries to meet their macroeconomic coordination targets is due to insufficient effort, to the growth-retarding effects of rapid currency appreciation and the inflationary effects of depreciation already described, or to fundamental inadequacies of traditional macroeconomic policies in the current economic environment. At issue are both intellectual disagreements and a perceived conflict of interest.

If, as it often appears, surplus and deficit countries alike regard export-led stimulus as more desirable than an equivalent dose originating at home, then a genuine impasse emerges, since the reduction of some countries' deficits inevitably requires the reduction of other countries' surpluses. However shaky the logical foundations of such preferences may be in the general case—and there is in fact nothing magical about exports that makes a dollar's worth of additional demand originating abroad any less inflationary or more employment-creating than a dollar's worth arising from domestic consumption or investment—it is true that countries whose growth has traditionally been heavily export-based, like Germany and Japan, are likely to experience transitional difficulties in accelerating the real growth of their economies *and* reducing export growth at the same time.

Even more fundamental is the disagreement and confusion surrounding the relationship between inflation and unemployment. Germany has traditionally tended to be super-cautious as regards inflation even at some cost in terms of real growth, and the same has recently been true to some extent of Japan. Furthermore, doubts have been growing recently as to whether the traditional Keynesian trade-off between inflation and unemploy-

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ment in fact exists at all. An alternative view—that inflation will over the longer term make the achievement of satisfactory levels of employment and output more problematic rather than less—has been gaining increasing support.

Such disagreement reflects the tremendous uncertainty that currently prevails regarding the impact of the traditional tools of demand-management policy in an environment of persistent stagflation. Until some general consensus once again emerges, and until reliable ways are found to sustain or stimulate real growth while restraining inflation, divergent national views and preferences are bound to impede further progress toward the international coordination of domestic macroeconomic policies among the leading industrialized nations.

Furthermore, we should not expect too much of reduced differentials in real growth rates between the industrialized countries as a means of eliminating payments imbalances. Recent studies suggest that even if other industrialized countries achieved the same growth rates as the United States in relation to their underlying potential, this would reduce our current account deficit (expected to total some $17 billion in 1978) by only two to five billion dollars. Treasury Secretary Blumenthal has recently forecast a reduction of 50–60 percent in the U.S. current account deficit in 1979, an optimism shared by the leading international organizations and by most private forecasters, and only moderately dampened by the unexpectedly large OPEC price increase. Some anticipated convergence of growth rates should contribute to this improvement, but the major factor underlying it should be the improved competitive position stemming from the substantial depreciation of the dollar in 1977–78, whose trade effects were beginning to become apparent by the latter half of the year.

V

The apparent shift in Administration policy heralded by the dollar-rescue package of November 1, from a long-standing policy of what many regarded as "benign neglect" of our external payments position to a strong commitment to stemming the dollar's decline, highlighted a perennial question. Is there an inherent conflict between the needs of the U.S. economy and the requirements of the dollar as an international currency?

As regards the monetary tightening measures that formed part of the package, those (including this author) who regard the reduction of inflation as the most overwhelming priority domestically see no fundamental conflict. Those who fear that increased

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fiscal and monetary stringency are likely to precipitate recession argue the contrary.[8]

As regards the parts of the November 1 announcement dealing with exchange-market intervention and the value of the dollar internationally, the issue is somewhat different. Clearly, a brake on the dollar's accelerating decline was essential both to restore order to foreign exchange markets and to reduce inflationary pressure on the domestic economy. However, if intervention directed toward strengthening the dollar in its international financial role results in once again overvaluing the dollar, thus undermining our international competitive position and hampering adjustment of our imbalance on current account, it will ultimately prove counterproductive not only for the U.S. economy but for the international role of its currency as well. The story of the dollar's adjustment is far from over.

The question of whether the international role of the dollar is a special burden or, in the words of General de Gaulle, an exorbitant privilege, has intermittently complicated U.S.-European relations for several decades. The end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 meant that the accumulation of dollars by other nations through exchange market intervention is now voluntary rather than mandatory, but this has not abolished the problem. In fact, both sides continue to display a certain amount of schizophrenia regarding the role of the United States as the world's banker and of the dollar as the leading international currency. The Europeans and the Japanese, for their part, insist that the United States must become more competitive and bolster its current account position, but often appear unwilling to accept a concomitant weakening of their own trade and current account positions. The United States, for its part, insists that the dollar should have the same freedom of exchange-rate movement as any other currency to eliminate imbalances in our external position. At the same time, we seem reluctant to contemplate a reduction in the reserve currency role of the dollar, a role which places a premium on dollar stability.

With these divergent attitudes, and to a large extent in response to European concerns about the dollar, the European Economic Community took the major step during the year of developing new plans for a European Monetary System. In brief, the EMS is designed to consist of a set of rules limiting exchange-rate movements between the currencies of EEC countries within a specified

[8] The position of the AFL-CIO, for example, is that direct controls on imports and capital outflows would be preferable to domestic monetary stringency as a means of trying to improve our balance-of-payments position. Questions of effectiveness aside, such controls would hardly be consistent with the desirable characteristics of an international currency.

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band; a new, composite European unit of account called the écu; and a European Monetary Fund, in which a significant portion (perhaps 20 percent) of the member countries' reserves would be pooled. The resulting fund, which would probably total about $30 billion, could be drawn on by member countries to support their currencies in exchange markets.

The proposal was initially greeted with widespread skepticism, reflecting not only the failure of several earlier attempts along these lines but also the formidable difficulties confronting any attempt to stabilize exchange rates between countries whose rates of inflation currently range from two to 13 percent. With the apparent resolution of French-German disagreements on the operation of the system, the probability appeared high that it would in fact be introduced early in 1979 (with Britain opting to remain outside for the present), although whether it will in fact evolve into something significantly beyond an extension to more countries of the present currency "snake" is still uncertain.[9]

To some extent, such a move toward monetary unification can be seen as a logical next step in the institutional evolution of the European Community and a stimulus to political cooperation. But the fact remains that a major reason for the formation of the EMS was negative rather than positive: a sense that attempts to establish a stable international monetary system centered on the dollar had failed, and that the domestic economic difficulties and international problems engendered or exacerbated by prolonged exchange market instability required the EEC nations to create their own regional self-help mechanism. Whether a stabilized dollar would interrupt these plans once political momentum had been created is still uncertain, but there is little question that the EMS proposal was born of disillusion with the performance of the dollar and the dollar-centered international monetary system.

Perhaps predictably, the U.S. response to the prospect of the EMS was ambivalent and cautious. A number of concerns have been voiced as the basis for this reserved attitude, including the possibility that the EEC nations might attempt jointly to limit the movement of the dollar exchange rate, that the requirements for maintaining tightly linked exchange rates might prove excessively deflationary, and that the new arrangements might undermine the influence and authority of the International Monetary Fund. But I suspect that another unspoken factor is the continuing reluctance of the United States to see the emergence of a potential alternative

[9] The planned inauguration of the EMS on January 1, 1979 was postponed when France insisted that the long-standing issue of agricultural subsidies ("compensatory payments") within the EEC be resolved before the new monetary system comes into operation.

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asset (the proposed écu) that might spur reserve diversification and reduce the dollar's international role. Nor are the Europeans entirely free of the same ambivalence: while some would clearly welcome the emergence of a European alternative to the international dollar, others regard the proposed EMS as a second-best solution born of despair that stability can be restored to a dollar-centered system.

Whatever the doubts on all sides, and however the latest proposal for European monetary union fares, two facts seem clear. One is that the dollar is likely to continue as the world's major reserve asset for the foreseeable future. The second is that even if this role were to disappear overnight, the sheer size of the United States and its importance in world trade and investment would continue to impose on it special responsibilities for the health of the global economy.

VI

While attention was focused primarily on the macroeconomic aspects of relations between industrialized nations, 1978 was also a year of significant developments in the more traditional spheres of international economic diplomacy: trade relations and commercial policies. Although there were fewer headline-grabbing events in these areas, the issues that crystallized during the year may prove just as critical to the world economy as what happened to the dollar.

Certainly, 1978 was a year of paradox for international trade, with protectionist pressures in the leading industrialized countries threatening to erode the foundations of the postwar international trading system even as the latest round of multilateral negotiations directed at further liberalization of international trade crescendoed toward their final phase in Geneva.[10] The ironic interplay underscores both the importance and the difficulty of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

In discussing the politics of international trade, it is helpful to bear in mind the three different functions of such trade. First, there are the aspects of trade beloved of economists: trade as a vehicle for increasing specialization, enhancing competition, enabling each country to concentrate on what it does best and thus increasing potential output, income and living standards throughout the world. Second, there is trade as an instrument for adjusting

[10] A target deadline of December 15, 1978 was announced at the Bonn summit for agreement among the negotiators at Geneva on a package to take home for ratification. The U.S. negotiating authority does not expire until the end of 1979; it is hoped that congressional ratification of an agreed trade package can be obtained before that date. As this is written, it appears that the negotiations will not be completed before the spring of 1979.

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payments imbalances, invoked most recently by President Carter's announcement of a program to stimulate U.S. exports as a means of reducing our payments deficit and alleviating pressure on the dollar. And, finally, there is trade as an instrument of foreign policy, a time-honored role that has never been entirely absent from the American scene, but which has received increased attention during the Carter Administration. The inherent tension among these three different and at times conflicting functions has greatly complicated the formulation of trade policies and the conduct of trade between the industrialized countries, which are one another's most important trading partners.

Government interference with trade by means of import restrictions or export subsidies is hardly a new phenomenon in the industrialized nations (or anywhere else, for that matter), but it received new impetus and took on some new and complex forms during the past year. Probably the most widely noted example was the so-called trigger price mechanism, introduced late in 1977 to control steel imports into the United States, in response to a threatened deluge of dumping complaints by the domestic steel industry. It operates first by establishing a "trigger price" for imported steel, based on the production costs of the most efficient producer, Japan. Sales of imported steel at prices below the trigger level are then regarded as a signal for the institution of an immediate investigation by the U.S. Treasury Department, leading under the law to the imposition of anti-dumping duties on imported products found to have been "dumped," or sold in the U.S. market at a price below cost or below that prevailing in the producer's home market. Given the uncertainties and apprehensions the program creates among foreign producers, its practical effect has been to establish a minimum price for imported steel.

Steel imports into the United States rose in 1978 over 1977 despite the introduction of the trigger price mechanism, but the market share accounted for by imports declined as U.S. production increased, the excess capacity of the U.S. steel industry was rapidly reduced, and the profits of American steel firms rose substantially. The trigger price mechanism has, however, altered the geographic pattern of imports, cutting into the Japanese share of the U.S. market to the advantage not only of European producers, which was part of the original intent, but of such fast-growing newcomers as Brazil, Korea and Taiwan.[11]

[11] Because trigger prices are based on Japanese production costs, the rapid appreciation of the yen has required substantial quarterly adjustments—i.e., compensating increases—in U.S. trigger price levels. This offered an opportunity to other foreign producers with higher initial costs, or whose currencies were appreciating less rapidly vis-à-vis the dollar, to dump legally, that is, to sell in the United States at prices above trigger levels even though they were below their own costs of production.

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The most striking impact, however, of a trigger price mechanism based on Japanese costs, given the rapid appreciation of the yen, has been to raise prices. Trigger price levels rose by more than ten percent in 1978, almost entirely as a result of the yen's appreciation, and were scheduled to rise by another seven percent on January 1, 1979. Domestic steel prices rose at about the same rate during the year, and a five percent increase was announced for the first quarter of 1979. In the words of the head of the EEC's steel producers' group, Eurofer, the trigger price mechanism "has raised steel prices all around the world."

Other trade-limiting measures introduced recently by the United States include the negotiation of so-called orderly marketing agreements (OMAs) with Japan, limiting its exports of color television sets to the United States, and with Korea and Taiwan limiting their exports of footwear. In addition, there has been somewhat tighter application of the 1974 Trade Act as regards three major categories of import restrictions. These include anti-dumping duties, already described, countervailing duties imposed to offset the price-reducing effects of other countries' export subsidies, and escape clause actions, involving the imposition of higher tariffs, quotas or "voluntary" export restraint agreements to mitigate injury to domestic producers from increased imports.

The 1974 Act broadened the conditions under which U.S. producers might be entitled to import relief or adjustment assistance, and speeded up the timetables within which the government was required to act in response to their petitions. The effect was to create a more favorable climate for appeal to the courts in instances where domestic producers were not satisfied with the response of the executive branch. Indeed, one of the reasons for the establishment of the steel trigger price mechanism was to forestall the institution of a rash of anti-dumping actions by U.S. steel producers, with a high probability of leading to a number of court suits.

In another situation, an explosion of countervailing duty actions was threatened by a 1977 decision of the U.S. Customs Court in New York, in the so-called Zenith case, that Japanese tax exemptions for television sets sold overseas constituted a subsidy requiring the imposition of countervailing duties. If this decision had stood, it would have rendered a broad range of European manufactured exports vulnerable to similar action because they receive a rebate of the value-added tax. Such a development would doubtless have seriously disrupted the multilateral trade negotiations and provoked significant retaliation against U.S. exports. On

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June 21, 1978, however, the Customs Court's Zenith decision was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court.

A similar tendency toward increased restrictiveness has also been apparent in the European Economic Community, concentrated primarily in some of the same particularly sensitive industries as have already been mentioned in connection with U.S. trade policy. In particular, the EEC, whose steel industry was suffering from problems similar to those of its U.S. counterpart, was developing a full-fledged cartelization plan, involving proposals for minimum prices, production controls, market-sharing quotas, and the "rationalization" of the industry's structure, including reductions in capacity. If this so-called Davignon Plan (named for its originator, the EEC Commissioner for Industry) can be implemented for the steel industry, the idea is to extend the general concept to other industries currently suffering from excess capacity and slack demand on a global scale, such as shipbuilding and synthetic fibers, and then to try to multilateralize these cartelization schemes.

Japan, whose domestic markets are less open to imports than those of any other non-communist industrialized nation, has introduced no significant new trade restrictions. However, its liberalization efforts have not so far proved effective in opening up its domestic market.[12]

At the multilateral level, the extension of the multi-fiber agreement covering trade in textiles for the period 1978–82 appears on the whole to be significantly more restrictive than its predecessor. Overall, 1978 must surely have seen a significant increase over the best available end-1977 estimate, that three to five percent of world trade, amounting to some $30–40 billion, was then "being adversely affected by import restrictions introduced, or seriously threatened, by the industrially advanced countries."[13] Far broader than the direct effects of new restrictions, however, is their indirect impact: the chilling effect of uncertainty on production for export and the tendency of restrictive trade policies to proliferate as countries take defensive actions to protect domestic producers whose access to foreign markets are curtailed by other nations' restrictions.

The reasons underlying this increase in protectionist pressures in the industrialized nations are many and varied. Among them is the fact that a number of painful adjustments have already been required of these countries.

[12] A comprehensive assessment will be found in James C. Abegglen and Thomas M. Hout, "Facing up to the Trade Gap with Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, pp. 152–59.

[13] Address by Olivier Long, Director General of the GATT, to the Zürich Economic Society, GATT Press Release No. 1199, November 9, 1977.

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The sudden post-1973 increase in the relative price of energy exacerbated the stagflation problem in most industrialized nations and led to intensified export drives to protect the balance of payments in a number of countries. And there has been a continuing significant shift of comparative advantage in the production of a growing list of manufactured products, first toward Japan and then toward an emerging group of "new Japans"—such advanced developing countries as Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. With this shift has come a rapid increase in import penetration of the industrialized countries, necessitating significant structural adjustments in these economies at a time when, for a variety of reasons, they are finding it increasingly difficult to make such changes.

One reason for this increasing rigidity—in the United States and elsewhere—is the growing political and social preoccupation with economic security and distributional equity, as opposed to a primary focus on economic efficiency and rapid growth, which places a premium on adaptability. In particular, the narrowing of wage differentials, combined with a low rate of population growth, tends to increase the rigidity of the labor market, making it more difficult to move people from one occupation or industry or geographical area to another in response to changing patterns of demand. A stiffening of the regulatory climate in many of these nations has also reduced flexibility.

In effect, the inadequate recovery in most industrialized countries from the severe recession of 1974–75 has brought about an interaction of cyclical difficulties with longer term structural problems. Persistent high unemployment and excess capacity, both in the aggregate and in particular sectors, low rates of investment and profitability, and a climate of increased uncertainty stemming in part from persistent inflation and in part from upheavals in the international economy, have all contributed to slower growth and a pervasive sense of insecurity. These have in turn engendered pressure for measures to slow down the process of adjustment-forcing change, particularly change in the form of new patterns of import competition—change "foreign" in a psychological as well as an economic sense.

There are, of course, elements of another vicious circle here. Slower growth tends to make adjustment more painful and difficult, but barriers to change reduce the efficiency of the allocative mechanism and lead to slower growth. For example, much of the industrial overcapacity that has catalyzed pressures for trade restriction and cartelization is itself the product of previous government intervention, in the form of protection, subsidies or, in

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some instances in Europe, outright nationalization, to rescue inefficient firms or aging industries.

It is perhaps natural that, against a background of continued ideological commitment to liberal international trade, some confusing Newspeak and Double-think has now arisen to rationalize such defensive economic nationalism. Orderly marketing agreements and voluntary export restraint programs restricting trade are introduced preemptively, presumably to forestall more restrictive unilateral import restraints; "adjustment policies" and "rationalization schemes" frequently turn out to be income maintenance measures for threatened industries; and the French concept of "organized free trade" turns out to rest primarily on substituting multilaterally agreed trade restraints and market-sharing agreements for unilateral restrictions. In this environment, the explicit recognition by the industrialized countries of the need for "positive adjustment" policies that actually *facilitate* economic change in response to market forces, rather than insulating particular segments of the economy from the need for it, is a welcome and hopeful sign.[14]

Against the background of mounting protectionist pressures, a successful outcome of the so-called Tokyo Round of GATT-sponsored multilateral trade negotiations is particularly crucial. Although agreement on the key non-tariff issues had been reached by the negotiators for the major industrialized countries, subject to ratification by their respective governments, by the end of the year it appeared that completion of a comprehensive negotiating package by all participants would require several months more.

A last-minute development which complicated the discussions was that the authorization of the 1974 Trade Act permitting the United States to waive countervailing duties for four years in cases where active trade negotiations were under way was to expire on January 3, 1979. The U.S. Congress adjourned in October without enacting the expected extension of this waiver authority, a situation that would presumably force the U.S. Treasury to impose countervailing duties on some $700 million of subsidized exports at the beginning of the new year. The U.S. negotiators, while acknowledging that the failure to extend the waiver was inadvertent, argued that it made multilateral agreement on the limitation of export subsidies all the more imperative, while the French took the view that the negotiations could not be brought to a successful conclusion until the U.S. Congress had removed this sword of

[14] The need for positive adjustment measures was explicitly acknowledged by the participants in the Bonn summit, shortly after a detailed discussion of such measures and their relation to economic growth was annexed to the June 14 communiqué of the OECD Council.

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Damocles hanging over the heads of our trading partners. As of mid-December, it seemed that this impasse was being resolved, but the outcome was necessarily uncertain until the new Congress convened in January.

Even without this gratuitous complication, the Tokyo Round negotiations were particularly complex. In earlier rounds of postwar trade negotiations, the focus was on increasing the scope for market-directed international trade, mainly by reducing the tariff barriers in industralized nations on imports of industrial products. But by this last round, although tariff reductions averaging some 25–30 percent, to be phased in over an eight- to ten-year period, were expected to emerge from the negotiations, tariffs had ceased to be the main instrument for limiting or distorting trade. They have been superseded by a wide variety of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) instituted by nations as part of their efforts to manage domestic agricultural policy, to minimize adjustment costs in the face of domestic stagflation, or to correct for "market failure" in such areas as preserving environmental quality.

In a series of codes covering non-tariff measures, the Geneva participants addressed many of these complexities. They extended GATT coverage to significant new areas and laid the basis for broader international supervision of trade practices. With respect to a number of national policies and practices directly affecting trade, including customs valuation, government procurement, and product standards and technical regulations, the draft codes of behavior emphasized the need to harmonize national policies and to minimize trade distortions arising from their implementation. At the insistence of the United States, which has always felt that the transparency or explicitness of its own NTBs put it at a negotiating disadvantage with nations whose barriers tend to be more "occult" (that is, informal and harder to pin down), "transparency" was made an explicit goal.

Agricultural trade, which is of particular importance to the United States as a major agricultural exporter, had never been effectively incorporated into previous rounds of GATT negotiations. This time, the negotiators agreed to establish an overall framework for consultation on agricultural policies and the development of mechanisms to assist the stabilization of agricultural prices and incomes. This general framework is to be supplemented by commodity agreements covering four critical product groups: wheat, coarse grains, meat, and dairy products. In addition, the United States reached agreements with Japan and the EEC on the liberalization of tariffs and quotas on a variety of agricultural products, liberalizations that will be extended to all GATT member

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suppliers under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. Although these concessions were less than had been hoped, their realization would represent more significant achievements in the agricultural area than have emerged from most earlier GATT rounds.

As one major element in a meaningful code of conduct covering trade policies, the United States has long urged the broadening and strengthening of multilaterally agreed criteria and procedures covering the so-called safeguards, or escape-clause actions, that countries currently apply to protect domestic industries from injury associated with import competition. In this area, a principal issue was the European contention that countries should be free to apply such safeguards selectively against particular suppliers, which would contravene the fundamental GATT principle of nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) treatment. The United States has itself initiated an increasing number of orderly marketing agreements and voluntary export restraint programs in recent years with selected countries whose rapidly growing exports to this country of particularly sensitive products have created serious domestic difficulties. But the United States remains concerned about serious compromise of the MFN principle, of which it has long been the main supporter, and holds that such selective safeguards should at least be subject to strict international review and surveillance. As of the end of the year, the standards and procedures to embody this general principle had not yet been fully worked out.

Perhaps the most sensitive bone of contention between the United States and its industrialized trading partners has to do with export subsidies and the countervailing duties imposed by importing nations to offset them. The negotiators agreed, under strong American prodding, to strengthen and clarify existing GATT limitations on direct subsidies to industrial exports, to develop international guidelines designed to minimize trade distortions arising from subsidies granted for legitimate domestic reasons, and to establish the principle that countries' subsidies for agricultural exports should not be used in such a way as to distort historical trade patterns and market shares. The United States undertook, in turn, to bring its countervailing duty law into closer alignment with those of our major trading partners; at present, we alone among the major industrialized countries have no injury test—that is, provision for evidence of damage to domestic procedures—as part of that legislation. Agreement on these principles represents a significant achievement, but the knotty question of when a legitimate exercise of national policy (such as tax breaks

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for new plants in a lagging region of a country) distorts trade and thus is the legitimate object of countervailing duties remains to be argued out on a case-by-case basis.

Although it is not encompassed in the Geneva negotiations, the problem of government-subsidized export financing suggests some of the difficulties that may be encountered in implementing the principles regarding subsidies enunciated at Geneva. Early in 1978, at the urging of the United States, 22 industrialized nations and the EEC agreed, under OECD auspices, to try to end the competitive escalation of subsidized export financing by accepting a list of mutually agreed limitations on such subsidies. The agreement was quickly breached by at least one of our industrialized competitors, and the United States has taken additional steps to try to expand its scope and tighten its terms.

This country has taken the position that, while we would prefer to see this increasingly expensive competition effectively limited, if that proves impossible it is our intention to match our competitors' terms. Indeed, increased resources for the U.S. Export-Import Bank, whose financing has already been increased fivefold during the past two fiscal years, are a key point in the export promotion program announced by President Carter in September.

VII

Although not addressed intensively in the GATT negotiations, the question of export restrictions and assured access to supplies of commodities in international trade has in recent years taken on new importance. The oil embargo of 1973 focused attention dramatically on this issue, which during most of the postwar period had taken second place to concern about limitations on imports and assuring access to markets, but less startling instances of such restrictions have also proliferated among the industrialized countries in recent years. And the United States, which has traditionally eschewed export controls except where national security is at stake, has not stood entirely aloof from this new trend. For example, our short-lived embargo on the export of soybeans in the summer of 1973, intended to alleviate domestic inflationary pressures, made our foreign customers extremely nervous and lent support to protectionist forces in Europe and Japan that had long advocated reducing dependence on U.S. agricultural exports by promoting high-cost domestic self-sufficiency.

More recent developments have raised anew issues involving the United States' use of trade as an instrument of foreign policy. These issues include U.S. government goals and attitudes regard-

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ing nuclear proliferation, the Arab boycott of trade with Israel, relations with the Soviet Union, bribery as a business tool, and human rights generally. This is not the place for a comprehensive evaluation of these complex questions. But there can be no doubt that the insistence that U.S. companies operate under special rules not applicable to foreign competitors has had a negative impact on U.S. exports, and raised questions about U.S. reliability as a supplier.

The magnitude of these effects is hard to quantify. Even before the Carter Administration's stress on the nonproliferation issue, earlier government stop-and-go policies on exports of enriched uranium had created difficulties for the nuclear industry. In 1977–78, the Administration and now especially the Congress have imposed extremely tight controls on future American nuclear exports, subjecting them specifically to new conditions respecting nuclear reprocessing activity in recipient countries. The Carter Administration has recently taken pains to reassure other countries that we are in fact sensitive to their energy needs and will indeed be a reliable supplier of nuclear fuels. But we have by no means eradicated foreign suspicions regarding the motives underlying American nonproliferation policy, nor the anger engendered by the temporary embargoes we have from time to time imposed on shipments of enriched uranium to foreign customers.

Similarly, there is uncertainty about the commercial impact of new legislation relating to the Arab boycott, making it illegal for U.S. companies, in effect, to participate in business involving the application of secondary boycott provisions. Supporters note that American exports to boycotting countries have continued to rise since passage of the anti-boycott legislation; opponents counter that the exports of our major competitors to these rapidly expanding markets have risen even faster, and that no similar legislation is operative in Europe or Japan.[15]

Restrictions on U.S. trade with the Soviet Union in the interests of national security have long been an integral part of U.S. foreign policy—indeed, for most of the postwar period, such trade was essentially embargoed entirely. Over the past decade, however, economic relations between East and West have been expanding

[15] What appears to trouble the business community most is the complexity of the rules in this area and the uncertainty they create for decision-making, along with some apparent inconsistencies between the requirements of the Export Administration Act, the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act, and the antitrust statutes as all three relate to boycotts. Although the broader philosophical issues would remain unresolved, presumably the commercial impact of U.S. anti-boycott legislation could be minimized, with no erosion of its purpose, if the relevant statutory provisions were clarified and rendered mutually consistent.

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and, by the heyday of détente, U.S. restrictions were largely confined to items having a direct military application. Most recently, the Administration has attempted a broader balancing of the trade-offs between the effects of a particular export decision on restraining Soviet expansionism, U.S.-Soviet relations, and the United States' trade competitiveness and world leadership position.

For example, the Commerce Department in 1978 licensed the export to the Soviet Union of a sophisticated plant for making oil-drilling equipment only after a heated debate on these issues. In December, the Secretary of Commerce announced in Moscow that her department was now prepared to grant licenses for a number of high-technology oil and gas equipment exports that had been held up for some months. These developments took place, however, within the framework of President Carter's 1978 order to the National Security Council to scrutinize carefully all commercial transactions with the Soviet Union involving the transfer of sophisticated technology.

With the passage of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments of 1974 prohibiting the extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment and severely limiting Export-Import Bank financing for trade with the Soviet Union until that nation liberalized its policies on the emigration of Soviet Jews, a new consideration entered the U.S. trade picture: human rights. And in the summer of 1978, President Carter vetoed the sale of a Sperry Univac computer to the Soviet news agency TASS, explicitly linking his action to the recent trials of Soviet dissidents. The immediate results of these moves were not encouraging: Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union declined sharply in the wake of the 1974 amendments, and TASS promptly solicited bids from European firms. Thus, the basic issues involved in defining and implementing the optimal relationship between U.S. trade and U.S. foreign policy remain unsolved.

In September of 1978, President Carter addressed himself directly to the encouragement of U.S. exports, keeping a promise he had made at the Bonn summit two months earlier. One section of his statement dealt with expanding direct assistance to U.S. exporters through the Export-Import Bank, the Small Business Administration, and the Departments of Commerce, State and Agriculture. Another focused on American efforts to reduce foreign import restrictions and export subsidies through the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva. But the bulk of his policy statement was devoted to a detailed discussion of U.S. *domestic* barriers to exports, including government regulations,

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export controls for foreign policy purposes, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, antitrust laws, and environmental reviews. In general, the President promised a careful scrutiny of the impact on U.S. exports of current policies and practices in each area, efforts to reduce the uncertainty they create for actual or potential exporters, and minimization of their trade-impeding effects to the extent consistent with their basic goals.

With one exception—an Executive Order explicitly exempting the bulk of U.S. exports from the requirement of environmental impact statements relating to potential effects in other countries—the President's language regarding domestic barriers to exports is general rather than specific. Thus, it remains to be seen how it will be implemented and what its actual impact on U.S. exports will be. But the attention devoted to this particular issue, and the balanced, pragmatic language in which it is discussed, indicate a new willingness on the part of the U.S. government to confront explicitly the multiple goals and complex trade-offs involved.

VIII

The United States has served throughout the postwar period as the major supporter of a liberal (that is, market-oriented and nondiscriminatory) multilateral system of trade and payments in the economic sphere, along with what has been termed "world order politics," including a significant role for international institutions, in the political sphere. A desire to halt the erosion of the GATT framework for international trade underlay U.S. leadership of the most recent round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and a similar desire to preserve the authority of the International Monetary Fund helped shape the cautious view of the United States toward the proposed European Monetary System.

The same concern for the institutional role of the IMF, rather than a belief that an increase in world liquidity is necessary or even desirable in strictly economic terms, underlay the crucial American support for a substantial increase in the IMF's resources and for a new issue of Special Drawing Rights totaling $12 billion over the next three years (along with a significant relaxation of restrictions on the use of SDRs), both of which were agreed to at the annual meeting of the World Bank and the IMF in September. The position of the IMF was also enhanced by the ratification in April 1978 of the Second Amendment to its Articles of Agreement. The United States was one of the original proponents of this Amendment, which legalized the practice of managed floating and endowed the IMF with responsibility for surveillance of member

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countries' exchange-rate policies.

The U.S. commitment to the principles of economic liberalism and world order politics has never been unqualified. Our own policies and actions have run counter to these precepts on many occasions, and the struggle between an executive branch committed to international institution-building and a Congress in which the forces of nationalism, both political and economic, are far more apparent, has been a prominent feature of American political life for decades. But the events of 1978 suggest a sharpening of the tension between our commitment to these long-term principles on the one hand and our pursuit of specific short-term economic and political goals on the other.

This problem is hardly unique to the United States, of course; indeed, the forces of defensive economic nationalism appear to be stronger in most other industrialized nations than they are in our own. But the situation confronting this country is unique in at least one respect. Despite the significant decline in American economic hegemony over the past two decades, U.S. support of the international economic system continues to be a necessary (though no longer a sufficient) condition of its survival. Should the United States decide that defensive economic nationalism is the new order of the day, and therefore sacrifice to particular economic and political interests its sense of responsibility for a viable international system, its behavior, more than that of any other single nation, would have the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Whether the postwar framework of international economic relations can survive the mounting pressures on it depends on many factors, including the attitudes and behavior of several important actors outside the present circle of industrialized nations. But there can be no doubt that the first prerequisite is effective management of the domestic economies of the major industrialized nations. Satisfactory growth rates, high levels of employment, and reasonable price stability will do more than anything else to make macroeconomic coordination between countries feasible and microeconomic adjustment within countries acceptable.

Historically, it has been in the absence of these conditions that trade and payments problems have become intractable and international economic relations increasingly problematic. Should the industrialized countries fail to solve the problem of stagflation domestically, a liberal and coherent international economic system will be among the early casualties and, with it, the economic fortunes of the numerous developing countries heavily dependent on the markets of the industrialized world.

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Adam Ulam

U.S.–SOVIET RELATIONS: UNHAPPY COEXISTENCE

As has been true of practically all American presidents since World War II, Jimmy Carter entered the White House with high hopes of effecting a major and salutary breakthrough in our relations with the Soviet Union. Also evident was the President's determination to achieve some substantial success in this direction quite early in his first term in office. The new Administration believed, as new administrations are prone to, that, unlike its predecessor, it had some special qualifications and opportunities to establish a more satisfactory rapport with the Kremlin. It had a fresh, though to be sure not overwhelming, popular mandate. The executive and Congress were now in the hands of the same party. The Republican Administration, despite its contribution to détente, eventually faltered because it was tainted and hobbled by Watergate and Vietnam, and its chief foreign policymaker unduly addicted to power politics. Now the new people, free of such burdens, would be able to turn a new leaf, not only in our relations with the U.S.S.R., but also in the arena of the growing competition between the two superpowers—the Third World.

There were other, more subjective reasons for America's new leaders to feel that they would succeed where their predecessors had faltered. Despite all the evidence that if anything the opposite is true, the American public and politicians have never quite gotten over the belief that the communists prefer to deal with people whose political orientation is, well, call it progressive, rather than conservative. "I go to see Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna. I go as the leader of the greatest revolutionary country on earth," said John Kennedy in 1961. In a sense he was right, yet it did not help him much on that occasion with Khrushchev. In 1977 it was still felt that the Soviets should react positively to the fact that the U.S. government was now in the hands of those who had been critical of our past involvements with foreign reactionaries, who had

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pledged to cut defense spending and who promised to pull U.S. troops out of South Korea.

What has been learned from bitter experience is that in addition to assuaging Soviet fears and countering misperceptions of what the United States stands for, it is also necessary to impress the Kremlin with America's firmness and determination to protect this country's and its allies' vital interests. Here Washington hoped that Mr. Carter's stance as elucidated during the campaign and upon his inauguration represented just the right blend of friendly overtures toward the Soviets and a warning that this country was not abandoning its historical role as the champion of democracy. This Administration was free of the old anti-communist obsession—it was even ready to discuss the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba and Vietnam. At the same time, its stand on human rights would convey a warning to the communist world not to mistake friendly advances for signs of weakness. If for the Soviets, as Brezhnev had said, détente had not abolished the laws of the class struggle, then for the Americans, Mr. Carter implied, it had not weakened their traditional attachment and readiness to defend the ideals of freedom.

II

How, in fact, did Moscow view the results of the election and the new people with whom it would have to deal? It is most unlikely that the Soviet leaders were pleased. Being deeply conservative by temperament, elderly and set in their ways, they would have preferred that U.S. foreign policy continue to be run by those whom they had come to know and, if not exactly trust (a rare word in the Kremlin's vocabulary), then whose reactions to Soviet policies, they believed, could be gauged with some accuracy. Whatever the virtues of the new Administration's stand on the Soviet Union, whatever the benefits to be garnered through its inexperience, in the mind of the Politburo they were probably more than offset by the fact that a new element of unpredictability had been added to American policies, so lamentably unpredictable in any case: witness Korea in 1950, Cuba in 1962.

The first year of Carter-Brezhnev coexistence eroded most of the initial American optimism without dissipating many of the Soviets' initial apprehensions. There had been some nervousness in Washington that the U.S.S.R. might "test" the new President by contriving an international crisis. But it was the Soviets who should have been, and probably were, nervous. For all his previous

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pronouncements, would not Mr. Carter, now that the campaign was behind him, demand from them an explanation of their buildup in conventional and nuclear arms, take a strong stand on recent Soviet moves in Africa, and so forth? Before negotiating on specific issues, the new President might well have drawn Moscow's attention to the relevant passages of the Nixon-Brezhnev declaration of 1972 that had ushered in détente: "The U.S.S.R. and the United States attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations . . . . Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives."

But the Carter Administration proceeded on the assumption that its first priority was to reach a quick SALT II agreement, and then in the glow of success resulting from it, take up those other bothersome issues during a summit meeting between the two Presidents. It is perhaps pertinent to quote what I wrote on the subject in 1976: "Strategic arms limitation has been considered by the United States as the very keystone of détente. This in itself made sure . . . that the negotiations over SALT I and II would be long drawn, with the Soviets constantly airing new demands and creating fresh complications."[1] If you show that you want something very badly then it is usual for the other side (especially if it is the Soviet Union) to show itself as *almost* intractable, thus making it probable that it will get its own way, and perhaps additional benefits on other issues.

It was also not an insignificant mistake to send Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Russia. Protocol dictated that it should have been the turn of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to come to America to pay his respects to the new leaders and to initiate a diplomatic dialogue about the whole range of issues separating the two powers. But instead it was Mr. Vance who in March 1977 went to Moscow, carrying with him comprehensive SALT II proposals. The Administration must have known that the Soviets could not accept *in toto* the American plan. Its net effect would have been to reduce their numerical superiority in strategic launchers and put constraints on the most advanced Soviet "heavy" missile, while leaving the cruise missile, in which the United States was technologically ahead, as well as the Soviet "Backfire" bomber, outside the agreement. But it was hoped that the proposals would be seriously examined by Moscow and lead to comprehensive negoti-

[1] "Detente under Soviet Eyes," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1976.

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ations. In fact, the Soviets refused even to talk about them. Gromyko chose to read the new Administration a lesson: "One cannot talk about stability when a new leadership arrives and crosses out all that has been achieved before."[2] And the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement made it clear that the rather rude reception accorded Mr. Vance was not unconnected with the President's recent utterances on behalf of the Soviet dissidents: "We shall not permit others to take the stance of tutors and teach us how to conduct our internal affairs."[3]

Some of Mr. Carter's subsequent moves in 1977 and early 1978, such as his vacillation over and then cancellation of the B-I bomber and deferring of the neutron bomb, must have reinforced the Russian impression that the President, for pressing domestic reasons among other things, felt it imperative to achieve a SALT II agreement. Hence for their own part they could afford to be both obdurate and relaxed about the whole thing. And while this attitude changed during 1978, the initial misstep did throw out of balance the entire American negotiating posture vis-à-vis the Soviets, and its aftereffects were to plague Washington's diplomacy to this day.

In addition to impatience and vacillation, the Administration's diplomacy in those first few months displayed another debilitating characteristic—inconsistency. There were signs before and during the elections that the Soviets had been taken aback by the strong reaction of American public opinion to the introduction of Cuban soldiers in 1975 in Angola. It is incorrect to believe that the Soviets never desist from some innovative form of international mischief unless we spell out in full and frightening (sometimes to ourselves, as well as to them) detail what we would do if they don't desist. There had been vague hints inspired by Moscow[4] that the Cuban contingent might be gradually withdrawn, or at least substantially reduced. But rather than solemn warnings, what came from Washington on Africa was a chorus of discordant voices which must have strengthened the position of those in Moscow who argued that the Cuban gambit and other forms of Soviet intervention could be safely continued and expanded.

Where the Carter Administration did unpleasantly surprise the Soviet policymakers was in the intensity of its protests on behalf of Russian dissidents. Its campaign oratory on the subject must have been taken by the Kremlin as just that. Yet here was the U.S. government apparently reconciled to significant new areas coming

[2] *The New York Times*, April 1, 1977.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] See *The New York Times*, May 26, 1977.

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under Soviet influence while making a fuss about how the Soviet Union was treating a few of its own citizens. The Americans, the Kremlin probably ruefully reflected, had never been so bold and nosy when their power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had been much greater. There must have been people in the Soviet establishment who refused to take the whole matter very seriously: a few appropriate gestures could appease the President, bolster his political standing at home, and tend to make him more amenable on the really important questions separating the two countries. But for others in the ruling elite, the human rights issue when focused on the U.S.S.R. was not a trifling matter.

Soviet leaders tend to be what might be called power hypochondriacs: hence their fear that the trickle of dissent might turn into a torrent should the troublemakers be allowed to operate with impunity. If today you mollify the Americans on a few "refuseniks," what will they demand tomorrow? And even if the American human rights rhetoric was for the moment not very significant in relation to the Soviet Union, were the Soviets to show themselves susceptible to pressure, it could have sinister effects in the communist states of Eastern Europe.

But apart from any political calculations, the Kremlin's vehement reaction betrayed its hurt ideological-national pride. How could the Soviet Union, at the pinnacle of its power, give even an appearance of tolerating such interference in its internal affairs, and what did it portend for any long-run prospects of accommodation with the United States?

III

Thus 1977 was a year of mutual frustrations in the two powers' relationship. As to the atmosphere when 1978 began, these few press clippings have an eloquence of their own: "January 12. President Carter accuses the Soviet Union of interference in the Ethiopian-Somali dispute . . . . January 17. [At the Belgrade Conference] the U.S.S.R. submits a draft concluding document, which is termed unacceptable by Western participants because it fails to address the question of implementation of the human rights provisions of Helsinki. . . . January 23. Brezhnev has sent letters to the heads of governments of NATO warning them against the introduction of the neutron bomb. . . . February 11. *Pravda* expresses concern over the slow progress of the SALT talks . . . . a new agreement must include curbs on the cruise missile and reject the inclusion of Backfire bombers under the accords." Soviet-American relations had resumed their normal pattern.

Yet while discord prevailed, negotiations between the two pow-

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ers continued. And now there was to appear an unmistakable note of urgency concerning them on the Soviet side. The Nixon-Kissinger concept of détente had been epitomized by the picturesque simile of the carrot-and-stick technique applied to the Soviet Union. After one year in office the Carter Administration realized that while the Soviets were enthusiastically munching the carrots—Western credits and technology (and it is important to bear in mind that the U.S.S.R. is also indirectly but vitally helped by Western trade and credits to its East European clients such as Poland) and America's virtual commitment to a strategic arms limitation agreement—for its own part it lacked a stick. "Linkage," the Soviet Union has always proclaimed, is essentially immoral; every issue under negotiation should be considered on its own (i.e., largely from the Soviet point of view) merits. But, more fundamental, to use trade and credits as an effective bargaining chip would have required the kind of synchronization of the West's and Japan's economies which, in view of the recession (not to mention the American farmer's aroused appetite for Soviet trade), hardly seemed practical.

Though they now were clearly eager for a strategic arms accord, the Soviets felt that in view of America's predicament there was no reason for them to cater unduly to Washington's sensitivities. Soviet intervention in Africa continued unabated. The Cubans' military presence was being expanded rather than curtailed, and with it came Soviet and East German military advisers and huge shipments of arms. The Soviets now assumed a prescriptive right to license any guerrilla group as a national liberation movement and to aid it in any way they chose. Mr. Gromyko could not help gloating at the West's impotent discomfiture: "Some people in Washington and other NATO capitals blame the Soviet Union for everything that is not to their liking. . . . apparently they need to create some kind of screen to cover their actions, to hide what happened in Zaïre." The U.S.S.R., the Foreign Minister continued, should be given great credit for its altruism and self-restraint: "Every fair-minded person should have a good word for the Soviet Union, which has assisted a victim of aggression with arms—I repeat with arms. Not one Soviet soldier with a rifle is in Ethiopia."[5] Such public statements are usually carefully tailored to their expected impact abroad as well as at home, and rather than trying to mollify the sorely tried American Administration, Gromyko was conveying the message that insofar as any third party

[5] *Pravda*, June 3, 1978.

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was concerned, the subject of the Soviet role in Africa was closed.

Yet some Soviet Americanologist may well have warned his political bosses that it was a mistake to push the Americans too hard, and exult so blatantly over the U.S. government's pusillanimity. In their frustration with the U.S.S.R. some American officials were beginning to talk about playing the "China card." As yet they were not quite sure what this card stood for or how to play it. But in time, and with Peking's help, they might find out. Solicitous of Moscow's feelings and eager to distance itself from the Nixon/Ford Administration's presumed wooing of Peking, the Carter Administration was at first circumspect in dealing with the People's Republic. But in May 1978 the President dispatched his national security assistant to Peking, obviously a gesture of exasperation over the Soviet tactics. Hence it became important for the Soviet Union to reach an accommodation with the United States and to breathe new life into détente before what was still a flirtation between Peking and Washington turned into a solid liaison with all that it might portend in terms of Western help for China's industrial development and defense capabilities.

Now it was the turn of the Soviet Union to grow anxious about the strategic arms limitation agreement, precisely at the point where the Carter Administration, though still eager for one, was encountering mounting difficulties in fending off domestic criticism of the treaty's probable impact on national security. The overall strategic picture, the critics claimed, was already dangerously tilted in favor of the Soviet Union, and under the agreement it might, sometime in the 1980s, become fatally so. How could the U.S. government acquiesce in an arrangement under which the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with their superior megatonnage and more extensive multiple warhead capabilities, would be in a position to knock out almost all of our land-based missile launchers? If the Soviets had indeed forsworn a nuclear first strike and accepted the validity of mutual deterrence, then how could one explain their meticulous and costly civil defense preparations?

Some of the protesting voices proclaimed that SALT I had been a grievous mistake—once again we had fallen prey to the delusion that those 20 to 30 men in the Kremlin who make all the decisions think the way we do and that the proposition "there can be no victors in a nuclear war" is as self-evident to them as it is to us. The 1972 agreement had greatly reduced if not totally destroyed the credibility of our nuclear deterrent insofar as Western Europe was concerned, and the new one threatened to have a similar ef-

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fect on the defense of the United States itself.

In his March 17 speech at Wake Forest University, Mr. Carter tried to rebut the more extreme criticisms but also to put the Soviet Union on notice that America was not a supplicant anxious to conclude an agreement at any price. The President declared it to be a myth "that this country somehow is pulling back from protecting its interests and its friends around the world." Though it must have been painful for one who had promised during his campaign to reduce defense expenditure, Carter was realistic in citing the Soviet military buildup: "Discounting inflation, since 1960 Soviet military spending has doubled . . . . while our own military budget is actually lower now than it was in 1960." He still hoped for a strategic arms limitation agreement, but "before I sign [one], I will make sure that it preserves the strategic balance . . . . and that we will be at least as strong relative to the Soviet Union as we would be without any agreement."

If anyone had hoped that the Russians would be more forthcoming with concessions it would have been better to have phrased the last sentence the other way around: we were determined to be at least as strong as the Russians *without* a treaty as with it—and in view of our respective gross national products we could afford to be. Mr. Carter also mentioned that some new weapon systems, such as the follow-on ICBM, known as the MX, were in the works, but the bargaining value of this announcement was also rather limited since it was known that the MX would not become operational for several years. In any case the overall tenor of the speech implied that the era of unilateral American offerings on the altar of American-Soviet friendship—for that is how the Russians must have viewed the cancellation of the B-1—was rapidly drawing to a close.

The official Soviet reaction was one of plaintive indignation. America, bewailed *Pravda*, was shifting the course of its foreign policy "from ensuring the national security . . . . through negotiations, limiting the arms race and deepening détente" to one of threats and arms buildups.[6] But it is unlikely that the Soviets were as yet unduly concerned: obviously Mr. Carter's speech was directed mainly at his domestic critics and was intended to reassure the American public. And they were not going to alter their negotiating stand just because the Americans talked about new weapons it would take years to produce.

Moscow did not react with equal nonchalance to the President's

[6] *Pravda*, March 17, 1978.

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other major speech on Soviet-American relations, delivered on June 7 at Annapolis. This time Mr. Carter found the kind of language that makes the Kremlin sit up and take notice rather than just indulge in journalistic harangues. "The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation," he declared. "The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice." Instead of vague talk about the strategic balance, the President spelled out clearly those aspects of nuclear weaponry in which the U.S.S.R. was superior: "more missile launchers, greater throw weight and more continental air defense capabilities." Against "more" on the Soviet side, he could mainly claim "better" on the American: "generally greater accuracy, more heavy bombers, a more balanced nuclear force, better missile submarines, and superior antisubmarine warfare capability"—a far from reassuring picture in view of the speed with which the Soviets often catch up with America's technological advantages where weapons are concerned.

The Annapolis speech could not be taken for yet another exercise in public relations, an attempt to mollify the Administration's critics, several of whose factual arguments the President this time acknowledged as being correct. The Soviet Union's public reaction probably came fairly close to what its leaders must have felt at this latest turn in American foreign policy rhetoric—irritation but also a degree of puzzlement. Did the President really mean what he seemed to be saying: that American public opinion should be prepared for the possible collapse of détente and for what it would imply in new burdens and sacrifices? A long *Pravda* article of June 17 examined the question in depth. Could the winds of change in American-Soviet policy be ascribed to anything the U.S.S.R. has done? Obviously not. And then a fairly standard type of explanation: "For some time that country's ruling circles have been enmeshed in an acute struggle over questions of détente and relations with the Soviet Union. . . . There are more and more indications that the forces gaining the upper hand in this struggle represent factions that would like to undermine détente and return the world to the cold war. . . ."

For all its propagandistic tone, the article seemed to reflect various nuances in the Soviet elite's appraisal of the new turn of events. Was the President, after all, talking tough mainly to smooth the passage of SALT II when it comes before the Senate? But then surely he should adopt a different approach: "The government itself is plainly in no hurry to take a definite stand and to begin to

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defend the agreement both in Congress and to the public. . . . On the contrary, many government leaders in this complex situation are busy stirring up mistrust toward the Soviet Union and spreading lies about the 'Soviet military threat'." Those are the same people who are still trying "to link disarmament talks to other questions that are totally unrelated." Note also "Washington's latest intrigues, or to be more exact, 'petty intrigues' with China." Petty though they may be (and *Pravda* still did not want the Americans to think they could get very far in playing the "China card") they were still dangerous: "Soviet-American confrontation and, even better, war, that is Peking's cherished dream."

As is usual when the Kremlin is really worried, the main thrust of its message was intended to be soothing rather than menacing. For all the provocations on the American side, the U.S.S.R. will not desist from its peaceful endeavors: "we do not accept invitations to join in burying détente and the hopes of millions of people for a peaceful future." The dominant mood in Moscow, the article suggested, was one of cautious optimism: Mr. Carter still needed and wanted SALT II and the American people were not ready to face the consequences of another major international crisis. For the President *Pravda* had some rather unsubtle advice: "courage in politics is by no means the same thing as bravado and the readiness to resort to strong expressions and brandish a club. . . . By no means is everything that one can get away with in American domestic politics acceptable in foreign policy. . . . The price of miscalculation . . . will not only be measured by a drop in someone's popularity—it already threatens to result in new, costly spirals in the arms race, political crises, a growth in the tax burden, and even more severe consequences." And to underline this solicitude for Mr. Carter's political fortunes, *Pravda* reminded him that public opinion surveys clearly indicated that the overwhelming majority of the American people "favor the improvement of relations with the U.S.S.R., the achievement of an immediate strategic arms limitation agreement, and the development of economic ties with the Soviet Union."

All in all the Soviet leaders gave no evidence that the main lines of Soviet policies would be changed, or that Washington should have any reason to suspect that by raising its voice it could make Moscow back down. Rather, their policies would be pursued more circumspectly: there would probably be no further Cuban intrusions until SALT II was resolved one way or another. And the hand of American proponents of the strategic arms agreement might also be strengthened through a propitiating gesture by

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Russia on another issue. In June the Soviet Union offered new proposals in the force reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna: it would be ready to accept the principle of equal ceilings on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. This theme was given much prominence in Brezhnev's speech of June 25 in Minsk. He obliquely acknowledged the West's concern with the Warsaw Pact's preponderance in tanks, and reiterated the idea of "the same common ceilings . . . for each of the groupings in Central Europe . . . [which] corresponds to what the Western countries have proposed."[7] If an agreement was reached, the Soviet Union was ready to pull out three divisions and one thousand tanks within a year.

In view of such goodwill gestures it might appear odd that at about the same time, in July, the Soviets tried and imposed heavy sentences on a number of dissidents whose imprisonment had already aroused considerable indignation in America and brought official protests from the U.S. government. But without casting undue aspersions on Soviet justice, one can see here some sound psychological and political reasoning. If the principle that the U.S.S.R. does not brook any interference in its domestic affairs was to be reasserted with the least possible damage to the business at hand, it was obviously advisable to incur the burden of American displeasure on that count well in advance of the crucial phase of the public debate in the United States over the ratification of SALT II. And it would not be surprising if the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet should decide to pardon Anatoly Shcharansky and he were permitted to leave the U.S.S.R. during the course of that debate.

In Baku on September 22, Mr. Brezhnev once again confounded the speculation in the West concerning his health by giving a lengthy speech, and once again gave vent to the growing Soviet impatience over SALT II. "Obviously the distance between the two sides' negotiating positions is not so great; it can readily be bridged with real goodwill and statesmanship." Alas, in Brezhnev's view some influential circles in the United States did not want "a stable peace and mutual cooperation." Those circles had already caused the cancellation of some American trade deliveries to the U.S.S.R. and were continuing to put all sorts of obstacles in the way of cultural and scientific exchanges between the two countries, yet the Soviet Union would patiently persist in seeking an understanding: "We shall resolutely rebuff any attacks on the rights and interests of the Soviet state, but we shall not let ourselves be provoked."[8]

[7] *Pravda*, June 26, 1978.
[8] *Pravda*, September 23, 1978.

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In November Mr. Brezhnev talked with some visiting American Senators (an occasion that must be harder on the Soviet leaders' nerves than any other aspect of détente). Wearily, one assumes, he sought to rebut an insinuation which was gaining ground in the United States: no, the U.S.S.R. did not think it could win a nuclear war; it would be a catastrophe for both sides. How difficult it was, the Kremlin must have begun to realize, to impress the Americans with your power without frightening them to the point where it becomes counterproductive.

And another irony, as 1978 drew to its end, was that it was the Soviets, hitherto resolute opponents of "linkage" of any kind, who were now hinting that, much as they desired SALT II and the continuation of détente, all, and much more, would be placed in jeopardy if the West transgressed certain bounds in its relationship with China. Mr. Georgi Arbatov, whose job is to interpret the Americans' quaint customs and thought processes to the Politburo and to pour oil on the troubled waters of the two powers' relations, had some rather somber reflections to share with an American journalist: "If China becomes some sort of military ally of the West, even an informal ally . . . we would have to reexamine our relationship with the West. . . . Then there would be no place for détente." Mr. Arbatov had also some advice for Peking, in fact strikingly similar to what the U.S.S.R.'s American well-wishers have long been urging on the Soviet Union: instead of throwing its weight around and creating trouble all over the world, the People's Republic of China should "turn all its efforts toward the tremendous internal problems they have developing the country and improving its standard of living, etc."[9]

What might be called the social side of détente could in 1978 be deemed a qualified success. Thousands of American tourists visited the Soviet Union, and cultural and scientific delegations went to and fro with but an occasional interruption due to some unfortunate development on the human rights front. Trade between the two countries still reflected the after effects of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments, denying the U.S.S.R. most-favored nation status and access to government credits and guarantees. The Soviets imported about two billion dollars worth of American goods, but more than half of it was accounted for by foodstuffs. There were some, on the whole minor, chicaneries directed against American journalists, whose interest in dissent, almost to the exclusion of all other news, must be a major inconvenience to the secret police.

[9] Interview with Jonathan Power, *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), November 11–12, 1978.

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Despite all this brisk intercourse, unimaginable some ten years ago not to mention during the Stalin era, the basic problems of Soviet-American coexistence remained unsolved. This year once more demonstrated what unhappily has been true during most of the postwar era: quite aside from the concrete issues separating them, it is the very nature of their general approach to foreign policy that makes it so hard for the United States and the Soviet Union to carry on a meaningful diplomatic dialogue, let alone solve some of their outstanding differences. On the Soviet side, the obsessive secrecy in which decision-making is veiled and the camouflage thrown over their real hopes and fears, and, on the U.S. side, the excessive volatility of American foreign policy and the diffusion of responsibility for its conduct, combine to undermine that mutual credibility which is a basic condition of fruitful negotiations. It is as difficult for the Americans to believe Soviet promises as it is for the Kremlin to heed seriously the U.S. government's warnings.

IV

Since the Soviet system will not change basically in the foreseeable future, what can be done by the United States to alter the unhappy pattern of the two powers' relations? Perhaps not very much, but the record of the last few months offers some helpful hints. It was shown in 1978 how illusory it is to expect that by trying to resolve just one of the major issues dividing the two superpowers, even one as supremely important as strategic arms limitation, the United States can bring about a magic improvement in the overall situation. In some ways, "linkage" is a synonym for diplomacy, and that is what the original concept of détente was all about.

To be sure, within two years Nixon's version of détente was destroyed, buried under the debris of the political and economic crisis of the West. It is a sobering thought that nothing the U.S.S.R. has done since the war has dealt as devastating a blow to the West as the actions of OPEC, and that no Soviet move or ruse has undercut the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy as much as what the Americans have done to themselves in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate. It was probably genuinely incomprehensible to Brezhnev and his colleagues how anyone could think that what was still called détente placed them in 1978 under the same obligations and restraints they had been ready to accept in 1972. Hence it is clear what some of the basic priorities for the United States must be before it can expect to begin to work for a modus

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vivendi with the Soviet Union. The ghosts of Geneva '55, Camp David '59, and Moscow '72, are there to warn us that that cannot take place before the West puts its own house in order, and as long as the American view of the Soviet Union vacillates between unrealistic hopes and unreasonable fears.

Soviet foreign policy is the product of a peculiar dialectic. What, to eschew euphemisms, must be called imperialism is a vital element of the rationale of the Soviet system. Now that the unity of the world communist movement is irretrievably lost and the doctrine itself has become discredited or irrelevant insofar as the majority of the Soviet people is concerned, the regime strives to demonstrate its viability and vitality through foreign expansion; despite its internal shortcomings, it is under communism that the Soviet Union has steadily advanced in power and world influence while the democracies, for all their alleged freedoms and riches, are in retreat. That is the lesson the Kremlin wants to inculcate in the Soviet people.

As against this motif, we have a countervailing one: the Soviet leadership's recognition that imperial expansion, whether in military or political terms, cannot by itself guarantee the security of the Soviet system. The more extensive the Soviet gains and Western losses, the more likely the danger of a confrontation, or what to the Kremlin amounts to the same thing, a virtual alliance between the United States and China. The Americans may consider the "China card" as a mere bargaining device, but as *Pravda*'s June 17 article on the Annapolis speech makes clear, the Soviets do not believe that the cumbersome machinery of American foreign policy is equipped with an effective braking mechanism: "As we already see today, the 'tough line' has every chance of changing from a tactic into a dangerous and uncontrollable political course, acquiring a momentum of its own that would be difficult to overcome, and that would call forth an appropriate counteraction." And the Soviets lack sufficient introspection to perceive how often this has been true of their own policies.

It is not the nature of the Soviets' ambitions, but rather that of their fears which makes the problem of peaceful coexistence so difficult. Years before anyone in the West thought this possible, Moscow perceived the possibility of Sino-American rapprochement: "With a stubbornness worthy of a better cause, the Chinese leaders attempt to prevent the improvement of Soviet-American relations. . . . At the same time the Chinese government makes feverish attempts to improve relations with Britain, Japan, West Germany. . . . They would not refuse to improve relations with

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the United States, but as yet do not see favorable circumstances for such an endeavor."[10]

To be sure, Soviet policies greatly contributed to U.S.-China détente, and have unwittingly endowed it with such sinister (from Moscow's point of view) possibilities. In their more reflective moments, Russian leaders may well regret having succumbed to those temptations which, because of the West's disarray and indecision, appeared so irresistibly alluring. What would a future historian deem more significant about 1978—the fact that Soviet interest became paramount in Afghanistan and South Yemen and was on the rise in Africa, or that Washington and Peking drew much closer and that China was on the threshold of a new relationship with the West and Japan, one which promised to bring her massive foreign credits and arms?

Some of the past achievements of Soviet foreign policy also called for a reappraisal: Egypt, on which the U.S.S.R. had lavished so much help, was no longer a client. There were still ties with the "hard line" Arab states, but while they were useful in making the danger of real peace and stability in the Middle East more remote, they were otherwise of little direct benefit to the Soviet Union. As in the case of other imperial systems, yesterday's conquests often tend to become today's burdensome liabilities.

But if such somber reflections pass through the minds of Politburo members, nothing in 1978 has suggested that they influenced them to the point of altering the pattern of Soviet foreign policy. On the whole, the present leadership believes, current world trends favor the U.S.S.R., and the West will not in the foreseeable future be able to reverse them. Witness Iran.

And as for China? The Soviets had expected much more there in the way of turmoil and factional strife in the wake of Mao's death than has actually been the case, but they are still hopeful that internal instability will for some time keep China from realizing her full potential in world affairs. And, perhaps after all, one of the contending factions will feel constrained to turn to the Soviet Union for friendship and support. Moscow also remains skeptical about the ability of a democracy, and especially one such as the United States, to play successfully the balance-of-power game. If all other calculations fail, the Soviets may count on the silent persuasiveness of the statistics of Soviet ICBMs and tanks to deter the West from seeking too close a relationship with Peking. And it

[10] M. Suslov at the *Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, February 1964*: Moscow, 1964, p. 495.

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is probably this view of arms as a political as well as military deterrent that has been the main reason for the magnitude of the Soviet arms effort of the last 14 years and that may incidentally help explain Mr. Brezhnev's agitation over the neutron bomb.

V

The waning days of the year were signaled by a development of central importance to U.S.-Soviet relations. On December 15, 1978, Mr. Carter dropped the other shoe by announcing that the United States would establish full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic and withdraw recognition from as well as terminate its defense pact with Taiwan. The step was not unexpected; its timing was. One suspects that the Administration hoped that this dramatic display of the China card would make the Soviets more amenable to some last minute adjustments, admittedly not of major importance, in SALT II, as well as improve the chances of the agreement being ratified by the Senate. The first assumption may very well be correct, though by the same token the Soviets are unlikely to hurry forward with the actual signing of the treaty so soon after the announcement of the new relationship between China and the United States. And Mr. Brezhnev must bridle at the idea of traveling to Washington either shortly before or in the wake of the visit there, now scheduled for the end of January, by the mercurial Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.

In fact, Brezhnev hastened to send a personal message to the President. No, it was not to congratulate the United States on recognizing a fellow communist regime with which the U.S.S.R. has had diplomatic relations for all those 30 years (not to mention a treaty of friendship and alliance, theoretically still in force). If President Carter's first reading of the message was that Brezhnev saw the recognition as a contribution to world peace, then Tass, in an official paraphrase of the Soviet leader's words, chose to put a somewhat different interpretation upon it: "Of course" the Soviet Union does not object to the normalization of relations, but it had to express its unhappiness about the phraseology of the Peking-Washington communiqué, which spoke of the two countries as being opposed to any power seeking "hegemony" in Asia or elsewhere. Whom could they have in mind? Mr. Brezhnev then went on to state the obvious, but in language rather unusual in a formal message to a friendly power, for the uninitiated could take it as a threat: "The Soviet Union will most closely follow what the development of American-Chinese relations will be in practice, and from this will draw appropriate conclusions for Soviet

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policy."[11]

We have seen how throughout 1978 Soviet attitudes toward U.S.-China relations oscillated between two beliefs—one, that the talk about the China card was an empty threat, and the other that the United States might overplay the card and be enticed by Peking into a situation which could create a major danger to the U.S.S.R. It is at least arguable that the American policymakers should have been quite candid in pointing out to their Soviet counterparts that the character and extent of U.S.-China ties depended largely on the Soviets' own behavior. The "appropriate conclusions," which the Soviets should draw from U.S.-China relations as well as other policies, are, on the one hand, that this country will not acquiesce in the Soviets' "efforts to obtain unilateral advantages" at the expense of the West, and, on the other, that such policies will not develop an "uncontrollable political course, acquiring a momentum of its own," which would constitute a threat to the legitimate security interests of the U.S.S.R.

As yet the Kremlin remains to be persuaded on both counts. Certainly, 1978 has presented Soviet leaders with some evidence that the U.S. government can be mindful not only of their presumptions, but also of their fears and sensitivities. At the Belgrade conference the U.S.S.R., to no one's surprise, refused even to discuss its domestic conduct in regard to human rights. And for their own part, Mr. Carter and his advisers seem to have tacitly recognized that direct pressure on this issue can be counterproductive, and that the U.S. government can be most effective in alleviating the lot of the dissidents by communicating quietly to the Soviets the intensity of American feelings on this subject.

On the one hand, it is illusory to think that as long as the Soviet system remains authoritarian—that is, for the foreseeable future—it could ever observe human rights as they are understood in the West. On the other hand, were the Soviet Union to adhere to the original concept of détente, that in itself would have a beneficial effect on its domestic policies, just as even the present flawed state of détente makes its rulers sensitive to world public opinion. But it is only when Moscow is fully convinced that the American political system is capable of producing and adhering to realistic and consistent policies that the Soviet Union is likely to reexamine the premises of its own foreign policy.

[11] Quoted in *The New York Times*, December 22, 1978.

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David Watt

THE EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

In the 30 years following the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, promising military aid to Greece and Turkey, America's relations with her Western European allies have been subject to many tensions and fallen into many vagaries, but the alliance has been underpinned by a clear perception of common interest at the most fundamental levels of strategic argument. For the United States, Western Europe has represented not only a vital extension of the American economic system but also a bulwark against geopolitical encroachments on that system by the Soviet Union. For Western Europe, the United States has been not only the sole credible source of military security but—notwithstanding Europe's increasing prosperity—the ultimate provider of her economic security as well.

These basic truths are worth restating at the outset of any account of transatlantic relations in 1978. It is so easy to overestimate the extent to which they have been challenged at various points during the last 30 years; and equally easy to underestimate how much they were shaken during the last two. The point is best understood by comparing 1978 with the period of greatest strain within the alliance during the previous three decades—that is, the early 1960s when General de Gaulle launched his frontal assault on the "American challenge." The Gaullist attack failed at that time for a variety of reasons, the chief of which was that it failed to carry the West German government with it. The Germans still felt psychologically and militarily dependent upon the American connection and, as far as economics was concerned, the net American outflow of about one billion dollars a year appeared to the Germans as to nearly all the other allies (and despite French mutterings about the American takeover) to deliver growth without excessive inflation. From the American perspective, the Gaullist position, though irritating, seemed equally irrelevant to essentials. The cohesion of the rest of NATO and the social stability of the rest of the European Economic Community reassured successive American governments that Europe was essentially "sound."

At the end of 1978 it was still possible to maintain that these assumptions were valid. But most of them had lost their air of

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immutability, and some had had to be abandoned altogether. Notably, belief in the American economy and the dollar as the mainspring of the Western economic system was badly undermined in Europe; and although Europe's overriding reliance on U.S. arms for protection was undiminished, the reassertion of the power and rights of Congress vis-à-vis the Carter Administration created fundamental doubts about the stability of American foreign policy. From the American point of view the Europeans still looked like reasonably reliable allies, but the political and social alarms of the previous 12 months had aroused a whole legion of ideas and possibilities that had never hitherto penetrated American consciousness on a wide scale. In part, of course, these doubts on both sides of the Atlantic only differed in degree from those which have beset the alliance from its beginnings. In two respects, however, they represented a transformation of kind. In 1978, a West German government thought and acted for the first time on Gaullist, or at least semi-Gaullist, principles; and, on the other hand, it dawned on many Americans that the alliance in Western Europe might be destroyed not by an external attack but by the corrosive action of various forces within.

II

As it turned out, the most dangerous of these disintegrative forces were not the ones most American commentators had expected. The specific political danger most feared and discussed in the United States in the early months of the year—namely the prospect that the southern flank of Europe might fall prey to a dangerously seductive heresy called Eurocommunism—failed to realize its ominous potential, and indeed, after the spring, faded almost completely from the scene, leaving the incumbent non-communist coalitions looking a good deal stronger than they had for some time past. In Italy and Spain the two propositions on which the idea of Eurocommunism had been based—that is, that socialism is a democratic concept demanding a permanent, and not merely transitional, respect for parliamentary democracy and, second, that the schism between Communists and Socialists within the workers' movement should be healed—were unable to make headway in the face of intractable political difficulties at home. In France they were jettisoned ruthlessly by the French Communist Party itself.

Among these sagas the eclipse of the French Communist Party (PCF) was most immediately significant, since it strengthened the position of the French President and thus altered the balance of power within the European Community as well as casting general

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doubt on the credibility of Eurocommunist claims. The PCF, having for some years put itself forward as a moderate democratic party purged of Leninist doctrine and supporting a moderate Common Program alongside the Socialists, found itself at the beginning of 1978 faced with the nightmare of being virtually swallowed up by its Socialist partners in the parliamentary elections in March. Opinion polls and by-elections showed that its moderation had entirely benefited the more plausible left-wing party and that in the first round of the forthcoming elections it might well find itself beaten into second place by the Socialists in all but a handful of contests and with no hope, under the present system, of recouping in the second round. In these circumstances the Communist Party leaders were obliged to turn their guns on the Socialists, demanding an extravagant new left-wing Common Program, and denouncing the Socialists as reactionaries and backsliders when they predictably refused to agree. In this way they succeeded in regaining control over their traditional vote and in driving away moderate support from the Socialist-led coalition of the Left. The Communists' share of the total vote was only slightly down from 1973, and they actually made a net gain nationally of 13 seats. But in achieving this result the PCF not only destroyed its own chances of coming to power as part of a left-wing coalition government, but revived its own scowling and aggressive Stalinist image and blasted the fortunes of the Left.

The majority of 90 seats won by the Center-Right coalition parties was far better than the most optimistic forecasts on the government side. Moreover, President Giscard d'Estaing's Union pour la Democratie Française emerged in a greatly strengthened position in relation to its Gaullist partners. The Gaullist leader, Jacques Chirac, whose personal popularity had also been damaged in the election, was obliged to patch up a temporary truce with the President and thus, with the Left in disarray, to leave him free to pursue far less constricted economic policies than he had been able to afford in the past. By the fall, indeed, both Gaullists and Socialists were embroiled in ferocious intra-party struggles. Meanwhile, the ideological in-fighting, lasting through the summer and conducted mainly in the columns of *Le Monde*, among leading French Communist theoreticians over the correctness of the strategy and the internal state of the Party, was evidence, perhaps, that the PCF is by no means a Stalinist monolith; but it did nothing to erase the impression that beneath the sheep's clothing of the last few years the wolf's paw was in fact waiting to "strike once and strike no more."

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If the situation in France showed Eurocommunism outflanked on its Right, the dramatic unfolding of events in Italy showed an abortive attempt to outflank it on the Left. The growing violence in the Italian streets, the terrorist attacks on prominent individuals, and, finally, the kidnapping of the Christian Democratic Party chairman, Aldo Moro, by the Red Brigades in March were the price that Italy had to pay for the so-called historic compromise between the Communist Party and the Christian Democrats. The decision of the Communists under Enrico Berlinguer to commit Western Europe's largest communist party to achieving power by democratic means and to supporting in the Chamber of Deputies a minority coalition led by the Christian Democrats left a vacuum on the far Left filled by young middle-class militants who declared an "armed struggle" against the state. The Red Brigades had apparently intended to kidnap Berlinguer, but, finding him too well guarded, had seized Moro, presumably with the intention of forcing the government to recognize their legitimacy and to negotiate with them. This the government, backed strongly by the Communists, refused to do, though there was some revulsion of public feeling against it when Moro's bullet-riddled body was eventually recovered in the trunk of a car at a point equidistant from Christian Democrat and Comunist headquarters.

Outside observers could derive some relief from the shock these events caused. A strong anti-terrorist bill went through the Italian parliament by a vast majority, and the "well-behaved" Communist Party suffered a marked setback in the provincial and municipal elections that were held a week after the final dénouement of the Moro tragedy. The government, with Communist support, was also able to carry through a major economic stabilization plan: an unpleasant dose of fiscal, military and administrative conservatism that enabled the Italian balance of payments to make a spectacular recovery and inflation to be reduced from more than 22 percent at the beginning of the year to an annual rate of only 12 percent at the end. Still, the underlying picture in 1978 never looked less than depressing and ominous. The spectacle of the impotence of the Italian police, the strains and the inequities of the Italian economy, rising unemployment, and corruption that has been rife in every part of the Italian state and that finally implicated President Leone himself in a scandal which obliged him to resign in June—all suggested that the uneasy balance of forces could not remain in place for very long.

Elsewhere in Europe the communist issue was hardly a serious one. Even in Portugal, where it seemed in 1974 and 1975 that the

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extreme Left might easily take over in the confusion that followed the end of the Salazar dictatorship, the pendulum of political power swung in a very narrow arc. While the country had no less than three governments during 1978, President Eanes had no great difficulty in creating a rough public consensus, embracing the army and the main political parties and allowing him to set up a moderate, "non-party" administration.

This temporary banishment of the communist factor in West European politics was not the only hopeful symptom of improved political health within the alliance. In West Germany, the five strange years of neo-anarchist urban terrorism associated with the names Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof came to an end; Northern Ireland had its quietest year in the last ten; and Scottish separatism took some hard electoral knocks. Above all, the young democracy of Spain seemed more and more firmly rooted. In spite of the violent activities of the Basque separatists and some rather farcical right-wing plots, the centrist government of Alfredo Suarez easily survived a hard year for the Spanish economy, and the Spanish people overwhelmingly endorsed their new democratic constitution at the referendum in December.

III

These political successes, however, have floated on the surface of an economic stream which most observers perceived to be flowing in the opposite direction. And it was the fear that this current could sweep away all prospect of cooperation within Europe or even within the NATO alliance that haunted leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. It is true that the performances of the main economies of Western Europe were rather better than in the two or three previous years. The average rate of price inflation was slightly reduced within Europe, and the divergencies between individual inflation rates narrowed in comparison with the mid-1970s. In Italy the rate was cut from 17 to 12 percent and in the United Kingdom from nearly 16 to just over 9 percent, the latter being the rough average for Western Europe. This provided greater stability of exchange rates within Europe itself (though not, of course, of the rates against the dollar). On the other hand, growth remained at well under three percent both as an average and in the strongest single economy, that of West Germany; and unemployment remained enormously high, with more than five million out of work in the European Community alone.

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Moreover, the individual industries of Western Europe were under attack on two fronts. On one side, the newly industrializing countries of the Third World were moving steadily into traditional markets for manufactured goods, and, on the other, American and Japanese companies were more and more firmly entrenched in the high-technology fields which European industry aspired to invade. The social and political difficulties of adjusting to this challenge by modernizing and deploying declining industries would impose severe strains on European governments in the best of times. In a period of no growth and high uncertainty it is hardly surprising that ominous cracks began to appear throughout the whole fabric of West European cooperation.

By far the most serious of these fissures was the one which yawned between the aspirations of the European Economic Community and its actual performance. At the economic level the members of the Community resorted to all sorts of protectionist measures. Some, like the Davignon price cartels in man-made fibers, shipbuilding and steel, were sanctified by a Community-wide approach. Others were national devices to protect domestic industries concealed by a variety of subterfuges: preferences by public authorities in purchasing contracts; automatic licensing systems; and the zealous application of rules concerning public quality or public health. The European Commission was sufficiently alarmed to warn during the summer that it would take action against these practices, but they continued to proliferate all the same. Similarly the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the Community remained unreformed at the end of the year despite its mounting internal absurdities and in the face of increasing hostility in the outside world to its propensity for producing huge farm surpluses and dumping them on world markets with gigantic export subsidies. At the summit conference of the nine heads of government in Bremen in July it was agreed that the CAP's soaring cost could not be allowed to continue. Yet the Brussels summit two months later showed how difficult it is to get agreement on something as relatively straightforward as a farm price freeze, let alone any radical reform, so long as the exigencies of German domestic politics give such power to the farm lobby.

At the political level, the Community appeared at the beginning of the year to reach an impasse. The ringing declaration of the 1972 Paris summit, proclaiming European union by 1980, had been completely annulled. In the aftermath of the 1973 oil price increase, inward-looking national governments had elbowed aside the European Commission and almost all supranational aspects of

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the Community. Some external coordination of policies had been achieved among the Nine, but positive initiatives on the big issues in which the interests of some or all the Nine were deeply engaged had been almost completely absent.

A serious attempt was made in 1978 to plan a breakout from this European stalemate and the effort itself was encouraging. Yet the final result was not; for, by the end of the year, it had begun to look as if two of the three main exit roads proposed might very well lead back into the maze, while the third might provide an escape for the Community only at the cost of weakening the alliance. The path least strewn with pitfalls was the election of a European Parliament by direct suffrage due to take place for the first time in June 1979. Throughout 1978, however, as the national parliaments passed the legislation necessary to put this process in train, it became ever clearer that the French and British governments were still determined to prevent such a parliament encroaching on the powers of national governments. The British Labour Party, it is true, grudgingly allowed a bill providing arrangements for the polls but then proceeded to select candidates to contest them, the vast majority of whom were commited to root and branch opposition to the European Community in general and the European Parliament in particular. In Paris the Gaullists not only forced Giscard to concede that France would veto any extra powers of the Parliament, but actually threw out, in December, the bill financing European elections in France. In short, although a parliament would be elected and might even succeed in amassing more democratic power over the years, this process would be at best slow and uncertain.

Equally doubtful seemed the consequences of the enlargement of the Community by the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain. Negotiations with Greece continued throughout the year and indeed, after a negotiating breakthrough in December, seemed doomed to succeed. Those with Portugal began in October and those with Sapin were due to begin in 1979. The nine existing members of the Community welcomed the applications on political grounds and, from the point of view of the United States, the consolidation of NATO's vulnerable southern flank looked very attractive. Yet throughout 1978 the difficulties of enlargement loomed larger and larger and began to affect the calculations and negotiating positions of members of the existing Community. Leaving aside the institutional and linguistic problems of a Community of Twelve, one has only to mention the fears of French and Italian farmers in the face of competition from Spanish and Greek agriculture or the fears of, say, Germany, that Spain will

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both prove a formidable competitor in exports of cars and steel and yet need expensive nursing in other sectors, to see that problems are being raised here which could easily cause further protectionism in the Community and an eventual collapse of the whole structure. The "three wise men" appointed at the December summit to explore the institutional implications of enlargement were certainly bound to make the best of it but any serious examination of the problem seemed doomed to reach the conclusion that at best a very different and much looser European Community would emerge at the end of a long and stormy process; and at worst the Community would cease to provide the stability in the West that the United States has always regarded as its main advantage.

The third method proposed for pulling Western Europe out of its rut appeared to have a greater chance of immediate success. Certainly the scheme for a European Monetary System (EMS), which in 1977 had been no more than a gleam in the eye of Roy Jenkins, the President of the European Commission, moved forward to implementation at the beginning of 1979 at a speed which was astonishing considering that it was conceived as a rather desperate means of getting back on to the road to full economic and monetary union that was one of the ultimate aims of the Community's founding fathers. Mr. Jenkins revived the debate in his Jean Monnet lecture in November 1977, with the idea that by setting up a monetary framework the Community might give a boost to the harmonization of the nine economies, itself the prerequisite of further political and economic unification. To those who replied that it was literally preposterous to put the monetary cart before the harmonization horse in this fashion, Mr. Jenkins replied that monetary union could only take place if there was a firm commitment on the part of the wealthier members to transfer resources on a massive scale to the poorer; and he was thought by many, perhaps most, observers to have destroyed his own case by this proviso, since there was virtually no chance of such a transfer being agreed to by the West Germans.

The matter would no doubt have rested there if it had not been for the unwitting assistance of the American Administration. By allowing the dollar to fall precipitously in the early months against the main currencies and particularly against the Deutschemark, President Carter and his advisers gave a new and highly practical motive to the Europeans for trying to take joint defensive action. Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was particularly angry with what he saw as American aggression against the German economy. He found himself in the unpleasant political position of facing

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either the wrath of German exporters, whose goods were being priced out of the market by the appreciation of the German currency, or the fury of inflation-sensitive public opinion, which knows that intervention by the Bundesbank to keep down the exchange rate increases the money supply and stokes up inflationary pressure. The Chancellor's reaction was to try to prevent the Deutschemark from floating into the stratosphere by mooring it firmly to the other main European currencies in a new "zone of monetary stability."

This idea, which he put forward at the Copenhagen summit in April, was limited in scope and indeed constituted not much more than an attempt to reexpand the existing "snake"—the device by which West Germany, Denmark and the Benelux countries agreed to limit the fluctuations of their currency to within 2.25 percent on either side of a central rate—but it captured a wide constituency. It pleased the European Commission and the smaller European countries that saw in it at least a step in the direction of European Monetary Union. It suited those countries like France and Italy, which were engaged in a cold shower treatment for their industries and were glad of an external excuse for imposing severe monetary policies. It was clearly intended to cut the dollar down to size and therefore pleased the Gaullists in Paris. It was attractive to all those European currencies—that is, most—that had suffered from the fluctuations of the dollar. Those who distrusted it did so either because they felt it was another encroachment on national sovereignty, or because they feared it would force them into a deflationary, monetarist straitjacket, or because they felt it was bound to fall apart and those who tried to prop it up would probably have to spend a lot of their reserves in the attempt for no good purpose. James Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, subscribed to at least the last two of these arguments, and most of his Labour Party followers to all three—which is why he was from the outset the foremost skeptic among the nine heads of government.

The detailed scheme worked out (mainly by the Germans and French) for the July Bremen summit took account of some of these doubts.[1] But when the technicalities were stripped away, the main haggle was over who would pay and how much. The weaker economies, chiefly the British, Italian and Irish, harked back to the original arguments about a European Monetary Union. They could not, it was said, stand the strain of excessively high exchange

[1] For a more detailed description of the emerging European Monetary System, see Marina Whitman's article, "A Year of Travail: The United States and the International Economy," in this issue.

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rates in relation to their inferior growth and inflation performances unless there was a firm commitment on the part of the richer economies, i.e., Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, to transfer resources to them. Furthermore, in a situation where it was widely agreed that the dollar was the main culprit, why should "innocent parties" like the pound, the lira, or indeed the franc, be involved in expensive operations to prevent an embarrassing appreciation of the German currency?

The answers hammered out at the Brussels summit in December were dictated by a complex mixture of political and economic considerations. President Giscard, having put his money firmly on political solidarity with the Germans, gave up his attempt to make the rules of the intervention game slightly less biased toward Germany. However, bowing to Gaullist pressures, he also vetoed a German attempt to sweeten the Italian and Irish waverers by expanding the European Regional Fund and supplementing subsidized loans from the European Investment Bank. The Irish and Italians, failing to get what they wanted in cash, left the summit apparently determined to stay out, but they eventually decided to come in—the Italians for complicated internal political reasons, the Irish apparently because they felt they had overplayed their hand.

The British decision to remain outside the system was, as a whole, a matter of domestic politics. At a critical moment for Mr. Callaghan in his attempt to impose a wage policy on his trade union allies, a major row with the left wing over the Common Market would have been unwelcome, to say the least. The final element in the British calculation, however, is the most interesting because the more disinterested. Throughout the nine months of discussions Mr. Callaghan consistently took the view that a European scheme was too narrow and basically too anti-American. His settled conviction (and we should remember that this is the man who nearly allowed his name to be put forward for the Managing Directorship of the International Monetary Fund) was that no scheme that did not attempt to solve the problem of the dollar in a direct and cooperative fashion was likely to survive.

IV

It is a moot point to what extent the EMS, as it finally emerged, was indeed "anti-American." The U.S. Administration itself seemed unable to decide the point. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in his Chatham House speech in London early in December

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welcomed it as an "important step toward the economic integration of Europe." But White House and Treasury sources were quoted in the press as taking a different view. A European cynic might remark that this ambiguity has been characteristic of American policy toward the Community from the start, and that the United States has been all in favor of European integration until it starts to become effective. But in the case of the EMS, it was hard to say whether these unworthy thoughts were appropriate or whether the State Department and White House roles should be reversed. It seemed possible that the new system would collapse like the original "snake" from which Britain and France were fairly rapidly forced to withdraw, leaving the Community even more demoralized than it was before the attempt was made. What is certain, however, is that the EMS was conceived in a spirit of exasperation if not actual hostility toward American policy caused by European perceptions of President Carter's weak leadership in the latter months of 1977 and the first part of 1978. Those American feelings about the precariousness of democracy within the alliance, which I have already described, were mirrored by an equally strong European sense that in the United States democracy had in some way gotten out of control.

The chief evidence of this was thought to lie in the economic field, where the President's difficulties with the Congress over energy policy and with the electorate at large over the attack on inflation seemed both extraordinary and dangerous. But the economic malaise would not have been so acute if it had not reinforced and been reinforced by difficulties in other areas. The story of West German alarm at Mr. Carter's impulsive human rights initiatives, and of French and West German annoyance at the Congress' rather muddled interference with plans to sell nuclear technology to Pakistan and Brazil, belong to 1977 although they cast their shadows forward into the following year. But there were other issues in 1978 which caused concern in Europe, not so much because they were enormously important in themselves but because their handling showed signs of ineptitude and divided counsels in Washington that cast doubts on the President's will and ability to deal with the supreme issues of war and peace. The neutron bomb controversy was just such a case.

A plan to produce a new nuclear battlefield warhead, designed to destroy life by massive radiation, was naturally a difficult and emotional issue, and nobody blamed the Carter Administration for treating it with some caution. Even Mr. Carter's abrupt decision in April to postpone the production of the weapon was

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not in itself regarded as necessarily a bad one. The West German position that it should be produced and then used as a bargaining chip in disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union was not so different from the Administration's position that its non-production could be used as a chip in the arms control game. What annoyed and alarmed the European allies was the Administration's attempt to shuffle the responsibility for the decision onto governments in Europe, which were far more embarrassed politically by the argument than was the President, and then, just when European politicians were beginning to weather the storm and gain acceptance for the deployment of the warhead, the President made a unilateral volte-face and left them looking foolish. The announcement in October that the United States would proceed with production of a new generation of tactical nuclear warheads that could be adapted for use as neutron weapons closed the controversy for the time being, but there is no doubt that considerable damage was done to morale.

Another example of what was perceived as American unreliability was the muddle over the final stages of the Tokyo-round trade talks toward the end of the year. The course and substance of these negotiations is described in detail elsewhere in this issue; but it hardly needs an understanding of the technical issues to realize that the significance of these talks for the alliance and indeed for the world at large can hardly be overestimated.[2] The consequences of failure were bound to be calamitous both in practical and psychological terms and would most likely plunge the developed world back into the protectionist nightmare of the interwar years. Yet the U.S. Administration was unable to prevent the Congress last October from failing to extend a waiver on legislation which obliged it to impose countervailing duties on subsidized imports after January 4, 1979. Not unreasonably, the reaction of the Europeans was to refuse to negotiate under what they saw as a serious threat, and it took endless persuasion from Mr. Robert Strauss, the U.S. Special Trade Representative, to make the European Economic Community accept the promise that the Administration would table and actually get passed a bill extending the waiver as soon as the Congress reconvened in the middle of January. Everyone always expects the final part of any trade negotiation to be a cliff-hanger, and no one supposed that the negotiating parties would be anything less than very tough; but the fact that the incident occurred underlined for many the unreliabil-

[2] See Marina Whitman, *ibid*.

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ity of American policy in a period of congressional supremacy. The claim that the waiver was not extended owing to a mistake only worsened this impression.

V

The anxiety and irritation caused by such incidents made a strange counterpoint to the genuine achievements of the Western alliance in 1978, some of them certainly attributable to European perceptions of the ever-increasing military menace of the Soviet Union, but some, too, to the encouragement and exhortation of the President himself. On the whole, NATO had a good year. The NATO summit meeting in Washington in May was a landmark in two respects. First, it contained a remarkably forceful speech by Mr. Carter reaffirming the American commitment to the defense of Western Europe, if necessary with strategic nuclear forces. Second, it formally unveiled the results of the first year in the crusade against NATO's shortcomings, which the President launched at the London summit in May 1977. These results had been impressive. Nearly all the allies had agreed to a three percent real annual increase in their budgets between 1979 and 1984. Moreover, agreement was reached on the long-term defense program, under which the allies promised to look at what needed to be done over the next 10 to 15 years to strengthen and streamline NATO in every department, including the reinforcement of troops in Europe, the mobilization of reserves, and the improvement of weaponry including technical nuclear weapons. Agreement, announced later in the year, on a NATO airborne early-warning system (the so-called AWACS) may be said to be the first fruits of this program.

Even the perennially dismal subject of NATO's southeastern flank looked rather less daunting by the end of 1978. The tension between Greece and Turkey continued, of course, accompanied by bitter slanging matches over the unsolved problems of national sovereignty in the Aegean. But the Administration's achievement in persuading Congress to lift its embargo on arms shipments to Turkey resolved the three-year crisis in that country's relations with the United States and appeared, at least temporarily, to have put an end to a potentially dangerous Turkish flirtation with the Soviet Union. Greece remained withdrawn from the military wing of the alliance, and the possibility of her return remained entangled with the Turkish quarrel. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Caramanlis' slogan that "Greece belongs to the West" remained in

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force, and the way to a return to NATO was opened by the withdrawal of the Greek stipulation that negotiations on the subject would not take place while Turkish troops still occupied part of Cyprus.

Against all this must be set the fact that during 1978 the Warsaw Pact proceeded with its apparently inexorable buildup of military forces. Not only was the Soviet Union apparently continuing to spend about 12 percent of its gross national product on defense, but the year was punctuated by commentaries from Western military strategists on the improved quality and equipment as well as the increasing size of the Pact's ground forces in Central Europe, its vast naval program and the improvement of its air forces. The attempt to deal with this disparity by arms control and disarmament agreements as well as by counterimprovements continued, but at a sluggish pace. The force reduction talks in Vienna (MBFR) became hopelessly bogged down in an argument about the facts upon which the concept of parity between the two sides is supposed to be built. On the Western side, this deterioration of the talks into a squabble over data probably reflected a cooling-off based on two calculations. The first was that, given the buildup of Soviet forces and their ability to reinforce more easily than the United States, NATO would be placed at a disadvantage in any agreement based on parity, and key aspects of the new long-term defense policy might be bargained away for no corresponding real concession on the Soviet side. Second, to the extent that MBFR was regarded as a useful means of combating the remnants of the Mansfield lobby in the U.S. Congress that would urge unilateral troop withdrawals, that objective was best served by a prolongation of the talks.

Meanwhile the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations remained stalled on the question of verification and the second round of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) dragged its slow way toward a probable agreement in early 1979—more than a year after the expiration of SALT I. By and large, the European allies had been satisfied with the consultative process whereby Washington kept them informed of these bilateral discussions and, once reassured that the United States had resisted Soviet pressure to prevent their acquiring the cruise missile, they were content to leave the running pretty much to the Carter Administration.

Where there had been deep concern on the European side was over the prospect of SALT III, which will presumably follow close upon SALT II. A fierce debate was already raging behind the scenes during 1978 about the desirability of bringing intermediate-

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range nuclear systems, targeted on Western Europe or the Soviet Union, into future negotiations. The West Germans, who are in the front firing-line as far as the Russian SS-20 missile or the Backfire bomber are concerned, are anxious to discuss these weapons. The British and French, on the other hand, are not anxious to bargain with their own nuclear deterrents, and, in addition, the British argue on more general grounds that it is against European interests to encourage the idea that there is a regional "Euro-strategic" balance which can be distinguished from the overall balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The deployment of long-range tactical nuclear weapons on the NATO side, such as the cruise missile or the Pershing II, might foster the illusion that European security was not reliant on the U.S. strategic umbrella.

VI

It is hard to construct a coherent picture out of all these contradictory forces. And yet, as I hinted at the beginning of this article, some themes do emerge from the confusion. The newsworthy phenomena of urban terrorism and Eurocommunism, which apparently came as such a shock to American public opinion, were only two symptoms of a deeper instability that affected the whole of Western Europe. This instability was caused in the first instance by a sharp attack of inflation and stagnation brought on by the oil price increase in 1973 and later by the side-effects of conventional deflationary treatments applied to the original disease.

In 1978 there were some signs that the fever had been checked and had even begun to decline, but many European countries were also left in a state of debility and confusion. Almost every European government had to spend a good deal of political capital trying to achieve an economic balance—some by frantic stimulation, others by stern monetary discipline. Arrayed against them were militant workers, a discontented middle class and an assortment of more specialized pressure groups such as taxpayers and "green revolutionaries," who are apt to proliferate in societies under pressure. The British Labour government ended the year in a dangerous confrontation with its trade union allies; the Italian coalition was virtually breaking apart under the stress of a rigorous conventional monetary policy; the Danish work force was heading for a showdown on pay. Even the supposedly dynamic West German government was seriously embarrassed by labor troubles

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in the steel industry. In Austria, the ecology lobby shook Chancellor Kreisky, and in Sweden, in October, it actually caused the downfall of the government.

The second theme was that all these governments tended to blame their difficulties on the United States. They had been used to regarding the American economy as the motor driving European prosperity for so long that it seemed self-evident that lack of prosperity must stem from troubles with the motor and its driver. The manifest muddle of the Administration in economic matters confirmed this general impression and concealed the fact that the Europeans were themselves hopelessly divided over whether they wanted the American economy to cure their unemployment or their inflation. Had President Carter succeeded in evolving a coherent economic policy earlier and managed to maintain a stable dollar in the markets, many of his other so-called eccentricities and fumblings in the political and security fields would have been forgiven him.

Those European countries that could congratulate themselves on having weathered the economic storm without the assistance of the United States, or even perhaps in spite of it, were in a mood not simply of exasperation but of independence. President Giscard, as soon as his domestic political position was consolidated by the National Assembly elections in the spring, branched out all over the place with independent initiatives that revived a positive form of Gaullism instead of the merely negative one practiced by himself and his predecessor in the immediate past. The French military expedition to rescue Europeans stranded in Zaïre, the rather futile French proposals for conventional disarmament put forward at the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, the eager seizure of the EMS idea, the hosting of the four-power Western summit in January 1979, all pointed to a reversion to an activist French diplomacy designed to re-establish France as a member of an Alliance directorate, such as General de Gaulle himself frequently proposed.

An even more remarkable development—indeed the most notable feature of politics in Western Europe in 1978—was the emergence of West Germany in a similar role. For the first time since World War II Germany began to claim political rights that would match its economic ascendancy. The main practical manifestation of this was, of course, the scheme for EMS, but in many smaller ways Germany's partners in the European Community noted an increasing tendency on the part of the Germans to demand automatic deference to their interests in a fashion hitherto

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monopolized by the French (a tendency which caused, incidentally, a serious revival of anti-German sentiment in French public opinion). The old postwar inhibitions still applied in the military sphere and, for that reason as well as geographical vulnerability, there was no sign in 1978 that Germany would carry a quarrel with the United States to extreme lengths. Nor should the important extension of cooperation with East Germany, enshrined in the agreement in June to build a new northern Autobahn link from West Berlin to Hamburg, be taken as a symptom of creeping "Finlandization" in Bonn. Yet it is almost certainly true that even two or three years previously Bonn would not have dared to embark on anything as "anti-American" as the EMS which, though it is in practice not much more at the outset than the "snake" of six years earlier, was conceived in an atmosphere radically more pretentious and more sulphurous.

It is not clear how far this new German spirit, or the revival of its French counterpart, can be successfully harnessed to wider purposes. Many Europeans, including myself, hope that it may breathe new life into the Community—and to some extent the EMS promises to fulfill this expectation. Yet the experience of 1978 suggests that neither the attempt to coordinate a common European external policy nor the necessary effort to achieve some greater equalization among the Nine (and soon perhaps Twelve) economies of the Community, would be possible without some further modification of the national neuroses of Germany and the fierce nationalism of France.

The British, with their post-imperial insularity, their hoard of North Sea oil and their stubbornly broken-down economy, were another fearful obstacle to European progress. But there was at least one saving facet to their vices, enhanced at present by their phobia of the European Community—namely their tendency to think instinctively in terms of the American connection. Mr. Callaghan's cooperation with President Carter over southern Africa was constructive as well as self-interested; and the same can be said of his attempts to put the EMS into a wider context. What he failed to realize was that his unpopularity in Europe as a result of his European policies deprived him of any credibility as the honest broker of the alliance. The central question for 1979 is whether French aspirations to take part in a directorate of Western policy and German feelings of renewed national self-confidence can be turned to similarly constructive purposes but with more effect.

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Stanley Karnow

EAST ASIA IN 1978: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION

The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China on New Year's Day 1979 dramatized an extraordinary year in which East Asia experienced an array of other significant political, social and economic changes. This transformation had been building up over the past decade, gradually sweeping away many of the myths and dogmas on which American policy and practice were predicated for so long. But if history can be said to be marked by decisive moments, 1978 was such a climax. In both its domestic dynamics and attitudes toward the world, the region appears to be entering a fresh phase that will require the formulation of new strategies tailored to new realities.

Five years ago, for example, the economic vitality of the region seemed threatened. It was widely feared that Japan as well as emerging industrial areas such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong would be hard hit by the oil price rise and ensuing global recession, causing them to face serious economic and political dislocations. But they have continued to display remarkable resiliency, and their growth in particular has made East Asia perhaps the most dynamic region in the world economic picture.

Almost four years ago, the collapse of America's client regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia tested long-standing prophecies that this would throw the rest of Southeast Asia into disarray. Today the "dominoes" that were supposed to topple are now standing more upright than ever, both individually and as members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and their links to the United States are improving even as they seek accommodations with China and with the communist states of Indochina.

It had been prophesied that China in the wake of Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung's death in September 1976 would

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be nagged endlessly by internecine dissension as opposing factions fought for power as well as to promote their respective domestic and foreign policy doctrines. But with astonishing rapidity, the pragmatists among Mao's successors managed to subdue their radical rivals and supplant his revolutionary dogma with a rational approach to that huge country's enormous dilemmas. And their drive for modernization, along with their quest for security against their Soviet adversaries, has propelled them into unprecedentedly close ties with the Western "imperialists" and Japanese "militarists" whom they once denounced as the enemies of mankind.

It had been thought in the past that China and Japan might compete for influence in East Asia, and thereby contribute to uncertainties in the area. But the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty signed in August, and ceremonially sealed by Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to Tokyo two months afterward, reinforced a bond that not only strengthens the stability of East Asia, but, to the degree that it curbs Soviet ambitions, also works to the advantage of the United States.

Finally, it was feared that the American setbacks in Vietnam and Cambodia, followed by the Carter Administration's early inclination to relegate East Asia to a minor slot on its roster of priorities, would inspire a progressive loss of faith in the United States throughout the area. But several initiatives, ranging from the President's decision to decelerate the American troop withdrawal from South Korea to the normalization of ties with China—and finally, at the very close of the year, the announcement of agreement with the Philippines on the continued use of U.S. military bases there—have largely served to allay apprehensions that the United States might reduce its responsibilities in the region.

A veteran of the cold war scanning East Asia on the threshold of 1979, then, might be amazed to note that the only military conflicts roiling the region are pitting communist nations against each other. Supplied and supported by Moscow, the Vietnamese and their Cambodian surrogates seized power in Phnom Penh by early January of 1979, thus ousting the Cambodian regime supported by China. Meanwhile, China is confronted on its northern and western frontiers by a buildup of Soviet forces that official U.S. sources describe as both "qualitative and quantitative." These communist enemies, moreover, are exchanging propaganda more virulent than anything they ever hurled at the United States and its allies.

This suggests that the traditional ethnic and national animosities

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currently coming to the fore would have surfaced earlier had not the United States inadvertently fused Asia's communists by its strategy of "containment," which ran from the encirclement of China and backing for the French struggle to retain Indochina to direct American involvement in Vietnam. Or, as Richard Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has said: "It would appear in retrospect that the main thing that unified the Asian Communist states in the past was a common opposition to the West—and particularly to the American military presence in Indochina." A senior American diplomat once associated with the Vietnam commitment recently remarked: "We're better off today than if we'd won the war."

It would be a distortion, though, to portray East Asia and the U.S. position there only in glowing technicolor. For there are present and potential problems that threaten the countries of the region and their connections with the United States.

From an American viewpoint, the biggest of these problems is the trade dispute between the United States and Japan, a tangle that defies easy solution. The Carter Administration must still persuade Congress that recognition of China will not endanger Taiwan, and then face basic decisions whether to develop a military aspect to the new relationship. And the disruption of Indochina now menaces the region's equilibrium, since it could conceivably explode into a larger confrontation between the Soviet Union and China, each of which is committed to backing its protégé.

II

The evolution of China during the year was the most significant single development in the area, if not in the world. For the time being at least, it betokens a decisive choice in a struggle that has raged within the Communist government ever since it took over the mainland in 1949.

After consolidating their authority in the early 1950s, the Communist Chinese leaders set out to construct a strong and secure China. But they lacked capital, and the population under their control was spiraling in Malthusian magnitudes. Though they agreed on goals, they fell almost immediately into a bitter debate over means. The more pragmatic elements argued for institutions, decentralized planning, material rewards, ideological flexibility, and, among other things, the acquisition of foreign technology. The radicals contended that such an approach would inevitably create an elitist bureaucracy of the sort that had corrupted the Soviet Union, and they argued for perpetual class struggle, assert-

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ing that growth could be attained by unleashing the "masses" and exhorting them to produce through spiritual incentives.

Mao backed the radicals, especially as advanced age heightened his apprehension that China would slide into "revisionism" after his death. The pragmatists were personified in Teng Hsiao-ping, who believed that progress demanded practical measures rather than political campaigns, and his views were shared by many of his Communist Party and military colleagues. The "struggle between the two lines," to use Mao's phrase, sparked recurrent upheavals as the rival factions sought to promote their respective policies. In the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, Mao tried to shatter the entrenched Communist Party apparatus that had resisted him. It was his "last hurrah," and the disruption it caused compelled him to abandon his dream. Teng Hsiao-ping, purged during the Cultural Revolution, reemerged in the spring of 1973—symbolizing a return at least to moderation, led by Chou En-lai until his death in early 1976—but was purged again in the spring of 1976 as the radicals counterattacked.

Their fate was sealed when Mao died in September 1976. Within a month, his wife and three of her comrades, the so-called Gang of Four, were arrested, and thousands of their acolytes, most of whom had soared into prominence during the Cultural Revolution, were rounded up throughout the country. Since then the drive against them has continued, finally engulfing Mao himself in 1978. In late November, for the first time in memory, Peking wall posters publicly criticized him for having encouraged the radicals, saying that he had displayed "mistaken judgment about class struggle." Meanwhile, thousands who were indicted during the Cultural Revolution, like Teng Hsiao-ping, have not only been "rehabilitated" but elevated to important jobs. Plainly Teng seeks to exorcise the ghost of Mao from Chinese politics, partly by resorting to the traditional device of using historical allegories to criticize him indirectly and partly by revealing the late Chairman's hitherto secret admissions of his own shortcomings. Consonant with this effort, such relics as the "little red book" of Mao's quotations have been attacked as obsolete and misleading.

These zigzags have left many Chinese disillusioned, cynical and hesitant to identify with any policy out of fear that the pendulum could swing again. At the same time, there are indications that the upper echelons of the leadership group are still not entirely cohesive. Communist Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, who was plucked out of obscurity by Mao, has seemed to be more determined to restrain the drive against the radicals than Teng, who, as

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a two-time victim of the leftists, understandably favors a thorough housecleaning. For similar reasons, Hua has been reluctant to bury Mao's thesis that political purity be primordial.

These differences are complicated by personal and political animosities. Hua, who owes his career to the Cultural Revolution, was directly involved in the early 1976 campaign against Teng, and it must be assumed that a degree of tension remains between them. In addition, generational changes are bound to occur in the leadership, with consequences for the future. Teng is 17 years older than Hua and realizes that he is at a disadvantage in terms of time. He is therefore striving to commit the Peking government to long-range programs designed to continue after his death.

Significantly, the National People's Congress formally adopted in March a ten-year economic plan instead of the usual five-year plan. The plan calls for a forced march toward modernization of agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology, and its targets are exceptionally ambitious. Grain production, which attained 285 million tons last year, is to be boosted to 400 million tons by 1985. During the same period, 120 new large-scale industrial projects will be constructed, among them ten iron and steel complexes, ten oil and natural gas fields, five harbors, six rail lines and 30 electric power plants. Steel output is to be doubled, to 60 million tons, during the period. Total investment is estimated to run to some $350 billion, and the plan's overall aim is to raise industrial growth to an annual rate of more than ten percent and agricultural growth to a rate of 4.3 percent per year.

Many experts doubt that the plan can succeed, at least in its present form. One question is whether the Chinese can mobilize the capital necessary for investment. Another is whether they have the managerial talents for the task, and yet another obstacle to be hurdled is the lassitude of labor, which has been confused and demoralized by a generation of leaps forward and backward. But the Peking government is going further than it ever has in promoting a liberal approach to development.

Workers have been accorded salary raises, and factory operations are being reformed to lay greater stress on technical expertise. Individual initiative and market forces are being encouraged, along with a reliance on what the Chinese press euphemistically terms "economic means" rather than "purely administrative means." In an unusual appeal published recently, a senior adviser to Teng Hsiao-ping went so far as to recommend the study and emulation of capitalistic methods. Writing in the *People's Daily*, he said: "The proletariat can and must learn from the bourgeoisie.

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The socialist system itself is not a guarantee."

The same spirit is being infused into scientists, who were formerly under constant ideological pressure but are now encouraged to conduct their research freely. The educational structure, virtually destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, is being renovated as Maoist injunctions against examinations and admission requirements are being scrapped in favor of teacher and student competence. As part of this reform, thousands of young Chinese are due to go to American, Japanese and West European universities even though the Peking authorities know that many may defect to the attractions of consumer cultures.

But perhaps nothing in this new approach has been as dramatic as Peking's decision to reach abroad for assistance—to "put to use the advanced experience of foreign countries," as Hua Kuo-feng said in his National Day address in October. This move not only reverses Mao's insistence on "self-reliance," but represents a retreat from the age-old concept of China as the "center of the universe," which, as the Ch'ien-lung Emperor told the Earl of Macartney in 1793, "possesses all things in prolific abundance."

Within the past year, the Chinese have signed a total of some $60 billion in deals with foreign firms. This commercial thrust outward began early in the year with an eight-year trade agreement with Japan, under which China would purchase ten billion dollars worth of industrial plants and technology in exchange for oil and coal. Since then, the Chinese have indicated a willingness to go far beyond that figure in additional trade with Japan, and they have signed contracts with British, West German, Dutch, French and American companies to construct steel mills, equip coal mines, expand harbors and provide them with other installations. Consistent with this opening to the West, the Chinese are also bidding for tourists, and soon it will be possible to fly to China aboard Pan American, stay in an Inter-Continental Hotel, eat in a snack bar supervised by McDonald's, wash down the meal with Coca-Cola—and pay for it all with a Diners Club card.

The Chinese are resorting to a variety of schemes to cover the cost of their imports over the long term. They hope to develop their substantial offshore petroleum resources and, with that in mind, have been negotiating with the major American oil companies. Reversing past practice, they have acceded to the idea of borrowing, even though they refuse to use that "capitalistic" term. For example, they have arranged a "deferred payment" schedule with West European suppliers. The Bank of China, a Chinese government institution with branches in London, Hong Kong and

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Singapore, is also accepting deposits from Western banks that are being used to underwrite deals. The expectation is as well that China will finance its imports from Japan through two Japanese organizations, the semi-official Export-Import Bank of Japan, which extends loans for natural resources development, and the official Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, the main Japanese vehicle for foreign aid.

Moreover, the Chinese have recently announced that they would accept foreign investments on a minority basis in joint ventures in China, and they are putting money into construction projects in Hong Kong, thereby signaling indirectly that they have no intention of terminating their lease on part of the British colony when it expires in 1997.[1] Justifying the Chinese decision to rely on capitalist economies, Teng Hsiao-ping recently offered a characteristic quip: "It's useless for an ugly woman to pretend that she is beautiful. We must face the fact that we are backward."

III

Paralleling this increased dependence on the outside world to modernize their economy, the Chinese also made strenuous efforts during 1978 to mobilize international political support against their two principal enemies, the Soviet Union and its client, Vietnam. Hua Kuo-feng traveled to North Korea and later to Romania, and Teng Hsiao-ping journeyed to Southeast Asia in the fall. But the most important steps were, of course, the consolidation of new relationships with Japan and the United States.

Treaty negotiations between China and Japan had started as far back as 1974, but then went into abeyance because of Chinese demands that the text feature an "anti-hegemony" clause directed against the Soviet Union. The Japanese resisted this demand, fearing that it would undo their effort to maintain an equidistant stance between Peking and Moscow. But by the summer of 1978, they were ready to accept the treaty for four main reasons.

Earlier in the year, China and Japan had signed a trade accord, and the prospect of profits softened the formerly tough attitude of a segment of the Japanese business community toward Peking. The Soviet Union's bullying tactics, which included continued blunt rejection of Japanese hopes for resolving a dispute over four islands off Hokkaido, also served to drive Japan into China's

[1] In an ironic twist of history, the Chinese have entered into a Hong Kong real estate project with the firm of Jardine Matheson, the heirs of the Scottish opium smugglers whose activities triggered the Opium War and the opening of China to Western imperialism in the nineteenth century.

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embrace. In their eagerness to conclude the treaty, the Chinese acceded to Japan's insistence that the "anti-hegemony" clause be matched by a phrase stating that the pact would not affect the relations of the signatories with "third countries." And finally, the United States quietly but firmly urged the Japanese to go ahead with the agreement.[2]

The treaty was historic in the sense that it formally ended the hostilities between China and Japan that had erupted in 1931, and which would later contribute to the outbreak of World War II. It represented a milestone for the United States, since Americans for the first time in two generations would not be compelled to choose between China and Japan, but could welcome their reconciliation as beneficial to both nations. It was strategically crucial as well, since its setback to Soviet aspirations in East Asia augured an altered balance of power in the region.

Finally, both diplomatically and in overall policy terms, the Sino-Japanese Treaty can now be seen as a prelude to the normalization of relations between the United States and China. On the diplomatic front, the Soviet Union, apparently in reaction to the Sino-Japanese pact, went ahead in November to sign a virtual treaty of alliance with Vietnam—this at a time when frictions between China and Vietnam were acute over a number of issues, including Cambodia and also Vietnam's harsh treatment of ethnic Chinese, which was forcing large numbers to flee the country and seek asylum as "boat people" all around the coastline of Southeast Asia. The fear of being flanked by hostile forces on both its northern and southern borders must surely have been a significant factor in Peking's ensuing handling of normalization with Washington.

IV

This is not the place to review the tortured history of American relations with the Chinese Communists. Recent literature again suggests lost opportunities as far back as 1944 and 1945,[3] as well as in the months after October 1949 and before the Korean War drove the two governments into a long period of strong hostility. Even in the mid-1950s there was at least a brief moment when normal relations might have been achieved: in 1956 Chou En-lai publicly pledged Peking to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan

[2] For a fuller discussion, see Chalmers Johnson, "The New Thrust in China's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978, pp. 125–37.

[3] See, for example, Theodore H. White's dramatic account of the 1944–45 period in his memoir, *In Search of History*, New York: Harper, 1978, chapters 5 and 6.

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problem, going further than the Chinese leaders have gone now.[4] But his offer was rebuffed by John Foster Dulles, who refused to deviate from his policy of "containing" China. So it remained for Richard Nixon to begin in 1971 the process that Jimmy Carter concluded in December 1978.

The famous Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 declared that the United States "does not challenge" the thesis that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait consider that there is only one China, which includes Taiwan. In effect, the United States was prepared to leave it to the Chinese to settle the Taiwan issue themselves, although the Communiqué further stated America's "interest" in a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem. Peking's "three conditions" for normalization, on the other hand, were—and remained—recognition of its sovereignty over all China, including Taiwan, abrogation of the U.S. defense pact with the Nationalist regime, and withdrawal of the remaining American forces from the island.

The United States could at any time have accepted Peking's conditions. But, largely for domestic political reasons, no President could take that step without some form of direct or indirect assurance from China that it would not attack Taiwan and that the United States could continue to supply weapons to the island as well as maintain an unofficial representative there, as Japan and other nations do. The Chinese were loath to make these concessions, since the Taiwan question in their eyes was an internal matter.

The Shanghai Communiqué had looked forward to a fairly early normalization, and President Nixon might have hammered out a compromise during his second term, but he was paralyzed by the Watergate scandals. Then President Ford's room for maneuver was restricted by the fall of South Vietnam, with shock waves that seemed for a time to preclude any alteration of the U.S. alliance with Taiwan. Thus the field was open for President Carter, who had repeatedly affirmed his desire for an accord with Peking. But he was preoccupied during his first year in office with other foreign policy problems, such as the Middle East, Africa and talks with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic arms. As a consequence, China was put on the back burner in the early priorities of the new Administration.

That, however, did not deter a small group of specialists within the Administration from examining possible paths toward normal-

[4] See Robert G. Sutter, *China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978, p. 56.

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ization. The group included Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and Michael Oksenberg, a former Michigan University professor on the National Security Council staff. Working through Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's National Security Adviser, they persuaded Carter to authorize discussions with the Chinese. Thus, in August 1977, Vance went to Peking on what was dubbed an "exploratory" mission.

As authoritative sources now tell the story—most of it for the first time—Vance's proposals then included a suggestion that, upon recognition of Peking, the American representation on Taiwan take the form of a "liaison office," in effect reversing the diplomatic arrangement that then existed. Moreover, Vance urged that the Chinese explicitly promise not to use force against Taiwan. But Teng Hsiao-ping, whose own stature may have been shaky at the time, rejected both ideas, and the Administration specialists returned to their drawing board.

In September, while continuing to refine normalization scenarios, they enlisted State Department legal experts to draft legislation for preserving economic, trade, cultural and other ties with Taiwan after switching diplomatic recognition to Peking. The United States and Taiwan are bound by some 60 treaties and executive agreements covering matters ranging from loans, investments and tariff privileges to fishing rights and airline accords. The draft legislation was unique in international jurisprudence, since it envisaged U.S. links with a regime on Taiwan that would have lost its status as a national government after normalization. As one State Department official put it afterward: "We were creating an entirely new kind of law."

These moves were made in utmost secrecy, in large measure because the Panama Canal treaty controversy was then raging and the Administration feared leaks that might furnish its opponents with ammunition. For instance, in the summer of 1977 a plan briefly existed to bring Ambassador Leonard Unger home on protracted "leave" from Taiwan in order to signal to Peking that the U.S. diplomatic mission on the island was being downgraded. But when it was felt that his departure might arouse criticism on Capitol Hill, he was sent back to Taiwan.

In April 1978 (as the Panama debate finally moved to its close), the specialists revived the issue, and Vance and Brzezinski handed the President a normalization script proposing January 1, 1979 as a target date. The date was not a deadline, since the Chinese reaction was unforeseeable. Carter approved the proposal, specifying that only Holbrooke and Oksenberg be authorized to work

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on the project. A month later, Brzezinski went to Peking with three objectives in mind—to emphasize Carter's determination to normalize, to urge that Sino-American economic, scientific, cultural and other relations be improved even if diplomatic relations could not be agreed, and to brief the Chinese on America's overall foreign policy in order to bolster their confidence in the United States.

The Brzezinski trip gave fresh momentum to the Sino-American dialogue, even though it was uncertain at that stage whether the Chinese intended to make the concessions necessary for normalization. In an effort to initiate a "consultative" process with them, Brzezinski furnished the Chinese with details of U.S. strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union and also with White House secret memoranda (notably the so-called PRM-10) assessing the overall military and security balance and indicating Administration ideas for specific action. The Chinese, for their part, agreed to go forward with bilateral exchanges despite normalization, thus changing their earlier stance, under which they had held that progress toward formal diplomatic ties was a prerequisite to relations in other fields.

Brzezinski's public performance in Peking provoked the complaint in some quarters that he was gambling on the "China card" against the Soviet Union. Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev called it a "short-sighted and dangerous policy," and his view was echoed by American commentators who raised the question of whose card was being played against whom. "While the United States imagines itself as playing the Chinese card, China intends to play the American card against the Soviet Union," remarked Professor Hans Morgenthau, warning that the game was "fraught with risks" because the Russians might eliminate China as a threat and leave the United States confronted by a single superpower.[5]

Nevertheless, the Brzezinski trip had tangible results. It paved the way for visits to China by Frank Press, the White House scientific adviser, Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger, Secretary of Agriculture Robert Bergland, Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal and Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps. In addition, the Chinese agreed to Brzezinski's suggestion for a series of "presentations" on the subject of normalization by Leonard Woodcock, the former chief of the United Automobile Workers, who has represented the United States in Peking since the start of the Carter Administration.

[5] *The New York Times*, July 25, 1978

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Contrary to some later media accounts, Woodcock did not actually negotiate with the Chinese at that early stage. His assignment, which began in late June, was to spell out the U.S. terms for normalization so that the Chinese could decide on their acceptability. Meanwhile, at a news conference on August 17, President Carter voiced his hope for diplomatic relations "when we're both willing to proceed expeditiously and when we're both willing to accommodate one another's wishes," adding that he could not "impose" normalization on the Chinese but "would have to judge by what their response might be."

Woodcock held most of his meetings with Huang Hua, the urbane Chinese Foreign Minister who had been Edgar Snow's interpreter when Snow interviewed a little-known Communist leader named Mao Tse-tung in Yenan in the 1930s. In Washington, meanwhile, Brzezinski initiated a series of parallel talks with Chai Tse-min, a veteran Chinese diplomat who had recently arrived to head Peking's liaison office in the U.S. capital.

Senior Administration officials proposed at the start that the process be conducted slowly and prudently, so that the Chinese clearly understood the U.S. position on three vital points. First, normalization was contingent on the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan. Secondly, mutual recognition would abort if the Chinese contradicted a public U.S. statement expressing hope for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem. And finally, Peking would have to accede to some kind of unofficial American representation on the island. Evidence that the Chinese were seriously contemplating these terms emerged in early September, when a high-ranking Peking diplomat in Washington nervously questioned Holbrooke about newspaper reports that the United States was considering the transfer of sophisticated aircraft to Taiwan. The question prompted the Administration to issue a public denial of these reports, and at the same time (consistent with long-standing policy calling for the supply of only "defensive" weapons to Taiwan) to reject privately a Nationalist request for aircraft that appeared to have significant offensive capabilities.

On September 19, two days after his Camp David triumph, President Carter personally entered into the normalization discussions with the Chinese. Almost euphoric following his Middle East mediation, he invited Ambassador Chai to the Oval Office to stress the need for Chinese concessions. But whatever weight the President's intervention carried, it was not immediately felt. The Chinese were silent for six weeks, presumably debating the U.S. proposals. Finally, on November 4, they responded to Woodcock

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as he ended his series of "presentations."

During that session, Woodcock gave Huang Hua the draft of a communiqué in which, for the first time, the January 1 target date for normalization was communicated to the Chinese. Huang replied by asking for clarification of several points regarding the future of U.S. links with Taiwan. Among other things, Huang wanted to know what sort of legislation was necessary to retain ties with Taiwan as well as the nature of America's eventual trade and cultural relations with the island. His request encouraged the Washington specialists since it indicated that the Chinese now appreciated the gravity of the Taiwan dimension in the normalization process.

Woodcock provided Huang with answers to his questions, but four weeks went by without direct word from the Chinese, presumably because they were again debating their next move. In the interval, however, Teng Hsiao-ping signaled his willingness to push the process forward in three separate interviews, two with American journalists and one with a Japanese political figure. He made it plain to the Americans that China would not disrupt Taiwan's economic and political system. And speaking to Yoshikatsu Takeiri, chairman of Japan's Komeito Party, he underlined two crucial points. First, he said, normalization could be concluded "in two seconds" if handled as a political rather than legalistic problem. And, second, he looked forward to visiting the United States once normalization was complete. After that, Teng added, he would be ready "to depart and join Karl Marx, wherever he is."

On December 4, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung (substituting for Huang Hua, who was ill) summoned Woodcock to a meeting, and showed him a Chinese draft communiqué that agreed on January 1 as the target date for normalization. He also advised Woodcock that Teng Hsiao-ping would see him soon. "At that stage," an Administration official later recalled, "we knew we had it."

The prospect of Teng concluding the deal with Woodcock came as a relief, since it had been anticipated that Vance would have to go to Peking for the final negotiations, and that augured risks of possible failure. But nothing occurred for a week, until, in Washington, Brzezinski prodded Ambassador Chai. On December 12, Teng met with Woodcock and accepted the U.S. proposals: the Chinese would "agree to disagree" on arms sales to Taiwan; and, Teng assured Woodcock privately, there would be no Chinese "contradiction" of a statement by the President voicing his concern for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem.

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Still, aware of the difficulties caused by ambiguities in the Camp David accords, the President insisted that Woodcock see Teng twice more to make sure that they understood each other, especially on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. Brzezinski meanwhile went over the point with Chai during the small hours of Friday, December 15, and won his concurrence.

Carter made his announcement that evening, and the Chinese stuck to the agreement. In a Peking news conference, Hua Kuo-feng predictably denounced the sale of weapons to Taiwan, but added that the United States and China had agreed to normalize relations despite "differing views." Significantly, too, he refrained from any pledges to "liberate" Taiwan, but referred to the island together with Hong Kong and the Portugese possession of Macao as territories that would ultimately be "reunified" with China.

Under the terms of the understanding, the United States would not immediately abrogate its defense pact with Taiwan, but allow it to lapse in one year in accordance with Article 10 of the treaty. The United States would make no new commitments to furnish military equipment to Taiwan during 1979, but supplies in the pipeline would continue to flow and fresh arms sales could commence again in 1980.

What emerges from this account is that the move to normalize relations was carefully considered and prepared on the U.S. side, over a long period. As the expressed approval of both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger indicates, the acceptance of the basic Chinese terms was all along essential to any possibility of agreement. In the end, the Administration seemed to most objective observers at home and abroad (where normalization was almost universally approved, mostly with enthusiasm) to have got as much assurance on the future of Taiwan as was conceivable. And the timing, while originally put forward by the American side, seems to have been pushed in the end by the Chinese, doubtless partly under the pressure of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty and partly in the realization that any delay would be likely to raise more serious political problems in America.

Despite expressions of outrage and an anti-American demonstration on Taiwan that unfortunately got out of hand, the Nationalist regime responded to normalization on the whole with moderation. President Chiang Ching-kuo ruled out the possibility of a flirtation with the Soviet Union and rejected the notion of a declaration of Taiwan's independence. Underlying his caution may have been the realization that, while China lacked the military muscle for an invasion, it could shatter the island's successful

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economy by putting pressure on the nations that recognize Peking to refrain from trading with Taiwan. Barring an unforeseeable crisis, it seemed that Taiwan was secure.

There were signs during the course of the year that Peking may be striving gradually to work out a Chinese-style modus vivendi with Taiwan that would eventually permit the island to enjoy autonomy under China's nominal sovereignty. In August, for instance, Peking reversed its past policy by sending representatives to a conference in Tokyo at which scientists from Taiwan were also present. Similarly, Peking recently raised no objections to a request by Thai International Airways to fly to both China and Taiwan. Reports from Hong Kong indicate, moreover, that a lively if covert trade between China and Taiwan is developing, with goods from the two places being "laundered" as they pass through the British colony. One school of thought suggests that China's aim, for the foreseeable future at least, is the "Hongkongization" of Taiwan, under which Peking would continue to assert its claim to the island as it does to the British colony, but profit from its remarkable prosperity until its status is defined—if it ever is.

It remained to be seen, however, whether President Carter's move would surmount opposition in Congress. The President was supported by such Senators as Edward Kennedy, Alan Cranston and Henry Jackson, but he encountered hostility from outright foes of normalization like Barry Goldwater as well as from others like John Glenn, who felt that Congress should have been consulted in advance—as a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, passed unanimously in July 1978, had urged. The Administration required backing on Capitol Hill for confirmation of an ambassador to Peking and for legislation to retain the U.S. ties with Taiwan, and it was counting on an appreciation in Congress that a refusal to endorse the President's step would mainly hurt Taiwan.

V

The U.S. relationship with China thus moved during 1978 dramatically in the direction of closer ties. In marked contrast was the normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. By early 1979, with Vietnam's takeover of Cambodia, the prospect of U.S. recognition of Hanoi seemed remote.

Carter had declared even before entering office that he intended to recognize the Hanoi regime, and the Administration moved in that direction during 1977. In a series of talks in Paris and New York during that year, Holbrooke advised the Vietnamese that the Administration placed no conditions on recognition, and, as a sign

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of good will, the President withdrew previous U.S. objections to Hanoi's membership in the United Nations. But the Vietnamese, whose skill at diplomacy is spotty at best, displayed a lack of flexibility by demanding more than three billion dollars in war reparations, contending that they had been promised that sum by President Nixon as well as by the cease-fire agreement signed in Paris in 1973. The demand prompted Congress to put constraints on U.S. dealings with Hanoi, among them a prohibition against any American assistance to Vietnam through international financial institutions. The Administration lobbied successfully to remove that prohibition, but the Vietnam negotiations were derailed again early in the year when the chief Vietnamese envoy to the United Nations was implicated in an espionage case. These complications consumed time that could have worked in Vietnam's favor had its leaders been more supple.

During the first half of 1978, the Vietnamese began to indicate a readiness to drop their demands for reparations and, as a gesture of their changed attitude, they delivered the bodies of 11 American servicemen missing in action since the Vietnam War. The change appeared to be motivated in part by their conflicts with China and Cambodia as well as a desire to dilute their dependence on the Soviet Union.

In the latter half of the year, however, those very conflicts began to affect sharply the American attitude. Hanoi's harsh treatment of its ethnic Chinese minority—which had largely stayed passive throughout the long 30 years of war—precipitated a wave of refugees, whose plight led the Carter Administration to act to admit another 25,000 of these "boat people." Inevitably congressional sentiment, which had shown signs of relenting on the issue of normalization, tended to stiffen.

More important still, as Administration statements at the end of the year explicitly recognized, was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which moved from border warfare in mid-1978 to an all-out offensive by late December. In April, as the conflict first became clearly visible, Zbigniew Brzezinski in Washington was moved to label it a "proxy war" between the Soviet Union and China. In fact, its roots were home-grown: Vietnamese and Cambodians had been fighting against each other since the days of Angkor, and, as Cambodians of every political tendency admit, Cambodia was saved from total annihilation by Vietnam by the arrival of the French in the nineteenth century. More recently, animosities between the two neighbors were exacerbated when the Cambodian Communist movement, anxious to avoid domination

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by Hanoi, liquidated its pro-Vietnamese faction. But by the end of the year Moscow's major role in assisting the Vietnamese and allying itself to them had given a color of truth to the label.

The conflict alarmed the Chinese, who for years had sought to limit Vietnamese influence in Southeast Asia, which they considered inimical to their own security. Besides, China and Vietnam had a long history of friction, which has been aggravated within the past decade by other factors. Hanoi's leaders, many of whom had drawn their early inspiration from the French Communist Party, were scornful of Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary innovations, and so they had differed from Peking on ideological grounds. They also regarded Peking's support during the Vietnam War as having been less than total, and they were especially rankled by China's invitation to President Nixon as the war was still being fought. The Chinese, for their part, were annoyed by Hanoi's consistent refusal to side with them in the Sino-Soviet quarrel, and they were further irritated in mid-1978, when Vietnam adhered to COMECON, the East European economic community that functions under Moscow's tutelage.

The tensions rose in early November as the Soviet Union, evidently retaliating against the Sino-Japanese pact, signed its treaty with Vietnam. Peking exploded in wrath. Teng Hsiao-ping, referring to the Vietnamese as the "Cubans of Asia," called the agreement a "military alliance" that "threatens the security of the region." And his decision to come to terms with the United States was, in part at least, his answer.

Yet the Chinese, though supporting Cambodia with at least a trickle of arms sent by sea, was hard put to begin to match what the Soviets were doing on the other side. And the United States, for its part, had to swallow hard on human rights objections to the domestic conduct of the Cambodian regime, to arrive by the end of the year at a public position condemning Vietnam's intervention and linking any future hope of normalization with Hanoi to the course of the developing war situation.

VI

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the five member countries of ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore—observed these tensions with mixed feelings of apprehension and satisfaction. Fearful of being drawn into the conflicts between the great Communist powers and their surrogates, they realized as well that the disputes were serving to add cohesion to

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their group, which after its founding in 1967 had tended until the last two or three years to resemble a debating society rather than a solid organization. Then, under the stimulus of Communist victories in Indochina and worldwide recession—and with encouragement from Japan in particular—ASEAN began to act more vigorously as a group, and concurrently to expect more concrete signs of support from the United States.[6]

These trends continued during 1978. The ASEAN countries reduced import tariffs and arranged for currency swaps as a safeguard against sudden monetary fluctuations, and they have plans to share energy and improve communications. They have also undertaken a concerted effort to press the industrial nations to reach an accord on a proposed Common Fund to stabilize commodity export prices. The Carter Administration encouraged these moves during the year. Vice President Mondale toured the area, and in August the Administration played host to a conference of the ASEAN foreign ministers in Washington. The U.S. gestures were designed to reassure the association that the American presence in Asia would continue, and that the United States would henceforth deal with its members in regional rather than individual terms.

At the same time, Vietnamese and Chinese leaders traveled through the area during the year, behaving like missionaries as they proselytized for their respective causes. Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong promised the Thais late in the summer that Hanoi would not assist the Communist Party of Thailand either "directly or indirectly," and in his talks with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, he tactfully sidestepped the contentious issues of American bases and conflicting territorial claims. He also adopted a conciliatory tone as he pledged to edge Vietnam closer to the ASEAN concept of peace and neutrality for Southeast Asia. But the general response to his pitch, while courteous, was noncommittal. Teng Hsiao-ping evoked much the same response not long afterward, even though he went to such extraordinary lengths in his tour of the area as genuflecting to the Crown Prince of Thailand. Thus the countries of Southeast Asia, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, remain wary of power disputes in the region.

The United States, however, fared better in its negotiations with a former Pacific possession, the Philippines. After more than two

[6] See Bernard K. Gordon, "Japan, the United States, and Southeast Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1978, pp. 579–600.

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years of negotiations, an agreement was reached that assured the "unhampered" use of two American bases in the Archipelago—the Subic Bay Naval Station and Clark Airfield on Luzon.

Administration specialists had originally favored maintenance of the Subic installation and closing Clark Field, which had been used for logistical purposes during the Vietnam War. But soundings indicated that most Asian nations, including China, perceived the bases to be a measure of U.S. interest in the area, and so the decision was reached to maintain both. That decision posed a dual problem—one involving new understandings with the Philippines on such details as jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel, and the other concerning compensation to the government in Manila. The jurisdictional problem, while highly technical, was charged with the kind of nationalistic emotions that are often aroused by the presence of foreign troops. The problem of compensation was equally difficult, since the Carter Administration faced resistance both in Manila and on Capitol Hill.

The Administration had inherited a proposal made by Secretary of State Kissinger in late 1976 to furnish the Philippines with one billion dollars, half in economic assistance and half in military aid, over a five-year period. The program was supposed to appear generous to Manila and modest to Congress, but perceptions were just the opposite. The Philippine government considered the sum to be insufficient, and its hostility to the offer was sharpened by many of the post-colonial passions that have long nagged relations between the United States and its former possessions. Congress, meanwhile, was reluctant to lock itself into a long-term aid commitment, and its attitude was aggravated by the growing belief that the regime of President Marcos, which governs under martial law, is corrupt and disdainful of human rights.

In the agreement announced in late December, American officials finally persuaded Marcos to accept a compromise under which the Administration undertook to seek congressional approval of some $500 million in military and economic aid over a five-year period, the bulk of the military supplies to be purchased. In exchange, the bases would come more clearly under Philippine sovereignty until the expiration of their tenure in 1991. Thus Marcos agreed to a substantially smaller package than had been offered by the previous Administration—partly because he realized that the earlier proposal would not be approved by Congress and also because other Southeast Asian leaders advised him of their desire to see the U.S. bases remain.

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VII

To a large extent, the Administration's concern about the Philippine negotiations represented a lesson learned from its initial fumbling regarding Korea. During his election campaign, President Carter pledged to withdraw all U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea by the early 1980s, and he held to that timetable during his early months in office. But his promise caused grave doubts, even among senior members of his Administration, for three principal reasons. First, he had not consulted the South Korean government beforehand, nor had he discussed the question with Japan, which views the Korean Peninsula as vital to its security. Second, he failed to take into account the impact that disengagement would have on other Asian nations, China among them, which were worried by the possibility of a U.S. retreat from the area in the wake of Vietnam. And finally, he had not adequately lobbied on Capitol Hill for approval to transfer some $800 million in American military equipment to the South Korean armed forces, and the prospect was that Congress, divided between those opposed to withdrawal and those determined to penalize the Park Chung Hee government for the "Koreagate" scandal and its violations of human rights, would reject the plan.

On the advice of his aides, however, the President backtracked. Instead of pulling six thousand men out of South Korea, as originally contemplated, he removed about half that number during the year, and he announced that the last two brigades of the U.S. Second Division, the main American combat unit in the country, would remain until near the end of the withdrawal period. He arranged to make some $275 million in military sales credits available to South Korea in the 1979 fiscal year, with comparable credits to follow for several subsequent years, and to reinforce the U.S. tactical fighter wing scheduled to stay in the country after the withdrawal. These moves, combined with the President's personal intervention, persuaded Congress to endorse the equipment transfer project. And to add credibility to the withdrawal program, the largest joint military exercise since the Korean War was conducted in March 1978, which demonstrated America's capacity to deploy powerful air and sea forces rapidly from the United States and its Pacific bases to the Korean area.

But while the President's reversal reassured Asians, members of Congress and a segment of U.S. public opinion, his back-and-forth motion raised doubts about his consistency. The episode also served as a reminder of the tragic consequences that stemmed from an earlier error in policy toward the same region—the

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Truman Administration's decision to exclude the Korean Peninsula from the U.S. defense perimeter, which prompted the Soviet Union to encourage its North Korean client to invade the South and ignite a conflagration whose repercussions were felt in Asia for a generation.

VIII

The Japanese, who had been especially upset by President Carter's intention to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea, regained their composure after he revised his plan. And they were heartened by his repeated assertions that the relationship with Japan is the "cornerstone" of America's policy in Asia. The relationship has been helped, moreover, by China's vocal support for the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan, which has undermined the Japanese Socialists and Communists who oppose the pact and thus bolstered the Liberal Democratic Party, which is committed to a strong security link with the United States.

But if the United States and Japan have overcome many of the diplomatic differences that have divided them in recent years, their trade conflict has degenerated into what one prominent American official calls a "nightmare." By the end of the year, some high-ranking White House advisers were expressing the fear that the trade dispute might begin to erode U.S. political ties with Japan, and memories were evoked of 1960, when President Eisenhower's visit to Tokyo was cancelled because of anti-American demonstrations. The Administration's objective, therefore, has been to insulate the security alliance from the trade quarrel, and so far it has been successful.

Despite the Strauss-Ushiba agreement reached early in 1978 to increase the access of American goods to the Japanese market, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan ran to some $13 billion during the year, and the prospects for improvement seem remote. Much has been written about the problem, but two of its aspects merit emphasis because they underline the extreme difficulties involved in finding a solution. One is the domestic political pressure confronting the Japanese government, which inhibits its attempts to liberalize its import regulations, especially on agricultural products. The other is the changing pattern of Japan's trade, which is working against the United States and other Western industrialized nations.

The Liberal Democratic Party, whose popularity has been declining steadily, owes its survival in office mainly to the fact that the rural vote on which it relies is disproportionately important

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due to gerrymandered electoral districts. The movement of a large percentage of Japan's rural population to the cities during the postwar industrial boom should logically have weakened the Liberal Democrats, who depend on conservative constituencies in the countryside, but they retained their strength under a system of representation that gives rural voters extraordinary influence. Thus the Liberal Democrats cannot afford to alienate the farmers, whose power to sway import policies has also been built up as a consequence of Japanese agricultural strategies.

In an effort to curb Japan's annual rice surplus and reduce expensive price supports, the Liberal Democrats urged farmers to switch to breeding livestock and cultivating citrus fruit. But fruit production has been so successful that Japan now has a citrus surplus, and Japanese growers have put pressure on the Liberal Democrats to protect them against U.S. imports. Meanwhile, similar pressures are being exerted on the Carter Administration by citrus states like California, Florida and Texas, which are demanding that Japan be opened to their products. The same kind of controversy has been raging over beef.[7] The United States and Japan reached an agreement in December, but it would only increase American agricultural exports by some $200 million per year, enough to tilt the trade balance only fractionally. So the commercial dispute between the United States and Japan appears to be far from a solution.[8]

Japan is meanwhile reducing its percentage of U.S. and West European imports because, in a shift of its trade pattern, it is buying more merchandise from South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, or "developing Asia." The share of consumer durables sold to Japan by these countries rose from some five percent in the late 1960s to more than 20 percent in the mid-1970s, while U.S. and other Western exports to Japan fell by roughly the same proportion during the period. Japan is reluctant to erect trade barriers against its Asian neighbors, since it has ambitions to play a more vigorous political role in the region.

The obvious danger to the relationship between the United States and Japan could come from rising protectionist sentiment already visible in Congress. It may not be too farfetched to imagine

[7] An example of the sensitivities involved in this controversy emerged recently, when U.S. meat packers found a loophole in the Japanese quota through which they could export a cut of beef stomach known as *traversus abdomena*, which can be made to resemble a steak. The Japanese government detected the loophole and plugged it, and the trade it represents is neglible, but the *traversus abdomena* issue has been engaging the energies of senior officials in Washington and Tokyo.

[8] See James C. Abegglen and Thomas M. Hout, "Facing Up to the Trade Gap with Japan," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978.

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U.S. retaliation against Japanese products leading to a slowdown of Japan's export industries, with increased unemployment in Japan sparking hostility against the United States. Both American and Japanese officials are aware of this threat, but despite intense negotiations, an understanding appears to be remote. The trade quarrel with Japan, however, illustrates the extent to which the nature of the U.S. involvement in Asia has changed from its former focus on security.

IX

There are other potential problems in the area, several of which affect America's future relationship with the region.

Given China's episodic record since the Communists took over a generation ago, there is no guarantee that the leadership group now in control in Peking will remain united in their pursuit of prudent policies. To a certain extent, then, China must be considered an unpredictable factor in the Asian equation.

Vietnam's hold over Cambodia ought to be a source of concern, since it could exacerbate tensions between the Soviet Union and China. This would have a destabilizing effect on Asia, and, in particular, confront the United States with unattractive choices.

Though relatively placid now, the partitioned Korean Peninsula has been a chronic cockpit of tensions. President Carter's decision to scale down the U.S. troop presence there, combined with the impact of the so-called Koreagate scandals on Congress, has provoked doubts about America's intentions toward that area. As a result, the Administration will have to proceed cautiously in Korea in order to avoid jarring the Japanese and other Asians.

The economic contrasts that separate the industrial nations from the developing countries are vivid in East Asia, where a land like Indonesia is plagued by a population explosion compounded by food shortages. Problems of this kind challenge the West, and especially the United States, because of their potential for disrupting the area.

On the whole, however, the American position in East Asia is healthier today than it has been in nearly half a century. The United States is neither waging a conflict nor supporting an ally militarily engaged in the region, and the power tilt that has aligned its strategic interests with those of China and Japan offers an effective antidote to Soviet ambitions in the area. The focus on security as the key element in U.S. policy has therefore been superseded by other concerns, such as trade, technology transfer, economic development and the quest for social equity. These

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concerns will require strategies that are in many ways more complex and frustrating than the deployment of troops and targeting aircraft.

But the complications of peace are preferable to the ravages of war. And it may be that 1978 will go down in the history of East Asia as a year in which most of its people, many of whom have known decades of devastation and turmoil, looked toward the future with increasing confidence and optimism.

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John C. Campbell

THE MIDDLE EAST: THE BURDENS OF EMPIRE

Throughout 1978 the Middle East was at or near the top of the Carter Administration's foreign policy agenda. For the first time in 30 years an Arab-Israeli peace settlement—at least a partial one—was a practical possibility once President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 had opened the door. As the year began, it was clear that the parties would need mediation and help to reach the promised land of peace and that the United States, the old friend of Israel and new friend of Egypt, was admirably placed to escort them there. The Soviet Union, on bad terms with both Israel and Egypt, was out of the picture. The signs for productive American diplomacy were favorable.

Not all American interests in the Middle East were wrapped up in the Arab-Israeli question, although Washington tended to give that impression by the time and effort devoted to it. Stability in the Persian Gulf region and access to its oil were of the highest importance from the standpoint of the global balance with the Soviet Union and from that of the economic well-being of the West. Iran and Saudi Arabia had long been regarded by the United States as the keys to protection of those interests. The Shah of Iran and the Saudi royal family had been cooperating with Washington for more than a quarter of a century. These traditional friendly relations, by 1978, were flourishing in the heady atmosphere of expanding trade, grandiose development programs dependent on American technology and management, and large sales of American arms. Soviet influence, except in Iraq, was scarcely to be seen in the Gulf. Here, too, the signs were favorable. Washington was moving confidently forward with its established policies.

For five years the United States had been living off the fruits of the October 1973 War. It may seem strange, but that moment of crisis for the United States, which revealed U.S. vulnerability to the new economic power of OPEC, also left it in a stronger political position than ever before, as it gained new influence in the Arab

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world without losing its special relationship with Israel, and as it stepped forward as the principal partner in the security and economic development of the oil-producing states of the Gulf. It was not in the nature of the Middle East, however, that these particular circumstances should last. America's destiny in the Middle East must reckon with a changing scene and, as past experience can confirm and as the events of 1978 were to show, is not entirely determined in Washington. It may be affected, more than has been apparent in the past few years, by decisions taken in Moscow. Most of all, it is dependent upon the dynamics of Middle Eastern politics, forces not subject to control by any outside power.

At the end of the year, as these factors came into play, the signs were less favorable. The Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations had not produced a treaty, and on other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict there was no progress at all. What was happening in Iran, even though the Shah's troubles unfolded by gradual stages, had come as a surprise and a shock to Washington. The Middle East seemed to be entering a new phase, to which U.S. policy would find it difficult to adjust.

That perspective provides a basis, a demanding one, for an examination of the year's events. Has surface success only veiled bigger problems? One Camp David agreement, impressive though it was as a diplomatic triumph, was not enough to exorcise the persisting and intractable conflicts bound to make the mediator's lot anything but a happy one. The new wealth and military power of Iran could hardly be a pillar of security in the Gulf if support for the Shah had crumbled at home. Was the firmly knit American position in the Middle East, with Jerusalem, Cairo, Riyadh and Tehran as its nodal points, beginning to unravel?

II

To deal with 1978 in the Middle East we must first say something about 1977, the first year of the Carter Administration. When it came into office this country was still reaping the benefits of the shift in Egypt's position from ally of the Soviet Union to virtual ally of the United States. Henry Kissinger's step-by-step peace process, however, had run out of steam after the Israeli-Egyptian agreement of September 1975 known as Sinai II, and the new Administration had some old familiar questions to answer as it set about the task of carrying on the effort for peace: whether to try for additional separate bilateral arrangements, or for a comprehensive settlement; whether to call the Geneva Conference into being, or

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to play a lone hand; whether to tackle the question of Palestine and Palestinian representation head-on, or to go around it; whether to state American views on the terms of settlement, or to hold back; whether to consult with the Russians, or to leave them out.

It was not necessary to make immediate and clear-cut decisions on all those questions, but they could not be indefinitely avoided, and the new team (which on the working level included many of the old hands) did not intend pussyfooting. On the contrary, it was given to speaking out, in fact rather too soon and too often for its own good. But as the strategy unfolded the pattern became clearer. The United States hoisted the banner of a comprehensive settlement because it was apparent that no Arab state was willing to enter into a separate negotiation with Israel. That meant that at some time, presumably soon, there would be a Geneva conference, at least as a means of providing an umbrella under which bilateral negotiations could go forward. A harder question to deal with was whether the Arabs could find sufficient unity to permit them to negotiate at Geneva or anywhere else. Among the necessary parties, in Arab eyes, was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), recognized by the Arab League since the Rabat conference of 1974 as the legitimate representative body of the Arab Palestinians.

It is to the credit of the Carter Administration that it made a serious effort to tackle the Palestinian problem. The President, early in his term, spoke out publicly in favor of a "homeland" for the Palestinians. How much prior thought went into his choice of words, spoken in the course of a folksy town meeting with the people of Clinton, Massachusetts in March 1977, is not a matter of public record, but his use of the same term of art used by Lord Balfour in his pledge to the Jews in 1917, suggesting statehood but not saying it, could not but impress the Arabs favorably as recognition that the Palestinians had a place in the peace settlement and in the making of it. It impressed Israel unfavorably, as might be expected, but Israeli displeasure was tempered by the desire not to alienate its principal ally and supporter at the very beginning of a new administration.

For most of 1977, the United States found itself pursuing a will-o-the-wisp, a formula for Palestinian participation in the peace process that the Arab states and Israel could accept. The chances of finding the road to a broad and genuine Arab-Israeli negotiation did not seem hopeless. Following two years of war in Lebanon in which Arabs were feuding with Arabs, the combination of Syrian

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military presence there with an Arab League cover, the weakening of the PLO, effective Saudi diplomacy, and acceptance of the situation by Egypt and Jordan made possible a common front that seemed ready for negotiation with Israel—if only the question of Palestinian participation could be resolved. In his swing around Middle Eastern capitals in August, Secretary of State Vance made a valiant attempt to score a breakthrough, but it was not to be. In the end there was no way to bridge the gap between the absolute refusal of the PLO to recognize the existence of Israel or to accept U.N. Resolution 242, the generally accepted basis for negotiation, and the absolute refusal of Israel to recognize or deal with the PLO.

I have dwelt at some length on the Palestinian question because it lies at the heart of the entire Arab-Israeli problem, and American diplomacy in 1977 demonstrated a recognition of that fact. In the new phase that began with Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November, the Palestinian question tended to be dealt with in a different way, rather as a persisting nuisance that had to be coped with somehow but which should not be allowed to close off the promising avenue opened up by Sadat's willingness to negotiate directly with Israel. None of the three parties embarking on the road that led to Camp David, however, could push aside the fundamental issue of the future of the Palestinians, which remained to plague them.

III

The other principal question evaded by the Sadat initiative and the ensuing negotiations was the place of the U.S.S.R. in the process of an Arab-Israeli settlement and in the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. As the United States has pursued the goal of a settlement over the years, it has been of two minds about Soviet participation, at times seeking a basis of agreement with the Russians on principles and procedures, at other times quite happy to go ahead without them. The practical question was often how much Soviet cooperation was necessary or useful, and how little would be enough.

During the two-year period of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy that followed the October 1973 War, the Soviet Union was virtually shut out of the peacemaking process although it was all going forward nominally within the Geneva framework. Kissinger conferred with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko a few times, but the latter hardly regarded that as adequate consultation, much less participation. When the second Israeli-Egyptian agreement was

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concluded in 1975, Moscow showed its annoyance by sending no one to be present as co-chairman when the documents were formally signed at Geneva. Soviet pronouncements by that time were denouncing the entire American-managed process of step-by-step negotiation as a manifestation of imperialism and a cynical betrayal by Sadat of the Arab cause. At the same time, the Soviets, whose relations with Egypt were fading fast, were trying their best to stay in the game by providing political support and more arms to Syria and the PLO.

The U.S. government had never repudiated the proposition that the cooperation of the U.S.S.R. would be needed at some stage of the effort for an Arab-Israeli settlement, although as long as American diplomacy could succeed on its own that stage might be postponed indefinitely. With the great difficulty encountered in putting together the Arab side of a negotiation, it might well help to get some cooperation from the Soviets instead of obstruction and sabotage. In mid-1977 the two governments decided to revive the idea of a common approach.

The resulting Soviet-American joint declaration, announced on October 1, 1977, outlined a number of principles and procedures for an Arab-Israeli settlement. In its general thrust it was not very much different from what had been said in the agreed communiqués following the final Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting at Moscow and the Ford-Brezhnev meeting at Vladivostok, both held in 1974. Those earlier statements had referred to the "legitimate interests" of the Palestinians and had called for negotiation at the Geneva Conference as soon as possible. The 1977 declaration went a bit further, speaking of the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians, taken by some as code words for a Palestinian state, but in general it was a mixture of points on which both powers made some compromises and refrained from insisting on the totality of their existing positions. The real significance of the declaration lay in the fact that it was negotiated at all and that it was announced at that particular time.

Was it an aberration in American policy or a recognition of reality? From the standpoint of immediate prospects for negotiations, the effects were largely negative, in that the joint statement complicated the Administration's relations with Egypt, with Israel and with portions of the American public. The natural objections of all three to the concessions made and to the idea of bringing the Russians into the picture were compounded by bad timing, insufficient consultation with others, and telltale evidence that a Soviet draft provided the basis for the final text. The Administration,

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taken aback by the outcry against the declaration, virtually abandoned it, doing nothing to follow up with further consultation with the Russians. But neither was it able to move ahead on its own to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

It was at this point that President Sadat announced his willingness to go anywhere to demonstrate his will to peace, even to the Knesset in Jerusalem. That decision and the visit that followed it took the initiative from Washington and placed it in Cairo and Jerusalem. The United States, though a little surprised, could hardly object. Here was an Arab head of state for the first time about to deal directly with Israel.

The United States was ready to offer mediation as before, and there was little question that American participation would be desired by both sides and would be indispensable to successful negotiation. Yet, in taking up its task, the United States was less free, less master of the agenda, than it had been. It was more closely tied to the policies and fortunes of the principal actors, especially of Sadat, and involved in the politics of the Middle East more deeply than it might wish. Among the casualties of the new situation, as we have seen, were first, the remaining chances for a broader negotiation including representatives who could speak for Arab states other than Egypt and for the Palestinians; and second, the chances that the Soviet Union might play a constructive role. Those chances may have been slight in both cases. It might have been an acceptable price to pay for what the Sadat initiative could accomplish. But those entering the new stage of negotiations would now have to make their way in the certain knowledge that their opponents and detractors in the Arab world and in Moscow would be in a position to exploit the Palestinian issue against them.

IV

When President Sadat made his appeal in Jerusalem for "no more war," the drama of the occasion was overwhelming but also deceptive. Merely by his presence in the capital of Israel, Sadat gave to the Jewish state what its people had wanted for 30 years: acceptance. Thereafter, whatever the immediate consequences, Arab-Israeli relations would never be the same. But Sadat, although he went for Egyptian reasons, by the nature of things had to go also as an Arab leader and to defend the interests of other Arabs. He did so eloquently, pressing their right to recover their occupied territories and the right of the Palestinians to a state of their own, including "Arab (East) Jerusalem," but he did not evoke

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from Begin a grand gesture comparable to his own. Trouble with his fellow Arabs was then inevitable.

The difficulty of dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict, for outsiders as well as for the parties themselves, has always lain as much in the complexities of inter-Arab relations as in the issues between Arabs and Israel. Sadat went to Jerusalem without a mandate to speak for Arabs other than the citizens of his own country. He took this decision on his own, ignoring or contravening the advice of fellow Arab leaders, including the rulers of Saudi Arabia whose support was so important to him. The leaders of Syria and the PLO did not thank him for this defense of their interests but instead denounced him for recognizing and consorting with the enemy before there was any assurance the occupied territories would be returned or Palestinian self-determination realized. This ambiguity in Sadat's position, his endeavor to represent the general Arab cause when the other Arabs were denying him their concurrence and support, having constantly to defend himself against the charge of seeking a separate peace when that was what he indeed appeared to be doing, was to infect the entire course of Israeli-Egyptian negotiations.

For Israel this state of affairs was not particularly troublesome and in some respects was welcome. Sadat's initiative opened the prospect for a peace treaty with the strongest and most important of its Arab neighbors. The questions at issue with Egypt appeared resolvable—even the return of all Sinai territory, if there were adequate safeguards, would not imperil Israel's security—while the same was not true for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and probably not for the Golan Heights. Israel had never regarded the idea of a general negotiation or conference with all its Arab opponents as at all realistic; as a practical matter it would have to go step by step, dealing with individual Arab states in separate negotiations on the particular points to be settled. What was practical also made eminent political sense to the Israeli government, for it offered the possibility of starting the process with Egypt and leaving the more sensitive Palestinian question to a later stage—the later the better. Needless to say, a peace with Egypt would leave Israel in a very favorable military position in relation to its other Arab neighbors.

Sadat was not to be deterred by the vociferous opposition of the "steadfast front" of Arab states that formed against him, although it must have hurt when the relatively moderate Syrian regime of Hafez al-Assad chose to join the wild men of Libya and Iraq in the lineup. He was not deterred by the caution of Saudi Arabia (as

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long as it continued its financial support of the Egyptian economy) or by the reticence of King Hussein, whose delicate position he appreciated. He was fed up with the PLO, which was causing more trouble for Arab governments than for Israel and was now numbering Egyptians among the victims of its terrorist operations. He was prepared to go ahead alone if other Arab states chose not to occupy the empty chairs held ready for them. Egypt wanted peace and would take action to get it. The people of the Arab world supported that course, he maintained, and their governments would eventually do so. Meanwhile, Egypt had enough weight in the Arab world to act alone and had nothing to fear. It would do its best for all Arab interests.

Such was Sadat's reasoning. He was taking risks: the risk of defeat and humiliation if he could not achieve peace with honor, the risk of continued isolation in the Arab world even if he succeeded with Israel. Whatever happened, he would be the target of abuse, possibly a victim of political enemies at home or of an assassin's bullet. The great venture for peace from all indications had the support of the Egyptian people, but it was still a personal venture. The U.S. government and President Carter, in choosing this country's own course, were aware of these risks, which were theirs as well; the entire American effort to bring about a settlement, on which Carter had staked so much of his domestic and international prestige, depended in large measure on Sadat's ability to carry it off. The United States, then, in playing its mediating role, was bound to be extremely sensitive to his problems and his needs.

The negotiations, which we shall not follow in detail here, proved anything but easy. The parties were, presumably, negotiating a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel within the framework of a broader Arab-Israeli settlement. But what kind of framework? This was no Geneva Conference but essentially a bilateral, or trilateral, negotiation. Israel wanted peace with Egypt, whether it was called a separate peace or not. Egypt wanted peace with Israel but could not afford to have it look like a separate peace. The United States, keeping a wary eye on the attitude of Saudi Arabia, tended to agree with the Egyptian position. Consequently, the most difficult problem of all, the disposition of the West Bank and Gaza and the rights of the Palestinians, was back again.

It must be conceded that there was an unreality underlying all of this. Sadat could not really negotiate for the Palestinians or for Jordan, and Begin was not disposed to negotiate at all on the

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future legal status of what he called Samaria, Judea and Gaza, three lands of Israel. What Sadat needed was agreement on some principles, going beyond U.N. Resolution 242 (which did not even mention the Palestinians by name but only referred to "the refugees"), enabling him to say he had not sold out his brethren by making peace with Israel. How much more than a fig leaf he would need was the question. Unreality or not, it threatened to derail the whole enterprise.

The discussions on an Israeli-Egyptian treaty were not so very difficult or complicated. Israel, it seems, was ready to withdraw from all of Sinai, in stages and with security arrangements, in return for peace and normalization of relations. It was not easy for Israel to give up its settlements and air bases there, and Begin held back on concessions as long as the fur was flying on the issues concerning Palestine.

Prime Minister Begin's response to Sadat's and Carter's call for Israeli flexibility had been his detailed plan for limited autonomy for the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza, submitted to Washington in December 1977. It was a major effort for Begin, with his profound convictions about historic Jewish rights to those territories, to produce this plan. But to the Americans it seemed inadequate and to Sadat and other Arab leaders no real concession at all, for it promised the Palestinians little more autonomy than they already had and retained Israeli military control with no assurance it would ever end. The plan was unacceptable as a basis for negotiation, and so the parties went on arguing about principles, with Sadat's position the same as before: Israel should accept the principle of total withdrawal.

The United States came up with a new and carefully measured formula: that "there must be a resolution of the Palestine problem in all its aspects; it must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable [them] to participate in the determination of their own future." It was not quite self-determination, although not far from it. Sadat found it satisfactory, but it did not advance the negotiations.

The visits and the exchanges continued; Sadat came to Washington and Begin followed him, but progress was meager, and the hopes and excitement stirred by the Sadat initiative faded. Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in March and the danger of a clash between Israel and Syria added to Sadat's difficulties. Secretary Vance met with the Foreign Ministers of Israel and Egypt at Leeds Castle near London in July, a meeting seen by many as a last-ditch effort, but it failed to bridge the differences on the West Bank and

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Gaza. That meeting proved to be the next-to-last ditch, for it was followed by Carter's invitations to Begin and Sadat to come to Camp David. They came; they were subjected to considerable persuasion by the President; they bargained with each other; they made concessions; and they surprised the world by reaching two major agreements.

V

The Camp David accords, signed on September 17, so exceeded the meeting's expectations and were announced and acclaimed with such fanfare that it is difficult even now to assess them judiciously. What has or has not happened since then may help us to do so.

The two agreements concluded at Camp David are entitled the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel." The latter is relatively simple and straightforward. Most of the points had already been agreed before Camp David. The treaty was to be concluded within three months, and the terms to be implemented in two to three years. The broader and more complex document on peace in the Middle East includes the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 and others talked about over the past few years, plus some quite detailed provisions for the West Bank and Gaza on the formation of an elected self-governing authority, withdrawal of Israeli military government, and eventual negotiations to determine "the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors." Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and representatives of the Palestinians are to negotiate the agreements covering all the stages of the process. The plan was built on the structure of the Begin plan of the previous December, but with crucial changes introduced by the Americans and in the discussions with Sadat.

According to all the public statements, there were no losers at Camp David. Everybody came out ahead and would benefit from the specifics of the accords and even more from the impetus given to the movement toward peace. But all parties had their unstated but firmly held objectives, and how they would balance out, in the terms of the agreement and in their implementation, was an open question.

Israel gained by having the bilateral treaty with Egypt put on the tracks for rapid conclusion, while the complicated provisions concerning the Palestinians were dependent on future negotiations in which Israel would retain its veto power, although total immo-

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bility on Israel's part would hardly be possible. An especially important point for Israel was that the peace treaty with Egypt was not explicitly linked to progress under the other "framework," though, of course, Egypt could simply hold up the peace treaty if not satisfied with progress on other questions, which is exactly what Sadat, as the three-month deadline passed on December 17, decided to do.

As for Egypt's interests, Sadat appeared satisfied with the outcome at Camp David. His most important asset was still the goodwill and support he was getting from the United States. The terms of bilateral peace were satisfactory; Egypt would get back all its territories. The big question was whether the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" would prove sufficient for Sadat to do what he wished to do for the sake of his own country. What are the prospects for that framework? Here the record of events since Camp David is not encouraging.

The process for comprehensive peace laid out at Camp David depends for its realization on key actors who had no hand in the negotiation. The document itself invites "other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict" to adhere to it. How real was the hope that they would do so? From the standpoint of Egypt, it depends on whether Sadat looked upon the agreement as a solid basis for settlement, attractive enough to bring the other Arabs in, or basically as a gesture providing political protection for him to go ahead with a separate peace. Perhaps it is little more than a problem of definition. Even those who hold that his consistent aim since the journey to Jerusalem was a separate peace concede that he could not achieve it without something of substance to show for it on other fronts. The heyday of pan-Arabism may have passed, but no Egyptian leader could ignore the connection with the rest of the Arab world.[1] The political and cultural ties were not just fiction or propaganda, and it was that connection that brought indispensable financial support from the Arab oil states to keep Egypt's economy going. If the Camp David accords fell short of what Sadat needed to attract the necessary minimum of Arab cooperation, then there was an obvious failure to prepare the ground and some extraordinary miscalculation.

The Carter Administration, which clearly hoped Camp David would start the bandwagon rolling, may be charged with the same miscalculation, although there were extenuating circumstances. The Camp David accords were made possible only by extensive

[1] See Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/79, pp. 355–73.

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and exhausting diplomatic efforts. The result was in doubt until the last weekend of the ten-day session. There was no time for key leaders not present, such as Jordan's King Hussein or Saudi Arabia's Prince Fahd, to be fully informed, to weigh the issues and to give their views. Those who made the agreement had to trust their own judgment, taking their chances on its reception.

The reaction of the radical Arab states, not slow in coming, was entirely negative. Syria, which had gone unmentioned in the Camp David framework except for the brief reference to certain principles and provisions agreed upon between Egypt and Israel as being applicable to peace treaties between Israel and each of its Arab neighbors, was still allied with Libya, Algeria and Iraq in denouncing Sadat, Begin and Carter, and all their works. Jordan was not willing to commit itself in the absence of any commitment by Israel that the West Bank would ever be returned to Arab sovereignty. Saudi Arabia was discreetly silent. The PLO, of course, was totally hostile. Thus, so far as the lineup on the Arab side was concerned, the Camp David accords appeared to have changed nothing. Sadat, for all his tough bargaining with Israel and the support he had from the United States, was still close to isolation in the Arab world.

The United States, after its Herculean efforts toward the goal of a comprehensive peace, was nettled by the disappointing Arab reaction. American diplomats undertook a campaign to sell the Camp David agreement on its merits, to elicit enough cooperation to give the plan for the West Bank and Gaza at least a decent chance for success. Hussein, if he could not be persuaded to join in, might at least refrain from putting obstacles in the way. If local Palestinian leaders would cooperate, the plan might go ahead in the West Bank and Gaza without any governmental participation or support on the Arab side other than Egypt's. But that would be hard going. Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders' attempts to convince West Bank notables raised considerable dust in U.S.-Israeli relations without scoring much success in luring them into cooperation. There is a crucial point here that goes to the essence of the Camp David accords and their implementation: it is whether the provisions on Palestinian autonomy, if put in train, will lead inevitably to real self-determination and thus to a Palestinian state. That was the argument that might make Camp David palatable to the Palestinians and other Arabs. But that was precisely the final result that Israel was determined to avoid, as its actions after Camp David, on the matter of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, for example, made crystal clear.

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At year's end the treaty between Israel and Egypt was still unsigned. There remained a few points which in the American view were eminently subject to compromise, but compromise did not come easily, for behind the problem of finding acceptable wording lurked issues of fundamental importance to both sides: for Israel, security; for Egypt, relations with the rest of the Arab world. The two major points had to do with (a) the connection between the peace treaty and progress toward Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, and (b) the relation of Egyptian obligations under the peace treaty to obligations under other treaties such as the Arab Collective Security Pact. Was a peace treaty worth much to Israel if it did not ensure that Egypt would stay out of a new war on the Syrian front? Or if it left the attainment of a real state of peace with Egypt, for which the Sinai would be given up, at the mercy of some timetable for elections or autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza? Was a treaty worth much to Egypt if it appeared to be abandoning all solidarity with the Arab world? The moderate Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, had just taken the unexpected step of meeting with the rejectionists, at Baghdad in November, to voice their disapproval of Sadat's course. He could not ignore it. He was ready for peace with Israel, but not for what would be taken as an alliance with Israel against the other Arab states.

The significance of a formal peace treaty between Israel and Egypt should not be underestimated. It could be a political and military fact of considerable weight. But whether the treaty is concluded or not, the immediate prospect is not one of tranquillity. The United States, after producing its diplomatic miracle at Camp David, will have to face the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict in a new phase that will generate new crises and require new strategies. A new round of war is not on the horizon, if only because of the disparity in military power between Israel and her Arab enemies on the Eastern front, but then, neither is the comprehensive peace that the Carter Administration hoped to achieve. The Arab world may well relapse into a new stage of internecine struggle and violence, not only in the conflict between Egypt and the others but in a state of general radicalization and instability growing out of persistent problems such as the future of Lebanon and of the Palestinians. The Palestinian question, unresolvable under the Camp David formula if the Palestinians themselves and those who support or fear them do not accept it, will remain, as will the PLO and its acts of violence and terror.

One could ask whether the entire year of political and diplomatic

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activity spent in pursuit of Sadat's initiative was not directed to the periphery rather than to the core of the Arab-Israeli problem, which is Palestine. True, the marathon negotiations with Begin and Sadat have been mostly about the Arab Palestinians, but they have not been with the Palestinians nor with Arab states more closely concerned with the Palestinians than Egypt is. The problem may have to be attacked again from the start—and that, after all the effort and the expenditure of political capital with Egypt and Israel, is a daunting prospect. There are limits to what an American government can do in exerting pressure on Israel, and yet any serious attempt to resolve the Palestine question cannot succeed unless and until Israel is prepared to give up the West Bank and to accept a compromise on Jerusalem. Such an attempt would put a far greater strain on relations with Israel than any Administration has been prepared to contemplate.

VI

The importance Washington ascribed to an Arab-Israeli settlement was based on the conviction that the United States needs stability in the Middle East in order to avoid a new round of war that could be worse than that of 1973, to build up solid relations with the oil producers of the Persian Gulf ensuring access to oil at bearable prices, and to close off opportunities for the Soviets to establish military or political positions damaging to Western interests. The mere listing of those objectives makes the point that Saudi Arabia is of paramount importance to the United States by virtue of its vast resources of oil, its financial power, its influence on other Arab states, and its opposition to Soviet expansion. It is not surprising that from 1973 onward both the Nixon-Ford and the Carter Administrations gave special attention to cultivating the best possible relations with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis in turn used their unique power in OPEC to keep the price of oil down, and supported Sadat's turn from Russia toward America. Thus, when the Saudi government decided to make its request to buy F-15 aircraft a test of America's friendship, the Carter Administration got the message.

The way in which the Administration handled the Saudi request in the spring of 1978, linking the proposed deliveries with others to Egypt and to Israel, and wrapping them all in a single package on which Congress could vote only as a whole, was a new and complex chapter in domestic politics, in which the Administration and its supporters in the Congress took on the hitherto unbeatable "Jewish lobby" and won. The intensity of the opposition of Israel

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and its American friends to the package deal lay not only in the presumed threat to Israel's security that Saudi Arabia's possession of the F-15s would represent, but to the unmistakable change in the pattern of responding to Israel's own requests for arms. It was a public demonstration of the fact that America's special relationship with Israel was being redefined in practice while still being paid full homage in official statements. Israel remained America's friend and ally, but more and more Egypt and Saudi Arabia were also given that designation.

Some observers would say the U.S. government was selling its morals and its true friends for Arab oil and Arab money, which added up to Arab pressure; others, that it was at last waking up to the fact that American and Israeli interests did not necessarily coincide. But there was no denying the fact that at least two Arab states had acquired primary importance in American policy for the Middle East or that this change was gaining increased understanding and support on the part of the American public.

Saudi Arabia, of course, had importance not only for developments in the Arab-Israeli area at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, but also for the Persian Gulf. In the latter region, the United States had placed its reliance on what was known as the "two-pillar system" (the pillars being Saudi Arabia and Iran) to maintain stability and security. After the shocks of 1973 that system responded to the interests of those two nations and of the United States. Their governments appeared stable; they were pro-Western; they could keep their smaller neighbors in check; and they were creating an impressive volume and variety of economic relations with the United States and the West resting on a mutually advantageous trade of oil for aid in development.

The system seemed to be working exceedingly well until unrest and violence struck Iran in 1978 and shook the Shah's regime, and thus the Iranian "pillar," to its foundations. For better or for worse the United States had a high stake in the political survival of the Shah, although it really could do nothing to protect his power against the demands of his own people. So close was the association with him over a quarter century that the forces opposing him automatically directed their hatred also to the power that had supplied his military establishment with the latest weapons, trained his security police, and become his partner in the transformation of Iranian society. The presence of over 40,000 Americans in the country, there to help, to teach and to train, as well as to earn good salaries, merely compounded the problem, for they became a natural target of nationalist resentment.

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It has been a revolution in slow motion, with the Shah trying to maintain his authority but continually forced to fall back on the armed forces to suppress the demonstrations against him, to keep order and to govern the country. Meanwhile, the country became increasingly ungovernable as universities and schools were closed, banks and public buildings were sacked and burned, workers left their jobs, development plans were abandoned, and oil production needed for essential revenues and services declined. The opposition included the forces of Shia Islam, led by their militant *mullahs* incensed by the disruption of cultural traditions and by the social inequities and corruption that marked the Shah's program of modernization; and the forces of middle-class nationalism and liberalism represented in the National Front and led mainly by old politicians who had been in the wilderness since the glory days of Mohammed Mosaddeq. In contrast to that time of crisis between the Shah and Mosaddeq, 25 years ago, now there appear to be no significant Communist or pro-Soviet forces in the ranks of the opposition, thanks to years of effective work by the Shah's security police and to the Iranians' deep distrust of Russia.

The Shah's loss of power, which seems inevitable whether he is forced out or remains as a limited monarch, does not necessarily mean a gain in Soviet influence. The religious leaders, if they take power, may well be more anti-Soviet than the Shah, with whom the Soviet Union has learned to live quite comfortably. But the change will be damaging and possibly disastrous to America's position and prestige, which has not been helped by periodic high-level statements in Washington, totally without effect, of support for the Shah. Aside from the certainty that new leaders, at least initially, will repudiate the Shah's foreign connections as well as his domestic programs, there is uncertainty whether they can hold the country together and help to keep things stable in the Gulf region. The Shah, despite his delusions of grandeur about himself and his country, did give his country a stabilizing role in the Gulf. If Iran turns entirely inward or becomes a prey to chaos, no Gulf country can fill that role.

Saudi Arabia, despite its great wealth, has neither the military power nor the political experience and influence to do so. Yet Saudi Arabia has inevitably taken on greater importance in American calculations in the light of events in Iran. The Saudi ruling family has shown more steadiness than the Shah and a remarkable flexibility in combining Islamic tradition with modernization. Yet the same potentially disruptive problems are there: suddenly acquired riches, overambitious development plans, an enlarged

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military establishment armed with all kinds of new weapons, a great influx of foreigners, and the growth of new groups seeking political expression. The most immediate cause of worry for the United States is not that the Saudi regime will succumb to revolution but that it will adapt its policies to meet the dangers it sees—communism, radicalism, Arab disunity, Zionism and Israel—in ways that would not be helpful to American interests.

The special relationship, presumably cemented by the agreement for the sale of F-15 aircraft, did not prevent Saudi Arabia from joining Sadat's opponents at the Baghdad meeting, or from going along with the OPEC decision in December to raise the price of crude oil well above the point the United States considered reasonable. The decline in Iran's oil production, which was a factor in the OPEC decision, is likely to provide a new test of the Saudi-American relationship. Will Saudi Arabia be expected to expand its own production to make up the difference, and will it see its own interests served in doing so?

VII

Without planning it, at least not in the sense of having a grand design and calculating the consequences, the United States in the past five years has taken on an expanded role in the Middle East far beyond any it had adopted or exercised before. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, as we have seen, it has assumed the task of sole intermediary and shepherd of the negotiating process, placing on itself (and on the shoulders of the President personally) the responsibility for failure as well as for success. It has undertaken to keep the interests of Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia in balance, without alienating any of them, and to keep the challenge of the Arab radicals in check. In the Gulf region, it has become the principal friend, protector and international partner of Saudi Arabia and Iran. In many respects these relationships just grew, the result of traditional security ties, the oil trade, the eagerness of American business for large contracts, the disinclination to say no to the Shah's or the Saudis' requests for arms, and the influx of thousands of Americans into their countries to advise, train or otherwise help in the rapid modernization of their societies.

Those who have called the Middle East an American empire are not far off the mark, even if it is based not on domination but on the consent of local governments. The principal gainer from the upheaval of 1973, including the emergence of OPEC and its undeniable oil power, has been the United States. But an empire has to be managed, in the sense of keeping within tolerable limits

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the conflicts and disorders of local forces and the challenge of other powers, and it is by no means certain that the United States has the will or capacity for that task. The years of the middle 1970s held few major challenges. The troubles in Lebanon, in Oman or on the border of Iraq and Iran, or the spectacular raids of the PLO, were contained largely by local forces. But the Middle East's potential for instability and violence, and thus the task of management, is much greater than that.

Observers with a geopolitical vision have pointed to ominous developments in the year 1978 that indicate a successful Soviet strategy of closing in on the region. A few salient events might be mentioned: the coup in Afghanistan bringing to power a Communist-led group that turned immediately to Moscow for support and by year's end left little doubt of the dominance of Soviet influence; the struggle for power in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen that ended in the ascendancy of the pro-Soviet wing of the leadership; the consolidation of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, with Soviet and Cuban help, and its military victories over the separatist movements in Eritrea; the continued supply of Soviet arms to Libya well beyond the absorptive capacity of that country, and their use for subversion in pro-Western countries; the strengthening of Soviet influence in Arab states such as Syria and Iraq as they hardened their opposition to Sadat's dealing with Israel and the United States; the disaffection of Turkey from the United States and from NATO as a result of the U.S. arms embargo, lifted only in October; and the deterioration of the power of the Shah's government in Iran, of which new opportunities for Soviet influence or intervention might be a consequence. The picture of a master strategy may be overdrawn, but the potential squeeze on the major oil producers and the core of the American position in the Middle East is evident.

To be mesmerized by the Soviet threat, however, and to see the problem as primarily one of American weakness to be remedied by military power and a firmer resolve to support friendly regimes is to apply a theory based on a fixed view of Soviet global strategy, and to miss the point of what has been happening in the Middle East since World War II, especially since 1973. As a superpower adjacent to the Middle East, and also as the professed patron of movements of national liberation and social revolution, the Soviet Union is bound to have influence in the region, as both governments and opposition movements look for outside support for their domestic or international aims. So it is not surprising that a coup in Afghanistan or a war in Ethiopia should bring Soviet

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influence, by invitation, into those countries. The record of the past two decades shows, however, that a country that invites the Soviets in does not necessarily accept their control and can, when it chooses, invite them out. Two aspects of the Soviet gains of 1978 are, nevertheless, disturbing. One is that it remains to be proved that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, South Yemen and Ethiopia is temporary. The other is the effect the gains may have on the leaders and peoples of other Middle Eastern countries. Saudi Arabia, for example, has made no secret of its concern over the communist danger and the apparent inability of the United States to do anything to check it.

The problem of management is essentially one of adaptation without losing sight of hard interests. If the United States is to be able to cope with the persistence of conflict (as between the Arabs and Israel and among the Arabs themselves) and with the disintegration of regimes (as in Iran), it will have to arrive at a deeper appreciation of both surface and subsurface forces in those countries. It will have to do more than stand with a series of friends (e.g., Israel, Sadat's Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Shah of Iran) without taking full account of the currents of Palestinian nationalism, inter-Arab rivalry, social unrest or Islamic fundamentalism swirling around them. The fragility of governments, no matter how rich they may be, is endemic in the Middle East.

Military power is not unimportant. It is a necessary means of deterring the Soviet Union from military adventurism, and President Carter was right to reply to Mr. Brezhnev's warning against U.S. intervention in Iran with a counter-warning that the United States would not tolerate any intervention by the U.S.S.R. This mutual deterrence, assuming it works, should reduce the danger of war without altering the fact of continued great-power competition. Yet the answers to the problems of management, as to those of international competition, are essentially political, and they rest on the proposition that the basic decisions affecting the region will be made by the governments there and not by outside powers. The latter can influence them effectively only if they find common ground with internal forces.

A second proposition is that no outside power, superpower though it may be, can successfully take on alone the burden of guiding, and managing, or deflecting the course of events. It is worth considering how others with interests in the region as great as America's, such as Western Europe and Japan, can share the political responsibility. It is worth considering, too, how the Soviet Union, if it can be shown by firmness and strength the dangers

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and futility of resort to military force or pressure, may be brought to see a common interest in the control of regional instability.

Whatever may be the right interpretation of the past year's events, America has and will continue to have vital interests in the Middle East. The basic factors of security and economics in the region are much more favorable to long-term cooperation with the West than with the U.S.S.R. The Carter Administration, building on the experience of its predecessors, has shown some appreciation of the magnitude of the task; of the fact that military power is essential in the background but of very limited use in dealing with current problems; of the need for cool appraisal of trends in the region and for flexible diplomacy. The Administration has shown courage and tenacity, together with over-optimism and inconsistency, in working for an Arab-Israel settlement. It has yet to find the balance of long-term mutual interest with the countries of the Middle East, shared responsibility with Western allies and understandings with the Soviet Union that will make it possible to maintain vital American and Western interests over the long run without placing on this country an imperial burden that it cannot carry alone.

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Colin Legum

THE AFRICAN CRISIS

Developments in Africa—and in the capitals of the great powers—made that continent an important testing ground for the foreign policies of the Western nations and the Soviet Union in 1978. While clearly still the dominant foreign influence in Africa, the Western countries were thrown on the defensive and groped for new ways of protecting their interests there. In the open diplomatic confrontation with the Soviet Union and Cuba, the West came off worst in the Horn of Africa but continued to maneuver actively in southern Africa. In neither area were the Western powers able to discourage the Soviet Union and Cuba from intervening militarily in the continent's internal affairs.

More positively, however, the new Western diplomatic approach aimed at developing close ties with African leaders to further common interests in southern African settlements showed definite promise. Whether Western diplomacy could be skillfully orchestrated to offset Soviet military activism was not clear as the year drew to a close. The trend which first began to emerge in 1975 was clearly evident three years later: Africa had become the scene of new Soviet efforts possibly foreshadowing important shifts even in the balance of world power between the West and the Soviets.

This bold Soviet policy coincided with—and benefited from—the strong disinclination in the West to become involved in any new military adventures in the Third World. Early in his Administration, President Carter declared that the United States would not become militarily involved in any foreign conflict simply because the Russians were there. The consistent pursuit of such a policy by the West was intended to foster détente and permit the level of arms shipments to Third World countries to be scaled down, but the evidently lower risk of open military confrontation with the United States also presented opportunities to the Soviets.

A larger question was raised by this conjunction of a lowered Western military role in much of the Third World with the Soviets' efforts to expand their influence and the delivery capacity of their

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armed forces. If they gave up the option of responding militarily, the NATO powers would have to rely on diplomatic means, but how could diplomatic means alone discourage the Soviets from using their military capacity in conflict situations in which the U.S.S.R. had an interest in intervening?

Before it was terminated because of congressional opposition in late 1975, the covert military assistance devised by Henry Kissinger in Angola was doomed to failure because of elements in the local Angolan situation which were not heeded by the United States. The Carter policy, on the other hand, emphasized "African solutions to African problems." This policy afforded few means to discourage Soviet activism in the Horn, however, and this failure set up a series of ambivalent responses or wobbles in Carter's policy which became evident by the spring of 1978.

The first was the debate, starting early in the year, about the possibility of linkage between détente and Soviet behavior in the Red Sea region. The second notable shift was President Carter's initial approval, after the second Shaba invasion from Angola in May, of the idea of a Western-sponsored African force to resist Soviet incursions. By midsummer, however, the Administration had demonstrated its continued commitment to working with Africans for political solutions through stepped-up diplomatic activity in southern Africa.

II

It was in the Horn that Soviet military involvement created shock waves that threatened détente. In the winter and early spring a vast infusion of Cuban troops and Soviet matériel enabled the Ethiopians to rout a Somali invasion of the country's Ogaden province. From the beginning of the year, an estimated 20,000 Cuban troops, 3,000 Soviet military technicians and about $2 billion in arms flowed into Ethiopia. The Somalis were defeated in the Ogaden in March, by a strategy worked out on the ground by three Soviet generals (a new development in Soviet policy).

Because the Soviets were helping to defend Ethiopia's territorial integrity, the United States was left without an appropriate countermove except to urge restraint and to warn off an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Conceding Ethiopia's right to seek outside help against aggression, in February Secretary of State Vance declared that the West was ready to supply arms to Somalia in case of possible subsequent Ethiopian aggression against the country. Given Somalia's irredentist designs against Kenya and Djibouti as well as Ethiopia, the United States could not, however, throw its political or military weight behind that country's cause. During a

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March visit to Mogadishu, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose informed the Somali leadership that U.S. military aid to Somalia was contingent upon that country's renunciation of aggressive designs against the territory of its neighbors.

During the spring, U.S. concern about the boldness of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in force in Ethiopia (following that in Angola) deepened as the victorious Ethiopian army shifted the locus of its war effort to the Red Sea province of Eritrea. There the 18-year-old struggle by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) against the Ethiopian regime appeared to be the main obstacle to the consolidation of the country's Marxist-Leninist revolution. The Cubans, who had played a decisive role in the Ogaden fighting, chose not to commit their combatants against the Eritreans—whose cause they and the Russians had actively supported during the time of the late Emperor Haile Selassie. Soviet and Cuban advisers, however, buttressed the Ethiopians' military offensive, which began in April. With an enormous advantage in sophisticated weapons and manpower, the Ethiopian army by November had routed the ELF, lifted the siege around the Red Sea port of Massawa and captured the territory's third largest city, Keren. By December they had not yet opened the road to the capital, Asmara, but the EPLF had been driven back to its original mountain strongholds, and victory proclaimed by the government.

The regional powers in and around the Red Sea area—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and Iran—voiced rising fears about the buildup of Soviet arms and political intervention in Ethiopia (where East European specialists were also engaged in trying to establish the organizational structure for a Marxist-Leninist mass organization). The seeming passivity of the Western powers in the face of the growing Soviet military reach increased their unease, and the possibility of new Soviet Red Sea bases following the victory in Eritrea was viewed with particular alarm.

For the U.S.S.R. this may be only the beginning of an increasingly costly involvement with Ethiopia's conflicts. The guerrillas still have significant conservative Arab backing and the struggle for Eritrean independence is likely to continue indefinitely unless the Soviets (backed this time by the Cubans, South Yemenis, Libyans and Palestinians) succeed in persuading the Ethiopian military regime on the one side, and the EPLF/ELF on the other, to compromise on a plan to establish a federation of Ethiopian and Eritrean Marxist-Leninist republics. Nor can the Ogaden problem be considered solved. President Siyad Barre's regime in Somalia survived its defeat in the Ogaden, and even retaliatory raids into

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Somalia by Ethiopian bombers did not forestall a reemergence of the Somali insurgency in the Ogaden which was evident by late fall.

But whether or not the longer term held potential "quagmires" in store for the Soviets, the immediate success of their massive aid commitment in assisting their Ethiopian ally to victory against a variety of adversaries increased a perceived tactical dilemma for the United States. American outrage at what was deemed to be Soviet transgression of the ground rules of détente was expressed by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who warned that Soviet-Cuban activities in Ethiopia could jeopardize SALT. In addition, tough, even threatening, statements by the President himself raised the possibility that the Administration was abandoning its goal of deemphasizing the cold war in Africa.

III

When Angola-based Shaba insurgents invaded Zaïre in May, the United States moved with alacrity to support the French and Belgian military bailout of the pro-Western Mobutu government. The invasion of the key mining province found the Zaïrean army as ill-prepared as it had been in 1977 when it had to be rescued by Moroccan forces, supported by Egypt and Sudan. Thousands of Zaïreans were killed in the attack as well as at least 130 whites, while a sizable number were taken hostage.

The invasion was put down only with the aid of more than 1,000 French and Belgian paratroopers. Although in 1977 it had limited its involvement to a modest shipment of spare parts, the United States now, in addition to supplying matériel, also ferried the French and Belgian troops. France and the United States subsequently agreed to provide logistical support for a pan-African force to be sent to Shaba to replace the French and Belgian troops there. (Morocco contributed 1,000 troops while Senegal, Ivory Coast, the Central African Empire, Togo, Gabon and Egypt made up the balance of a force totaling 2,700.) In addition, the Western powers approved a plan to shore up the Zaïrean economy through emergency loans administered by foreign experts under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund. This support enabled Mobutu to restore a semblance of security in Shaba, but his political position remained precarious and Zaïre's already straitened economy was brought to its knees by the disruption of its mining industry.

Although the CIA insisted that it had definite information about Cuban involvement, other Western intelligence agencies were inclined to absolve the Cubans (though not the East Germans, who

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were reliably reported to have helped train the invading cadres). American accusations against Cuba were vigorously denied by Fidel Castro, and even discounted in the American press. They may have been intended, however, chiefly to signal the end of U.S. patience. In a major policy speech at Annapolis on June 7, President Carter's warnings to the U.S.S.R. reached their apogee, when he declared that Soviet policy in Africa was harmful to détente, and warned that if détente was not reciprocal, the American people would not accept it. He added: "We and our African friends want to see a continent that is free of the dominance of outside powers; the persistent and increasing involvement of the Soviets and Cuba in Africa could deny this vision."[1]

Nonetheless, President Carter backed off from the idea of a Western-supported pan-African peacekeeping force after his initially positive reaction to the idea at the NATO summit in June. The idea, which was first floated at a Paris meeting of francophone African leaders in April, was enthusiastically supported by French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing but opposed by British Prime Minister James Callaghan.

The most decisive opposition, however, came from the Africans, whose reactions even to U.S./French support for the military forces sent to Shaba showed the dilemmas involved in Western military involvement in Africa. While responses were predictably mixed, some countries well disposed to the Carter Administration, like Tanzania and Nigeria, were sharply critical. Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere was particularly harsh; he accused the Western powers of insulting Africa, and termed it the height of arrogance for them to talk of establishing a pan-African security force, adding that "the danger to Africa does not come just from nations in the Eastern bloc. The West still continues to see Africa as being within its sphere of influence, and acts accordingly."

IV

In July, the yearly African stocktaking at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit showed a clear and growing concern about outside intervention in the continent. In the Horn, OAU norms were clearly on the Ethiopian side—to defend the territorial integrity of an African state. In Shaba, the same norms dictated

[1] This statement of American policy was broadly similar to one made by China. In a speech made on the same day as Carter's Annapolis speech, the PRC Deputy Prime Minister, Teng Hsiao-ping, supported the idea of a pan-African security force and accused the "latecoming super-power" of continually "dispatching additional mercenaries to Africa to kindle the flames of war. . . . Before the war flames it had fanned up in the Horn of Africa had died down it recently engineered a second incursion into Zaïre by mercenaries." His speech came soon after a visit to Zaïre by the PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua, followed on June 18 by a Chinese military team to help train Mobutu's navy and then by the army chief of staff and Deputy Defense Minister, General Hao-tien.

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support for the Zaïre regime, but stopped far short of a pan-African peacekeeping force—which would, in effect, line up a segment of its membership for or against one side or the other in the cold war.

At Khartoum, Africa's leaders expressed their acute awareness of the increasing extent to which they were becoming entangled in international rivalries for influence, and of their relative weakness to do much about it. Few now sought to deny the dangers of foreign intervention. In addition, many acknowledged that responsibility for what was happening lay with Africans themselves, particularly through their growing reliance on external support to help deal with a rash of violent inter-African disputes.

African leaders divided sharply over whether the greater threat came from the West or the East. But a growing tendency to take Soviet military involvement in the continent more seriously than in the past was discernible. Seen through a Western lens, African leaders may have seemed to divide simply into "moderates" and "radicals"—the former being those critical of Soviet policies, and the latter those critical of Western policies. However, viewed within its African context, the divisions are both more complex and more interesting.

First, there are those more or less committed Marxist-Leninist states which, on issues of foreign intervention, can be relied upon to take a strongly anti-Western, and usually anti-Chinese, position. Those in this category include: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé e Príncipe and the Congo. On other issues (such as Angola's position on Namibia and Mozambique's on Rhodesia) there is no predictability about their stand. For example, Angola and Mozambique seek and utilize U.S. and South African technological aid, respectively. Three more countries fit broadly into this category—Madagascar, Benin and Equatorial Guinea. (Although still officially a Marxist-Leninist state, Somalia is now strident in opposition to Soviet "intervention.")

Second, a group of hard-line anti-communist states (usually described for that reason as being "pro-Western") can be counted upon, whatever the merits of a particular issue, to take a strong line against Soviet and Cuban intervention, while generally endorsing (or even encouraging) greater Western involvement in certain African disputes. Those falling in this group are: Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Togo, Malawi, Gabon, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritius, the Central African Empire, Swaziland, Gambia, Zaïre, Chad, and the Comoros.

Third, several states tend broadly, but with some qualification,

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to support the anti-Soviet group on most issues: Kenya, Liberia, Upper Volta, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Djibouti, Botswana, and Rwanda.

And fourth, there are states holding the middle ground, which include in their number some of the most influential leaders in Africa. Some are idiosyncratic (like Libya and Uganda); most are pragmatic—like Tanzania, Nigeria, Zambia, Algeria,[2] Ghana, Cameroon, and now Guinea. The smaller countries that belong are Seychelles, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Mali.

Most notable in the African political lineup this year was Guinea's switch from the pro-Soviet hard-liners into this last middle group. Coming in out of the cold—where he had been almost continuously since 1960—Guinea's President Sekou Touré in March became reconciled with his two bitter enemies, President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Léopold Senghor of Senegal, the two *grands hommes* of francophone Africa. Subsequently, a significant change in his policy became apparent, with the promise of some relaxation of his harsh political system, the release of hundreds of political prisoners, and a return to much friendlier relations with France and other Western nations, including the United States. One of the losers from Touré's new policy was the Soviet Union, which lost at least some of its previous naval and air facilities at Conakry.

When we classify the 49 African countries in this way, it becomes evident that there are ten states that will usually defend any form of Soviet or Cuban intervention and almost three times that number that are likely to oppose any form of Soviet and Cuban intervention while remaining ready to endorse Western involvement in the continent's affairs. In practice, the middle group of 13 countries hold the balance, and their voices are usually decisive in determining the majority stand of the OAU on issues of foreign involvement.

The attitude of those in the pro-Soviet category was exemplified by the speeches of both the Angolan and Mozambican Presidents at the OAU summit. They insisted that in every case where the Soviets and Cubans were actively involved in the continent it was because they had been invited to assist legitimate African governments and bona fide liberation movements to fight against "imperialism," whereas every example of Western intervention was in support of reactionary regimes and forces, and against the liberation movements.

The anti-Soviet group's position was summed up by President

[2] Although Algeria is placed in this group, it is somewhat more rhetorically anti-Western than the others.

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Senghor in an interview—significantly with the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* (June 11, 1978)—in which he said:

> The Russians have behaved very astutely in Africa. They have been pursuing age-old expansionist policies in the tradition of Czar Peter the Great. The Soviet Union is conscious that Lenin once wrote: "Whoever controls Africa controls Europe." . . . The West is illogical. If it wants us to defend ourselves against the forces of external aggression, against the forces of international communism, it must give us the means to do so. Otherwise it can sit back and watch Africa fall to international communism. The West doesn't want that to happen, but it also doesn't want to spend money to aid us. What we're experiencing at present is the first phase of World War III—and the East has the edge on us because it has definite objectives and is prepared to commit very efficient, modern and expensive means toward attaining them.

Reflecting the views of the influential middle group of largely noncommited nations, Nigeria's head of state, General Obasanjo, took the position of unreservedly condemning all foreign intervention in sovereign African nations. He saw the mercenary-led attacks in Benin and the Comoro Islands, and the intervention by "European powers in Central Africa" (meaning Zaïre) as foreign intervention—and rejected any idea of the Western nations discussing among themselves where to intervene in particular African situations. In respect to the liberation struggles, he said, the fact was that the only source of effective support came from the Eastern bloc countries and Cubans. However, he then went on to warn:

> the Soviets and their friends not to overstay their welcome. Africa is not about to throw off one colonial yoke for another. Rather, they should hasten the political, economic and military capability of their African friends [i.e., the Angolans and Ethiopians] to stand on their own. . . . If the Soviets seek to maintain their presence indefinitely, they run the risk of being dubbed a new imperial power, as indeed they are already being called even by those with whom they have had long associations.

For their part, the Soviets' own assessment of their position, as evidenced in a midsummer manifesto on southern Africa, indicated a continued and increased involvement there. Indeed a new and intensified Soviet approach to the liberation struggle in the subcontinent was outlined in a TASS report in August.[3] The core of this strategy is the development of a fighting front of progressive nationalist forces in close alliance with communist parties, with the latter given the familiar Marxist role as the vanguard of the

[3] TASS Report, Dateline Moscow, August 26, 1978, reproduced in BBC Monitor Service, August 30, 1978, SU/5903/A5/1.

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armed struggle. This Soviet strategy corresponds to a significant development in radical African thought—in the growing importance of the idea of "superior weapons." The military strength of the "coalition of NATO and South Africa," it is argued, can be matched only by the Soviets. The value of "superior [Soviet] arms" was demonstrated in Angola and Ethiopia.[4]

Another significant feature of the Soviet manifesto, it may be noted, was the amount of space it devoted to attacking the Chinese as allies of the "imperialist conspiracy" in Africa. In fact, judged by short-term criteria, China's position continued much diminished during 1978, as few African leaders took Peking's frenzied campaign against the Russians very seriously. The Chinese tendency increasingly to support the same causes as the West in Africa (except for the liberation movements in the subcontinent) provided grist for Moscow's mill in its propaganda efforts to stigmatize the Chinese as "collaborators of the NATO powers," and as supporters of the continent's most reactionary regimes—a view which, incidentally, overlooked Soviet support for two of the continent's nastiest tyrannies—General Idi Amin's in Uganda and President Macias' in Equatorial Guinea.

In addition, the U.S.S.R. maintained the steady flow of military aid, which enabled Ethiopia to retake Eritrea by the end of the year. With their aid to Ethiopia and Angola justified by the OAU support for the maintenance of the African states' territorial integrity, neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba heeded Western demands for Cuban troop withdrawal. Always careful not to work against prevailing trends in African politics, however, the U.S.S.R. did not overtly obstruct the efforts of the front-line states—in concert with the Western powers—to achieve negotiated settlements in southern Africa. However, they continued to warn the African leaders against the danger of walking into a Western trap.

As far as the United States was concerned, midsummer brought a reaffirmation of its original approach. Talk of "linkage" petered out, at least temporarily, after the difficulties of tailoring a particular form of linkage to the particular situation in the Horn of Africa had become apparent. Beyond that, the effort espoused by the United States since the beginning of the Carter Administration to cooperate in fostering mutual interests with key African

[4] The necessity for "superior weapons" as a clinching element in the political choice of "strategic allies" was reportedly posited even in debates held on South Africa's Robben Island prison among black Africans convicted of political crimes. According to one informant, who had emerged from the Island after serving a sentence of 15 years, the ANC's charismatic leader, Nelson Mandela, found himself in a very tiny minority in the debate among Robben Islanders in opposing the "superior weapons" argument.

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countries offered discernible payoffs. President Carter's visit to Nigeria in April (when he became the first serving American President to travel to Africa) had symbolized the pursuit of this relationship and acceptance of commitments to specific objectives of importance to African nations. These were set out by President Carter in his Lagos speech:

> We share with you [i.e., Africans] a commitment to majority rule and individual human rights. In order to meet the basic needs of the people, we share with you a commitment to economic growth and to human development. We share with you a commitment to an Africa that is at peace, free from racism, free from military interference by outside nations, and free from the inevitable conflicts that come when the integrity of national boundaries are not respected. These three commitments shape our attitude towards your continent.

Western policies over the past two years have focused largely on the first of these aspirations as they applied to Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. American and West European thinking here can be seen to have developed along parallel lines. The crux of this common approach is their recognition that the exclusion of the African majorities from power-sharing in southern Africa is inimical to long-term Western economic and strategic interests.

Both the Western initiatives, on Rhodesia and Namibia, were developed with the close cooperation of the front-line African states—including the Marxist-oriented regimes of Angola and Mozambique, in addition to Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana—and often the West African regional power Nigeria, as well. The effectiveness of Western diplomacy depended on the ability of the key African actors to bring in the liberation movements.

Thus for the United States the crucial question was whether to continue acting outraged with Angola (and its backers) over Shaba, or to persist, at least in southern Africa, with the theme of working with the Africans and damping local rivalries. Knitting up U.S. ties with Angola offered two gains: assisting a rapprochement between Angola and Zaïre that would reduce the chances of further Shabas, and getting Angola to bring South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) around.

In mid-June, the dispatching of U.S. envoy Donald McHenry to Angola signaled the Administration's continued commitment to its activist diplomacy and demonstrated the value thereof. In Angola, McHenry received assurances that Luanda would try to prevent Shaban rebels from infiltrating into Zaïre and also enlisted Angolan aid in bringing the SWAPO into a Namibian settlement.

The extraordinary rapprochement between Angola and Zaïre occurred in the middle of July when, thanks to OAU mediation,

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delegations from the two countries met in Brazzaville (Congo) to normalize relations. Their preliminary agreement was quickly followed by a visit by President Neto to Zaïre's capital from August 19 to 22, at the end of which a joint communiqué was issued which, *inter alia*, announced a decision to establish a joint commission under OAU auspices to ensure security along their borders. When Mobutu visited Angola's capital soon afterward, he was treated to a rousing popular welcome—whereas only a few months earlier he had been denounced as "an American stooge" and "a Chinese puppet."

v

Within this context of international action and reaction, the main focus of attention this year continued to be southern Africa. Western hopes for negotiated settlements rose, then dimmed, and then began to rise again regarding Namibia toward the year's end. In Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, however, "superior weapons" appeared increasingly likely to determine the outcome. Hopes began to fade in March for the success of the Anglo-American proposals to bring Rhodesia to independence as Zimbabwe under internationally acceptable conditions. A major obstacle was created with the signing on March 4 of an Internal Settlement Agreement between the Ian Smith regime and three black Rhodesian movements—Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Congress (UANC), the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole's African National Congress (ANC-S) and Chief Jeremiah Chirau's Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO). The two wings of the Patriotic Front—Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)—denounced the agreement as a "sell-out"; they said they could have no confidence in the achievement of majority rule by the end of the year while Smith remained in charge of all the security forces and the guerrillas were to be disarmed as a prerequisite for the Patriotic Front's right to participate in the elections.

At an emergency summit meeting held on March 25, the front-line African Presidents asked for a categorical assurance from the U.S. and U.K. governments that they had not abandoned their proposals for solving the 12-year-old Rhodesian problem. London and Washington held that while the Internal Settlement marked an important step forward toward achieving majority rule, nothing could be hoped from any policy which did not include all the parties involved in the conflict. This stance aroused conservative

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opponents on both sides of the Atlantic, who insisted that the Internal Settlement deserved their governments' wholehearted support and that the claims of the "Marxist-led terrorists" of the Patriotic Front should be rejected. Proposals were also floated, both in the U.S. Congress and British Parliament, that sanctions should be lifted immediately.

The Anglo-American stand was that sanctions could in any case not be lifted unilaterally since they were applied under a mandatory resolution of the U.N. Security Council; that the fighting could not be stopped since a cease-fire required the agreement of the Patriotic Front; and that no settlement would be internationally acceptable which did not have the support of all the parties engaged in the Rhodesian conflict, as well as of the OAU. Moreover, for them to back only one side in the dispute would immediately wreck the Western strategy of engaging the support of Africa's leaders; this would also result in loss of African backing for the Namibian initiative. Furthermore, the predictable outcome of any decision by the Western powers to side with the new Salisbury regime would place the front-line Presidents under irresistible pressure to accept direct Soviet/Cuban involvement in Rhodesia—a possibility openly discussed by President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. In an attempt to keep up the momentum of the Anglo-American initiative, therefore, new proposals were published in October envisaging the establishment of an interim government shared by all the parties, and an interim British Resident Commissioner who would assume control over the security forces. The interim government could decide how and when elections should be arranged. The proposals were totally rejected by the Internal Settlement signatories and coolly received by the Patriotic Front, although broadly approved by the front-line Presidents. Nonetheless, efforts to arrange for all-party discussions of the proposals continued against a background of increasing violence in Rhodesia and a steady deterioration of the country's security and economic position.

From the beginning, the success of the Internal Settlement depended on the ability of Smith's black partners (derisorily referred to by the Patriotic Front as the "blacksmiths") to rally black Rhodesians to lay down their arms and refuse to shelter the guerrillas. Rather than pushing rapidly for reforms that would integrate the medical, educational and civil service systems, and abolish discriminatory land tenure and residential restriction, the new government temporized and seemed to place primary emphasis on reassuring whites that little would change. Far from diminishing, the level of fighting increased sharply. In the five years

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preceding the March settlement, some 7,000 people had been killed inside Rhodesia, virtually all of them black; yet during 1978, the number of fatalities had reached 12,000. Also significant was the rapidity with which the Salisbury regime lost effective control over the rural areas. Martial law was imposed over one-fifth of the country on October 4; by the end of that month over half the country had been brought under emergency law; by the end of November, three-quarters. Normal administration and law and order had thus broken down completely over almost the entire area inhabited by some five million black Rhodesians. The Rhodesian security authorities estimated that at least 5,000 guerrillas were operating inside the country; the Patriotic Front put the number at three times that figure.

Thus the whole character of the war had changed in Rhodesia in the less than nine months since the signing of the Internal Settlement agreement. The guerrillas had occupied the ground in considerable numbers, and were engaged in developing an alternative administration to Salisbury's. The fighting also had begun to assume the ominous characteristics of an inter-black civil war. Over 80 percent of the Rhodesian security forces were black (a phenomenon also witnessed in the final stages of the struggle in Mozambique, where the Portuguese had come to rely increasingly on black soldiers after 1973). Muzorewa and Sithole had been authorized by the security authorities to establish their own private armies in an attempt to consolidate their power bases in three or four of the tribal trust areas. More worrisome, the two wings of the Patriotic Front's forces—ZANLA and ZIPRA—were still fighting under independent commands—and the former had begun to establish itself in Matabeleland, the area traditionally regarded as the power base of the latter.

In some areas, mainly along the border with Mozambique, the majority of whites had abandoned their farms. In addition, the fighting increasingly spread across the borders into Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, as the hard-pressed Rhodesian forces sought to destroy the guerrillas in their base camps or through hot pursuit. The security problems of these border countries—and especially of Zambia—became extremely serious and were only partially met by increased British military aid to Zambia. Front-line resentment at the limits of Western commitment were expressed by Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, who said to Ambassador Andrew Young, "You cannot tell me that the great powers which found it possible and necessary to overthrow Hitler lack the necessary resources to topple a lightweight like Ian Smith."

On the basis of its inability to maintain an effective administra-

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tion and sustain morale, the Salisbury regime had begun to lose the war during the year; its leaders acknowledged in private that their success depended on their ability to attract external support to their side. This led them to concentrate on persuading the American and British publics to reverse their governments' policies by openly supporting the Internal Settlement. They also tried to persuade the new South African Prime Minister to commit himself more fully, in a military sense, to Rhodesia than had his predecessor, John Vorster.

The Salisbury regime felt that it had secured something of a breakthrough when the Carter Administration, yielding to pressure from a group of conservative Senators, permitted Smith, along with Muzorewa and Sithole, to visit the United States in October. The American decision drew strong criticism in Africa and was not much liked in Whitehall, where it was feared (as indeed proved right) that Smith would return home to make exaggerated claims about his success in turning Washington around toward support for the Internal Settlement, thus falsely bolstering white morale.

By the year's end it seemed clear that neither the Salisbury regime nor the Patriotic Front had sufficient authority or power acting on its own to impose its will on the country. With power thus dangerously fragmented, the situation could probably be saved only by one of two alternatives: successful all-party talks or the restoration of a British presence in Salisbury, marking the country's return to legality. With neither the Salisbury regime nor the Patriotic Front ready to compromise, the best option seemed to be in British intervention, which was strongly favored by the front-line African Presidents. But British public opinion was totally opposed to any intervention that would involve sending troops to Rhodesia. "No second Ulster" was the rallying cry.

VI

On the other hand, however, the chances for an internationally recognized settlement in Namibia looked somewhat more hopeful. Because expectations of success for the Western-sponsored initiatives for U.N.-supervised elections had risen and then fallen sharply during the year, however, optimism seemed foolhardy.

Launched in the spring of 1977, the Western plan for Namibia negotiated with South Africa and the South West African People's Organization by the five Western members of the Security Council seemed very close to implementation in July 1978, when both SWAPO and Pretoria accepted it. The Namibian initiative was

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historic in at least one respect: it marked the first occasion when the major Western powers (including the maverick French) acted in close concert on an international issue which did not touch immediately on their own security interests. The so-called Contact Group (also familiarly known as the Gang of Five) included the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France and Canada, with U.S. Ambassador McHenry as chairman.

On February 2, the Contact Group proposed proximity talks between South Africa and SWAPO to discuss their proposals for achieving an internationally acceptable settlement of Namibia's claim to independence. By the time that the group's proposals were formally introduced at the Security Council, on April 10, the South African government had given them its qualified approval, but SWAPO still withheld its endorsement. The chances of winning its support sank almost to zero when the South African army struck 250 kilometers deep into Angola on May 4 to attack SWAPO camps at Cassinga. With almost 600 Namibians killed and Angola infuriated by the attack, considerable diplomatic maneuvering was required (in which the front-line African states were prominently engaged) to get the negotiations back on the rails. Yet, less than two months later, on July 12, SWAPO announced its acceptance of the Contact Group's proposals at a meeting in Luanda, Angola's capital.

The remarkable feature of this change of mind by SWAPO was the vigorous role played by Angola's President Neto, along with the chairman of the front-line states, President Julius Nyerere, in persuading the very reluctant SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma to give his assent. The Angolan President's interest was obvious: an acceptable settlement in Namibia would both remove the menace of South Africa's military presence on his border, and avert the danger of having his country used as the base for an intensified and long military struggle against the South African army. The Soviet media made it clear that Moscow was somewhat less than enthusiastic about the endorsement given by SWAPO to the Western proposals, but the U.S.S.R. carefully abstained when they were presented to the Security Council.

A U.N. presence was formally established in Namibia on August 6 when, after more than 30 years of dispute with South Africa, the U.N. Secretary General's special representative, Martti Ahtisaari, arrived at the head of a 50-strong mission in Windhoek. South Africa, however, remained suspicious of SWAPO's intentions, while SWAPO kept up its guerrilla pressures on Namibia. It soon became clear that South Africa was unwilling to accept any U.N.

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proposals that would eliminate the certainty of defeating SWAPO in the elections to be held before independence, while Nujoma was equally determined not to accept any outcome that did not ensure a handover to SWAPO.

These conflicting interests came to the surface when Dr. Kurt Waldheim announced on August 30 that a peacekeeping force of 7,500 troops and up to 2,000 civilians would be required to supervise the elections in Namibia. South Africa rejected the need for such a large force, but was particularly opposed to Waldheim's insistence that the elections could not be held until seven months after the U.N. Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) had been established. South Africa insisted on strict adherence to its own timetable, which envisaged elections before the end of the year. The reason for this was obvious: the longer SWAPO took to organize itself for the elections, the harder it would be to ensure that the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)—the party favored by Pretoria—would be likely to become the government at independence.

The 63-year-old South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, in announcing his decision to retire on September 20, declared at the same time that his government would proceed with elections in December without international supervision. The resignation of John Vorster after 13 years as South Africa's head of state was thought by many to signal the end of an era in which Pretoria's foreign policy was informed by efforts to achieve "détente" with its black neighbors. The Nationalist Party's subsequent selection of Defense Minister P.W. Botha as Prime Minister appeared to bode no good for the prospects of a U.N.-supervised transition. The victory of Botha over less hard-line rivals showed the kind of choice which the ruling party felt it had to make. More than ever, the dominant elements in white South Africa, while no longer convinced that it would assure their future, seemed to see no alternative to apartheid and mobilization of the country's resources for what their army leader, General Magnus Malan, called "a total war effort."

The new Prime Minister has been frequently reported to support the view that sanctions were bound to be applied sooner or later and that he would prefer that they come sooner in order to demonstrate their ineffectiveness as a weapon in the armory of international diplomacy. (To some extent, Iran's cutoff of oil to South Africa is seen in that country as effectively equivalent to sanctions, given the Republic's virtually total dependence on that source.) However, Botha's views on international questions are to

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some extent an unknown quantity. He is certainly a much more complex character than is suggested by the ascription to him of hard-line attitudes. His career shows him as particularly tough on questions of security (he was mainly responsible for the disastrous decision to commit South African forces to Angola in 1975); but in other ways he was sometimes more flexible than his predecessors. Whether he would commit South Africa to a course of unyielding defiance against a hostile world remained to be seen.

Only two Namibian parties, the white-led DTA and the all-white Aktuur welcomed the decision to hold elections, which was otherwise universally condemned. The OAU called for severe sanctions, including a mandatory oil embargo, to "teach South Africa a lesson." On September 29, the U.N. Security Council instructed Waldheim to go ahead with setting up UNTAG and gave South Africa an ultimatum to accept the world body's decisions. Under Western pressures, no specific threat accompanied the ultimatum. Nevertheless, the Western powers fully realized that the issue of selective sanctions could not be avoided if South Africa rejected the ultimatum.

In a remarkable act of unity, the five Western members of the Security Council sent their foreign ministers (in the case of France its Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) to Pretoria in mid-October to make a collective démarche on the new Prime Minister. The mission was unsuccessful, as Botha stood firmly on his decision to go ahead with elections on December 4, though promising that he would work to persuade whatever government was elected to resume the negotiations with the United Nations. Meanwhile, the Western nations were faced with the difficult task of avoiding any immediate call by the Security Council for sanctions against South Africa while still awaiting future developments after the elections were out of the way.

In the event, the tissue of Western/front-line (cum Nigerian) cooperation held together, as all waited with some pessimism for Pretoria's next move. Whether the results of the elections reassured the Nationalist leadership—the turnout was good and, with SWAPO outside, predictably highly pro-DTA—or political prudence reasserted itself, the South African government in late December once again agreed to go ahead with U.N.-supervised elections. Successful implementation of a U.N.-supervised transition to majority rule would represent a major Western victory in the campaign to minimize Soviet influence in the area. Continued equivocation on the part of South Africa, on the other hand, would present the Western powers with extremely difficult domes-

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tic and international political dilemmas. Unless the U.N. plan goes forward, a showdown on the question of sanctions cannot be averted indefinitely.

VII

Although this article has dwelt overwhelmingly on crisis, several positive signs of strength in African political institutions may be of equal long-term significance. While Nigeria, with one-fourth of Africa's population, took a long stride toward restoring civilian democracy in scheduled 1979 elections, Kenya accomplished a smooth transition to a new government following the death of Jomo Kenyatta, Upper Volta held free elections, and Senegal broadened its one-party system to encompass two additional parties. The focus of Western attention, however, is unfortunately bound to be on the difficult cases. The Horn's conflicts have left a decided impact which, by the end of the year, flowed into Western concerns about turmoil in the adjoining pro-Western Persian Gulf oil power, Iran. Indeed, given U.S. concern about Soviet activity in what Brzezinski has called "arcs of instability," what happens in the African crisis areas is clearly linked to senatorial passage of SALT. With the United States at a loss as to how to "counter the Soviets" in the Horn and barely holding onto the possibility of a peaceful settlement in Namibia, the big question for 1979 may be whether the Soviets will be restrained by the SALT link.

Finally, looking at developments in Africa during the year, it is clear that the failure of Western nations to define for themselves and to communicate to the world an effective policy for dealing with Soviet military intervention in the continent has obscured very real Western political achievements in Africa. Thus, at this juncture, those who strongly dissent from any idea of returning to open or clandestine military intervention must show what other positive methods are available to resist Soviet expansionism.

One answer to this important question repeats an argument first popularized by the Chinese, which goes like this: Soviet military intervention, often on the side of minority regimes or movements, can produce only short-term successes; in the end, the Russians and Cubans will be found simply to have dug their own graves. There is a good deal of truth in this, but it comes much more convincingly from the Chinese than from Westerners since they see political developments on a completely different time-scale, and are much less troubled by the thought of how many people will have been cast into the pit before it closes up over the Russians and Cubans. Neither is it enough to say that Soviet policy will

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inevitably fail because it has done so in countries like Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and North Yemen, from which the Soviets were ejected after a time. Times have certainly changed in Africa and one cannot predict that comforting patterns will hold in a rapidly changing continent.

But considerable Western strengths on the continent can be utilized through stepped-up determination and attention. Despite disagreements over the Western nations' reluctance to move more forcefully against the Smith regime and South Africa, the structure of cooperation with the front-line African Presidents and Nigeria held up astonishingly well. The extraordinary nature of this relationship might, perhaps, have been better appreciated by Western audiences if, instead of working so closely with Western leaders to achieve agreed objectives, the African leaders had been cooperating with Soviet and Cuban diplomacy.

Paradoxically, one essential element in the closer Afro-Western diplomatic relationship was that the Western powers did not show themselves to be motivated simply by a desire to outmaneuver the Russians and Cubans—even though the practical result was to exclude them from both the Rhodesian and Namibian initiatives. If there is an element of hope in the West's ability to develop an effective response to the Soviet challenge in the Third World, it lies in the possibility of using the model developed of engaging the active cooperation of the most effective African leaders (not the most reactionary) to pursue mutually agreed objectives. But if such a policy is to succeed, it will require not only the harmonization of Western and Third World interests, but also the kind of massive material commitments (not necessarily, or preferably, military) undertaken by the communist powers in Angola and Ethiopia.

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Richard R. Fagen

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND LATIN AMERICA: BUSINESS AS USUAL?

Latin America was very much on the agenda during the first months of the Carter Administration. During that period, visits to, analyses of and speeches about Latin America emerged from the new Administration at a rate not seen since the early days of the Kennedy presidency.[1] Addressing the Organization of American States less than three months after taking office, the President spoke boldly of a "new approach" based on "a high regard for the individuality and the sovereignty of each Latin American and Caribbean nation, . . . our respect for human rights, . . . [and] our desire to press forward on the great issues which affect the relations between the developed and the developing nations."

Bold words—and now that almost two years have passed, what does the record say? To what extent have the energy and excitement of the first months been translated into policies and practices that really constitute a "new approach" to U.S.-Latin American relations? And perhaps most important, what are the new issues, problems and contradictions that have been illuminated by the Administration's attempts to translate the rhetoric of its commitment to human rights and democratic practice into a hemispheric foreign policy that is truly different from the conservatism and anti-communism of the immediate and not-so-immediate past?

II

If, in the early months of 1977, the Administration had been asked what its major specific policy initiatives toward Latin America had been to date, surely the response would have placed at the head of the list the decision to accelerate the negotiation of the

[1] Throughout this article, the phrase "Latin America" should be understood to include Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Panama Canal treaties and the decision to explore more correct, if not actually warmer, relations with Cuba. By August, after months of intense negotiations, new treaties were in fact ready. On September 7, Presidents Carter and Torrijos met at the Organization of American States and with much pomp and circumstance signed the documents in the presence of 17 Western Hemisphere heads of state and the representatives of nine others. Meanwhile, negotiations were also underway with the Cubans, a process which culminated in the opening of U.S. and Cuban Interests Sections in Havana and Washington on September 1, 1977.

Although a revised set of arrangements for the Panama Canal was essential in order to avoid a future crisis in the hemisphere, in a very real sense the final acceptance of the treaties was not primarily an inter-American or even a bilateral affair. Rather, it was essentially a domestic event—one might even say a domestic occasion. Even before Presidents Carter and Torrijos signed the two treaties, a massive and well-organized campaign against their ratification by the U.S. Senate had begun. The ratification process triggered deeply held feelings of chauvinism, pride, and prejudice, illuminating aspects of U.S. political culture which neither in the past nor in the present have yielded easily to what some like to call "rational debate." Particularly after January 1978, the full scope of this struggle came into view. At one point in his February 1 address to the nation on the treaties, Carter felt compelled to ask, almost in desperation: "Another question is why should we give away the Panama Canal Zone? As many people say, we bought it, we paid for it, it's ours. I must repeat a very important point: We do not own the Panama Canal Zone. We have never had sovereignty over it. We have only had the right to use it." After his presentation, phone calls to the White House still ran four to one against ratification.

During these months, hundreds if not thousands of consultants, lobbyists, "truth" squads (for and against), and fact-finding missions crossed and recrossed both Washington and the country—and occasionally even the hemisphere—arguing and arm-twisting for and against the treaties. Meanwhile, legal opinions, presidential statements, amendments, and both written and verbal "understandings" were all impinging on a Senate debate characterized in an election year by even more than the usual amounts of posturing and logrolling.

Somehow the treaties survived, and in March the first and less sensitive document—concerning the neutrality and operation of the Canal—was approved in the Senate. On April 18 the Senate ratified the by then much battered and amended second treaty by

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a scant one-vote margin. Two months later, on a steamy day in mid-June, Presidents Carter and Torrijos met in Panama City to deliver the instruments of ratification. But the tenor of the congressional debate had deeply affected the reception of the treaties on the Isthmus. A day earlier, the Panamanian government had closed down Panama University and instituted massive security procedures to forestall protests from Panamanians who were angry and humiliated, not only by certain aspects of the treaties themselves but also by a ratification process in which Panama and Panamanians had daily been subjected to insult, abuse and charges running from gross incompetence to communism.

Whereas the initiatives on Panama survived the U.S. political process, those on Cuba did not. Faced early in 1978 with a Soviet and Cuban buildup in Ethiopia, and later with the clear involvement of Cubans fighting against Somali troops in the southern Ethiopian province of Ogaden, the Administration responded to Havana with harsh words and thinly veiled threats.[2] On March 17, President Carter said pointedly that Soviet military intervention "in local conflicts" along with "mercenaries from other Communist countries" is an "ominous development." Subsequently Frank Carlucci, the Deputy Director of the CIA, told a Senate subcommittee that the Soviet Union and Cuba were waging "the most determined campaign to expand foreign influence in Africa since it was carved up by the European powers in the late 19th century." But the Administration could find no appropriate policy initiatives to match its angry words.

In this context of substantial frustration at Cuban and Soviet activities in Africa, and criticism at home and abroad for not "doing something" about it, the Administration reacted sharply in mid-May when approximately 4,000 Angola-based rebels invaded Shaba Province in southern Zaïre. Within hours, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division had been placed on alert, the first such mobilization since Carter's inauguration. Accusations that the Cubans were deeply involved in the invasion followed shortly. In his news conference of May 25, President Carter said that Cuba must share both the burden and the responsibility for the attack. Three days later National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski was warning, "I do not believe that this kind of Soviet and Cuban involvement ought to be cost free." In June, the Senate voted 53 to 29 to approve a nonbinding sense-of-the-Senate resolution calling on the President to terminate the Interests Section agreement until Cuba withdrew militarily from Africa.

[2] For background, see Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1978.

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Then came the Cuban reaction. Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, speaking in the United Nations, called Carter's charges of Cuban involvement "absolutely false." During June, Fidel Castro repeatedly denied Cuban involvement, explaining Cuban policies and activities in the area in great detail to journalists and U.S. officials and other visitors. It was, for many, an absurd and even depressing spectacle: the Carter Administration first accusing the Cubans of complicity in the invasion, and then of not being resolute enough in preventing it. In the end, it was Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who became the spokesman for a more moderate and conciliatory policy, but not before the Congress was both confused and inflamed by the conflicting reports. When the dust had settled at the beginning of July, senior U.S. officials were ready to admit in private that the Administration had "never had the evidence" of the Cuban involvement.

That a year which began in this fashion saw no further U.S. initiatives toward improved relations with Cuba is not surprising. But the final word had not yet been heard from the Cubans. In November, in a startling reversal of previous policies, the Cuban government announced that it was considering the release of all political prisoners and the implementation of plans that would enable tens of thousands of Cubans living abroad to return for family visits and reunions. Using the mechanism of a dialogue in Havana with representatives of the Cuban community in exile, President Castro announced at a second meeting in December that as many as 12,000 former prisoners would be allowed to leave the country if they so desired. Making pointed reference to U.S. human rights rhetoric, Castro said that it was now up to the United States to demonstrate that it cared as much about the fate of these persons as it had been claiming all along. As the year ended, U.S. officials were still seeking appropriate responses to the Cuban initiatives. At the same time, they were attempting somewhat weakly to explain why Cubans now seeking entry to the United States were being screened so slowly and carefully by authorities who only a few years earlier had welcomed exiled Cubans to the United States by the hundreds of thousands.

While Panama and Cuba had been on the Administration's agenda from the outset of the presidential campaign, the same cannot be said of Latin America's two largest nations, Brazil and Mexico. The President had, it is true, criticized the 1976 memorandum of understanding that had suggested a special U.S.-Brazil relationship; and Mexico's President José López Portillo had been the first foreign head of state to visit the White House after

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Carter's inauguration. But it could hardly be said that the new Administration had specific Mexican or Brazilian policies in mind beyond a rather diffuse commitment to "pay attention" to the bilateral relationships.[3]

In 1977, in fact, serious problems arose in U.S.-Brazilian relations as the Administration pursued policies—in the areas of nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, trade and tariffs—that on numerous occasions offended Brazilian sensibilities and interests. But the major fumble of the year took place much nearer home. In October 1977, after signing a letter of intent with potential U.S. purchasers, the Mexican government began to construct a gas pipeline from its southeastern fields to the Texas border. Shortly thereafter it became clear that Mexico's price—which gas transmission companies in the United States were quite willing to pay—was thought by the Administration to be too high given the ongoing domestic energy debate and other factors. In December the potential gas deal was turned down in particularly loutish fashion by U.S. officials, angering and embarrassing their Mexican counterparts in the process.

By the middle of 1978 it was obvious to many members of the foreign policy community in the United States, including some members of the Administration, that U.S.-Mexican relations merited much closer attention. In part, the sharply escalating estimates of Mexican petroleum reserves were responsible for the newfound interest. Of perhaps equal importance, however, was a growing preoccupation with the increasing numbers of undocumented Mexican workers crossing the border. Earlier, a hastily assembled package of legislation intended to reduce and control the inflow of migrants had been presented by the Administration. Despite strong backing from certain sectors of organized labor, however, it was soon evident that the package stood very little chance of congressional approval. A powerful coalition of Chicanos and Hispanics, civil rights activists, and businesses that employ low-cost Mexican labor was arrayed against it. Furthermore, the Mexican government, needing the safety valve represented by the export of the un- and underemployed, let it be known that it would not look kindly on a more closely guarded border.

With so much oil, so many people, so many problems, and a 2,000-mile frontier with the United States, Mexico was a natural candidate for high-level bureaucratic attention in Washington. In

[3] See Albert Fishlow, "Flying Down to Rio: Perspectives on U.S.-Brazil Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/79; and Richard R. Fagen, "The Realities of U.S.-Mexican Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1977.

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fact, in October when it became known that the U.S. government was preparing a Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM 41) on U.S.-Mexican relations, the big unanswered question was why this initiative had taken so long. But no amount of memorandum writing can change the fact that an easy consensus will not be forthcoming on such contentious issues as undocumented workers, trade and tariff policies, energy relations, and, not least of all, the U.S. role in alternative development scenarios for a Mexico that will double in population in the next 20 years, that is currently unable to employ one-third of its labor force, and that has one of the most unequal distributions of income in the world.

Brazil, unlike Mexico, was not seen as a prime candidate for high-level U.S. attention in 1978 despite Carter's whirlwind April stopover on his way to Africa. With relations on a more even keel than they had been a year earlier, there was a lessened sense of urgency in Washington toward the nation with the largest gross domestic product in the developing world. It was the Brazilians themselves who generated the big story of the year—the seeming anomaly in November of a hard-fought election in the context of what is still a military dictatorship. Almost 46 million people went to the polls, handing the government party a resounding defeat in the more modern and urban sections of the nation. Although the electoral system was openly rigged to generate governmental majorities at the national level, the message was clear: a repudiation of much of what the military has stood for and a mandate to continue and even accelerate the political opening of the recent past.

Both the Brazilian elections of November and the Venezuelan presidential elections of December seemed a hopeful and democratic note on which to end the year. Additionally—particularly in the Brazilian case—they seemed to vindicate the Carter Administration's human rights initiatives in the hemisphere. Although few U.S. officials would have been foolish enough to claim that the Administration was instrumental in creating the still-fragile political opening in Brazil, human rights advocates took comfort from the fact that Carter and his advisers were much more supportive of such tendencies than previous administrations. But elections are not the core of human rights concerns, nor is Brazil necessarily either the benchmark or the bellwether of Latin America.

III

The blue-ribbon private Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations, chaired by Sol Linowitz and thus known popularly as

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the Linowitz Commission, issued its second and final report on December 20, 1976, exactly one month before Carter took office. The timing was not casual, nor were its opening words in the section on human rights: "Latin America is suffering from a plague of repression." The Commission did not exaggerate. At no time in the recent history of the hemisphere had the incidence of military rule been so high, the gross violations of political and individual rights so widespread, and the use of officially sponsored assassination, torture and brutality so systematic.

From the outset, the Administration's policy initiatives in the human rights area were deeply conditioned by congressional actions already taken. Led by House and Senate Democrats reacting against the aid, comfort and support given to some of the most repressive governments in the world by all postwar administrations, the Congress in the mid-1970s mandated a series of mechanisms for the review and possible termination of both military and economic aid to governments engaging in gross and systematic violations of human rights. The key question was to what degree would the Carter Administration live up to the letter and spirit of this body of domestic legislation and the more diffuse but nonetheless significant obligations embodied in the relevant body of international law and practice?

Precisely because Latin America was, in global terms, not a high security area, and because gross violators such as Chile were a substantial embarrassment to U.S.-Latin American relations, the new Administration moved quickly to implement parts of the legislative mandate. On February 24, 1977, Secretary of State Vance announced to a Senate subcommittee that the Administration had decided to reduce or eliminate foreign aid to three countries—Argentina, Uruguay and Ethiopia—because of human rights violations. The amounts involved were not large, but symbolically the initiative was important, for it marked the end of an executive branch undercutting of legislative intent, as well as a partial declaration of independence by the Carter Administration from past U.S. policies. The Brazilian government, already forewarned that the cuts were coming, announced in March of that year that it would not accept $50 million in U.S. military sales credits. The official reason was that the U.S. government had prepared a human rights report which was "a violation of the principle of noninterference." Argentina, El Salvador, and Guatemala soon followed suit in rejecting military aid.

What was clear by 1978, however, was that there were sharp limits to what could be accomplished by various mixes of carrots

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and sticks applied to the more repressive governments in the hemisphere. Argentina is a case in point. There was little question that the Argentine military junta qualified as a gross violator of human rights under existing legislation. In 1978, for example, Amnesty International estimated that in addition to those known to have been imprisoned, tortured, or killed, more than 15,000 Argentines had simply "disappeared." Given this record, Congress halted all military assistance and commercial military sales to Argentina as of September 30, 1978. Earlier in the year, the Administration had also voted against three loans sought by Argentina through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and had abstained on several more in the IDB and the World Bank. Additionally, earlier in the summer, a $270 million Export-Import Bank credit for the purchase of turbine generators had been held up.

By this time, however, the business community in the United States was up in arms. "You have no idea of the pressure," said one State Department source. Evidently the pressure was effective, for by the end of the year the Administration had not only approved many of the previously prohibited commercial military sales, but the Export-Import Bank credits had been released after the Argentine government pointed out that it was ready and able to purchase the generators from non-U.S. suppliers backed by European or Japanese credits.[4] Meanwhile, there was no palpable improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina, and the Administration was faced with the somewhat embarrassing situation of having run out of sticks while watching its carrots being eaten by the junta without any noticeable effects on its behavior.

The human rights activities of the Administration were not, however, limited to attempts to pressure some of the gross violators into more acceptable forms of political behavior. Perhaps equally central to the White House was an attempt to identify the United States with nominally democratic forms of governance in a hemisphere ruled overwhelmingly by the military. Thus the clear cooling of relationships with the Pinochet government in Chile was matched by a search for more conciliatory relations with the democratic, Left-nationalist governments of the Caribbean basin, in particular Jamaica. In this context it was not by accident that the second Latin American head of state invited to Washington was

[4] As pointed out by Karen DeYoung and Charles A. Krause, the "halt" of commercial sales of military equipment was never more than partial because of very intensive lobbying by arms suppliers. See "Our Mixed Signals on Human Rights in Argentina," *The Washington Post,* October 28, 1978, p. C-1.

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Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela, a country that the previous Administration had viewed as too strongly supportive of Third World nationalism.

Subsequently, a crucial aspect of this attempt to identify the United States with formal democracy in the hemisphere was found in official support for elections. In this respect, 1978 was a vintage year. Major elections were held in nine Latin American countries outside the Caribbean. These ran from the total sham of General Alfredo Stroessner succeeding himself as President in Paraguay, to the controlled but nevertheless significant elections in Brazil, to the hotly contested presidential elections in Costa Rica and Venezuela.

It is in this context that the Dominican Republic election of May 1978 and subsequent U.S. actions take on special significance. While the ballots were still being counted, the Dominican military moved to halt the electoral process after it became clear that presidential candidate Antonio Guzmán would defeat the more conservative incumbent, Joaquín Balaguer. Immediate and sharp protests from the United States, coupled with a generalized protest from the more democratic governments of Latin America and Europe, helped preserve Guzmán's victory. There were evident historical ironies in these events: the man Guzmán had defeated was none other than the U.S.-blessed three-term ruler of the nation—its only elected President since U.S. armed forces invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965. And Secretary of State Vance, heading the U.S. delegation to Guzmán's inaugural, had 13 years earlier, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, visited Santo Domingo as a member of the U.S. team seeking an "acceptable" solution to civil war and the U.S. occupation.

In a way, this was the high point of the year for the Administration's human rights efforts in Latin America. Using relatively conventional and acceptable instruments of diplomacy, the United States intervened on the side of the angels. The issue was clear: a military subversion of the electoral process was taking place. The alternative outcome was fully acceptable to almost all sectors of U.S. opinion: Guzmán, although to the left of Balaguer, was at most a reformist candidate. The necessary policy leverage was at hand: the Dominican armed forces and the die-hard opponents of Guzmán were hardly in a position to stand up to a U.S. government which had, for years, been their trusted supporters.

If the Dominican Republic proved an easy case, Nicaragua proved to be quite the opposite. At three specific moments during 1977 and 1978, the Carter Administration was given opportunities

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to define its position with substantial clarity vis-à-vis the Somoza dynasty—and each time the response was less than vigorous. First, on taking office and articulating its human rights policy, the Administration could have defined Nicaragua as a top priority. The level of Somoza-led repression was quite high enough to qualify for attention, and the historic and shameful role of the United States in creating and sustaining the dynasty made Nicaragua a key test for an Administration claiming to be different from its predecessors. Instead of seizing this opportunity, however, the Administration took a cautious, bureaucratic, business-as-usual approach. Given the long-standing intimacy of official U.S. relations with Somoza, this was tantamount to continuing support for the dictatorship.

Then, in January 1978, after the assassination of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of *La Prensa* and the most widely known moderate anti-Somoza leader, the opposition coalesced into an extremely broad band of religious, civic, business, and traditional political organizations as well as the armed Sandinista National Liberation Front. But the United States again hung back, choosing to use mild and conventional diplomatic measures to urge Somoza to improve his human rights record. In fact, in July, responding to some cosmetic changes in Managua, President Carter sent a letter to Somoza congratulating him on the progress being made. Although the text of the letter has never been made public and the Administration claims that it was not a letter of support, a private letter from Carter to the Nicaraguan tyrant at that point was naturally interpreted as an attempt to prop up the dynasty.

In late August the Sandinistas struck against the dynasty in their most audacious and successful armed action to date: the taking of the National Palace. For the next weeks, the world witnessed what one observer called a national mutiny, clearly inspired but not always directly led by the Sandinistas. It was literally the revolt of the Nicaraguan people against the dynasty and the National Guard: citizens at the barricades, government armored cars, artillery, and airplanes loosed on the cities, troops dragging young people from their homes and shooting them in the streets, the Red Cross entering still smoking towns to burn the bodies lest disease spread.[5] Yet even after it became clear that a Somoza bent on maintaining himself in power was quite capable of unspeakable crimes

[5] For ample documentation, see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua,* Organization of American States, Washington, D.C., November 1978. An Amnesty International press release dated November 20, 1978, reported that in October Nicaraguan refugees returning from Honduras were being detained and summarily executed by the Nicaraguan National Guard.

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against his own people, Washington's response was still cautious and "evenhanded," accompanied by endless explanations to the effect that the United States did not wish to intervene.

How is this timid, too-little-too-late approach of the Carter Administration to Nicaragua to be explained? Bluntly, a continuation of cold war attitudes and policies is at the root of the explanation. Stated most simply, the fear is that should Somoza be overthrown, the National Guard restructured, and the Sandinistas incorporated fully into a post-Somoza government, the door may be open in Central America to Cuba and the Soviet Union. From outside the Administration, particularly in the pro-Somoza lobby led by Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas, a more primitive vision predominates. There, following Somoza's own line to the letter, the choice is baldly put: either Somoza or another Cuba.[6]

For the more perceptive members of the Administration, the resulting policy dilemma is cruel. In the context of a professed human rights commitment, continued support for Somoza is not possible. Yet neither is any solution that might smack of "losing Nicaragua to the communists." The chosen avenue out of this dilemma has been to push hard for a process of mediation between Somoza and the opposition, a process which began in October with the participation of the United States, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. The expressed purpose of the mediation is to achieve "an enduring democratic solution," by which is meant some sort of electoral replacement of Somoza with minimal participation by the Sandinista movement. The preferred mechanism is a national plebiscite, currently scheduled for February 1979.

But in fact, if not in form, the mediation, as of the end of 1978, has already failed, for the opposition groups that have tentatively agreed to the plebiscite do not include either the Sandinistas or their civilian supporters; and it is difficult to imagine that any mechanism not supported by the most broadly based opposition force in Nicaragua has much chance of issuing in "an enduring democratic solution." In fact, as should have been clear from the outset, the minimal institutions of a democratic political order do not come easily into being in a country ruled for more than 40 years by one family, the sword, the dollar, and every imaginable

[6] The "true" nature of the Sandinista movement and thus the real nature of the choices, although not entirely clear, is certainly not as portrayed by Wilson and other hard-liners. It is suggestive of the quite different perspectives on the Nicaraguan struggle held in Latin America that the Sandinistas are explicitly or implicitly supported by just about every civilian government in the hemisphere. For additional support of this interpretation see Richard R. Fagen, "The Meaning of Nicaragua: The Hard but Necessary Choices," Testimony before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 4, 1978.

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form of graft and venality. What Nicaragua has also demonstrated is that when a popular struggle against despotism gets located within a cold war framework, the Administration's commitment to human rights will almost inevitably be subordinated to the maintenance of U.S. influence and control.

IV

The dilemmas, successes and failures of the Administration in the human rights area are properly viewed as the complex result of multiple forces at work both in the United States and abroad. This is well understood with regard to the first two categories of human rights used by U.S. authorities in assessing the performance of other governments: the *rights of the person,* understood as freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; and the *rights to civil and political liberties,* understood as freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press. There is, however, a third category which has proved to be much less viable both as a criterion with which to assess the performance of other governments and as a guide to policy actions in the human rights field or in foreign relations more broadly conceived. This is the category of *economic and social rights,* understood as access to food, shelter, jobs, health care, and education.

Yet to understand U.S. policy toward Latin America, the limits thereof, and the full implications of the current wave of violations of the rights of the person and civil and political rights, this third category is essential. It is essential precisely because it is *not* a high priority concern of U.S. policy in Latin America—nor could it possibly be without a reordering of priorities so massive as to be unimaginable under current circumstances.

To illuminate this problem, we need to review rapidly the realities of Latin American economic and social structures. Despite very significant national differences, several generalizations can be made.[7]

—Aggregate economic growth in Latin America over the past decade has been above world averages. The per capita income in the region now exceeds $1,000. As an integral aspect of the *kind* of economic growth that has been taking place, Latin America has

[7] Several of these generalizations are less applicable to the smaller and less-developed nations of the region, although they suggest the direction in which these nations are most likely to head if they are "successful." Cuba, with its very different developmental situation, should be excluded from this characterization. In that sense Cuba is "outside" the region.

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become predominantly urban, the work force increasingly proletarianized, and the more dynamic sectors of the economy linked more than ever before to international capital. Increasingly, growth is export-led, implying that questions of trade, tariffs and technology are critical to continued expansion.

—The actual situation with respect to income distribution and social equity is, in general, appalling. Fifty percent of the region's citizens have incomes of less than $200 per year; one-third receive less than $100. The top five percent of the population controls one-third of the total income. The emphasis on industrialization and export-led growth almost everywhere reinforces and accelerates the neglect of agriculture—at least agriculture in basic foodstuffs for domestic consumption. Large sectors of the countryside and those who live there are neglected. In the countryside—as well as in the fringe and slum areas of the cities—high infant mortality, high levels of illiteracy, and abominable housing are the norm. Although the statistics are in dispute, the situation of the poorest one-quarter or one-third of the population may actually be worsening—a situation exacerbated in certain countries by rapid population increase. Certainly the gaps between those who profit from growth and those who do not are widening. A short walk through the poor areas of almost any city in Latin America will reveal the human meaning of these statistics.

—Related but not identical to income distribution and social equity issues is the problem of unemployment. In some countries as many as one out of three persons in the working-age population is unable to find a job of any sort. Given the capital-intensive nature of much current development in Latin America, and the relatively high birth rates in at least some countries, unemployment rates are expected to rise even under conditions of "satisfactory" economic growth. Emigration, particularly from Mexico and the Caribbean, is rooted in this situation, although obviously it has multiple causes.

—The kind of development that has taken place is reflected in the structure of external indebtedness. Current estimates are that the countries of the region now owe approximately $80 billion in public and publicly guaranteed debt alone. Brazil and Mexico together account for well over half of this total, with significant amounts held by Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela. Increasingly, there has been a shift from public to private creditors. As a concomitant of this shift, more stringent terms are now the norm, with interest rates higher and maturities shorter than they were a few years ago. Needless to say, the less "confidence"

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the international banking community has in a borrower, the harder the terms. So massive is the overall indebtedness of the region that service payments on the debt are now running to about 40 percent of export receipts. In several countries—Peru and Jamaica being the most dramatic cases—the primary political-economic issue of the day is how to repay this still-accumulating foreign debt.

—The Latin American state is everywhere involved in economic development and management. It is usually the prime borrower abroad, often an important investor at home, frequently a chief partner of foreign capital, and always a source of regulations on everything from wages to import quotas. State capitalism has come to Latin America with a vengeance, and even the governments that claim to give the freest play to market forces are in fact constantly intervening to establish the rules under which "free markets" will be allowed to operate.

The above sketch of Latin American development aids in understanding the nature of contemporary authoritarianism. To follow only one thread of the argument: with indebtedness so high, with international confidence the key factor in securing new loans, with exports seen as a major engine of growth and the essential key to repaying debt, with unemployment at near record levels, and with inflation still a problem, the stage is clearly set for a government-led assault on workers and workers' organizations.

The linkages are complex, but very largely determine the public policies that will be followed. Creditors want to be paid in dollars or in other international currencies. The international financial institutions are critically concerned with the debtor country's balance of payments. A sharp increase in exports—acknowledged to be the best way to achieve a more favorable balance and repay the debt—is very difficult to achieve in the short run. Also difficult to accomplish is a dramatic increase in capital inflows—except by borrowing even more.

This leaves imports as a natural target for those who would save hard currency. But in order to cut imports—or at least that sector of imports that is least important to ruling elites, economic managers, and most national and international businessmen—mass consumption must be restricted. Since quotas and tariffs are seen as inappropriate policy instruments, to a large extent consumer demand must be managed through restrictions on the real purchasing power of wage earners—and increases in unemployment.

When coupled with cutbacks in government expenditures (typi-

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cally in public works and welfare-enhancing subsidies), a huge proportion of the adjustment burden is thus transferred to the working class. In an inflationary economy, the proportional burden is even greater. Needless to say, where minimal possibilities of political expression exist, this kind of adjustment medicine does not go down easily. Repression of trade unions as effective organizations and workers as individuals is in this sense "necessary," both for those in charge of managing the economy and for their friends and allies abroad.

Many of these same persons may decry the extreme and brutal measures used in countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia and Chile to establish and maintain control over the labor movement and to hold wages well below the inflationary spiral. Some may even take comfort in the fact that, once the most extreme measures have been used, a partial relaxation of control seems possible at a later date. But minimal honesty requires that the repression in both its physical and financial dimensions be seen as an organic aspect of what is now the prevailing mode of economic development in Latin America. Social and economic human rights do not fare well in such an environment.

Optimists believe—and they may well be correct—that the current plague of military-led repression in Latin America has peaked. The Brazilian and Chilean governments, for example, are both less overtly repressive today than they were a few years ago, with a true political opening seemingly underway in the former if not the latter. Certainly the net gain in dignity and well-being is immense when torture and imprisonment stop or are significantly reduced. It is to the credit of the Carter Administration that it has supported this trend.

The policy dilemmas embodied in the question of economic and social rights and the developmental dynamics sketched above are, however, resolved only very partially by a movement toward formal democracy. The dominant realities of social and economic conditions in the hemisphere remain unchanged even if the military go back to the barracks and the torturers are punished or simply move on to more congenial environments elsewhere. If the history of modern Latin America teaches no other lesson, it should now be clear that the combination of formal democracy (rare enough in the hemisphere) and late-industrializing capitalist economies has not and probably cannot significantly reduce the appalling inequalities in economic and social conditions referred to above.

In U.S. policy circles, this key fact of hemispheric life is not

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understood. For most, a false but comforting historical analogy between Latin America and the United States and Western Europe is still pervasive: in advanced industrial states it is substantially true that government policies have in part cushioned and aided those citizens most hurt by the operation of social class and the economy. For example, in theory and often in practice, public education gives most children a chance to learn and advance; systems of taxation reduce income differences and allow governments to deliver benefits to those who cannot purchase them in the marketplace; minimum wage and working conditions, enforced by the state, protect labor from the most ruthless aspects of exploitation. More generally, in this kind of system, the primary function of capitalist economics is seen as the generation of capital and aggregate growth, while the political process is supposed to assure movement toward equity in distribution and opportunity.[8]

Whatever its flaws in practice, a substantial argument in favor of the partial functioning—and self-corrective dynamics—of this model can be made for the United States and Western Europe. In Latin America, on the other hand, even allowing for different levels of development, no such case can be made. On the contrary, what has evolved in Latin America (and by implication in some other areas of the Third World) is a political-economic model that has *no* historical precedent in the now more developed capitalist world. For lack of a more concise phrase, this model can be called illiberal state capitalism, a situation in which state intervention in the economy is substantial, but governmental policies tend to reinforce rather than soften or ameliorate income inequalities, class distinctions and regional disequilibria.[9]

Often this illiberal state expresses itself through a seeming inability to act. Thus, even as nominally democratic a government as the Venezuelan, which has the added advantage of substantial oil revenues, has not been able to make significant inroads on problems of unemployment and rural impoverishment. Nor can the Mexican state, much favored by decades of stability and high levels of technical capability, accomplish a meaningful fiscal reform in order to correct one of the most regressive tax systems in the hemisphere. At other times the illiberal content of official policies is much more direct. For example, the once Left-leaning Peruvian

[8] For a clear general statement of this position see Arthur M. Okun, *Equity and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.

[9] Elsewhere I have sketched the functioning and the "logic" of illiberal state capitalism in the Third World, including its relationship to capitalism in the more developed countries. See "Equity in the South in the Context of North-South Relations," Albert Fishlow, et. al., *Rich and Poor Nations in the World Economy*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.

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military has increasingly undertaken wage and price policies that shift the burden of adjustment and debt repayment disproportionately to the poor and now even to the middle class. And in more repressive settings no pretense is made of using state power to help those who are left behind in the struggle for betterment and, at times, survival. There, even the rhetoric of liberalism has disappeared.

V

Here, then, is the heart of the policy dilemma that faces the Carter Administration: even if the worst excesses of torture and the denial of civil and political liberties are reduced in the hemisphere, the majority of the region's citizens will continue to live lives of poverty and much reduced opportunities, while a minority will continue their progress toward Western standards and styles of life. Admittedly, it is not within the power of this or any other U.S. Administration to redress these inequalities or to eliminate poverty in the hemisphere. This continues to be the responsibility of Latin Americans themselves and continues to imply the need for profound structural changes in politics and economics.

But it is precisely at this point that the Administration can be held accountable for its behavior toward Latin America and can be judged severely. Without doubt the overall political record of the Carter Administration is better than its immediate predecessors: by speaking the language of human rights, the Administration has helped to create some space for political opposition in the hemisphere.[10] By seeking a modus vivendi with the existing Left-nationalist, English-speaking Caribbean states—in part, of course, to prevent them from moving further to the Left and closer to Cuba—a willingness to bargain with the Left rather than simply oppose or subvert it has been displayed. By moving on the Panama Canal treaties when it was clear that domestically there was perhaps more to lose than to gain, the White House has validated its disposition to run some risks and adjust to changing international realities.

But none of the above really addresses the basic developmental and foreign policy dilemmas of this hemisphere—and by extension of the Third World and the United States more generally. One cannot, for example, honestly claim to be interested in supporting significant improvements in economic and social rights without at

[10] This contrast is most clearly embodied in policies toward Chile, where the Carter Administration has been actively hostile toward the Pinochet government. For background, see Richard R. Fagen, "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975.

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the same time being willing to accept and even support much more radical, nationalist, and potentially "anti-American" politics and economics than this or any other Administration has been willing to countenance. One cannot continue to subscribe to and even celebrate banker's rules in public and private international capital markets that operate to deepen indebtedness, repression and inequality while at the same time claiming that one has policies designed to address basic human needs and encourage democracy.

The choices implied are difficult and the costs are necessarily high. Neither the national security community in the United States nor many elements in the business community would look with favor on U.S. policies that were clearly tilted toward social and political forces on the Left of the hemisphere's political spectrum. Even policies implying substantially greater sympathy for groups identified more closely with popular aspirations—such as certain elements within the Roman Catholic Church—would not be easy to implement. But in the long run, if the commitment to social justice in the hemisphere is to be meaningful, nothing less will do.

When viewed from this perspective, the Carter Administration, although substantially more civilized than its predecessors, is hardly more innovative or insightful. It is an Administration that has failed, or is unwilling, to understand that the old forms of political and economic organization are unable to deliver minimally acceptable conditions of life to millions of persons south of the border. It is an Administration that still views popular movements and protests through the lens of the East-West conflict. It is an Administration that apparently refuses to face up to the fact that what is good for U.S. business and security interests, as conventionally conceived, may in fact be quite disastrous for human rights.

That such contradictions are not easily addressed, much less easily resolved, through existing policy instruments is obvious. So, too, is the fact that the contradictions are not exclusively regional nor are the issues raised amenable to regional solutions. But it should be remembered that it was the President himself who introduced the human rights theme into both his campaign and his Administration. This carries with it an obligation to seek policies and opportunities, scarce as they may be, through which to align oneself with those social forces and political movements that are not only against authoritarian rule, but clearly in favor of the economic and social rights of the majority. A human rights commitment in foreign policy can mean no less.

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Daniel Yankelovich

FAREWELL TO "PRESIDENT KNOWS BEST"

For many years, public attitudes toward foreign policy leadership in the United States could be summed up as "President knows best." Virtually throughout the Vietnam War, up to its very end, the public gave the President—whether Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon—the benefit of the doubt. A President, any President, was presumed to possess vital information unavailable to others, and therefore to be in the best position to judge what actions were in the nation's interest. Several years ago I calculated a pre-Watergate, 50 percent "automatic support" factor for presidential decisions in foreign policy. Analyzing a number of public opinion polls taken before and after presidential decisions in foreign policy, I calculated that the President could count on adding up to 50 percent of the electorate to his support column once he had made a decision, almost regardless of the policy initiative in question. So untroubled was public confidence in executive legitimacy in foreign affairs that people simply assumed the President *must* have access to knowledge and wisdom denied to ordinary citizens.

In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, these "old rules" of presidential latitude largely collapsed, victims of abuses under the so-called imperial presidency. Although it is difficult to calculate the precise shrinkage of automatic public support since the end of the Vietnam War, my impression is that it has dwindled to less than half its previous 50 percent margin, and in some instances may have disappeared altogether. Increasingly, the President may find himself having to justify his initiatives to a critical, reluctant public, with few citizens going along just because the President is presumed to know best. Under the conditions that now prevail, not only has automatic support for presidential policymaking dwindled, but public opinion data have indicated that the Ameri-

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can people are eager to have more say—both directly and through their surrogates in Congress—in the formation of foreign policy.

Vietnam and Watergate were pivotal events in spurring the American public to withdraw automatic support for presidential initiatives. But the continuing mood of skepticism and lack of confidence in the presidency can no longer be blamed on these fast-receding historical episodes. Today, public mistrust of presidential leadership in foreign affairs is an almost accidental by-product of a larger decline of confidence in government that has been gathering force for 20 years. Except for Vietnam, the decline is almost unrelated to foreign affairs, having to do mainly with the enlarged role of government in the daily lives of people. We are witnessing an accelerating breakdown of the consensus, formed in the early 1930s, that government has to play a key role in correcting the defects of the private sector. The growth of doubts about how well government is carrying out this larger role begins to show up in University of Michigan surveys in the early 1960s. The doubts pick up momentum in the late 1960s and continue to grow throughout the 1970s.

The statistical record of this growth of mistrust is simple, stark and dramatic: in 1964, seven out of ten Americans believed in the competence of government officials. ("They know what they are doing most of the time.") By 1976, the number of Americans continuing to have this confidence had shrunk to 44 percent. By 1978, it had further declined to 30 percent.

In the early 1960s, a 42 percent minority feared that the federal government was growing too powerful for the good of the country. By the late 1970s, this fear had swelled to a 68 percent majority.

In the early 1960s, by more than a two-to-one margin (64 percent to 28 percent), people believed that the government was "run for all of the people rather than for the benefit of a few big interests." By the late 1970s, the pendulum had swung the other way, and the ratios had reversed themselves. Now, by more than two to one (66 percent to 24 percent), people believe that the government is run primarily for a few big interests.

In the early 1960s, a majority trusted the good faith of the government; now the majority assumes bad faith.

In 1960, most Americans (71 percent) firmly rejected the idea that "public officials don't care much what people like me think." Now a majority agrees with this view.

The indictment is an imposing one: lack of competence, bad faith, indifference, unresponsiveness, captive of special interests. So sweeping is it that we risk losing perspective. Taken by

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themselves these data suggest a crisis of legitimacy. But no such crisis exists, or is likely under prevailing circumstances because of the deep and abiding faith more than 90 percent of Americans have in our democratic form of government and in the private enterprise form of economy (as subject to regulation). We are plunged into the midst of a family quarrel. The quarrel is intense, but the family is in no danger of breaking up. Its leaders are suspected of having feet of clay and of being less concerned with the welfare of the family as a whole than the other members had originally assumed. This suspicion has led to doubts about the distribution of power. Convinced that the power it has delegated to its leaders has been abused, the members of the family, feeling helpless to affect their own destiny, seek a redress in the balance of power.

The decisions that leaders must make in the field of foreign policy are so fateful for our future survival and well-being—matters of war and peace, friend and foe, international trade, security, standing in the world—that it is unreasonable to expect a public struggling to regain some say over the decisions that affect their lives to revert to blind faith in presidential leadership in foreign affairs. In all likelihood, we will never again revert to quite the *status quo ante* innocence of "President knows best." We will surely not revert to it as long as the family quarrel over power and the role of government continues. In short, we had better start learning how to live with the new rules for at least the rest of this century, for the quarrel of the American people over the role and power of its government has just begun.

II

Some observers express trepidation at an enlarged public role in the complexities of foreign affairs. The most concerned critics fear that in the conduct of its foreign affairs, the United States may be moving from the abuses of an imperial presidency to the even more dangerous abuses of an "imperial public."

For example, Theodore Sorensen effectively expressed this view in a recent talk.[1] Acknowledging that the abuses of the imperial presidency were both real and intolerable, he said he feared that the cure may now be worse than the disease. He pointed out that the public is often ill-informed and mercurial in its attention to foreign affairs, and that as foreign policy-making comes to resem-

[1] "The Impact of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy," a National Public Radio *Options* program, January 31, 1978.

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ble the more traditionally opinion-sensitive field of domestic legislation, the nation hovers precariously on the brink of degenerating into a "messenger boy" presidency. Americans, having cast out the excesses of presidential power, now face the even more fearful alternative of a President who makes foreign policy according to the dictates of public opinion polls.

How valid are these fears? Are the extremes the only possible alternatives? Are they even the likely alternatives? How accurate is this description of the new role played by public opinion in the arena of foreign policy?

The concern voiced by Sorensen is shared by many in the foreign policy community. As someone engaged in public opinion research, I have never escaped from a discussion of the role of the public and public opinion polls in foreign policy without encountering fears that a less-than-well-informed public, particularly an uninterested one, will play havoc with our foreign policy; and almost inevitably this expression of concern is accompanied by an even deeper fear that public opinion polls will replace leadership prerogatives.

These are important concerns and deserve careful attention and analysis. They raise urgent questions about the public role in shaping the foreign policy of a democratic superpower, about domestic dangers inherent in the ambiguities of international affairs, and about the role public opinion polls can and do play. Fortunately, 1978 presents us with an opportunity to examine foreign policy-making under the new, post-Vietnam set of rules, and permits us to draw several inferences from the new encounter between public opinion and foreign policy.

From an analysis of public attitudes in four foreign policy arenas in 1978—the Panama Canal treaty debate, the vicissitudes of détente and SALT, Mideast initiatives, and the struggle to shape a South Africa policy—I have drawn the following inferences:

1. On considering the public's role in all four foreign policy arenas in 1978, few of Sorensen's fears are borne out, and his alternatives appear unnecessarily harsh. An imperial public as the alternative to an imperial presidency sets up a false dichotomy as regards the new public involvement in foreign policy matters. Actually, there appear to be benefits as well as constraints derived from wider public participation in foreign affairs. The new involvement of the public in foreign affairs does, however, place a heavier burden on the measurement and analysis of public opinion, and it appears clear that public opinion survey techniques need some improvements to be equal to the task.

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2. It is possible that our foreign policy leadership has in the past underestimated, and continues to underestimate, both the intelligence and the ability of the American public to live with the ambiguities posed by a climate of détente. There is an evident willingness to accept antagonism-with-cooperation as a way of life. The public does not have to believe that the Soviet Union is either a devil or our principal partner in achieving a structure of peace in the world in order to support a policy where we oppose and cooperate with the Soviet Union as circumstances dictate. In the past, Presidents have felt that they had either to oversell the menace of the communist powers to awaken a complacent public, or, conversely, to exaggerate the need to be cooperative in order to generate public support for less hostile or defensive initiatives. Analysis of public response suggests that these efforts to turn the public on and off like a faucet are destructive—and unnecessary. Either extreme—overselling cold war fears or masking the existence of U.S.-Soviet disagreement—confuses our allies, the Soviets and, most important of all, the process of building orderly, consistent public support for our foreign policy here at home. If we are to construct a rational, stable public perception of the international scene, we need a leadership that refrains from overselling either the blessings of détente or the deviltry of the Soviets.

3. The Vietnam trauma, which produced unequivocal "hands off" public reactions to such developments as the 1975 civil war in Angola, has abated. Although public concern about getting too involved in the affairs of other nations remains an active force, there is a revived interest in asserting valid U.S. interests in the international arena.

4. Public attitudes convey a clear and genuine mandate for a moral component to American foreign policy. The idea that our international positions should be dominated solely by the strategic dictates of Realpolitik is anathema to the American public. Moral considerations play a role in every case I explore below, and in almost every foreign policy issue that comes to the attention of the public. This concern, however, is not an absolute dictum: whether in its grudging approval of the Panama Canal treaties, in its condemnation of Soviet human rights violations or in its attitudes toward South Africa and the Mideast, the public has indicated that it is constantly calibrating what the right balance should be between morality and pragmatism in U.S. foreign policy.

Let us look at a few pivotal events on the American foreign policy calendar in the past year. I believe they will show us that public opinion is far from being an albatross around the neck of

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the foreign policy leadership or that the alternative to an imperial presidency is a servile presidency. Following a review of some relevant public opinion data, we can then address the implications of some of the perplexing changes taking place under the "new rules" of public involvement in foreign policy formation.

III

Panama Canal Treaties

From the time President Carter signed the Panama Canal treaties in September 1977, referring them to the Senate for ratification, up to the present moment, at least a plurality of Americans opposed and continue to oppose the treaties. Nearly a year after a heated senatorial debate, a tireless Administration campaign to generate public support, and eventual ratification, the American people remain profoundly ambivalent about relinquishing control of the Canal to the Panamanians. What lessons can the Panama Canal debate teach us about the new relationship of public opinion to foreign policy?

First of all, as the debate over ratification progressed, and more people became aware of the issues, some of the initial public opposition to the treaties began to relax. The better informed Americans became about the treaties, the more likely they were to support them. However, from the outset, intensity of conviction belonged almost exclusively to those who opposed the pacts. Fervent emotional nationalism—during the debate some called it jingoism—remains a potent political factor not to be lightly dismissed in assessing public reaction to foreign policy initiatives.

In the early stages of the debate, public opinion on the treaties seemed unequivocal. Toward the end of 1977, when a cross section of Americans who were *not* familiar with the treaties were given a brief description of its terms and asked their positions, nearly a two-to-one margin (39 percent to 23 percent) disapproved, with 38 percent expressing no opinion.[2] But when the questioning was narrowed to only those people who had previously heard or read about the treaty debate, the margin of disapproval shrank (40 percent in favor, 48 percent opposed). Among those who could correctly answer three specific questions about the terms of the treaties and the current usefulness of the Canal, the balance shifted to 51 percent favoring the treaties, 48 percent opposed. In short, the more knowledgeable people were, the more likely they were to favor the treaty.

[2] American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), October 1977.

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As the Senate debate progressed, the Carter Administration, aware of public ambivalence, lack of knowledge, and intense opposition, increased its efforts to inform the American people about the treaties. Assuming, correctly as it turned out, that more public awareness would generate more public support, Carter persuaded Sol Linowitz to spearhead a vigorous campaign to correct public misconceptions about what the United States was "giving up" in the Canal treaties. The campaign succeeded in reducing the lopsided two-to-one public opposition to the treaties to something like a standoff—enough public support to sustain the Senate approval. But even after the treaties were ratified, actual support for the pacts has remained lukewarm. Why?

Amendments to the second treaty, which gave the United States military prerogatives and preferred use of the Canal in times of emergency, mollified some of the public apprehensions about turning the Canal over to the Panamanians. Louis Harris reported that, in April 1978, Americans aware of the amendments favored the treaty by a slim margin of 44 percent to 39 percent. Those who continued to oppose the treaties, however, cited arguments that the amendments did not address. Advocates of the treaty made regular reference to the fact that for the largest U.S. warships and tankers, the Panama Canal was already obsolete: the ships were too big to use the Canal. This argument of practicality, however, was not potent in reducing opposition to the treaties. When asked in October 1977 whether it wasn't a mistake to make "such a fight" over continued American control of the Canal since it is "not as important as it was," respondents rejected this argument by a two-to-one majority (53–26).[3] Another argument, that a changing era of U.S.-Latin American relations made continued U.S. control of the Canal unfair, was also rejected by a two-to-one majority (53 percent to 24 percent). Asked whether it was "wrong for the United States to own the Canal, which goes right through another independent country," respondents rejected this proposition 61 percent to 24 percent.

Among respondents who had read or heard about the treaty debate in October 1977, the "best" argument in favor of the treaties was that the Canal Zone belonged to Panama. Yet, even this argument received only 13 percent support, compared to the 38 percent of informed respondents who said that there were *no* good arguments in favor of the treaties. Nor did the notion that the United States should not be involved in the Canal Zone, a position

[3] Louis Harris and Associates, October 1977.

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taken by some as one of the "lessons of Vietnam," persuade the American public in the case of the Panama Canal treaties.

Even as their absolute numbers appeared to shrink, those who opposed the Canal treaties grew more confident in their convictions. When informed respondents were asked in late 1977 what the "best arguments" against the treaties were, 25 percent said that the United States had built and paid for the Canal, and 10 percent cited its military and national security value.[4] When the question was worded more strongly, the response was even more adamant.[5] Presented with the assertion that the United States was given ownership of the Canal in return for having built it, making it "perfectly proper" to maintain ownership, a three-to-one majority (65 percent to 22 percent) agreed. By an even wider majority (67 percent to 17 percent), respondents also agreed that it "adds insult to injury" for the United States to pay Panama $50 million a year until the end of the century in addition to giving up control of the Canal. Large segments of the public felt, and feel, that issues of national pride are at stake in the Canal treaty debate. Even with treaty amendments that guarantee the U.S. rights to military defense of the Canal in the event of a third-nation attack, the United States appears to many citizens to be "giving away" something that rightfully belongs to this country.

Through an intensive program of public education, the Carter Administration was able to dampen some of the initial public opposition to the Canal treaties. Yet, even when Americans became convinced that the United States was not signing away any substantial strategic access to the Canal, they still gave only grudging, lukewarm support to the accords. In November 1977 and again in May 1978, Yankelovich, Skelly and White found for *Time* magazine that even with the assurance that the United States maintained its right to defend the Canal, support for the treaties did not rise above 33 percent, while opposition hovered near the 50 percent level.

Actual public support for the Canal treaties has yet to develop. An NBC/Associated Press survey taken in October 1978, months after the treaties were ratified, found 45 percent of the public in favor, with 47 percent still opposed. Clearly, the case of the Panama Canal treaties illustrates neither presidential enslavement to public opinion nor an imperial disregard for it. A positive role for leadership emerges from the furor over the treaties. Early in the debate, President Carter described the domestic response to

[4] Gallup, October 1977.
[5] Harris, October 20, 1977.

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the treaties as a political "no win" situation. Even though public antipathy toward the treaties remains, a new U.S. posture in hemispheric relations has been crafted—emphatically not at the behest of public opinion, but not in defiance of it either.

It came about through a combination of three elements: a vigorous effort to correct misunderstandings about the treaties, once public opinion polls had shown that some of the opposition was due to lack of knowledge; a willingness on the President's part to pursue a politically unpopular initiative that he and his Republican predecessors agreed was in our national interest; and an independent Senate making its own judgments—taking into account both presidential desires and public opinion without being enslaved by either. In this instance, each of the major players acted their roles properly and constructively. The policy process was enhanced, not diminished, by public involvement.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

In the area of U.S.-Soviet relations, as with the Panama Canal treaties, a careful look at public opinion data reveals the presence of ambivalence, ambiguity and conflict. However, the public is closer to consensus here than on Panama. While there remains strong public support for agreements between the two superpowers on strategic arms limitations, weapons testing and trade, one also finds a rising concern for stricter reciprocity on any new accords. Although widespread support exists for the *principle* of détente, the public sees the Soviets as having been the principal beneficiary of détente thus far: 46 percent believe the Russians have benefited most from the policy of détente; only 5 percent of the public believes that the United States has been the chief beneficiary. A corresponding 47 percent plurality feels that the Carter Administration's dealings with the Soviet Union have been "too soft."[6]

In the spring of 1978, Harris found a 71 percent to 15 percent majority in favor of the concept of détente—that is, of the United States and the U.S.S.R. seeking out areas of agreement.[7] This level of support varied only slightly from the 75 percent and 73 percent majorities, measured in 1977 and 1976 respectively. Support for specific proposals, such as increased trade between the two countries, received a 70–80 percent level of support. The desirability of a new SALT agreement was endorsed by a 75 percent majority. But alongside this support, a profound ambivalence and skepti-

[6] *Time*/Yankelovich, May 1978.
[7] Harris, May 22, 1978.

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cism also exist concerning agreements reached with the Soviets. At the same time that the public registered overwhelming support for a SALT agreement, a majority of Americans feared that the Soviet Union might not live up to its part of a nuclear arms limitation agreement. The *Time*/Yankelovich survey reported a 56 percent majority fearing that signing an arms agreement with the Soviets would be "too risky." An Associated Press/NBC survey found only 24 percent support for the belief that the Soviets "can be trusted." And yet despite this questioning of Soviet trustworthiness, Americans by a two-to-one plurality have said they would support more strongly a congressional candidate who favored signing an arms limitation agreement than one who opposed it.

Crucial to understanding public responses to our initiatives toward the Soviet Union are the public's perceptions about the relative strengths and defense postures of the two nations. Although a 34 percent plurality held that the United States was the most powerful nation in the world at the end of 1977,[8] by the end of 1978 only 18 percent felt that the defense system of the United States was stronger than that of the Soviet Union.[9] To some extent, the goal of achieving military superiority over the U.S.S.R. has become less of an issue than in the past, replaced instead by a concern that we maintain at least equivalent strength. Informed elites, and to a lesser extent the general public, see equal military strength rather than superiority as the desired goal for U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. In a 1977 survey of an informed foreign policy audience, the Foreign Policy Association found an overwhelming 68 to 6 percent majority opposed to the proposal that the United States pursue an all-out goal of military competition and superiority over the U.S.S.R. In the summer of 1978, a *New York Times*/CBS survey found 46 percent of Americans saying that the United States should seek superiority over the Soviet Union in military strength; but 47 percent said the two nations should be equal.[10] The public may be more divided than leadership groups but is moving in the same direction.

While there is a growing willingness to see military parity replace the quest for superiority over the Russians, the public is deeply concerned lest the United States "let its guard down." Suspicion of Soviet opportunism in a climate of détente has also generated renewed support for higher levels of American military and civilian preparedness. In the last few years we have found a

[8] Gallup, November 1977.
[9] Harris, September 7, 1978.
[10] *Public Opinion*, July/August 1978.

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growing public willingness to increase defense spending. Despite the fact that six out of ten Americans are convinced that there is "a lot of waste" in U.S. defense spending, an overwhelming seven out of ten support maintaining or increasing the level of our defense expenditures.[11]

On the question of U.S. policy toward Soviet treatment of dissidents, public opinion presents a typical pattern of concern for moral issues balanced by an equal concern that these not be pursued as absolutes but as factors to be weighed against strategic interests. While more than two-thirds of the Americans questioned in a summer 1978 survey voiced approval of President Carter's outspoken condemnations of the way Russian dissidents have been treated, 62 percent felt that a continuing emphasis on Soviet violations of human rights might make it more difficult to reach agreements on strategic arms limitation and other important issues.[12] A slim majority supported the cancellation of computer sales to the Soviets in protest against the convictions of dissidents Shcharansky and Ginzburg, and a plurality endorsed an exchange of Russian spies for imprisoned dissidents. But proposals to halt possible wheat sales or SALT negotiations as the "price" for continued human rights violations did not earn public support.

Despite a clear public concern that the United States pursue a "moral" course in its foreign policy, there is little support for a sacrifice of vital American interests in defense of human rights. When asked "if U.S. efforts to influence Soviet policy regarding human rights threatened a nuclear weapons agreement . . . which would you feel would be more important?", 61 percent said a weapons agreement, compared to 25 percent who identified the human rights of Soviet citizens.

A cautious idealism can be said to govern American public attitudes toward the Soviet Union and toward U.S. foreign policy regarding military and trade agreements pending between the two nations. There is so much eagerness to lessen tensions that despite a profound skepticism about our ability to benefit as much from détente as the Soviet Union, the public overwhelmingly supports the search for cooperation. At the same time, Americans feel that our government has been "too soft" in its dealings with the Russians, demanding too little and yielding too much. These feelings have spurred a renewed and growing concern about our national safety, and a new willingness to support defense spending

[11] Harris, September 9, 1978 and Associated Press/NBC poll, October 1978.
[12] Harris, August 17, 1978.

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and a "harder line" in future negotiations, within the framework of détente.

Middle East

Tension in the Middle East is a relatively familiar issue that has been with us for many years. Public opinion developments in 1978 reflect not only continuity with past attitudes, but also some dramatic shifts in reaction to the peace negotiations. In the past year, the hopes of the American people for peace in the Middle East have risen and fallen with the vicissitudes of the negotiations. A year ago, after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, a small majority (51 percent) felt chances for a total peace settlement were "excellent" or "pretty good"[13]—up from only 34 percent in March 1977 who believed that a lasting peace would ever come to the area. But then in January 1978, as the peace talks stalled, public optimism faded. After many bleak months of deadlocked negotiations, the Camp David summit again raised hopes for a settlement: 55 percent of the public felt that the summit improved chances for peace.[14] An even larger majority (67 percent) were convinced that Egypt and Israel would sign a separate peace treaty and 53 percent felt that Jordan would then be obliged to follow Egypt's lead. Smaller pluralities believed Lebanon and Syria (43 percent and 38 percent respectively) would then follow suit.[15]

Beneath these ups and downs in Americans' expectations of a Middle East peace, several constants can be discerned. First, Americans continue to side with Israel in the conflict. Since early 1977, between four and five out of every ten Americans have supported Israel—as opposed to approximately one in ten who support the Arabs, even after President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.[16] Fully one-third of the public remains uncommitted to either side.

Americans support Israel predominantly for moral reasons, principally because it "has the right to exist" (75 percent), because the Israelis "have stood up for what they believe in despite overwhelming odds" (62 percent), and because "the Jews have a right to a homeland after their suffering in World War II" (52 percent).[17] It is worthwhile noting that in October 1978, when asked their opinion of the various provisions in the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt, Americans most strongly

[13] Harris, January 23, 1978.
[14] AP/NBC poll, October 1978.
[15] Harris, October 26, 1978.
[16] Yankelovich, Skelly and White (hereinafter YS&W), Israel Study, March 1977.
[17] YS&W, Israel Study, March 1977.

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approved (by 84 percent to 6 percent) the provision that "Israel will be recognized as having the right to exist with guaranteed and secure borders."[18]

Yet despite the fact that Americans continue to favor Israel in the Middle East conflict, Israel's hard core of dedicated supporters is not large. One growing component of Israel's support among the public is qualified and hesitant. Perhaps the most important public reservation is the belief that Israel is not doing everything it can to bring about peace. In March 1977, only half (49 percent) of the public considered Israel a "peace-loving" country, and only four in ten (39 percent) felt that Israel was "doing everything for peace"—a number which remained constant in November, after President Sadat's trip. In January 1978, only one in four informed Americans (25 percent) felt that Israel was doing all it should be to bring about peace in the Middle East—compared to a slightly larger number (32 percent) who felt that way about Egypt.[19] Later in the year, a majority feared that Israel was not doing enough for peace.[20]

Qualifying the support for Israel is the now widespread belief that Egypt's President Sadat has been at least as forthcoming and conciliatory—if not more so—than Israel's Prime Minister Begin. In November 1977, two-thirds of the public (64 percent) felt that both men were equally interested in peace, but one out of four (24 percent) felt that Sadat was more interested—as against only 7 percent for Begin.[21] Positive perceptions of Sadat were largely responsible for the fact that 40 percent of the Americans surveyed in November 1977 said that their impressions of Egypt had grown more favorable over the preceding few months.[22] In January 1978, when the public was asked which leader they trusted more, each man drew equal support (32 percent)[23]—a pattern which has continued throughout the year. But while three in ten Americans felt that President Sadat was doing an "excellent" job in the peace negotiations, only 16 percent felt that way about Prime Minister Begin.[24]

In 1978, for the first time, a significant core of supporters for an Arab position seems to have developed. In a recent article, Seymour Martin Lipset noted the emergence of a strongly pro-

[18] Harris, October 26, 1978.
[19] Gallup, January 1978.
[20] YS&W, 1978.
[21] *Time*/Yankelovich, November 1977.
[22] *Time*/Yankelovich, November 1977.
[23] Harris, January 26, 1978.
[24] *Public Opinion*, March/April 1978.

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Egyptian group among better informed, better educated Americans—a group that has traditionally been strongly pro-Israeli.[25] In April 1978, this group was more convinced of the good intentions of Sadat and Egypt than of Begin and Israel.[26] In the past, the dichotomy in the public's mind has always been either to be pro-Israeli or to be undecided. Now, for the first time, to be pro-Egyptian has become a real alternative for many Americans.

This pro-Egyptian feeling is a new—and critical—factor in public attitudes toward the Mideast, but it has some significant antecedents. Sadat had a strong base of potential American goodwill toward him on which to build. In March of 1977, we found that the public considered Egypt to be almost as moderate as Israel (57 percent—Egypt; 62 percent—Israel) and felt that of all the Arab states, Egypt was the most ready to make peace with Israel. Moreover, almost three out of four Americans (73 percent) felt that Egypt was a country we could get along with—which compared favorably to the 88 percent who felt that way about Israel.

In addition, the same moral principles that underlie public support for Israel also cause a plurality of Americans to be sympathetic to the Palestinian cause—another factor which qualifies pro-Israel support.

It should be pointed out, however, that informed Americans who are sympathetic to the Palestinian desire for a homeland are not supportive of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In March 1977, 66 percent of those familiar with the PLO felt that the United States should not consider it the legitimate spokesman for the Palestinians—and in 1978 an almost equal number (63 percent) felt that the PLO does not represent the point of view of most Palestinians.[27]

Its sympathy notwithstanding, when it comes to specific solutions to the Palestinian problem, the public is confused and hesitant about supporting an independent Palestinian state. In November 1977, more than four out of ten Americans (42 percent) felt that Israeli fears of such a state were justified.[28] In January 1978, only one-fifth to one-quarter of the public favored an independent Palestinian state—with most undecided.[29] Gallup data for January through April does, however, indicate some increase in public support for an independent Palestinian state—from 24 percent to

[25] "The Polls on the Middle East," *Middle East Review*, Fall 1978.
[26] CBS/*New York Times*, April 1978.
[27] Gallup, January 1978.
[28] *Time*/Yankelovich, November 1977.
[29] Gallup, Harris, January 1978.

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32 percent. But it is important to note that almost equal numbers—24 percent in January and 29 percent in late April—had no idea what should be done.

In their support for Israel—as in virtually all other foreign policy issues—Americans are guided by a "prudent idealism": they are willing to support moral stands within practical limits. The public is far more interested in seeing peace brought to the Mideast than in playing favorites. In March 1977, when given a list of possible U.S. policies in the Middle East, Americans preferred "helping to bring peace to the Middle East" (51 percent) over either "improving our relations with the Arab countries" (36 percent) or "helping to defend Israel against her enemies" (28 percent). The public sees peace encouraged through an impartial approach, and the desire for a balanced U.S. policy has, if anything, grown since that time.

In our pursuit of peace, Americans are deeply concerned that we avoid military involvement. The public supports present levels of military aid to Israel, but is quite nervous about it. The public's wariness is attested to by their opposition to President Carter's "package" plane sale to the Middle East: by a two-to-one margin (49 percent to 26 percent) they felt that such a plan would hurt the chances for a negotiated peace in the Middle East, and, of those who felt this way, 72 percent believed that such a deal would cause both sides to take a harder line.[30] The public even opposed our selling planes to the individual countries: by 64 percent to 28 percent in the case of Israel, and 71 percent to 20 percent in that of Egypt.[31]

In the case of the Middle East, then, several fundamental feelings come together—and conflict. Americans feel a moral obligation to support Israel. They also feel that the Palestinians, if not the PLO, have a legitimate moral claim. And increasingly, they are convinced that Egypt's desire for peace is genuine—and therefore morally compelling. Cold war strategic thinking no longer plays as important a part in the public's thinking about the Mideast as in previous decades. Nor is the threat of a renewed Arab oil embargo, should peace falter, in the forefront of the public mind. But the "lessons of Vietnam" are still alive, and the public fears any direct—or even indirect—military involvement. Just about the only result that would satisfy all American yearnings and calm all American fears would be real peace in the Mideast—especially a peace an American President helped to create.

[30] *Time*/Yankelovich, May 1978.
[31] Harris, May 1, 1978.

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South Africa

One of the most complex foreign policy issues to emerge in 1978 was the situation in South Africa. A number of factors indicate that it will become more important in the future. The Carter Administration's concern for human rights, events in neighboring Rhodesia and Namibia, Soviet and Cuban activity in Africa, and American economic interests all point to a growing U.S. interest in the area. Public opinion on this issue is sometimes vague and often seems contradictory, due chiefly to the fact that most Americans have not given a great deal of thought to South Africa. However, several themes emerging in other policy areas can also be found affecting attitudes toward South Africa.

As with the Middle East, Americans are also motivated by a "prudent idealism" in their attitudes toward South Africa. We see manifested the desire of the public for the United States to "stand for something" in its foreign policy other than the protection of narrow economic and military interests. In the case of South Africa, human rights is the particular principle that concerns the public. By almost a four-to-one margin (57 percent to 15 percent) Americans feel that South Africa's policy of "keeping the blacks down" cannot be justified.[32] An even larger majority (63 percent to 12 percent) rejects specific repressive acts—such as closing down black newspapers and putting moderate black leaders in jail.[33] The general principle of blacks ruling black countries draws definite support from Americans—46 percent pro; 25 percent con.[34] Even less than in the case of Israel, however, is the American public willing to put sharp teeth into its moralistic stand. Several factors temper public idealism on this issue.

First, the public is unwilling to see us pay a high economic price for our human rights policy. Specifically, by 47 percent to 37 percent Americans are opposed to pushing harder for black rule in South Africa if that policy means a reduction in the supply of vital minerals to the United States. And by more than a two-to-one margin (51 percent to 21 percent) the public opposes forcing American businesses to close down their operations in South Africa.[35]

A second, and deeply rooted concern, is the public's reluctance to see us get involved in any situation reminiscent of Vietnam. There is hesitancy to see American interference in the internal

[32] Harris, June 30, 1977.
[33] Harris, December 15, 1977.
[34] Harris, June 30, 1977.
[35] YS&W, 1978.

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affairs of another country, especially a country not considered vital to our national interests. Getting into any kind of involvement that could "suck us in" further raises the specter of Indochina. Developments in Africa have awakened the public's Vietnam fears: in early 1976, for example, Americans opposed by a three-to-one margin (59 percent to 21 percent) the proposal to send military supplies to the pro-Western forces in Angola because they perceived the Angolan situation as fitting the Vietnam model too closely.[36] With regard to South Africa, by eleven to one (76 percent to 7 percent), Americans agree that "the United States does not have the right to tell South Africa how it should run its country any more than South Africans have a right to tell us how to run our country." Even black Americans supported this position by 59 percent to 9 percent.[37] Consequently, Americans oppose any military action against the white regime in South Africa by a huge 73 percent to 7 percent margin, and equally oppose encouraging blacks inside that country to engage in guerrilla warfare against the white government.[38]

What the public is willing to see the United States do is to bring moderate pressure on the South African government—pressure that will not cost us much, either in dollars or involvement. Specifically, they are willing to see the United States cut off arms sales to South Africa (by 51 percent to 24 percent), get companies in South Africa to put pressure on the South African government (46 percent to 28 percent), and restrain new business investment in South Africa (42 percent to 33 percent).

With one important exception, the American public does not seem willing to see the United States go further in its involvement in South Africa. As mentioned above in the discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations, public suspicion and apprehension about the Soviet Union has been on the rise. The public is particularly worried about Soviet/Cuban incursions into Africa, and those feeling that the communists present a "very serious threat" in Africa have increased over the past year from 44 percent to 53 percent. Five out of ten Americans (51 percent) now feel that it would be a "very serious loss" to the United States if more African countries went communist—compared to 41 percent who felt that way in 1977.[39] Consequently, in June 1978, while the public rejected by 67 percent to 24 percent the idea of sending American troops to

[36] *Time*/Yankelovich, January 1976.
[37] Harris, June 30, 1977.
[38] Harris, December 15, 1977.
[39] Harris, July 31, 1978.

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African countries threatened by communists, a plurality (48 percent to 33 percent) were willing to break off arms control talks until the Soviets withdrew, and a majority (56 percent to 34 percent) were willing to see the United States send increased military equipment—but not troops—to threatened countries.[40] One can suppose that, if South Africa were threatened by a Soviet or Cuban invasion, the American public might be willing to abandon its "hands-off" attitude.

IV

What can be concluded from the events of 1978 seen from the perspective of the public's new role in foreign policy?

Let us take a brief backward glance at recent history. In presenting the Truman Doctrine to the Congress and the American people in 1947, President Truman went several steps beyond detailing a strategic containment of Soviet expansionism in the eastern Mediterranean. Larger than a regional policy objective, military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey was urged on the public not merely to stem the tide of communist guerrilla forces, but also to make clear a U.S. involvement in an international choice "between alternative ways of life." A crusade was at hand and the Saracens were Soviet. Americans were warned not to "falter in our leadership," lest we "endanger the peace of the world. . . and the welfare of this nation." The moral clarity of the appeal was compelling and, in fact, generated the consensus Truman sought.

In 1972, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon began to prepare the American people for détente, a promised reduction in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. This process, too, needed to be "sold," and in many ways the selling took the form of minimizing the areas of conflict between the two nations. From an image of the U.S.S.R. as a systemic horror, the public was asked to accept the "other superpower" as our principal partner in maintaining world order. In the Carter Administration's foreign policy statements, on the other hand, we find denunciations of Soviet expansionism in Africa and violation of human rights alternating with "soft" statements on the need for cooperation.

This brief review reveals the pattern that has often characterized our relations with the Soviets. In its statements to the American public, the U.S. leadership blows hot and cold. The tone is rarely

[40] CBS/*New York Times*, June 1978.

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balanced, ambiguities are played down, subtlety is sacrificed to overstatement. Some (perhaps all) of these government statements harbor the assumption that the public is simpleminded, capable of holding only one extreme alternative in mind at a time—black *or* white, for *or* against, friend *or* foe. As policy needs dictate, the appropriate switch is thrown in an attempt to elicit the appropriate single-dimensioned response. If this conception of the public mind were valid, then all of Sorensen's fears about greater public involvement in foreign policy would be justified. The analyses of public opinion on major issues of 1978 considered above strongly suggest, however, that this assumption is false—and self-defeating.

One of the key implications I would draw from the events of 1978 is not that the public mind is one-dimensional, but that to the extent foreign policy leaders act on this assumption, they risk creating the ogre they fear: a public intolerant of ambiguities in a world filled with ambiguity. If the foreign policy community had a better feel for public opinion, its members would not fear the public as an intolerable burden on an otherwise enlightened leadership.

In over a quarter-century of consulting leaders in business, government, education, communications, and other fields, I have consistently found that our foreign policy leaders are the most remote and theoretical in their perspective on "the public." Their portrait of the American public is even more limited and incomplete than the public's image of them as an aloof elite.

It may be true that only a small fraction of the public is ever fully informed or even fully attentive to foreign policy matters. But this should not be interpreted as meaning that the public has no rational means of arriving at judgments on pressing issues in the foreign policy field. There is a definite "public mind" at work—a special way in which the American people view the role of the United States in foreign affairs. In the year just past, we can isolate three primary ingredients that have governed public attitudes toward foreign affairs.

First, in all of the policy issues analyzed above, there emerges evidence of a constant public weighing of practicality and moral concern. Especially in the wake of Vietnam, an agonizing public "calibration" of moral principles and practical interests operates as a filter through which American foreign policy options are viewed.

Second, we have seen in the past year a renewal of public interest in an active role for the United States in world affairs. This attitude is not the same as in the interventionist period of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The public is more than mildly reluctant

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to dispatch American troops around the globe. But Americans are slowly freeing themselves from the paralysis of the immediate post-Vietnam period during which the country took a semi-isolationist turn. Americans are renewing their conviction that the United States has a positive responsibility in world affairs.

A third component of the prevailing public mood grows out of the second. Any pendular swing returning the American people to an internationalist stance is qualified and tempered by what we may still call "the lessons of Vietnam." The American public perceived the Vietnam trap as having these five characteristics: (1) the United States involved itself needlessly in the internal affairs of another country; (2) the United States supported the weaker side while communist forces supported the stronger side; (3) the United States was directly involved while the Soviet Union was able to participate through surrogate forces; (4) U.S. involvement took place in a country not considered vital to American national interests; and (5) the United States got progressively more involved in its commitment, with little hope of extricating itself. Vietnam has taught the American people to examine as never before the degree of involvement implied by foreign policy decisions. The abhorrence of "more Vietnams" lingers on.

It will be noted that these attitudes—balancing the moral and the practical, calibrating the appropriate degree of involvement, applying the lessons of Vietnam—are extremely general. They offer great latitude of application. At any one time the public holds in mind just such a limited set of principles. They are rarely made explicit. And they are applied in an ad hoc fashion to such specific situations as may arise. For example, in the case of American public attitudes toward South Africa, we find that the public is not well informed about intricate political and economic details, yet there is evidence of firmly held opinions. General principles of humane egalitarianism, national self-interest and reluctance to get too involved all govern public opinion on South Africa.

Because they are ad hoc, judgments on foreign policy issues may be inconsistent and unstable, particularly on issues that the public has not completely thought through. Competing principles jostle and contend with each other, forming attitudes that may be receptive to more than one specific policy approach. The analysis of American public opinion on the Middle East illustrates the possibility of contending principles being held simultaneously: a strong sympathy with and moral endorsement of Israel's right to exist is held simultaneously with a concern for the plight of

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Palestinians, a conviction that Egypt is sincere in its commitment to peace, and an interest in retaining a secure supply of oil from the Saudis.

There is an important lesson in this picture of the public mind for policymakers. Public opinion polls showing seemingly firm opinions on foreign policy issues should not be taken literally as the final word on public attitudes if the issue has not received thorough public debate. People's views prior to thinking through how they feel about an issue may bear little resemblance to their views once they have been obliged to face up to competing principles and forced to decide which one is more important to them. Since few foreign policy issues are ever debated and discussed thoroughly with the public, it follows that what the public opinion polls measure is usually what the public believes prior to having considered a foreign policy issue in depth. Such a situation is made to order for leaders who are gifted in their ability to communicate with the public. They realize that they have great latitude for leadership in applying a principle that the public supports to a specific situation. Conversely, this feature of the public mind must endlessly baffle and confuse those leaders who are uncomfortable with any public involvement in foreign affairs.

V

Having earlier taken issue with Theodore Sorensen, let me acknowledge that I share his concern about the use that is made of public opinion polls as they now exist. Single-question approaches, such as those used in most pre-election surveys, simply cannot be expected to accurately measure public attitudes on contending principles of morality, strategic utility and national priority. The average survey provides an attitudinal "snapshot" of the public. But is the captured image one of a public at the start of a process of thinking things through or at the end of the process? We need to know when a figure citing "60 percent approval" means that 60 percent of the public has truly "decided" in favor of a particular alternative, or when "60 percent approval" means mere lip service. In this latter kind of public "approval," a starting 60 percent might erode, after public debate, to a 15 percent level of support; of course, the reverse is also possible. When public opinion did not matter so much, we could tolerate this kind of enigma. No one took the public opinion polls seriously anyway. But now that public opinion counts so much we surely need to know when a 60 percent approval means what it says—and when it means something else.

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In the next several years, we need to incorporate into public opinion research in the field of foreign policy several improvements that are now standard procedure in sophisticated social and marketing research. We must be able to study patterns rather than responses to single-question, atomistic measurements. We must understand under what circumstances people can be expected to give honest, thought-through responses to complex and crucial questions. I would start with a simple practical innovation, which, if added to surveys of foreign policy attitudes, will at least reduce the misleading implications of similar numbers having totally opposed meanings, or different numbers sharing the same meaning.

We should, I propose, add to every foreign policy attitude survey an "intensity measure" to gauge the extent to which each respondent has thought through his own feelings and convictions. It would reflect the respondent's own assessment of the degree to which the issue affects him personally, the strength of conviction with which he holds the attitude, and the extent to which he feels knowledgeable about it, having explored and thought it through from every angle. Such a measure would be only a minor step forward but it could be a useful one for the policymaker: namely, it can inform him whether the support level for a proposed policy reflects genuine public opinion in the sense of a stable and deeply held conviction, or whether it represents an off-the-cuff opinion that could easily swing one way or the other, subject to the vicissitudes of the daily news.

VI

In all I have said above, I do not wish to minimize the difficulties of greater public and congressional participation in foreign affairs. At the very least, these new factors produce a "drag effect" on the speed with which the foreign policy process is conducted. There may also be a tendency to blur the hard-edged clarity of policies formulated by a single person. Under some circumstances, this most sensitive field can be made vulnerable to forms of narrow self-interest that pervade domestic politics. And the rise of single-issue interest groups as a feature of both national and local electoral politics as well as lobbying campaigns also casts a shadow over policies that must clearly be made in the *national* interest.

Notwithstanding these hazards, I believe the arguments favoring greater public involvement in foreign affairs far outweigh the inconveniences and the dangers. First, underlying the "crisis of

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confidence" that has beset the institutions of government, one finds a deeply felt sense of powerlessness and disengagement among the American people. On crucial foreign policy matters this public noninvolvement, within a context of apprehension and mistrust, could threaten our national survival. On issues such as national security, nuclear proliferation, SALT, and other policies designed to limit the possibility of nuclear confrontation, public indifference and congressional exclusion create a climate in which special interest groups can overwhelm the interest of the nation. When people feel that "this has nothing to do with me," and retreat into an inattentive privatism, their ignorance renders them inaccessible to informed, responsible debate, or worse, leaves them vulnerable to panic and hysteria in the event of a "crisis" for which they were not prepared.

In a democracy armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, public noninvolvement is a terrifying danger and not a desirable goal. An "irresponsible public" is one that is kept in the dark most of the time, leaving it to the "experts" to run the show. Such a public is manipulable, apathetic and panic-prone, in sharp contrast to an informed public that feels it must share responsibility for its own future with its leaders.

An equally potent argument for public involvement in foreign policy-making is, at first glance, somewhat abstract. As Hannah Arendt has observed, political truths are different from technical truths, and in a democracy can only be arrived at through the ego-bruising process of public debate. The ego that must be bruised is often the leader's—the President's—for only when he is made to see positions other than his own, or those of his close advisers, is he able to take into account the complexities of both technical issues and ongoing calibrations of morality and interest.

In an era in which governments regard the statements of leaders as the positions of the countries they represent, the damage done to American prestige and credibility by vacillation, inconsistency and contradiction must be considerable. The tendency of the Carter Administration to "change its mind" in public on a number of vital issues argues persuasively for public debate *before* national commitments are made. Consider the many modifications the Administration has had to make in its human rights policy, its efforts to limit arms sales, the arms embargo on Turkey, open diplomacy, the priority deserved by North/South relations, the viability of a "Palestinian entity," an overall versus a step-by-step solution in the Middle East, cutting defense spending, etc.

If we are to be credible and responsible we must also be

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reasonably consistent and think through our policies before they are enunciated rather than afterwards. In today's complex world, the President must take into account more than his own judgment and the advice of a few chosen advisers. The presidency remains a royal court, with all the small corruptions attendant thereto. If the President fails to gain the benefits of the ego-bruising debate he needs within the White House, he is well advised to have it from without rather than not have it at all. Under our system, public involvement is the only real alternative to an imperial presidency.

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Elaine P. Adam

CHRONOLOGY 1978

UNITED STATES

(*See also* country, regional and topical entries)

JAN. 13. Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey dies.

JAN. 14. Arthur F. Burns announces resignation from Federal Reserve Board.

JAN. 19. President Jimmy Carter addresses joint session of reconvened 95th Congress on the State of the Union.

JAN. 20. James T. McIntyre, Jr. named to succeed Thomas B. Lance as Director, Office of Management and Budget; he is sworn in Mar. 24.

JAN. 23. Carter Jan. 20 budget message released; seeks $500.2 billion for FY 1979, sets defense spending at $117.8 billion.

JAN. 24. Carter issues Executive Order 12036 reorganizing foreign intelligence activities.

FEB. 1. Senate, 58–37, blocks amendment to Supplemental Appropriations Act providing for use of $462 million in unspent funds for B-1 bomber. House, 234–182, follows suit Feb. 22. (*See* US Congress.)

FEB. 2. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, in annual military posture statement, presents five-year defense budget, including provision for 2.7% real increase in annual spending from $116.8 billion in FY 1978 to $172.7 billion in FY 1983.

FEB. 23. Carter transmits to the Senate four human rights conventions.

MAR. 8. G. William Miller sworn in as Chairman, Federal Reserve Board.

MAR. 27. Executive Order 12048 establishes International Communication Agency effective Apr. 1, with John B. Reinhardt as Director.

APR. 5. Air Force Gen. David C. Jones named Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Lew Allen, Jr. named Air Force chief and Adm. Thomas B. Hayward Navy chief, succeeding Gen. George S. Brown, Gen. Jones, and Adm. James L. Holloway III respectively; they are sworn in June 30.

JUNE 8. House International Relations Chairman Clement J. Zablocki in letter to Carter asks clarification of such issues as US-USSR relations and African policy.

JULY 12. Stanley R. Resor, US delegation head at Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, named Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

JULY 13. US Ambassador to UN Andrew Young reproved by Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance for remarks on US political prisoners. (*See* USSR.)

AUG. 17. Carter vetoes $36.9 billion Defense Appropriation Authorization Act (HR 10929) containing $1.9 billion for fifth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. House sustains veto Sept. 7.

SEPT. 5. Executive Order 12078 creates Presidential Commission on World Hunger; Sol Linowitz named Chairman Sept. 12.

SEPT. 26. Carter announces measures to improve US exports.

SEPT. 28. Carter message to Congress asks extension of authority to waive application of countervailing duties after 1/2/79 expiration date.

OCT. 10. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Paul C. Warnke announces resignation, effective Oct. 31; Ralph Earle 3rd named interim Director.

OCT. 20. Retired Army Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious II named ACDA Director.

OCT. 24. Carter in radio-television address presents US anti-inflation program; names Alfred E. Kahn as Chairman Oct. 25.

NOV. 1. Carter outlines dollar support moves.

NOV. 11. Carter vetoes Bank Holding Company Act (HR 9937) containing amendment that would hamper current MTA talks on textile and apparel tariff cuts. On Nov. 11 he vetoes Meat Import Act (HR 11545) for the same reason.

NOV. 14. Treasury Department asks financial institutions to pay interest on frozen foreign assets, including an estimated $80 million in PRC assets.

Elaine P. Adam is the editor of the Council on Foreign Relation's annual, *American Foreign Relations: A Documentary History*.

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Nov. 16. Carter announces Seignious will be installed without Senate confirmation; Seignious names retired Col. Norman G. Clyne as Executive Secretary of ACDA on Nov. 28.

Nov. 17. Attorney General Griffin B. Bell decides to admit 2,500 more Vietnamese refugees beyond 25,000 quota set for 4/30/79 deadline.

Nov. 18. Rep. Leo J. Ryan and four others shot dead in Guyana. (*See* Central America.)

Nov. 22. Administration aides disclose Nov. 11 Carter memo criticizing failure of intelligence branches to predict foreign crises.

Dec. 3. Ex-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at Aspen Institute conference in West Berlin voices concern over Soviet world intervention and US public pursual of human rights.

Dec. 6. At ceremony commemorating 30-year-old Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Carter asks Senate to ratify 1925 Genocide Convention.

Congress

Jan. 19–Oct. 15. The 95th Congress holds its second session and adopts the following major Public Laws (with dates of presidential approval):

P.L. 95-240, Mar. 7—Supplemental Appropriations Act, *1978*.

P.L. 95-242, Mar. 10—Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

P.L. 95-354, Aug. 28—Authorizing appropriations for Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.

P.L. 95-356, Sept. 8—Military Construction Authorization Act of 1979.

P.L. 95-370, Sept. 17—Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities Act for FY 1979.

P.L. 95-384, Sept. 26—International Security Assistance Act of 1978.

P.L. 95-393, Sept. 30—Diplomatic Relations Act.

P.L. 95-412, Oct. 5—Amending the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

P.L. 95-424, Oct. 6—International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978.

P.L. 95-431, Oct. 10—Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1979.

P.L. 95-435, Oct. 10—Authorizing US participation in IMF Supplementary Financing (Witteveen) Facility.

P.L. 95-457, Oct. 13—Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1979.

P.L. 95-481, Oct. 18—Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations, 1979.

P.L. 95-485, Oct. 20—Defense Department Appropriation Authorization Act, 1979.

P.L. 95-501, Oct. 21—Agricultural Trade Act of 1978.

P.L. 95-617, Nov. 9—Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978.

P.L. 95-618, Nov. 9—Energy Tax Act of 1978.

P.L. 95-619, Nov. 9—National Energy Conservation Policy Act.

P.L. 95-620, Nov. 9—Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978.

P.L. 95-621, Nov. 9—Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.

Presidential Visits

Dec. 29, 1977–Jan. 6, 1978. President Carter visits Poland (Dec. 29–31); Iran (Dec. 31–Jan. 1); India (Jan. 1–2); Saudi Arabia (Jan. 3–4); Egypt (Jan. 4); France (Jan. 4–6); Belgium (Jan. 6).

Mar. 28–Apr. 3. Carter visits Venezuela (Mar. 28–29); Brazil (Mar. 29–31); Nigeria (Mar. 31–Apr. 3); Liberia (Apr. 3).

June 16–17. Carter visits Panama.

July 14–15. Carter visits Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

July 16–17. Carter attends Bonn Economic Summit Conference.

Presidential Visitors

Feb. 3–8. President Anwar el-Sadat (Egypt).

Feb. 21. Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen (Denmark).

Mar. 2. Vice President Daniel arap Moi (Kenya).

Mar. 7. President Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia).

Mar. 21–22. Prime Minister Menachem Begin (Israel).

Mar. 23. Prime Minister James Callaghan (United Kingdom).

Apr. 12–13. President Nicolae Ceausescu (Romania).

May 1–2. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda (Japan).

May 17. President Kenneth D. Kaunda (Zambia).

May 26. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (France).

May 30–31. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Federal Republic of Germany).

May 31. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit (Turkey); President Antonio dos Santos Ramalho Eanes (Portugal); Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti (Italy); Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis (Greece).

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JUNE 13–14. Prime Minister Morarji R. Desai (India).
AUG. 4. Foreign Ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
SEPT. 5–17. Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat at Camp David.
SEPT. 21. President Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiry (Sudan).
OCT. 6. President Spyros Kyprianou (Cyprus).
OCT. 27. King Khalid (Saudi Arabia).
OCT. 31. Crown Prince Reza (Iran).
NOV. 14–15. King Hassan II (Morocco).
NOV. 29. Prime Minister Hedi Nouria (Tunisia).

THE US ECONOMY AND THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS

JAN. 1. International Sugar Agreement (signed at Geneva 10/1/77) enters into force provisionally. President Carter submits it to Senate Jan. 25.

JAN. 4. US Treasury and Federal Reserve Board announce joint action to support dollar through Exchange Stabilization Fund and $20 billion swap network.

JAN. 13. US and Japan reach agreement in Tokyo on package of economic measures.

JAN. 23. US, Japan and EEC present trade concession proposals at Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) meeting in Geneva.

FEB. 1. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) meeting in Geneva approves Jan. 17 Kuwaiti decision to cut heavy crude oil price by 10¢ a barrel retroactive to Jan. 1.

FEB. 3. EEC and China sign five-year trade agreement in Brussels.

FEB. 12–13. Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal meets with finance ministers of four industrial countries at Versailles on reflation rift.

FEB. 23. House of Representatives backs $1.7 billion contribution to ten billion dollar International Monetary Fund (IMF) Supplementary Financing (Witteveen) Facility, 267 to 125.

FEB. 27–28. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Economic Policy Committee meets in Paris, formally adopts "convoy" concept of reflation.

MAR. 11. Japan announces four-point emergency plan to reduce its exports to US.

MAR. 13. US and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) announce new action to stabilize the dollar and coordinate their economic policies.

MAR. 31. Dollar plunges worldwide as US reports largest monthly trade deficit in its history: $4.52 billion.

APR. 7–8. EEC heads of state meet in Copenhagen, agree to set up European Monetary System (EMS), and call for faster economic growth rate.

APR. 19. US announces plan to sell 300,000 ounces of gold per month for six months, as of May 23.

APR. 29–30. IMF Interim Committee meets in Mexico City, appoints Jacques de Larosière (France) to succeed Johannes Witteveen (Netherlands) as Managing Director, effective June 17.

MAY 7–8. OPEC meets in Taif, Saudi Arabia, and agrees on price freeze through December.

MAY 24. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) announces $500 million loan each year for next ten to 45 developing nations for oil resources development.

JUNE 14–15. OECD Council meets at ministerial level in Paris.

JULY 3–14. Plenary session of Tokyo Round in Geneva agrees July 13 on a "framework of understanding" for liberalized trade to present to Bonn summit.

JULY 6–7. EEC holds summit meeting in Bremen on proposed EMS.

JULY 16–17. Fourth annual economic summit of seven industrial nations held in Bonn.

JULY 25. OECD report advises limitation of US growth and increased unemployment rate, which US rejects on July 26.

JULY 28. FRG announces six billion dollar economic stimulus and tax relief plan.

AUG. 22. US Treasury announces sale of 750,000 ounces of gold per month for four months, effective November 1.

AUG. 28. For third time in two weeks (Aug. 18, 22) US acts to strengthen the dollar by eliminating reserve requirements on foreign borrowings.

SEPT. 25–28. Boards of Governors of the IBRD and IMF hold their 33rd annual meeting in Washington.

SEPT. 26. Carter unveils new measures to promote US exports that would give more direct aid to exporters and reduce domestic and foreign barriers to trade.

SEPT. 28. Carter asks Congress to extend Administration's authority to waive application of countervailing duties.

OCT. 15. Congress passes energy bill, stalled for 18 months, but fails to pass two bills containing amendments to continue countervailing duty waiver beyond 1/2/79.

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Oct. 24. Carter announces major anti-inflation program. (*See* US.)

Nov. 1. Carter announces emergency measures to shore up dollar, including 9.5% raise in discount rate, increased gold sales and $30 billion intervention fund.

Nov. 7. Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger in Tokyo warns Japan to reduce trade surplus or face US protectionist measures.

Nov. 15–17. At Geneva MTN meeting, EEC asks US assurances of waiver authority renewal in exchange for conclusion of Tokyo Round by Dec. 15.

Nov. 16–17. OECD Policy Committee meeting overwhelmingly backs US dollar support moves, despite danger to world economic recovery.

Nov. 24. FRG Bundestag approves $7.8 billion economic stimulus package as promised at Bonn summit.

Nov. 30. US steel industry and workers ask US extension of 1976 import quotas as EEC warns move could further impede MTN.

Dec. 4–5. EEC summit approves plan to set up EMS, effective 1/1/79, and a $33 billion fund to maintain stability, based on a European Currency Unit (ECU).

—— US-Japanese agreement signed in Tokyo ends year-long dispute on gradual increase in Japanese imports of US citrus fruit and beef.

Dec. 6. Treasury and State Departments in joint statement endorse EMS as Ireland, Italy and UK announce decision not to join. (Italian Parliament backs membership Dec. 13, Ireland Dec. 15.)

Dec. 11. Norway announces withdrawal from European currency "snake," effective Dec. 12.

Dec. 12. US in first such move borrows up to $1.5 billion in German marks to support international value of dollar.

—— France at EEC Executive Commission meeting again demands congressional action on waiver authority before final trade agreement is concluded.

Dec. 16–17. OPEC meeting in Abu Dhabi sets 14.5% price rise, effective 1/1/79, to be carried out in stages. Sheik Mana Saeed Oteiba (UAE) elected President.

Dec. 28. France warns FRG it will not join EMS unless FRG agricultural subsidies are phased out; Bonn says system will begin as scheduled.

Dec. 28–29. Heads of state of Jamaica, FRG, Canada, Nigeria, Australia, Venezuela and Norway meet at Runaway Bay, Jamaica, on ways to break North-South deadlock.

ARMS CONTROL

Arms Sales

Feb. 14. The Administration announces plans to sell $4.8 billion worth of war planes to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. (*See* Middle East.)

Apr. 4. The Administration tells Congress of plans to sell 12 F-5 jet fighters to the Sudan.

May 2. Reports of first major purchase by China of Western arms in a deal for French antitank missiles.

May 9. In effort to win congressional approval for its Middle East arms package, Administration announces sale of 20 additional F-15 jets to Israel. (*See* Arab-Israeli Conflict.)

May 12. Defense Department notifies Congress of plans to sell $396.6 million worth of military equipment to Iran, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan.

May 16. The Administration notifies Congress of its plan to sell $414.4 billion worth of arms to Japan and Iran.

July 20. US confirms requests by Shah for 70 F-14 fighter jets.

July 18–28. US and USSR meet at Helsinki on establishing principles of cooperation in curbing arms sales.

Nov. 1. Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, at news conference, rules out US arms sales to PRC.

Dec. 5–13. US and USSR hold fourth round of talks on conventional arms sales limitation in Mexico City.

Dec. 21. Iranian upheaval results in cancellation of three major arms sale deals.

Disarmament

Jan. 9. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) resume in Geneva.

Jan. 10. US-USSR Working Group opens talks in Geneva on chemical weapons ban.

Jan. 16. New "hot line" agreement goes into operation, replacing system established in 1963.

Jan. 23–Mar. 21. UK, US and USSR meet in Geneva on comprehensive test ban.

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JAN. 31. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) begins its 1978 session in Geneva.

FEB. 7–17. In Bern, the US and USSR hold fourth round of talks concerning the Indian Ocean.

FEB. 24. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) reports that the US and USSR have agreed to ban until 9/80 all mobile, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) following conclusion of SALT negotiations.

FEB. 28. State Department releases a Senate Foreign Relations Committee finding that the USSR has generally complied with the 1972 SALT agreements.

MAR. 9. The USSR presents a draft treaty at the CCD meeting outlawing the neutron bomb.

MAR. 15. The first Chinese atmospheric nuclear test since 9/17/77 is reported.

MAR. 17. Carter, in an address at Wake Forest University, warns the Soviet Union against military buildup and involvement in foreign countries.

APR. 7. Carter announces deferment of neutron bomb production.

APR. 10. Vance confirms Soviet agreement to negotiate suspension of hunter-killer satellite (ASATS) tests and discuss conventional arms sales.

APR. 19. France reportedly tests a neutron bomb in the Pacific.

APR. 20–22. Vance and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko meet in Moscow; communiqué reports some narrowing of SALT and nuclear test ban differences.

MAY 9. American and Soviet representatives announce agreement on a treaty to ban chemical weapons except for issue of verification.

MAY 11. US and USSR issue communiqué on results of Helsinki talks May 4–8, concerning limitations on conventional arms transfers.

MAY 23. The UN General Assembly begins 10th Special Session on Disarmament. French participation ends 16-year boycott of arms control negotiations.

MAY 24. The USSR tests a hunter-killer satellite.

—— Carter transmits to the Senate Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (signed at Mexico City 2/14/67).

MAY 31. Gromyko and Vance confer in New York amid signs US is slowing down pace on 1978 SALT agreement.

JUNE 12. Vance announces US pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states provided they pledge not to acquire such weapons.

JUNE 8–16. ACDA Director Paul Warnke heads US delegation at first round of Helsinki talks on banning hunter-killer satellites.

JULY 1. UN Special Disarmament session ends, adopts Final Document (S-10/2), without vote, that *inter alia* enlarges the CCD and establishes a Disarmament Commission.

JULY 12–13. Vance and Gromyko confer in Geneva in cordial atmosphere despite Soviet dissidents' trials.

Aug. 22. Joint US-USSR communiqué on banning chemical weapons, released at Geneva.

AUG. 25. Robert Byrd and other Senators request that any SALT agreement be submitted as a treaty.

SEPT. 18. Three-power meeting of US, UK, and USSR on comprehensive test ban resumes.

SEPT. 22. Carter transmits to Senate the Convention on Hostile Uses of Environmental Techniques (signed in Geneva 5/18/77).

SEPT. 27. France announces it will join new UN disarmament body to be established in Geneva under UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC).

OCT. 1. Carter concedes US use of spy satellites.

OCT. 9. UNDC opens first session in New York.

OCT. 18. Carter orders production and stockpiling of enhanced radiation components for Lance missile warhead.

OCT. 23. USSR tests cruise-like missile.

NOV. 6. US discloses recent Soviet efforts to conceal SS-18 missile-testing information.

NOV. 12. Carter approval disclosed of three billion dollar rise in funding for civil defense.

DEC. 14. China conducts an atmospheric nuclear test.

DEC. 20. Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski in address to Foreign Policy Association says SALT treaty will not weaken US security, but voices concern over Soviet buildup of forces in Europe and stability of countries around the Indian Ocean.

DEC. 21–23. Vance and Gromyko in Geneva announce agreement on "most" issues, but fail to conclude SALT treaty.

NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

JAN. 2. Carter in India says he will continue nuclear fuel shipments despite Prime Minister Morarji R. Desai's refusal to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. On

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Jan. 9, British Prime Minister Callaghan reports that India will agree to IAEA inspection once the UK, US and USSR agree on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

JAN. 11. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (major exporters of materials and technology) makes public a code aimed at preventing the use of nuclear technology for military purposes.

JAN. 26. A CIA study contends that Israel had produced atomic weapons as far back as 1974.

FEB. 9. Carter transmits to the Senate the US-IAEA treaty on safeguards (signed 9/17/76).

FEB. 16. South Africa decides to expand production of enriched uranium because of doubts over future US supply of nuclear fuel after South African refusal to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

FEB. 27. American and British scientists report development of a new breeder recycling system that would eliminate production of pure plutonium.

MAR. 10. Carter signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (PL 95-242).

APR. 27. Carter overrules Apr. 20 decision by Nuclear Regulatory Commission barring the sale to India of 0.8 tons of enriched uranium for an American-built nuclear reactor.

JULY 10. EEC-US compromise reached at Brussels on resumption of US enriched uranium shipments, cut off by Congress Apr. 10 over safeguards issue.

AUG. 11. State Department reports US-Iran nuclear cooperation agreement, including acceptance of IAEA inspection.

SEPT. 1. Following 18 months of talks, representatives of Brazil, FRG, UK and the Netherlands formalize agreement for delivery of enriched uranium to Brazil under strict safeguards.

SEPT. 28. France cancels agreement to sell nuclear reprocessing equipment to Pakistan because of Pakistan's refusal to modify contract.

NOV. 24. US reveals it approved French request to sell US-designed nuclear power plant to China (PRC) provided latter agreed to IAEA inspection.

USSR

(*See also* regional, topical and country entries)

JAN. 19. Two Soviet officials expelled from US in retaliation for expulsion of US Embassy aide from Moscow.

FEB. 24. President Leonid I. Brezhnev criticizes US attitude on disarmament and other issues. State Department in Feb. 25 reply warns Soviets that their role in Africa may endanger relations.

MAR. 2. Carter denies US links Soviet African involvement with conclusion of SALT agreement.

MAR. 17. Carter, in Wake Forest University address, warns US can match Soviet military power with or without a SALT agreement; TASS promptly accuses US of distorting Soviet goals abroad.

APR. 10. UN Under Secretary-General for Political and Security Affairs Arkady N. Shevchenko defects.

MAY 4. Carter in Spokane denounces Soviet intervention in Africa, charging "innate racism."

MAY 18. Physicist Yuri Orlov sentenced to seven years in prison and five years enforced residence for anti-Soviet agitation in trial that began May 15.

MAY 20. FBI announces arrest of two low-level Soviet UN aides, Rudolph Chernyayev and Valdik Enger, for espionage.

MAY 28. National Security Adviser Brzezinski on "Meet The Press" says USSR had violated the "code of détente" through its actions in Africa.

JUNE 7. Carter, at Annapolis, stresses US strength, tells Soviets they may choose cooperation or confrontation.

JUNE 13. US businessman F. Jay Crawford arrested by Soviet police for black market currency operations.

JUNE 20. President Josip Broz Tito at opening of 11th Yugoslav Communist Party Congress accuses both superpowers of interference in Africa and Third World countries.

JUNE 25. Brezhnev in Minsk criticizes US for trying to "play the Chinese card."

JUNE 28. Reporters Craig R. Whitney of *The New York Times* and Harold D. Piper of *The Baltimore Sun* are charged with libeling Soviet television.

JULY 4. US Ambassador Malcolm Toon in address on Soviet TV soft-pedals human rights.

JULY 7. USSR announces trials of dissidents Anatoly B. Shcharansky and Aleksandr Ginzburg, will begin July 10.

JULY 11. US Senate approves resolution deploring trials; House follows suit on July 12 as Carter announces plans to review US-Soviet exchange programs; UN Ambassador Andrew Young says "there are hundreds, perhaps thousands of political prisoners in the United States."

JULY 13. Ginzburg is sentenced to eight years in a labor camp for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

JULY 14. Shcharansky is sentenced to 13 years in prison and labor camps for treason, espionage, and "anti-Soviet agitation."

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JULY 18. Whitney and Piper convicted of libel, ordered to pay fine, and print retraction within five days.

—— Carter places new controls on oil technology exports to USSR and cancels Sperry Univac computer sale.

AUG. 3. Moscow court fines Whitney and Piper at hearing they do not attend. They pay fine through their Soviet lawyers on Aug. 4.

AUG. 15. Aleksandr Podrabinek sentenced to five years internal exile for reporting Soviet psychiatric abuses.

AUG. 25. Ex-CIA employee William P. Kampiles indicted for selling document on spy satellites to Soviet agents in Athens.

SEPT. 3. Sen. Edward Kennedy begins a six-day visit to the USSR, where, inter alia, he holds a secret meeting with dissidents.

SEPT. 7. Crawford is convicted following trial that began Sept. 5 and is given a five-year suspended sentence; he leaves the USSR on Sept. 8.

SEPT. 28. US approves $56.5 million oil equipment sale to USSR.

OCT. 13. Spies Chernyayev and Enger convicted of espionage, dismissed by UN Oct. 19 and sentenced to 50 years in prison Oct. 30.

NOV. 27. Several Brezhnev allies elevated at Central Committee meeting, including alternate Politburo member Konstantin U. Chernenko.

DEC. 4. Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps in Moscow announces immediate issuance of licenses for $65 million sale of oil-field equipment cancelled in August.

DEC. 4–7. Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal and Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps head US delegation to Moscow meeting of US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission.

DEC. 5. Byelorussian Premier Tikhon Y. Kiselev appointed Deputy Prime Minister.

MILITARY

JAN. 6. Carter, visiting Brussels, promises closer association of NATO with SALT negotiations.

JAN. 23. Brezhnev warns NATO against deployment of enhanced radiation weapon ("neutron bomb").

MAR. 16. At the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, NATO and the Warsaw Pact reach agreement on procedures for estimating manpower after exchange of detailed data.

APR. 7. Carter announces deferment of neutron bomb production.

APR. 18–19. NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meets in Copenhagen, decides to keep neutron bomb option open.

APR. 19. The fourth round of MBFR recesses for four months.

MAY 18–19. The 14-member NATO Defense Planning Committee meets in Brussels, approves long-term defense program.

MAY 30–31. NATO Council meets in Washington, adopts $60 billion to $80 billion long-term defense program.

JUNE 8. Warsaw Pact tables a new proposal for common ceiling of about 700,000 in ground troop forces and 200,000 in air force manpower.

JULY 19. MBFR talks recess, still deadlocked after five years.

AUG. 17. Carter vetoes defense authorization bill (H.R. 10929) that *inter alia* cuts $800 million from vital military programs affecting US NATO contributions.

SEPT. 28–DEC 14. MBFR winter session is held.

OCT. 3. Gen. Alexander Haig reappointed as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, for two years. He accepts for one year.

OCT. 18. US announces decision to produce ehanced radiation components.

DEC. 6. NATO Eurogroup meets.

DEC. 7–8. NATO Council meets in Brussels.

EASTERN EUROPE

JAN. 6. Secretary of State Vance returns Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary.

JAN. 17. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meeting (opened 10/4/77) resumes in Belgrade following Christmas recess. Session ends Mar. 9.

MAR. 3. US and Hungary sign trade agreement granting latter most-favored-nation status.

MAY 29–30. EEC and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON/CMEA) meet in Copenhagen. They meet again July 25–28.

JUNE 20–23. Yugoslavian 11th Communist Party Congress is held.

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JUNE 27–28. COMECON Council holds annual meeting in Belgrade; admits Vietnam as 10th full member.

JULY 13. China confirms July 11 cutoff of all economic and technical aid to Albania.

NOV. 16. US and Hungary sign tariff-reduction agreement, effective on successful conclusion of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN).

NOV. 22–23. Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meets in Moscow. Ceausescu refuses to increase contribution to Warsaw Pact and to sign pro-Arab declaration.

DEC. 5–7. Warsaw Pact meets in East Berlin.

DEC. 8–9. US Treasury Secretary Blumenthal visits Romania; reaffirms importance to US of Romanian independence and friendship.

WESTERN EUROPE

POLITICAL

JAN. 15–16. Finnish President Urho Kekkonen is reelected for a fifth term.

JAN. 16. Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti resigns over Communist Party (PCI) participation in the government. President Giovanni Leone asks him to form new government Jan. 19.

JAN. 26. Portugal's Prime Minister Mario Soares forms a new coalition cabinet with participation of conservative Center Democrats.

MAR. 9. Trial of 15 Red Brigade terrorists begins in Turin.

MAR. 12, 19. In two rounds of voting for French National Assembly, Center-Right coalition wins solid majority.

MAR. 13. Andreotti government sworn in.

MAR. 16. Christian Democratic Party (PCD) Chairman Aldo Moro kidnapped by Red Brigade terrorists.

APR. 7–8. EEC summit meeting in Copenhagen schedules direct elections for a European Parliament June 8–10, 1979.

APR. 21. Spanish Communist Party (PCE) ends four-day congress, deletes "Leninist" from its title, and reelects Santiago Carillo as Secretary General.

MAY 9. Body of Aldo Moro is found in central Rome.

MAY 14–15. Italian municipal elections result in PCD gains and PCI setback.

JUNE 15. Leone resigns over corruption charges; Senate leader Amintore Fanfani named acting President.

JUNE 23. Red Brigade trial in Turin concludes.

JUNE 30. UK Parliament renews direct rule of Northern Ireland for a year, beginning July 16.

JULY 8. Socialist Alessandro Pertini elected Italy's seventh President. He is sworn in July 9.

JULY 27. President Antônio Ramalho Eanes dismisses Soares following withdrawal of Center Democrats from government on July 24.

AUG. 6. Pope Paul VI (installed 6/21/63) dies.

AUG. 29. Portugal's nonparty cabinet under Alfredo Nobre da Costa (named Aug. 10) sworn in.

AUG. 31. In Iceland, a left-wing coalition under Olafur Johanneson is installed.

SEPT. 3. John Paul I (Albino Cardinal Luciani) installed as 263rd Pope. He dies Sept. 28 after a 34-day reign.

SEPT. 14. Portugal's 17-day-old government under Nobre da Costa is dismissed.

OCT. 5. Swedish Prime Minister Thorbjörn Fälldin resigns and is succeeded Oct. 18 by minority government under Ola Ullsten.

OCT. 11. Sixteen-month-old Belgian coalition government of Leo Tindemans resigns over Fleming-Walloon controversy. Defense Minister Paul vanden Boeynants named Prime Minister Oct. 20.

OCT. 16. Karol Cardinal Wojtyla of Poland elected 264th Pontiff.

OCT. 24. Independent Carlos da Mota Pinto named as Portugal's Prime Minister.

OCT. 31. Spanish Cortes approves new draft Constitution.

NOV. 16. FRG and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) sign major travel agreement in East Berlin including FRG three billion dollar payment for construction of Hamburg-Berlin highway.

NOV. 18. Tenth Portuguese Cabinet since 1974 under da Mota Pinto named; sworn in Nov. 22.

DEC. 6. New Constitution making Spain a parliamentary democracy under King Juan Carlos is overwhelmingly approved.

Dec. 7. Canada names leftist ex-Premier Edward R. Schreyer as 22nd Governor-General to succeed Julles Leger, effective 1/79.

DEC. 13. Socialists abstain and PCI, in first open break with PCD in two years, votes against Italian membership in EMS. (*See* Economic.)

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DEC. 17. Belgium holds parliamentary elections. Vanden Boeynants resigns Dec. 18.
DEC. 27. King Juan Carlos signs new constitution, effective Dec. 29.

CYPRUS, GREECE AND TURKEY

JAN. 5. Turkey's Bulent Ecevit formally takes up duties following resignation of Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel on Jan. 1; Ecevit confirmed Jan. 17.
JAN. 26. Cyprus elects acting President Spyros Kyprianou to a five-year term as President.
FEB. 18–19. After slaying *Al Ahram* editor and Egyptian novelist attending Asia-Africa Solidarity Conference in Nicosia, two Palestinian gunmen hijack plane. After refueling in Djibouti, hijacked plane returns to Larnaca, where Cypriot National Guard kills 15 members of an Egyptian commando rescue party.
FEB. 22. President Sadat severs diplomatic relations with Cyprus.
MAR. 10–11. Greek Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis and Ecevit meet in Montreux, Switzerland.
MAR. 28–29. A US delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher visits Ankara.
APR. 13. In Vienna, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim receives Turkish Cypriot conditions for resumption of communal talks; rejected April 19 by Greek Cypriots.
APR. 24. New cabinet formed by self-proclaimed "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus."
JUNE 21–23. Ecevit visits Moscow and signs nonaggression treaty.
JULY 20. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash offers to place Varosha under interim UN-supervised administration if Greek Cypriots resume intercommunal talks. Cypriot government rejects offer July 24.
JULY 25. US Senate, 57 to 42, approves amendment lifting Turkish arms embargo.
AUG. 14. House-Senate conference backs lifting of Turkish arms embargo, conditional on Turkish "good faith" negotiation effort on Cyprus settlement.
SEPT. 26. With signature of International Security Assistance Act of 1978, the Turkish arms embargo is offically lifted.
OCT. 26. Cyprus announces first local elections in 50 years will take place 7/79.
OCT. 29. Turkish army chief warns Kurdish separatists in growing political violence.
NOV. 28. Turkish press publishes confidential US 12-point Cyprus peace plan.
DEC. 4. Greece and Turkey end sixth round of talks on Aegean Sea oil.
DEC. 14. UN Security Council Resolution 443 (1978) renews UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
DEC. 23–25. Sectarian fighting between the dominant Sunni and minority Shi'ite (or Alevi) sects in Kahramanmaras in southern Turkey results in over 100 deaths.
DEC. 26. Martial law is declared in 13 of Turkey's 67 provinces.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

FEB. 20. Defense Secretary Brown in major address stresses US intention to increase Pacific strength.
APR. 10–20. US and Micronesia, conferring in Hilo, agree on Micronesian independence by 1981, with US retaining defense authority for 15 years.
MAY 18–25. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski visits China, Japan, Korea (q.v.).
JUNE 7–8. The 27th meeting of the ANZUS Council is held in Washington.

JAPAN AND KOREA

JAN. 11–13. Special Trade Representative Robert S. Strauss, in Tokyo for discussions on trade issues, reaches agreement on economic measures.
JAN. 20. Japan reports 1977 overall trade surplus of $9.7 billion, $7.3 billion of it with the US.
JAN. 21. Japan's Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda confirms goal of 7% economic growth rate.
JAN. 31. Republic of Korea (ROK) to allow businessman Tongsun Park but not ex-Ambassador Kim Dong Jo to testify before House Ethics Committee in influence-buying scandal.
FEB. 8. Secretary of State Vance urges Congress to link military aid to ROK cooperation with influence-buying investigation.
FEB. 16. Japan signs $20 billion trade agreement with China.
FEB. 27. Tongsun Park formally indicted in Washington.

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MAR. 17. Rep. Richard T. Hanna pleads guilty to conspiring with Korean CIA; he is convicted Apr. 24.

MAR. 31. Ex-Rep. Otto N. Passman indicted on conspiracy and bribery charges in Korean scandal.

APR. 15. With record $2.45 billion trade surplus in March, Japan asks exporters to reduce shipments of light and heavy goods. 1978 appreciation of the yen against the dollar is 30%.

APR. 20. ROK airliner, en route from Paris to Seoul, crash lands in USSR after being fired on by Soviet fighter planes; two passengers killed, 13 injured as Soviet arrests pilot and navigator, who are released April 29.

APR. 21. Japan announces new measures to stimulate imports and increase foreign aid.

MAY 2. House International Relations Committee approves $800 million in weapons transfers to ROK.

MAY 4–10. Hua visits North Korea. (*See* China.)

MAY 13. Japan begins major debate on larger defense effort in response to US Far East pullbacks and Soviet military buildup in the area.

MAY 23–25. Brzezinski visits Japan and ROK. (*See also* China.)

MAY 31. House of Representatives votes 321 to 46 to back economic aid cut-off if Seoul refuses to allow Kim Dong Jo to testify.

JUNE 21. Supreme Court overturns US Customs Court decision allowing Japanese tax exemptions on its television exports.

JULY 26. Senate adopts amendment, 81-7, warning Carter against further ROK withdrawals.

AUG. 12. Japan and China sign peace and friendship treaty. (*See* China.)

SEPT. 27. Japan rejects Soviet offer of a cooperation treaty unless Soviets return Kurile Islands.

OCT. 13. US House concludes Korean inquiry. Senate concludes its inquiry Oct. 16.

NOV. 6. Brown arrives in ROK for three-day visit as US prepares for first formal troop withdrawal; 3,400 men are to be withdrawn by the end of the year.

NOV. 8–9. Brown visits Tokyo, announces agreement to increase Japanese share toward cost of maintaining US troops in Japan.

NOV. 14–16. US and Japanese representatives meet in Tokyo, agree on ten-year, ten billion dollar program to seek alternative energy sources.

NOV. 27. Liberal-Democratic Party Secretary-General Masayoshi Ohira defeats Fukuda (assumed office 12/76) as party head. Ohira confirmed as Prime Minister Dec. 7.

DEC. 27. Park releases 4,000 political prisoners, including opposition leader Kim Dae Jung.

CHINA

FEB. 24. USSR message to China (PRC) asks meeting on improving relations.

FEB. 24–MAR. 8. Fifth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference meets; elects Teng Hsiao-ping as Chairman.

FEB. 26–MAR. 5. Fifth National People's Congress meets, adopts new constitution, names Yeh Chien-ying Head of State and Hua Kuo-feng Prime Minister. Teng remains First Deputy Prime Minister.

MAR. 21. Chiang Ching-kuo elected unopposed to succeed C. K. Yen (assumed office 4/75) as President of the Republic of China (ROC). He is inaugurated May 20.

MAR. 23. PRC confirms rejection of Soviet Feb. 24 offer, citing presence of one million Soviet troops on its borders.

APR. 1. USSR rejects Mar. 9 PRC note demanding withdrawal from its frontiers.

APR. 14. Japan formally asks PRC to withdraw 38 armed fishing boats that entered waters around Senkaku Islands Apr. 13; PRC on Apr. 15 says incident was accidental.

APR. 26. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid F. Illyichev arrives in Peking to resume border talks broken off in 1977.

MAY 4–10. Hua visits North Korea—first trip abroad by a Chinese leader since 1957.

MAY 11. PRC protests May 9 Soviet raid across Ussuri River—the first such incident since 1969; USSR apology May 12 calls raid accidental.

MAY 19. Chai Tse-min named head of PRC Liaison Office in Washington.

MAY 20–22. Brzezinski visits PRC; briefs leaders on SALT status and discusses normalization.

JUNE 8. Administration approves sale to PRC of infrared scanning equipment denied to Soviet, reversing earlier decision.

JUNE 30. Brzezinski blocks sale of 60 F-4 bombers to ROC.

JULY 6–10. Presidential science adviser Frank Press and high-level science officials visit Peking.

JULY 25. Senate, 94 to 0, asks prior Senate-executive consultations on any changes affecting US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty.

AUG. 12. Japanese Foreign Minister Sonao Sonoda and Huang sign friendship and cooperation treaty in Peking.

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AUG. 14–31. Hua visits Romania (Aug. 14-21); Yugoslavia (Aug. 21-28); Iran (Aug. 29-31).

SEPT. 21. First US-Chinese student exchange in 30 years to begin in October.

OCT. 4. State Department announces preliminary talks are underway on US role in PRC communications satellite development.

OCT. 23. Teng, accompanied by his wife on an eight-day Tokyo visit, exchanges treaty ratifications with Fukuda.

OCT. 24. Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger in Peking confers on oil deals.

NOV. 6. US announces rejection of ROC request for advanced jets.

NOV. 17. US Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland ends ten-day PRC visit concerning farm sales.

NOV. 19. Peking wall poster campaign accuses Mao Tse-tung for first time of supporting "Gang of Four."

NOV. 27. Teng tells visiting US journalist Robert Novak that ROC can keep its political system even after reunification with mainland.

DEC. 2. Teng tells US journalist A.T. Steele that PRC would never agree to no-force pledge for return of ROC, but US could keep its ROC investments.

DEC. 15. Joint communiqués issued in Washington and Peking announce establishment of US-PRC diplomatic relations and termination of US-ROC ties and Mutual Defense Treaty.

DEC. 17. Vance on "Meet the Press" says US expectation that future of ROC would be settled peacefully "has not been contradicted by" PRC.

DEC. 19. Carter reports receipt of "positive message" from President Brezhnev on US-PRC developments. On Dec. 21 USSR publishes full text of message to contest "positive" designation.

DEC. 22. Sen. Barry Goldwater and 14 other legislators file suit in US District Court to prevent termination of ROC Mutual Defense Treaty.

DEC. 27–28. US delegation, led by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, confers in Taipei on future ROC-US relations.

DEC. 31. PRC issues appeal to ROC to allow postal service, personal visits and trade exchanges as first step toward reunification.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

JAN. 3. Border conflict between Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and Cambodia reaches temporary stalemate with SRV holding most of Svay Rieng Province.

JAN. 8. Brzezinski calls SRV-Cambodia conflict a Soviet-Chinese "proxy war."

JAN 31. In Washington, SRV national Truong Dinh Hung, son of Vietnam's 1967 "peace candidate," and US Information Agency aide, Ronald L. Humphrey, arrested as spies; each is sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment on July 7.

FEB. 2. Thai Foreign Minister Uppadid Pachariyankun announces that Thailand and Cambodia have agreed to normalize relations.

FEB. 3. US orders Dinh Bah Thi, SRV's chief UN delegate, expelled as unindicted co-conspirator in Hung-Humphrey spy case.

MAR. 22. Indonesian Congress reelects President Suharto for a third five-year term; Foreign Minister Adam Malik becomes Vice President. New "Third Development Cabinet" sworn in Mar. 31.

APR. 25. House of Representatives passes resolution condemning Cambodian human rights violations and atrocities (H. Con. Res. 573).

MAY 2–4. Mondale visits Manila and signs a $41 million economic aid agreement.

MAY 24. PRC assails SRV expulsion of about 70,000 Chinese.

JUNE 5–7. The sixth Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conference of Economic Ministers is held in Jakarta.

JUNE 9. PRC cancels over 70 aid projects to SRV, recalls 1,000 of its technicians; ends all economic and technical aid on July 3.

JUNE 12. Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos inaugurates new Philippine Parliament, takes additional office of Prime Minister.

JUNE 29. SRV becomes the tenth member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

JULY 6. International Monetary Fund (IMF) to lend SRV $28 million for economic reconstruction.

JULY 12–13. US and SRV confer in Honolulu on identification of missing Americans' remains.

JULY 18. PRC closes its borders to ethnic Chinese fleeing from SRV.

JULY 21. Heavy Cambodia-Vietnam fighting reported, especially in Parrot's Beak area.

JULY 31-AUG. 6. US Judiciary Committee group visits SRV. Its Aug. 22 report recommends *inter alia* lifting of US trade embargo.

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AUG. 7. Kennedy-sponsored US delegation ending week-long stay in SRV, returns with Vietnamese wives and children of US soldiers.

AUG. 8. International Development Association (IDA) approves interest-free $60 million soft loan to SRV for irrigation project.

AUG. 27. PRC-SRV talks (begun Aug. 8 in Hanoi) on status of ethnic Chinese break off without agreement.

SEPT. 7. SRV and Thailand sign five million dollar trade and friendship agreement in Bangkok.

NOV. 3. SRV and USSR sign Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Moscow.

DEC. 2. US intelligence sources report Nov. 18-19 SRV offensive defeated division-size Cambodian unit.

DEC. 3. SRV radio discloses formation of Kampuchean [Cambodian] United Front for National Salvation to overthrow government of Prime Minister Pol Pot.

DEC. 30. SRV radio reports capture of Cambodian town of Kratie by Cambodian guerrillas.

DEC. 31. US and Philippines end over two years of negotiations with signature of five-year agreement providing $500 million in economic and military aid in exchange for continued US use of Filipino military bases.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

GENERAL

FEB 7. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad is reelected unopposed.

FEB. 22. Egypt breaks diplomatic relations with Cyprus following the death of 15 commandos in Nicosia terrorist raid. (*See* Cyprus.)

MAR. 18. Pakistani ex-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sentenced to death for conspiring to murder political opponent; he appeals sentence on May 18.

APR. 27. Afghani President Mohammad Daud is killed in a military coup. On April 30, Nur Mohammad Taraki is named President and Prime Minister of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan."

MAY 21. President Anwar el-Sadat receives 98.29% of the vote in a national referendum giving him wide powers to restrict political dissent.

JUNE 3. In Bangladesh, Maj. Gen. Ziaur Rahman (assumed office 4/77) is elected President for a five-year term.

JUNE 24. Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) President Lt. Col. Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashani is slain, and replaced on June 25 by a three-man Presidency Council.

JUNE 26. President Salim Robaye Ali of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) is deposed and executed by pro-Soviet Liberation Front; a five-man Presidency Council is installed on July 1.

JULY 2. Sixteen Arab League members hold emergency session in Cairo and unanimously decide to "freeze" relations with the PDRY.

JULY 17. YAR People's Council elects Col. Ali Abdullah al-Salah as President.

JULY 22. Sadat announces dissolution of Arab National Union and plans to form new political party.

—— Indira Gandhi is formally charged with conspiracy and criminal misconduct in 1977 election campaign.

AUG. 10. Indian lower house enacts bill to prevent misuse of emergency powers as 200 Gandhi backers are injured in anti-government clashes.

AUG. 23. Pakistan President, Gen. Mohammad Zia al Haq, swears in all-civilian cabinet.

OCT. 2. Mustafa Khalil named to succeed Mamdouh Salem as Egyptian Prime Minister.

OCT. 22. Syria opens border with Iraq, closed for one year.

OCT. 24–26. Assad visits Iraqi President Hassan al-Bakr; they announce plans for joint military command.

NOV. 5. Gandhi wins Karnataka by-election; takes parliamentary seat as opposition leader Nov. 20.

DEC. 4–5. Taraki visits Moscow in first foreign trip since April coup; signs 20-year cooperation treaty.

DEC. 19. Indian Parliament expels Gandhi and jails her.

DEC. 22. Over 20,000 arrested and 11 killed in fourth day of protests over Gandhi arrest.

DEC. 26. Gandhi released as Parliament recesses.

DEC. 27. Abdul Fatah Ismail elected President of the PDRY.

LEBANON

FEB. 18. Israeli and Christian troops reported moving into seven border villages.

MAR. 11. In Beirut, Al Fatah claims responsibility for Israeli terrorist attack on Mar. 10. (*See*

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Arab-Israeli Conflict.)

MAR. 14–15. Israeli land, air and naval forces cross into southern Lebanon and occupy a four- to six-mile-wide "security strip."

MAR. 17. Israel continues advance as UN Security Council (UNSC) holds an emergency session and Lebanese Foreign Minister Fuad Butros meets with Lebanese President Elias Sarkis.

MAR. 19. UNSC Resolution 425 (1978) votes 12 (US)-0-2 for Israeli withdrawal and establishment of UN interim force. Resolution 425 (1978), same vote, approves 4,000-man UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for an initial period of six months.

MAR. 20. Israel completes occupation of area south of Litani River, except for Tyre.

MAR. 21. Israel announces unilateral cease-fire to take effect at 1600 hours local time.

MAR. 22. First UNIFIL contingents arrive in Lebanon.

APR. 11,14, 30. Israeli troops in three-stage withdrawal turn over positions to UNIFIL.

APR. 13. Syrian forces and Christian rightists announce a cease-fire after five days of fighting that began Apr. 9.

APR. 19. The government of Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss resigns.

APR. 20–21. By a vote of 99 (US)-14-0, the 8th Special Session of the UN General Assembly adopts Resolution S-8/2 providing $54 million to finance UNIFIL.

APR. 27. Parliament approves six-point Christian-Muslim proposal for a government of national reconciliation. Al-Hoss renamed Premier on Apr. 28.

JUNE 13. Israel completes withdrawal, turns over six-mile strip to Christian militia units.

JULY 6. Sarkis submits resignation; withdraws it on July 15.

JULY 27. US advises American civilians to leave Lebanon following intense Syrian bombing of Christians in Al Hadath July 26; Embassy staff being reduced.

JULY 28. Lebanon agrees to deploy army units in south alongside UNIFIL.

JULY 31. Lebanese army units moving south are blocked by Christian militiamen.

AUG. 2. US House of Representatives suspends $90 million in security aid to Syria.

AUG. 15. Lebanon and Syria agree to extend Arab peacekeeping force mandate beyond Oct. 20 expiration date.

AUG. 20. PLO attack on El Al bus in London takes two lives and injures nine.

SEPT. 3. Heaviest fighting in nearly a month erupts in Beirut Christian areas.

SEPT. 19. UNSC Resolution 434 (1978), by a vote of 12 (US)-0-2 extends 6,000-man UNIFIL mandate for four months to 1/18/79.

SEPT. 24. Sarkis announces extension of 30,000-man Arab peacekeeping force mandate.

SEPT. 29. Sarkis and Assad mediate cease-fire accepted by both sides.

OCT. 6. UNSC Resolution 436 (1978) unanimously calls for cease-fire.

OCT. 9. New US Ambassador John Gunther Dean arrives in Beirut.

OCT. 15–18. Six contributors to Arab peacekeeping force and Lebanon meet at Beit ad-Din and announce eight-point peace plan and renewal of Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) for six months.

NOV. 11. Palestinian guerrillas offer to end conflict with Christians provided they end cooperation with Israel.

DEC. 20. Israeli jets strike three PLO camps around Tyre in retaliation for terrorist raids inside Israel.

—— Maj. Gen. Victor Khoory is named Lebanese Defense Minister, replacing Fuad Butros, who gives up that post but retains Foreign Ministry.

DEC. 21. PLO retaliates with attack on Israeli city using new Eastern bloc long-range rockets.

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

JAN. 1–2. In Tehran, King Hussein tells President Carter he will not join Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.

JAN. 4. Sadat meets King Khalid of Saudi Arabia in first high-level contact between the two countries.

JAN. 6. President Carter says he will endorse limited-choice referendum for West Bank and Gaza.

JAN. 8. Israeli Cabinet bars new Sinai settlements while agreeing to strengthen and expand existing ones.

JAN. 11. State Department confirms Soviet plan to ship military equipment to Syria, including tanks, aircraft and improved SAM-6 missiles.

—— Egyptian-Israeli Joint Military Committee meets in Cairo, after Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman confers with Sadat.

JAN. 13. The Joint Military Committee meeting recesses.

JAN. 15.Israel accepts US compromise proposal to discuss West Bank and Gaza without mention of Palestinians.

JAN. 16. Secretary of State Vance arrives in Israel.

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JAN. 17. Egypt-Israel Joint Political Committee meets in Jerusalem, hears Vance call for recognition of Palestinian rights and complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.

JAN. 18. Sadat recalls delegation from Jerusalem. Following telephone call from Carter, Sadat agrees to allow the Military Committee to resume meeting on Jan. 21.

JAN. 19–20. Vance confers with Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Sadat in attempt to prevent a breakdown.

JAN. 21. The Israeli Cabinet unanimously delays return to the military talks.

JAN. 26–FEB. 1. Assistant Secretary of State Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. visits Middle East with US draft statement of principles.

JAN. 29. Israeli Cabinet unanimously decides to resume Cairo military talks.

JAN. 31. Military talks reopen as three new West Bank settlements attract notice.

FEB. 1. Military Committee suspends talks pending Sadat visit to Washington.

—— Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan denies Jan. 30 Carter assertion that Israel in Sept. 1977 promised not to establish any new settlements for a year.

FEB. 3–8. Sadat confers with Carter at Camp David and Washington.

FEB. 8. Dayan in New York announces establishment of three new settlements.

FEB. 10. Vance declares Sinai settlements are "contrary to international law."

FEB. 12. Israel, protesting Vance Feb. 10 statement, calls it inconsistent with Carter's expressed views to Begin in Dec. 1977.

FEB. 14. Vance reveals US plan to sell $4.8 billion worth of advanced military aircraft to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

FEB. 21. Bezhnev stresses return to Geneva Conference.

FEB. 21–MAR. 6. Atherton visits Middle East with Carter message; reports differing US-Israeli interpretation of UNSC Resolution 242 (1967).

MAR. 2. Carter warns that Resolution 242 must be basis for continued negotiations.

MAR. 8. Weizman in Washington asks US for $15 billion in arms.

MAR. 11. Begin postpones US trip and recalls Weizman after Al Fatah terrorists land on Mar. 10 on Israeli coast and attack bus; ensuing battle results in at least 37 deaths, with over 70 wounded.

MAR. 14–15. Israeli forces cross into southern Lebanon by air, land and sea; attack described as action to "root out the terrorist bases" rather than retaliation. (*See* Lebanon.)

MAR. 26. Israeli Cabinet unanimously backs Begin on civil autonomy for West Bank and Gaza with Israeli military presence.

APR. 16. Israeli Cabinet reaffirms status of Resolution 242 as basis for settlement.

APR. 21–25. Atherton undertakes fourth Mideast mission since 12/77.

MAY 1. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yassir Arafat calls for US-Soviet guarantees for Israel and for Palestinian state.

MAY 7. Begin ends coast-to-coast US visit that began Apr. 30.

MAY 11. Sadat proposes interim West Bank-Gaza settlement; Begin rejects proposal May 13.

MAY 15. Senate votes 54 to 44 in favor of US sale of military aircraft to Middle East.

MAY 19. PLO Central Council rejects reconciliation with Sadat.

MAY 25. Israeli Supreme Court temporarily bans further West Bank development.

MAY 31. UNSC Resolution 429 (1978) votes 14-0-0 to extend mandate of UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for six months to Nov. 30.

JUNE 18. Israeli Cabinet backs refusal to negotiate permanent settlement in West Bank and Gaza.

JUNE 29–JULY 3. Vice President Mondale visits Israel and Egypt. Sadat agrees to resume direct negotiations.

JULY 5. Egypt releases six-point peace plan.

JULY 9. Israel rejects July 5 proposal; accepts US invitation for Egypt-Israel-US Foreign Ministers' meeting in UK, July 18–19.

—— Sadat confers with Israeli Labor leader Shimon Peres in Vienna meeting arranged by Austrian Prime Minister Bruno Kreisky and FRG's Willy Brandt.

JULY 13. Sadat-Weizman meeting in Fuschl, Austria is followed by separate meeting between Weizman and Gen. Abdel Ghany al-Gamasy.

JULY 18–19. Foreign Ministers meet at Leeds Castle, Hollingbourne, England.

JULY 24. Dayan reveals Israeli offer at Leeds to negotiate West Bank and Gaza status in five years under certain conditions.

JULY 26. Begin reveals Egyptian request for immediate withdrawal of Israeli military mission from Cairo.

—— US Senate, 87 to 0, backs International Security Assistance Act amendment favoring continued US efforts to promote direct Egyptian-Israeli talks.

JULY 27–AUG. 2. Atherton visits Israel and Egypt in unsuccessful attempt to renew direct talks.

AUG. 8. White House announces Egyptian-Israeli acceptance of Carter invitation to three-way meeting at Camp David Sept. 5.

AUG. 14. Israel shelves June 28 plan for five new West Bank settlements.

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AUG. 21. Cairo rejects reported Israeli offer of withdrawal to new Sinai line as part of a partial settlement.

—— Israeli jets bomb PLO camps, killing three guerrillas and wounding 40 civilians in retaliation for Aug. 20 London attack on El Al bus.

AUG. 22. Israel launches all-out anti-terrorist drive as 12th bomb is found in Jerusalem's Arab quarter since Aug. 3.

AUG. 28. Begin says position at Camp David will be based on Israeli 26-point peace plan calling for Israeli presence in West Bank and Gaza.

SEPT. 5–17. Begin, Carter and Sadat meet at Camp David and sign "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt."

SEPT. 12. Syria and PLO boycott 16-member Arab League meeting.

SEPT. 19. The Egyptian Cabinet unanimously backs the accords as Foreign Minister Kamel resigns over differences with Sadat.

SEPT. 20. Begin tells US Jews Jerusalem will remain undivided and Israeli soldiers will remain in West Bank and Gaza; Sadat remains firm on signing treaty in two months.

SEPT. 20–23. Meeting in Damascus, the Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation (Algeria, Libya, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO) agree *inter alia* to reject the Camp David agreements and break diplomatic and economic relations with Egypt.

SEPT. 22. US releases texts of letters, exchanged by Sadat and Begin with Carter, clarifying issues related to Sinai settlements, status of Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza.

SEPT. 26. Butros Ghali named Acting Egyptian Foreign Minister to succeed Ibrahim Kamel.

SEPT. 28. Knesset votes 84 to 19, with 17 abstentions, to endorse Camp David agreements and to dismantle all Israeli settlements in Sinai.

SEPT. 30. Begin in letter to Carter states Israel is committed only to 90-day freeze on West Bank settlements, not five years.

OCT. 2. White House announces three-nation negotiations on Camp David accords will begin in Washington Oct. 12.

OCT. 12. US, Egypt and Israel hold first working session at Blair House, based on US draft peace treaty.

OCT. 19. US offers newly worded preamble stating that draft treaty would only be step toward overall accord.

OCT. 21. With deadlock broken on linking peace treaty to overall Middle East settlement, Egypt and Israel initial peace treaty.

OCT. 23. Diplomatic sources report that a four billion dollar US offer to finance an Israeli Sinai pullout broke Blair House deadlock.

—— UNSC Resolution 438 (1978) votes 12 (US)-0-2 to extend UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Middle East for nine months to 7/24/79.

OCT. 25. Israeli Cabinet overwhelmingly backs unspecified amendments to draft peace treaty. Sadat reportedly also seeks unspecified changes.

—— Israel announces it will "thicken" some West Bank settlements, as Carter telephones concern. Vance calls move "serious matter."

OCT. 27. Nobel Prize Committee announces Sadat and Begin will jointly receive Peace Prize.

OCT. 30. After meeting with Vance, Israeli and Egyptian negotiators agree to resume negotiations on Oct. 31.

NOV. 2–5. All Arab states, except Egypt, hold summit meeting in Damascus during which Iraq and PLO, and Jordan and PLO are reconciled.

NOV. 5. Vance and Israeli-Egyptian delegations issue statement following Blair House meeting reporting progress on peace treaty.

NOV. 6. Israeli Cabinet rejects US compromise plan, insists on elimination of linkage.

NOV. 9. Foreign Minister Ghali gives Vance a new plan linking detailed timetable for Palestine autonomy and peace treaty.

NOV. 12. Dayan and Vance reach tentative agreement on new US plan involving exchange of letters of intent to negotiate Palestine issues one month after treaty ratification and "good faith effort" to hold elections for Palestine councils by 12/31/79.

NOV. 16–20. Egyptian Vice-President Hosni Mubarak joins three-way talks in Washington, accepts Nov. 12 plan.

NOV. 21. Israeli Cabinet approves peace treaty draft but rejects linkage to Palestine issues.

NOV. 30. Sen. Byrd arrives in Israel for four-day visit, warns of possible aid cuts if new West Bank settlements are built.

DEC. 1–4. Prime Minister Khalil meets with Carter, Vance and other high Administration officials.

DEC. 8. Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir dies.

DEC. 10–12. Vance in Egypt receives Sadat approval of new formula to break deadlock.

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DEC. 13–14. Israel rejects US-Egypt compromise after Vance-Begin meetings.
DEC. 19. Knesset backs rejection of Cairo proposal, denouncing US attitude as "one-sided."
DEC. 23–24. Vance in Brussels meets with Khalil and Dayan; fails to revive talks but all agree to avoid mutual recriminations.

IRAN

JAN. 1. Carter meets with Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Tehran.
FEB. 21. Rioting breaks out in Tabriz in opposition to the Shah's reform program.
MAR. 5. Police and SAVAK officials disciplined for their handling of Tabriz riots.
MAY 9. Muslim extremists riot in 34 cities; Shah postpones East European visit.
JULY 20. US officials confirm Shah's request for 70 additional F-14 fighter jets.
JULY 29–30. Riots break out in 13 cities.
AUG. 5. Coalition of leftist extremists, moderates, and conservative Muslims launch demonstrations resulting in 16 deaths as Shah renews commitment to liberalization and parliamentary elections in 6/79.
AUG. 10. Religious riots in four cities result in deaths and injuries as Shah again reaffirms determination to carry out liberalization.
AUG. 19. Terrorists set fire to Abadan movie theater, killing 377 persons; ten conservative Muslims arrested.
AUG. 24. Nationwide rioting over theater blaze enters third day.
AUG. 27. Prime Minister Jamshid Amuzegar resigns and Jaafar Sharif-Amemi succeeds him.
AUG. 29–31. Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng visits Tehran.
SEPT. 6. Shah bans demonstrations as Parliament defers confidence vote in Sharif-Amemi until Sept. 10.
SEPT. 7. Six-month martial law is declared; massive protests break out Sept. 8 in Tehran.
SEPT. 9. Court Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda resigns.
SEPT. 16. Earthquake destroys Tabas; results in 16,000 casualties.
OCT. 4. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, key opponent of the Shah, is expelled to Paris from Iraq.
OCT. 5. Police fire on students and strikers during work stoppage begun Oct. 1. to protest expulsion of Khomeini.
OCT. 7. Strikes close airport, government ministries and schools.
OCT. 16. 100,000 marchers mourn Sept. 8 "Bloody Friday" massacre by government troops.
OCT. 25. 1,500 political prisoners freed on eve of Shah's 59th birthday.
OCT. 29. 1,934 key SAVAK aides reported purged.
OCT. 31. Strikes paralyze $20 billion-a-year oil industry.
NOV. 1. Wildcat strikes ground Air Iran; walkouts by oil workers spread.
NOV. 2. Opposition leader Karim Sanjabi meets in Paris with Khomeini.
NOV. 3. Vance statement endorses Shah's efforts to restore order and liberalize government.
NOV. 5. Sharif-Amemi and two Cabinet ministers resign.
—— Sanjabi and Khomeini call for Islamic government.
NOV. 6. Shah names Gen. Gholam Riza Azhari as head of 11-member Cabinet.
NOV. 8. Shah orders arrest of Hoveyda.
NOV. 11. Sanjabi and aide arrested following Nov. 10 return from Paris.
NOV. 18. Azhari announces six-point law and order program.
NOV. 19. Vance in formal rejoinder to Nov. 18 Brezhnev warning denies any US intention to intervene.
NOV. 26–27. Demonstrations and work stoppages hit all major cities following call by religious leaders for 24-hour strike.
NOV. 28. Azhari announces ban on all processions during holy month of Moharran beginning Dec. 2.
DEC. 1–2. An estimated 700 killed as rioters throughout Iran ignore parade ban.
DEC. 8. Azhari lifts parade ban for 48-hour period of holy day of Ashura.
DEC. 10–11. Religious parade in Tehran with thousands participating takes place peacefully.
DEC. 12. Carter at news conference implicitly criticizes Khomeini, reaffirms support for Shah.
DEC. 13. Khomeini threatens US and other countries with deprivation of oil if opposition wins.
DEC. 14. Shah confers with Sanjabi and ex-Prime Minister Ali Amini; violent demonstrations break out in several cities.
DEC. 22. National Front rebuffs efforts by Gholam Hussein Sadhigi to form civilian government.
DEC. 25. Sanjabi at rally of 4,000 supporters rules out all compromise solutions.
DEC. 26. State Department confirms cessation of all crude oil exports.
DEC. 28. Strikes in all sectors of the economy close central bank, stores, airlines and refineries; gas rationing instituted.

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DEC. 29. Opposition leader Shahpur Bakhtiar named to form civilian government.

DEC. 31. As nationwide rioting continues and oil production falls to record low of 225,000 barrels a day, US announces American dependents may leave on "voluntary" basis.

AFRICA

GENERAL

FEB. 6. Chad suspends diplomatic relations with Libya over latter's support of rebels in the north.

FEB. 27. Senegal reelects President Leopold Senghor in first multiparty election in 12 years.

APR. 20. France sends 200 troops to Chad in wake of Apr. 15 guerrilla attacks that killed two French military advisers.

JUNE 2. French legionnaires and planes fight major battle in Chad preceding scheduled cease-fire talks in Libya June 6.

JUNE 29. US and group of industrial nations meet in Brussels on supplying one billion dollars in emergency aid to Zambia.

JULY 5. Ghana's President, Gen. Ignatius K. Acheampong, resigns; Lt. Gen. Fred W. K. Akuffo succeeds him.

JULY 10. Mauritanian President Moktar Ould Daddah deposed in coup d'état; new government appoints civilian-military cabinet headed by Army Chief of Staff Col. Mustapha Ould Salik.

JULY 18–22. Organization of African Unity (OAU) holds its 15th annual summit conference, hears Nigeria warn USSR and Cuba on interference, elects Edem Kodjo (Togo) to succeed Eteki Mboumoua (Cameroon) as Secretary General.

JULY 28. Senate, 73 to 1, passes amendment banning trade relations with Uganda because of human rights violations.

AUG. 22. Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta (assumed Presidency 12/12/64) dies.

AUG. 29. A new government is formed in Chad with Brig. Gen. Felix Malloum as President and ex-rebel leader Hissene Habre as Prime Minister.

SEPT. 21. Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo lifts 12-year Nigerian state of emergency.

OCT. 10. Daniel arap Moi declared Kenyan President by Elections Supervisor.

—— Carter signs P.L. 95-435 containing provision for Ugandan trade embargo.

OCT. 12. Ugandan President Idi Amin accuses Tanzania of invading Ugandan territory.

OCT. 31. Tanzania reports invading Uganda forces crossed border Oct. 30.

NOV. 2. Tanzania confirms Ugandan annexation of 710 square miles of its territory.

NOV. 6. OAU representatives begin mediation effort in Kampala on Ugandan-Tanzanian war.

NOV. 15. Uganda claims its Tanzanian withdrawal is complete.

DEC. 12. Zambian President Kenneth D. Kaunda (elected 1/64) reelected for fourth five-year term; sworn in 12/15.

DEC. 27. Algerian President Houari Boumediene (seized power 6/19/65) dies.

ANGOLA AND ZAÏRE

APR. 3. Cuban-Angolan attacks reported against pro-Western groups in Angola.

MAY 11. Four thousand Katangan rebels from Angola invade Shaba province in Zaïre.

MAY 14. Zaïre appeals for international help; rebels claim Kolwezi on May 15.

MAY 18. Belgian-French paratroops arrive in Zaïre; Kolwezi retaken May 20.

MAY 19. White House discloses that 18 C-141 transport planes have been assigned to French-Belgian airlift in Zaïre.

MAY 22. Belgian troops leave Kolwezi; French legionnaires depart May 25.

MAY 25. Carter charges Cuba had foreknowledge of the Zaïre invasion and says Angola bears some responsibility.

MAY 26. Cuba denies Carter charge; Senate Foreign Relations Committee asks Carter for proof.

MAY 30. US Congressional Black Caucus warns Administration against resuming covert action in Angola.

JUNE 3. President Agostinho Neto denies Angola-Cuba intervention in Shaba province; promises to disarm returning guerrillas.

JUNE 5. First of 1,500 Moroccan troops flown to Zaïre by US.

JUNE 13–14. US and group of industrial nations meet in Brussels on one billion dollar aid package for Zaïre.

JUNE 16. US Zaïre airlift ends as last French units leave.

JUNE 18. Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and Patriotic Front co-leader Joshua Nkomo charge CIA promised aid to Angola anti-government forces.

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JUNE 20. Vance in major speech on African policy says US will increase efforts to promote Zaïre-Angola reconciliation.

JUNE 25–26. US Ambassador Donald F. McHenry pays unofficial visit to Angola. He does not see Neto.

JULY 21. Neto, at OAU meeting, expresses hope for diplomatic ties with US but not at the expense of Cuban troop withdrawal.

JULY 28–29. Zaïre and Angola agree on reestablishment of relations and prevention of future guerrilla outbreaks.

NOV. 21–23. McHenry and Moose visit Angola.

DEC. 12. Sen. George McGovern arrives in Angola, first Congressman to visit in two years.

SOUTH AFRICA

FEB. 16. US Commerce Department extends 1963 arms embargo to include all police and military equipment.

FEB. 27. Pan-African Congress founder Robert Sobukwe dies.

MAR. 10. Editor Percy Qoboza and nine other blacks arrested in 1977 are released.

APR. 5. Israel announces compliance with UN arms embargo against South Africa.

APR. 10. Transkei Prime Minister, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, breaks diplomatic relations with South Africa in dispute over East Griqualand.

APR. 28. Following a meeting with Chief Minister Patrick Mphephu, Prime Minister Johannes B. Vorster announces that the tribal homeland of Venda will become independent late in 1979.

MAY 9. Senate Banking Committee rejects amendment cutting off all Export-Import Bank activities in South Africa.

MAY 28. Vorster speech warns of possible collapse of Namibia plan.

JUNE 2. Liberia, Senegal and Ivory Coast call on US to take lead in applying economic pressure on South Africa.

JUNE 20. Vance warns South Africa of adverse effects of continued apartheid on relations with US.

JUNE 25–29. US Ambassador Gerard C. Smith confers in Pretoria on South African signature of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in exchange for peaceful nuclear cooperation with US.

JULY 22. OAU resolution affirms determination to obtain oil embargo against South Africa.

AUG. 29. General Motors plans $4.5 million budget to widen race integration at its South African plants.

SEPT. 12. Police arrest 11 friends and relatives of Stephen Biko on first anniversary of his death.

SEPT. 20. Vorster resigns (assumed office 9/6/66).

SEPT. 23. Police disperse 3,000 mourners at funeral of Soweto student leader shot by police.

SEPT. 28. Defense Minister Pieter W. Botha becomes Prime Minister. Vorster replaces Nicholaes Diedericks, who died Aug. 21, as President.

NOV. 6. Inquiry opens into widespread financial and political scandal; Cornelius P. Mulder, Minister of Black Education and Development, resigns Nov. 7 as Botha terminates judicial inquiry.

NOV. 14. Reform-minded Pieter G. Koornhof named successor to Mulder.

NOV. 25. Racial hard-liner Andries P. Treurnicht elected Transvaal National Party leader.

DEC. 1. Transkei President, Chief Botha Sigeau, dies.

NAMIBIA

FEB. 11–12. Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, the UK and US meet at the UN with South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha and South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) head Sam Nujoma on proposal for Namibian independence by 1979.

MAR. 20–23. UN Council for Namibia meets in Lusaka, adopts declaration condemning South Africa.

MAR. 26. Herero Chief and Democratic Turnhalle Alliance President, Clemens Kapuua, slain.

MAR. 30. The five Western powers present a compromise plan involving UN-supervised elections in transition period leading to independence. Nujoma on Apr. 1 calls the plan unacceptable, as it fails to give Walvis Bay to Namibia.

APR. 24–MAY 3. UN General Assembly holds Ninth Special Session on Namibia; adopts declaration and action program on May 2 calling for economic sanctions against South Africa by a vote of 88-0-18 (West).

APR. 25. Vorster announces South African acceptance of the Western plan.

APR. 27. Nujoma in Washington seeks changes on status of Walvis Bay and other restrictions on South Africa.

MAY 4. South African military forces in air-ground operations attack SWAPO camps in Angola in first such direct action since 1975–76.

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MAY 6. UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopts Resolution 428 (1978) condemning May 4 raid and calling for immediate withdrawal of South African forces.

MAY 8. Nujoma calls off negotiations on transition proposal.

JUNE 20. South Africa plans to register Namibian voters in preparation for Constituent Assembly elections outside UN transition plan.

JULY 12. SWAPO informs US it will accept UN-administered transition plan.

JULY 25. South Africa rejects negotiations on reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia.

JULY 27. UNSC Resolution 431 (1978), by a vote of 13 (US)-0-2 calls for independence at "earliest possible date." It also unanimously approves Resolution 432 (1978) calling for reintegration of Walvis Bay.

JULY 31. South Africa delays acceptance of transition plan, pending report of UN Representative Martti Oiva Ahtisaari (Finland) on plan's implementation; rejects Resolution 432 (1978).

AUG. 23. South Africa attacks SWAPO camps in Zambia in retaliation for alleged Zambia-SWAPO attacks that killed nine of its soldiers in Namibia.

AUG. 30. Waldheim asks UNSC for UN Transition Group (UNTAG) of 7,500 troops and 1,200 civilians, with $300 million budget.

SEPT. 20. Vorster, resigning, rejects UN transition plan and announces South Africa will proceed with elections; SWAPO announces refusal to take part in elections.

SEPT. 26. Administrator for Namibia Marthinus T. Steyn postpones scheduled Nov. 20–24 elections until Dec. 4–8.

SEPT. 29. UNSC Resolution 435 (1978), by a vote of 12 (US)-0-2 (with China abstaining) endorses UN transition plan, warns South Africa of international boycott.

OCT. 19. South Africa insists on prior internal elections, possibly paving the way for UN elections in 1979, following Oct 16-18 Pretoria meeting with five Western Foreign Ministers.

OCT. 25. SWAPO, the front-line states and UN Africa bloc reject Oct. 19 compromise.

NOV. 13. UNSC Resolution 439 (1978), 10-0-5 (West) demands cancellation of Dec. 4 elections.

NOV. 25. Waldheim reports South Africa has rejected UN demands to cancel elections.

NOV. 28. State Department spokesman says US studying wider range of sanctions against Pretoria if it refuses to cooperate with UN.

DEC. 3. Waldheim reports to UNSC on Dec. 2 South African pledge not to use internal elections to install a government and to cooperate with UN plan.

DEC. 4–8. Democratic Turnhalle Alliance wins Constituent Assembly election in Windhoek.

DEC. 21. UNGA Resolution 33/182 B, by a vote of 123-0-17 (US) condemns South Africa on Namibia elections and for not accepting UN plan.

DEC. 22. New Constituent Assembly accepts UN-supervised election on condition that UN withdraw recognition from and financial aid to SWAPO.

RHODESIA

JAN. 30–FEB. 1. British Foreign Secretary David Owen and US Ambassador Andrew Young meet with Patriotic Front leaders Joshua Nkomo of Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

FEB. 16–17. Prime Minister Ian D. Smith and black moderates agree on composition of National Assembly and on army induction or vocational training for guerrillas.

MAR. 3. Smith, Sen. Jeremiah Chirau, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa sign an "Internal Settlement"agreement providing for black majority rule by Dec. 31.

MAR. 7. Rhodesian forces raid Zambian army base; 38 guerrillas killed.

MAR. 8. Vance confers with Owen as Nkomo and Mugabe at UN denounce Salisbury agreement.

MAR. 9. President Carter doubts permanent settlement without participation of "all nationalist leaders."

MAR. 14. UNSC Resolution 423 (1978), by a vote of 10-0-5 (West), declares any settlement under the auspices of Smith regime "illegal and unacceptable."

MAR. 17. UNSC Resolution 424 (1978) unanimously condemns Mar. 7 raid.

MAR. 17–18. Rhodesia, US and UK representatives meet in Pretoria in effort to promote all-party conference.

MAR. 21. Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau sworn in as co-leaders of Executive Council with Smith retaining premiership.

MAR. 25–26. Four presidents of the five African front-line states (without Angola) back Anglo-American plan.

MAR. 27. State Department terms Salisbury agreement "illegal" and unworkable.

APR. 7. US Ambassador to Zambia Stephen Low and British Foreign Officer John Graham meet with Patriotic Front leaders in attempt to arrange joint conference with Salisbury interim government—rejected by the latter Apr. 10.

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APR. 12. Smith completes interim Cabinet with appointment of nine white and nine black ministers.

APR. 14–16. Patriotic Front agrees to an all-party conference at meeting with Vance, Owen, Young, and front-line presidents.

APR. 16. Foreign Minister Botha promises to support a peaceful solution; rejects outside pressure.

APR. 25. Interim government formally turns down wider conference.

APR. 28. Black co-Minister of Justice Bryan Hove is dismissed for criticizing white-dominated judiciary.

MAY 2. Executive Council legalizes ZANU and ZAPU, promises unconditional amnesty to guerrillas, and inquiry into Hove dismissal. Patriotic Front rejects amnesty May 3.

MAY 28. Vorster asks lifting of sanctions and inclusion of Nkomo in Rhodesian government.

JUNE 6. Low and Graham arrive in Salisbury in renewed effort toward all-party conference.

JUNE 15. Smith asks US-UK recognition of interim government.

JULY 16–17. Muzorewa in Washington asks Congress to nullify sanctions.

JULY 18. Smith rejects all-party conference.

JULY 19. British government inquiry finds six major oil companies have evaded UN sanctions.

JULY 20. US and UK in London meeting with Muzorewa refuse to lift sanctions.

JULY 22. OAU summit meeting warns US against violating UN sanctions.

JULY 26. Salisbury outlines plan for parliamentary elections to be held Dec. 4–6.

—— US Senate votes 59 to 36 to lift sanctions depending on progress toward freely elected government committed to negotiations with Patriotic Front.

—— Vance and State Department again rebuff Muzorewa on lifting sanctions as latter rejects all-party conference.

JULY 30–31. Rhodesia in major preemptive strike attacks ten rebel camps in Mozambique.

AUG. 8. Some racial curbs are abolished, but others remain on schools, hospitals and residential areas.

AUG. 21. Nkomo and Mugabe announce they will attend all-party conference.

AUG. 30. Sithole and Muzorewa accuse Smith of holding secret talks Aug. 14 in Lusaka with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and Nkomo.

SEPT. 5. Nkomo takes responsibility for shooting down Rhodesian airliner Sept. 3.

SEPT. 10. Smith imposes modified martial law in parts of the country, announces steps to liquidate internal wings of Patriotic Front.

SEPT. 11. Nkomo says all-party conference is now "dead and buried."

SEPT. 18. Executive Council accepts invitation of 27 Senators to visit US.

—— Kaunda accuses Britain of breaking oil sanctions for last 13 years.

SEPT. 20–23. Rhodesian forces raid 25 Mugabe bases in Mozambique.

SEPT. 23–24. British Prime Minister James Callaghan and Kaunda meet in Kano, Nigeria, review, *inter alia*, deteriorating Rhodesia situation.

OCT. 4. US grants visa to Executive Council "on exceptional basis." Smith and Sithole arrive in Washington for two-week US visit Oct. 7; joined by Chirau and Muzorewa Oct. 13.

OCT. 6. Zambia reopens border with Rhodesia, closed since 1973.

OCT. 10. UNSC Resolution 437 (1978), by a vote of 11-0-4 (US), condemns US for allowing Smith visit as contravening UN sanctions resolutions.

OCT. 18. Smith, in Texas, renews pledge to meet with Patriotic Front without US-UK preconditions.

OCT. 20. Rhodesian forces report raids on 12 Nkomo bases, and on Mugabe bases in Mozambique over last three days.

OCT. 21. Executive Council in Washington agrees to attend all-party conference.

OCT. 29. As front-line states meet in Dar Es Salaam (without Angola), Smith postpones elections for majority rule.

OCT. 31. Martial law, extended Oct. 4., is again extended to cover about half the country. On Nov. 24, 75% of the country is placed under martial law.

NOV. 15. Executive Council confers with South African leaders in Pretoria.

NOV. 16. Rhodesia announces new election date of 4/20/79.

ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA

JAN. 12. Carter expresses concern over Soviet-Cuban intrusions and calls for immediate negotiations to resolve Ogaden conflict.

JAN. 17. US rejects Somali request for military aid.

JAN. 18. Ethiopia denies presence of Soviet or Cuban military troops or advisers.

JAN. 22. Somalia announces start of Ethiopian offensive to retake Ogaden.

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FEB. 4. Somalia reports an attack in Ogaden by Soviet-backed Ethiopian, Cuban and South Yemeni forces.

—— State Department reports that Cuban pilots are conducting air strikes against Somalia.

FEB. 10. US reports Soviet assurances that Ethiopia would not invade Somalia once latter's troops are cleared out of Ogaden. Vance reports 3,000 Cubans in Ethiopia, 2,000 of which are in combat.

FEB. 18. US special emissary David L. Aaron meets with Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, receives assurances Ethiopia will not cross Somali borders nor interfere in its internal affairs; reporting to Carter on Feb. 21, he says Ethiopia also agreed to receive a new US Ambassador.

FEB. 24. National Security Adviser Brzezinski puts Cuban troops at 10,000 to 11,000; reports Soviet general is directing part of Ogaden forces.

FEB. 25. State Department warns USSR its actions in the Horn of Africa may affect relations and strategic arms agreement.

MAR. 8. Somali forces begin pulling out of Ogaden.

MAR. 9. Carter announces that Somali President Siad Barre has agreed to withdraw from Ogaden. Evacuation completed on Mar. 16.

MAR. 18. Ethiopia accuses US of planning to arm Somalia, rejects US call for withdrawal of Soviet-Cuban forces.

MAR. 18–23. A three-man US delegation, led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard M. Moose, visits Somalia; signs seven million dollar food-aid agreement on Mar. 20.

MAR. 29. Arab League meeting "condemns aggressive acts by foreign forces in the Horn of Africa . . ."

APR. 9. Siad reports crushing of an attempted military coup.

APR. 28. Pro-Soviet Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) agree to unite.

MAY 16. Ethiopian forces launch offensive against Eritrea.

MAY 26. Cuban forces reported massing in Ethiopia's Tigre Province.

JUNE 7. State Department reports US will send military mission to Somalia, but postpones such action on July 23, following renewed fighting in Ogaden.

JULY 25. Ethiopia recaptures major Eritrean supply town of Tessenei, reports siege of Asmara broken on July 28

AUG. 6. Ethiopia reports capture of 27 Eritrean towns.

SEPT. 12. Soviet First Vice-Chairman V. V. Kuznetsov and Castro attend fourth anniversary cerebration of Ethiopia Emperor Haile Selassie's ouster.

NOV. 18. Ethiopia launches assault on Asmara-Massana road; EPLF announces its withdrawal Nov. 21.

NOV. 20. Brezhnev and Mengistu sign friendship and cooperation treaty in Moscow.

NOV. 29. Ethiopia, claiming Eritrean rebellion has been crushed, reports capture of Keren stronghold.

DEC. 11. 100,000 Eritreans fleeing north following Keren capture. EPLF reports 5,000 killed by Ethiopian troops.

JULY 25. Ethiopia recaptures major Eritrean supply town of Tessenei; reports siege of Asmara broken on July 28.

LATIN AMERICA

CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

FEB. 5. Costa Rican opposition leader Rodrigo Carazo Odio defeats government candidate Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez in presidential elections. He formally succeeds Daniel Oduber Quirós (assumed office 5/8/74) on May 8.

FEB. 13. Soviet pilots reported flying air defense missions in Cuba to replace Cubans in Ethiopia. (*See* Ethiopia-Somalia.)

MAR. 2. Vance claims 35,000 to 37,000 Cuban troops are in Africa, including 11,000 in Ethiopia.

MAR. 5. Guatemalan presidential elections are held; Congress unanimously elects Gen. Romeo Lucas García Mar. 13 to succeed Gen. Kjell Laugerud García (assumed office 8/5/74); he is inaugurated July 1.

MAY 7–12. Mrs. Rosalynn Carter visits Costa Rica and Guatemala.

MAY 12. President Carter assails Cuba for African intervention, human rights violations, and subservience to USSR.

MAY 16. Dominican Republic holds presidential elections with Antonio Guzmán (Dominican Revolutionary Party) opposing Joachím Balaguer (Reformist Party). On May 17, the army halts counting of ballots as results appear to favor Guzmán.

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MAY 17. Cuban Premier Fidel Castro tells US he tried to prevent invasion of Zaïre's Shaba province.

MAY 18. Dominican ballot-counting resumes; Guzmán declared winner May 26; he is sworn in for a four-year term on Aug. 16.

JUNE 9. US Senate Foreign Relations Committee finds Administration charges of Cuban involvement in Zaïre unproved.

JUNE 19-24. Caribbean Group for Cooperation and Economic Development holds its first meeting in Washington; agrees to establish Caribbean Development Facility (CDF).

JUNE 29. State Department opposes Senate amendment calling for liquidation of Cuban-US "interest sections."

AUG. 8. Honduran President Brig. Gen. Melgar Castro (seized power 4/75) is replaced by three-man military junta in bloodless coup.

AUG. 31. Cuba offers to let 1,000 political prisoners go to US. A first group of 79 begins leaving Oct. 31.

SEPT. 16. Former President of El Salvador's Assembly, Alfonso Rodriguez, assassinated.

SEPT. 28. Mexican bill, passed Sept. 9, granting amnesty to all political prisoners and exiles, becomes law.

OCT. 4. Guatemala paralyzed by riots and strikes following Oct. 2 100% increase in bus fares; increase revoked Oct. 9.

OCT. 30. US discloses that Cuba received up to 20 MiG-23 jets from Soviet early in October.

NOV. 13. Mexico reports oil find in Tampico area containing over a billion barrels of crude oil.

NOV. 16. US announces resumption of photo reconnaissance flights over Cuba.

NOV. 17. Vance and Soviet Ambassador to US Anatoly F. Dobrynin meet on presence of MiG's in Cuba, confirmed by US Nov. 14.

NOV. 18. Following investigation of US religious cult at Jonestown, Guyana, Rep. Leo J. Ryan and four others are slain in ambush at Port Kaituma airstrip. Leader of the People's Temple Rev. Jim Jones and over 900 of his followers are eventually found murdered or dead by suicide.

NOV. 21-22, DEC. 8-9. Castro meets with Cuban exiles in Havana, criticizes US indecision on accepting political prisoners and reaction to MiG's presence.

DEC. 2. Divided pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic Party devises unified stand on Puerto Rico-US ties.

PANAMA

JAN. 27. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) votes 13 to 1 to incorporate Carter-Torrijos Statement of Understanding of 10/14/77 as Article IX of the Neutrality Treaty.

JAN. 30. SFRC votes 14 to 1 to send the Neutrality Treaty to the Senate floor with amendments that would guarantee US defense rights and priority emergency passage after the year 2000.

FEB. 7. Senate begins broadcast debate on Neutrality Treaty.

MAR. 10. Senate, 84 to 5, adopts Amendment 20 to Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty, giving US and Panama responsibility for seeing that the Canal remains open and secure to world shipping.

MAR. 13. Senate, 85 to 3, adopts Amendment No. 21 to Article VI of the treaty, giving US and Panama priority emergency passage.

MAR. 15. Senate, 82 to 16, adopts reservation stating that n othing in the treaty precludes the US and Panama from agreeing to keep bases in Panama after 12/31/99.

MAR. 16. Senate, 75 to 23, adopts reservation authorizing US and Panama to use armed force to keep Canal open, then approves resolution of ratification by 68-32.

MAR. 17. Senate begins debate on second Panama Canal treaty.

APR. 11. Rep. DeConcini seeks amendment to second Canal treaty giving US right to intervene militarily to keep Canal open.

APR. 18. Senate approves second treaty, 68 to 32, after approving leadership reservation, 73 to 27, disavowing US intentions to interfere in Panama's internal affairs. Gen. Omar. Torrijos accepts treaty as amended.

MAY 9. House of Representatives, 231-170, approves amendment to FY 1979 budget resolution (H. Con. Res. 559) enabling Canal Company to transfer its revenues to US Treasury Department.

JUNE 16-17. Carter visits Panama and exchanges ratification of two Canal treaties.

OCT. 11. Aristides Royo sworn in as President for a six-year term, ending ten-year Torrijos rule; Torrijos remains head of National Guard.

NICARAGUA

JAN. 10. *La Prensa*'s anti-Somoza editor, Pedro Chamorro, is killed.

JAN. 24. Business and labor join forces in protest strike over Chamorro killing.

JAN. 27. President Anastasio Somoza rejects demands for his resignation; invokes emergency law on Jan. 28.

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FEB. 3. Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) joins anti-Somoza protest as strike enters second week and seven National Guardsmen reported killed in attacks Feb 2-3.

FEB. 7. Strike ends as Venezuela asks Organization of American States (OAS) to investigate National Guard brutality.

FEB. 27. Somoza Feb. 26 announcement that he will retain power until 1981 precipitates new riots.

MAR. 9. FSLN kills Somoza's chief military aide, Gen. Pérez Vega.

JUNE 1. US releases part of 1977 $12 million in aid, held up over human rights issue.

JULY 19. 24-hour strike by Broad Opposition Front shuts down most Managua business.

JULY 31. Over State Department objections, Carter thanks Somoza in personal letter for allowing Human Rights Commission investigation.

AUG. 22. Leftist terrorists attack National Palace, take 1,500 low-level officials hostage.

AUG. 23. Terrorists demand ten million dollars, the release of political prisoners and safe conduct in exchange for hostages. Somoza accedes to some demands Aug. 24; terrorists and prisoners fly to Panama.

AUG. 28. Anti-Somoza businessmen's strike (including guerrillas), called Aug. 25, spreads as National Guard reports army plot to overthrow Somoza.

AUG. 30. Air force strafes rebels in Matagalpa, under siege for third day; fighting breaks out in Managua between police and strikers.

SEPT. 10. Guerrillas and government forces fight full-scale battles that began Sept. 9 in Managua and four other cities. Martial law declared Sept. 13.

SEPT. 17. US Special Ambassador to Panama William Jorden, begins eight-nation mediation trip.

SEPT. 18. OAS team investigating charges of Costa Rican aid to guerrillas under cover of Venezuelan aircraft.

SEPT. 19. US for second time in four days appeals for truce, mediation, and human rights investigation.

SEPT. 20. Reports of widespread atrocities elicit strong State Department protest to Somoza.

SEPT. 23. Estelí, last of five cities, retaken as strike and sporadic violence continue in several cities; Somoza rejects outside mediation.

SEPT. 25. Jorden tells Somoza he will not receive US economic aid unless he accepts mediation.

SEPT. 30. Somoza announces acceptance of International Mediation Group consisting of US, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala.

OCT. 3-13. Inter-American Human Rights Commission investigates flagrant abuses; issues unanimous condemnation of regime on Nov. 17.

OCT. 9. Somoza lifts press censorship, but extends suspension of individual rights through 4/79 on Oct. 12.

OCT. 16. First round of negotiations between Somoza and opposition begins.

NOV. 10. Opposition rejects Somoza call for plebiscite, repeats threat to withdraw from mediation effort unless he resigns Nov. 21.

NOV. 10-11. National Guard units and guerrillas clash on Costa Rican soil.

NOV. 21. Costa Rica breaks diplomatic relations with Nicaragua following Nov. 17–18 border clashes.

NOV. 30. Somoza agrees to Nov. 23 mediators' proposal for plebiscite, but on his conditions.

DEC. 6. Somoza agrees to opposition demands that he lift martial law, grant amnesty to all political prisoners and relax press and radio censorship.

DEC. 14. Somoza closes Costa Rica border after Dec. 13 border clashes.

DEC. 15. Opposition accepts mediator's proposal on organization of plebiscite; Somoza signs amnesty for all political prisoners.

DEC. 27. Senior US official warns Somoza that rejection of OAS-supervised plebiscite would seriously affect US-Nicaragua relations.

SOUTH AMERICA

JAN. 4. Chilean plebiscite gives 75% of vote to government; President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte announces postponement of elections until 1986.

JAN. 5. Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel names intelligence chief Gen. João Baptista de Oliveira Figueredo to succeed him in March 1979.

JAN. 25. Argentina rejects decision of arbitration court to award Beagle Channel Islands to Chile.

FEB. 12. Paraguay's President Alfredo Stroessner (inaugurated 8/15/54) is reelected to a sixth term beginning Aug. 15.

MAR. 4. Pinochet reduces 1973 state of siege to state of emergency.

MAR. 17. Bolivia severs diplomatic relations with Chile in dispute over access to Pacific.

MAR. 28-29. President Carter visits Venezuela.

MAR. 29-31. President Carter visits Brazil.

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MAR. 29. Argentine President Jorge Rafael Videla announces civilian government will replace junta in 1979.

APR. 3-5. Representatives of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) meet in Caracas.

APR. 5. Pinochet announces all political prisoners will be freed or have sentences commuted to exile; calls for draft constitution this year.

APR. 8. Chile deports Michael V. Townley, suspect in 1976 Letelier assassination, to US. He is formally charged with conspiracy Apr. 26, and pleads guilty on Aug. 11.

APR. 14. US-Bolivian treaty on penal sentences (signed FEB. 10) is transmitted to the Senate.

APR. 19. Chile decrees broad amnesty for violators of 1973 siege.

APR. 30. Videla receives support of military leaders for second term (assumed office 3/76). He is confirmed for three-year term as President May 2, retroactive to Mar. 29.

MAY 19. Riots and looting result in postponement of June 4 election for Peruvian Constitutional Assembly. President Francisco Morales Bermúdez declares martial law on May 20.

MAY 22. Five killed in Peruvian general strike led by communist-labor group over austerity law demanded by IMF and foreign banks.

MAY 24. President Carter transmits to the Senate Protocol I of the Tlatelolco Treaty. (*See* US.)

JUNE 4. Ex-Foreign Minister Julio César Turbay Ayala wins Colombian presidential election, succeeding Alfonso López Michelson (elected 4/21/74), for a four-year term beginning Aug. 7.

JUNE 18. Popular American Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) receives plurality in Peru's constitutional elections, the first since 1963. Assembly holds inaugural session amid street clashes by rival factions.

JUNE 21-JULY 1. The Eighth Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly meets in Washington.

JULY 3. Eight-nation Treaty of Amazon Cooperation (Amazon Pact) signed in Brasilia.

JULY 9. Gen. Juan Pereda Asbún, Bolivian government candidate wins presidency in first election in 12 years. Electoral Court voids result because of widespread fraud on July 19.

JULY 16. Jaime Roldós wins first round, among six presidential candidates, in Ecuadorian elections with 31% of the vote. Electoral Tribunal declares him winner Dec. 7 and on Dec. 8 announces second round will be held 4/9/79.

JULY 18. American Convention on Human Rights (signed in San José, 11/69) enters into force with ratification by Grenada.

JULY 19. Peru issues amnesty for all political prisoners.

JULY 20. Export-Import Bank denies $280 million loan to Argentina because of human rights violations; Carter reverses decision in early November.

JULY 21. Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez resigns; three-man interim junta appoints Pereda as its head; he is sworn in as President July 24.

AUG. 1. Videla gives up army post but retains Presidency.

—— US recognizes Pereda government, announces plans to cut $14 million military aid program; resumes $25 million economic aid (suspended in July) on Aug. 10.

—— Peru and IMF agree on terms of credit agreement after 16 months of negotiations. Two billion dollar package completed Nov. 19.

AUG. 10. Paraguay releases Liberal Party leader Domingo Laino, arrested in July, after strong US protests.

AUG. 11. 48,000 Peruvian miners defy back-to-work order as strike enters second week; state of emergency declared Aug. 22 in key mining centers.

SEPT. 21. Brazil's Congress votes to end 1968 law (as of 1/1/79) that gave President arbitrary powers to dismiss Congress and deprive citizens of political rights.

NOV. 2. Three-man military junta, led by Army chief Gen. David Padilla Arancibia ousts Pereda in bloodless coup; sets elections for 7/79.

NOV. 15. Brazil holds congressional elections; preliminary returns show opposition Democratic Movement has trimmed percentage of ruling National Renovating Alliance.

NOV. 26. Lima meeting of Inter-American Regional Organization, with AFL-CIO participating, endorses boycott resolution against Chile, Nicaragua and Cuba.

DEC. 3. In Venezuela general elections Social Christian Party candidate Luis Herrera Campins defeats Democratic Action candidate Luis Pinerua Ordaz. Herrera succeeds Carlos Andres Perez (elected 12/9/73) as President.

DEC. 22. Pope John Paul II announces Dec. 21 acceptance by Chile and Argentina of his offer to mediate Beagle Channel Islands dispute; names Antonio Cardinal Samore Dec. 23 as his envoy.

OTHER GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS

MAR. 28–MAY 19, AUG. 21–SEPT. 15. The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea holds its seventh session in Geneva and New York.

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JULY 25–30. Conference of 87 Nonaligned Nations meets in Belgrade; agrees to meet in Havana in 1979.

JULY 28–AUG. 6. Eleventh World Youth Festival meets in Havana; Castro thanks US delegation for solidarity with Cuba.

AUG. 1–2. Seven Western nations confer in Bonn on draft agreement (drawn up at July Bonn summit) to suspend air traffic from countries that give sanctuary to hijackers.

AUG. 14–26. UN Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination meets in Geneva; US does not attend.

SEPT. 19–DEC. 21. UN General Assembly holds first part of its 33rd Regular Session in New York. Indalecio Lievano (Colombia) elected President.

OCT. 24–NOV. 28. UNESCO holds its 20th General Conference in Paris, adopts compromise, nonbinding Declaration on Free Flow of World News.

NOV. 29. UN observes "Day of Solidarity with Palestine People" in New York.

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